According to the signaling hypothesis, managers split their stocks to communicate favorable private information about the value of firms. Prior studies find that managers may combine with accrual-based earnings management to reinforce split signal. In addition to discretionary accruals, I want to examine whether real activities earnings management also can be regarded as signal of communicating private information prior stock split announcement. I find that stock split firms exhibit evidence of real earnings management, in particular, on reduction of discretionary expenditures. And real activities earnings management is positive related to the abnormal return of split firms. I also find that the stock split firms engage in real earnings management activities have stronger effect on stock return than accrual-based earnings management. Those result suggest that managers use real earnings management activities as a signaling when managers believe that future performance of firms is good and investors perceive the real activities earnings management prior to stock split as signal of managerial optimism rather than managerial opportunism.