ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFICIENCY OF RUSSIAN RESPONSE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF US MISSILE DEFENCE DEPLOYMENT CONCEPT IN EUROPE

This article is dedicated to the problems of deployment of the US anti-missile defence system in Eastern Europe. The European system of US missile defence is just one of the components of global US missile defence. This work aims to analyze possible Russia’s responses within military and political spheres. The measures proposed are divided into three subgroups: soft, medium and hard depending on the implementation of the adopted missile defence concept by the USA. This research employs the structure-system method and the method of actualization. The authors outline both positive and negative consequences of such actions for the Russian Federation, the USA, eastern European countries and the neighbouring countries, including the Baltic Sea states. The practical significance of this study consists in the proposed and justified responses of the Russian Federation that may serve as a basis for the scenarios of development of international situation and help to forecast the level of tension in Russia-US relations.

The idea of creation of a new anti-missile defence concept voiced by President George W. Bush in 2001 [19] and the concept of US missile defence deployment in Eastern Europe presented by the Presidential Administration in January 2006 [15] caused severe criticism from the Russian Federation and its alliance partners.
Despite the constant statements of the US Presidential Administration that the deployment of AA radars and an anti-missile defence system in Eastern Europe is by no means a move against the Russian Federation, Russia's gov- ernment believes that the USA pursues the above-mentioned goal. The defence concept aims to create "the system of non-nuclear means designed to counter ballistic missiles of all ranges -short, medium, intermediate and long" [15, p. 2]. The new anti-ballistic missile defence system (ABM) was originally planned to have the form of a triangle with one angle situated is Eastern Europe and two others in the USA -in Alaska (Fort Greely) and in California (Vanderberg). Anti-ballistic missile defence components would destroy hostile warheads in the terminal phase with the Patriot AD Weapon System. Missile defence facilities deployed in Eastern Europe would be employed for target detection and destroying of ballistic missiles at the ascent and midcourse stages. Space tracking and surveillance system should destroy warheads in the midcourse phase [10]. After Barack Obama and his Administration came to power in 2009, the initial plans of George W. Bush were reconsidered and adjusted. They then provided a basis for the new European NATO Deployment Concept which should be implemented in four stages. The US ABM is to be put into full operational service in 2018 but starts to operate as early as May 2012 [11].
In this connection the Russian Federation is ready to take any possible steps to prevent the escalation of threats to its international security. The range of these steps depends on the actions of the USA on the deployment concept implementation.
In the given case all possible Russian measures in response to the implementation of the US missile defence deployment concept can be grouped according to two spheres -political and military (Tables 1 and 2).
Political measures are soft, medium and hard, and aimed at developing an alternative to ABM or creating an alliance with Russia's partner-countries as well as ensuring legality of Russian response to the threat from the Third Site countries.
Military measures provide security to the RF, and are aimed at the development of a collateral defence system and the upgrading of aerospace defence capacity of the Russian Army.
Continued talks and negotiations with the US Administration on inadmissibility of the ABM   This working group should concentrate on fulfilling the following objectives: 1. Development of negotiation proposals on a number of topics, including, but not limited to: utilization of already existing US and RF ABM defence systems (radar stations in Gabala, etc.), joint participation of the US and Russia in the development of ABM defence.
2. Discussing counter-offers proposed by the US Administration and/or Working Group.
3. Discussing issues arising from the conflicting views of the parties. 4. Keeping the public informed about the negotiations. 5. Evaluation of existing and perspective US and Russian ABM defence systems, forecasting of the outcomes of agreements between Russia and the US and of US ABM defence deployment in Eastern Europe (for Russia). 9. Developing alternative ways of cooperation between Russia and the US regarding ABM defence.
Developing proposals on a new ABM treaty between Russia and the United States. If a joint ABM system is developed, the new treaty should include obligatory clauses defining joint efforts of both countries in this area.
Developing proposals on the new ABM treaty with the USA drawing on the positive experience of the USSR-USA ABM Treaty of 1972. The following provisions (on the agreement of parties) should be included in the treaty: Each Party undertakes 1. not to give missiles, missile systems, surface-mobile ABM defence systems, seaborne multifunctional combat information control systems, longand medium-range ABM interceptor missiles and other elements and components of ABM system, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; 2. not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; 3. not to create, test or deploy the ABM system or its components on its land, air, space and surface-mobile bases, excluding those already deployed or in the process of deployment; 4. not to create, test or deploy ABM launchers capable of launching more than one ABM at a time; not to modify already deployed launchers to give them such capability; and not to create, test or deploy automatic or selfloading devices designed to speedily reload missile launchers; 5. to keep the existing ABM systems under certain conditions (determine the conditions of conservation of the ABM system during additional talks or keep the conditions of 1972).

Conducting international hearings (in the EU, SCO, CIS, Disarmament Committee of UN General Assembly, CSTO, EurAsEC) on disarmament and missile defence issue with compulsory achievement of joint political agreement.
Already on the 15 th of June 2011, during the anniversary SCO summit in Astana, the participants of the summit adopted the Astana Declaration, in which the leaders of the SCO states (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizia) have condemned US plans of global ABM defence system deployment: «The member states believe that the unilateral and unrestricted build-up of a missile defence capability by one state or a group of countries can hurt strategic stability and international security» [9]. In his interview, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, said that the criticism is directed not only against the deployment of Euro-ABM, but against the "global ABM system that is being deployed by the USA all over the world, even in South-East Asia" [17].
Conducting negotiations with Iran on the non-proliferation of nuclear materials in military purposes, and on the inadmissibility of development of long-range nuclear missiles, on the possibility of further IAEA control over the nuclear programme implemented by Iran, on the necessity to fight nuclear terrorism and on the necessity to control the spread of missile technologies and to join the Missile Technology Control Regime.
Coordinating the ABM defence issue with the key issues of disarmament and non-proliferation across the world and in Europe will complement the already existing political measures. The possibility to refuse further disarmament and non-proliferation, and the possibility of Russian exit from the SNF-3 Treaty (Nov 23, 2011) was underlined by the President of the Russian Federation in his statement on the Euro-ABM deployment in Europe [5].
Convincing Eastern European Countries (Romania, Poland and Czech Republic) that there is a possibility of the following negative effects of the US ABM defence system deployment (to be achieved through public media, diplomatic, private and political channels of influence): -cooling down in political and economic relationships with Russia; -cooling down of relationships with the states involved in the nuclear debate; -discord within the EU, change of EU authority and introduction of new Members; -emergence of strategic secret objects that will disrupt the relaxed European lifestyle; -increased US military contingent in the Third Site states; -involvement in the arms race between the USA and Russia with possible additions of third countries; -destruction of targets, including missile attacks, in their territory; -radioactive poisoning of the territory after such attacks. We also call for support (media and financial support) of NGOs, unions, influential individuals who used to take prominent positions in the governments of Third Site countries, public intellectuals, and regular citizens who wish to protest the ABM deployment plans. Since some of the Eastern European countries also lie in Central Europe (Poland, Romania, Czech Republic), their general attitude and reaction can greatly influence the geopolitical situation, preferably in the interests of Russian Federation.

Introduction of the stipulation on possibility of a preventive strike (possibly with battle field nuclear weapons) on the objects of the 3rd missile launching area of the US ABM Defence into the Russian Federation Military
Doctrine. At present The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation approved by Russian Federation Presidential Edict on 5 February 2010, reserves the right for Russia "to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is under threat" [3]. Thereat among the main external military threats it counts "the desire to endow the force potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with global functions carried out in violation of the norms of international law and to move the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by expanding the bloc", as well as "the creation and deployment of strategic missile defence systems undermining global stability and violating the established correlation of forces in the nuclear-missile sphere, and also the militarization of outer space and the deployment of strategic nonnuclear precision weapon systems" [3]. At the same time, "the Russian Federation's military policy is aimed at preventing an arms race, deterring and preventing military conflicts, and improving <…> means of attack for the purpose of defending and safeguarding the security of the Russian Federation and also the interests of its allies" [3]. Besides, Russia's paramount task is preventing a nuclear military conflict, and among the main goals in preventing and deterring military conflicts it holds "creating mechanisms for the regulation of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the sphere of missile defence" [3].
Seeking coalition with states holding similar views on the 3rd missile launching area of the US ABM Defence (China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan) and cooperation at the international scene. Extending the coalition is possible through states that hold neutral (or indifferent) views on the said question or who have not yet defined their views. On October 4, 2011 it was reported that Russia and the Ukraine held negotiations on the cooperative missile shield system [16]. Head of the Ukrainian Mission in NATO, Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary Igor Dolgov said that the Ukraine would participate in the NATO ABM Defence only if Russia joined it [18].
Depending on the political situation the policies also include Russia's dismissal, consent or partial consent with the US proposals concerning the ABM.

Development of the military technical proposals to create an alternation ABM variant with the Russian Federation Armed Forces taking the lead:
-the US ABM system utilizing information from Russian missile attack warning facilities (the radar locator station in Gabala (Azerbaijan) and other areas) on the situation with possible nuclear missile attack forces; -deployment of the Russian Federation ABM system aerospace target weapons in the southern borderline areas of Russia and other missile threat directions; -forming a joined interface for the information management systems of Russia and the US ABM Defence.
At the Lisbon Summit that took place in November 2010 Russia and the US agreed to continue discussing future cooperation on ABM Defence. Russia proposed to create a sectoral ABM defence system, according to which missiles that would fly over Russia towards NATO members would be exterminated by the Russian forces. In its turn NATO must destroy missiles traversing territories of NATO members and aimed at Russian facilities. Besides, the parties will not aim their ABM facilities at each other and deploy them at the shared borders [4]. However, at the meeting of the Russian President with NATO administration held in July 2011 in Sochi and the visit of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov in Washington this idea was rejected. And at the Russia -NATO Council session held on December 8, 2011 the parties did not achieve any progress on this issue. The next NATO summit session will take place in May 2012 in Chicago. Its results may define the international situation.
Constant monitoring by extraterritorial surveillance facilities (space facilities for Earth's remote probing, like "Resurs-DK") of the Third Site of the US ABM Defence system facilities, both functioning as well as being under construction), and updating their location and creating their 2D images to input into the fire weapons guidance system. "Resurs-DK" makes it possible to obtain detailed images of the facilities and transmit the information through a radio channel to the Earth.
Precluding supplies of equipment and technologies for manufacturing nuclear missile weapons in the third countries. Russia may join in sanctions against Iran and Democratic People's Republic of Korea and discontinue its peaceful programme.
Deployment of means of destruction (short-range missiles "Iskander") within reach of the 3rd missile launching area of the US ABM Defence system (Kaliningrad region, Russian Federation regions bordering on the Third Site) that will not demand any substantial expenses and will take the form of an asymmetrical response. In 2008 in his first Address to the Federal Assembly the Russian President announced a possibility of installing "Iskander" missiles in the Kaliningrad region if need there be [13]. On the 23rd of November, 2011 Dmitry Medvedev in his special address to the citizens of the Russian Federation confirmed the intention to deploy the "Iskander" missile complex in the Kaliningrad region and strike systems in the western and southern areas of Russia if necessary [5]. The Russian President's allegation to deploy operational "Iskander" and making radar locator stations in Kaliningrad operational provoked a negative response from the Baltic States. Lithuanian Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius reassured Russia of NATO ABM Defence system not being targeted at Russia and mentioned that "it must be taken seriously, but… to assure Russia that it should not act so belligerently, we must… together with the NATO partners" [14]. At the same time "Latvian Defence Minister Artis Pabriks asked the authorities of the Latvian National Defence Forces to estimate Medvedev words "from the standpoint of the military threat" [14].
Research and Development of new means of destruction (suppression) of the Third Site facilities (for example, precision weapons, radioelectronic countermeasures means, aerospace jamming etc.). This will probably require introducing corrections into the Government military contract. In 2009-2010 the Ministry of Defence already contracted research and development works on the creation of complex specimens for the Strategic Missile Forces and Aerospace Forces; these works can be financed from the military spending budget under the Federal Armament Programme for 2011-2020 [2]. In the above-mentioned Presidential Address (Nov. 23, 2011), Dmitry Medvedev tasked the Military Forces of the Russian Federation with "developing measures ensuring the destruction of control and information-transfer system within the ABM defence, should such need ever arise" [5].
Further development of the Russian aerospace defence system (data transmission and strike capacity, methods and forms of overcoming ABM, etc.) within the framework of the new strategic partnership between the Russian Military Forces and its Aerospace Forces. As of December, 2011, the troops of the new Aerospace Defence Forces, created in accordance with the Presidential decree, took up their duty. Shortly before that, another Presidential decree (of Nov.29 th , 2011) introduced the system of missile attack detection, a radar location station "Voronezh DM" into the military facilities of the Kaliningrad region [6]. According to Dmitry Medvedev, Aerospace Forces will help to increase the protection of strategic nuclear objects [5]. "From the military and geopolitical standpoint, the aerospace defence is a valuable tool of keeping geopolitical balance in the modern world. From the strategic standpoint, it is the main guarantee of ensuring that the President of Russian Federation -and Supreme Commander-in-Chief -receives correct and relevant information about the airspace situation and is thus able to make strategic decisions" [8, с. 46].
Development of new means to overcome the ABM defence of the USA, of the forms and technologies of their combat applications. "Bulava ICBM", for example, carried by the nuclear submarines, has the launching radius of 8000 km, and its main advantage is that it contains individual nuclear maneuvering homing devices that are able to change the height and trajectory of the flight [1]. In his November Address, Dmitry Medvedev underlined that the strategic nuclear missile available to the Russian Military Forces and Strategic Missile Forces "will be equipped with the top means of overcoming ABM defence and with new, highly efficient warheads" [5].
In this article we propose a number of development scenarios for Russian response to the ABM system deployment -each of those scenarios can be triggered and put into action depending on the actual steps implemented by the US Administration.