This study intends to probe into the endogenous relation between ownership structure and corporate value. Prior studies hold that while the power of control and ownership are separated, the agency problem is thus induced. In addition, some scholars maintain that firm value could reversely affect stockholdings of agents through reward plan. Therefore, the endogenous relation between ownership structure and firm value should be further discussed. The empirical results indicate that when the percentage of stockholdings of directors and supervisors is increased, the problem of moral hazard could be relieved and hence firm value is increased. In high-tech industries, there exists a nonlinear relation between the percentage of stockholdings of directors and supervisors, and firm value. Moreover, equity-based reward empirically provide a great function of incentive alignment in high-tech industries. Finally, firm value positively affects the stockholdings of directors and supervisors, while it is in high-tech industries that the influence on the stockholdings of managers is sustained.