| 摘要Abstract | 近年來各國均有以會計師輪調制度之具體法規要求，來強化會計 師的獨立性，期能提昇企業財報盈餘之品質。然而，審計品質乃建立 於專業能力與超然獨立二大特質上，當會計師任期增加，其獨立性雖 可能降低，但卻會增加其專業能力。再者，會計師任期乃為考量審計 公費與審計風險之供需互動結果，因此本文認為會計師任期長短對於 審計品質之影響應為實證議題，而不一定存有必然之因果關係。本文 以會計師能否抑制公司透過裁量性應計項目來進行盈餘管理之能力來 衡量審計品質，並以測試會計師任期長短與公司裁量性應計項目間關 係，來驗證會計師任期對於審計品質之影響。本文以台灣上市櫃公司 為研究對象，研究期間為 2000 年至 2001 年，共計收集 1,421 個樣本/ 年資料。本文之實證結果發現，若以較能符合實務運作狀況的廣義會 計師任期以及實質事務所任期定義，則會計師任期愈長，其抑制公司 盈餘管理行為之功能並未顯著較低，因而會計師任期較長對於審計品 質不一定有負面影響。In recently years, auditor rotation has been mandated in many countries in order to secure auditor independence and to increase audit quality. Audit quality is determined by two major elements: the expertise and the independence of auditors. Longer tenure of an auditor will increase the expertise, yet decrease the independence. The length of tenure is a result of the interaction between the demand side and the supply side. This paper proposes that the relationship between tenure and audit quality is an empirical issue, not necessarily a causal relationship. This study documents empirical evidences on the relation between auditor tenure and discretionary accruals measured by the abnormal accruals of the Modified Jones model. This study collects 1,421 observations of Taiwanese listed and OTC companies in years 2000 and 2001. The empirical result indicates that no significant evidences support the statement that increased length of auditor tenure decreases audit quality |