Trust, Personal Moral Codes, and the Resource-Advantage Theory of Competition: Explaining Productivity, Economic Growth, and Wealth Creation

Scholars agree that societal-level moral codes that promote social trust also promote wealth creation. However, what specific kinds of societal-level moral codes promote social trust? Also, by what specific kind of competitive process does social trust promote wealth creation? Because societal-level moral codes are composed of or formed from peoples’ personal moral codes, this article explores a theory of ethics, known as the “Hunt-Vitell” theory of ethics, that illuminates the concept of personal moral codes and uses the theory to discuss which types of personal moral codes foster trust and distrust in society. This article then uses resource-advantage (R-A) theory, one of the most completely articulated dynamic theories of competition, to show the process by which trust-promoting, societal-level moral codes promote productivity and economic growth. That is, they promote wealth creation.


Introduction
How does trust within a society relate to that society's productivity and economic growth, that is, its wealth creation? Scholars across a wide range of disciplines maintain that societal-level moral codes that promote social trust promote wealth creation (e.g., Fukuyama, 1995;Gambetta, 1988;Harrison, 1992;Phelps, 1975). In economics, for example, Arrow (1972) hypothesized over three decades ago that because " [v]irtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, …[it] can be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence". (p. 357). He refers to trust as one of society's "invisible institutions. " As such, trust stems from "principles of ethics and morality" and promotes economic growth because it is an "important lubricant of the social system" (Arrow, 1974, pp. 23, 26).
As a second example, Harrison (1992, p.1), an economic development advisor, asks: "Why do some nations and ethnic groups do better than others?" And he answers: "The overriding significance of culture is the paramount lesson I have learned in my thirty years of work on political, economic, and social development. " What, then, are the characteristics of a culture that will engender prosperity, one that is progress-prone? This is Harrison's (1992)  The radius of trust, for Harrison (1992), is the extent to which individuals identify with, or have a sense of community with, others in a society. The smallest radius of trust is a society in which individuals trust only themselves. Next would be those in which the radius extends only to members of the immediate family and other kin. Because of the narrow radius of trust in "familistic" societies: "Commercial and industrial enterprises…are usually weighted down by centralization, including a variety of checking mechanisms and procedures designed…to control dishonesty" (p. 11).
As a third example, Fukuyama (1995, p. 267), a social policy analyst, sees a "crisis of trust" and maintains that trust is the sine qua non of societal productivity and economic growth. Defining trust as "the expec-tation…of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms" (p. 26), he maintains that a community's set of shared ethical values contributes to its capacity for spontaneous sociability, which "refers to the wide range of intermediate communities, distinct from the family or those deliberately established by governments" (p. 27). Indeed, where sociability and trust are low, governments often have to step in to promote community. Fukuyama (1995) argues that spontaneous sociability contributes to the ability of high-trust societies to innovate organizationally. In contrast, in low-trust societies, where the radius of trust extends only to kin, the cooperation necessary for large corporations can be obtained only "under a system of formal rules and regulations, which have to be negotiated, agreed to, litigated, and enforced, sometimes by coercive means" (p. 27). This legal and regulatory apparatus, which is unnecessary in a high-trust society, serves as a substitute for trust and imposes a high burden of transaction costs on low-trust societies: "Widespread distrust in a society, in other words, imposes a kind of tax on all forms of economic activity, a tax that high-trust societies do not have to pay" (pp. 27-28).
In short, a consensus is developing that societal-level moral codes that promote social trust promote wealth creation. The purpose of this article is to contribute to our understanding of the nature of the kinds of societal-level moral codes that are thought to promote social trust. Furthermore, this article contributes to our understanding of how trust-promoting, societal-level moral codes promote wealth creation.
This article is structured as follows. First, because societal-level moral codes are composed of (or formed from) peoples' personal moral codes, I explore a theory of ethics, known as the "Hunt-Vitell" theory of ethics, that illuminates the concept of personal moral codes.
I use this theory to discuss which types of personal moral codes foster trust and distrust in society. Second, as to how trust-promoting, societal-level moral codes promote wealth creation, I note that this question requires understanding the dynamic nature of competition. Therefore, I review what has come to be known as the "resource-advantage theory of competition" or "R-A theory, " which is one of the most completely articulated, most widely cited, dynamic theories of competition. (The original article that developed the theory has been cited over 1,200 times, and a search for "resource-advantage theory" yields over 75,000 "hits. ") The article then uses R-A theory to show how trust-promoting, societal-level moral codes influence the process of competition in such a way that wealth creation occurs.

The Hunt-Vitell theory of ethics
The purpose of the original article that developed the Hunt-Vitell (H-V) theory-which has been cited over 1200 times-was to (1) provide a general theory of ethical decision-making and (2) represent the theory in a process model (Hunt & Vitell, 1986). The theory would draw on both the deontological and teleological ethical traditions in moral philosophy. While deontologists believe that "certain features of the act itself other than the value it brings into existence" make an action or rule right, teleologists "believe that there is one and only one basic or ultimate right-making characteristic, namely, the comparative value (nonmoral) of what is, probably will be, or is intended to be brought into being" (Frankena, 1963, p. 14 -19 2012 (2006), which is displayed in Figure 1. The model addresses the situation in which an individual confronts a problem perceived as having ethical content. This perception of an ethical problem in the situation triggers the process depicted by the model. If the individual does not perceive some ethical content in a problem situation, subsequent elements of the model do not come into play. Given that an individual perceives a situation as having ethical content, the next step is the perception of various possible alternatives or actions that might be taken to resolve the ethical problem. It is unlikely that an individual will recognize the complete set of possible alternatives. Therefore, the evoked set of alternatives will be less than the universe of potential alternatives. Indeed, ultimate differences in behaviors among individuals in situations that have ethical content may be traced, in part, to differences in their sets of perceived alternatives.  Vitell (1986, 1993). Copyright © 1991 by Shelby D. Hunt and Scott J. Vitell  Vitell (1986, 1993 Once the individual perceives the evoked set of alternatives, two kinds of evaluations will take place: a deontological evaluation and a teleological evaluation. In the process of deontological evaluation, the individual evaluates the inherent rightness or wrongness of the behaviors implied by each alternative. The process involves comparing each alternative's behaviors with a set of predetermined deontological norms. These norms represent personal values or rules of moral behavior. They range from (1) general beliefs about things such as honesty, stealing, cheating, and treating people fairly to (2) issue-specific beliefs about things such as deceptive advertising, product safety, sales "kickbacks, " confidentiality of data, respondent anonymity, and interviewer dishonesty. The norms, according to H-V theory, take the form of beliefs of the following kinds: "It is always right to … ;" "it is generally or usually right to … ;" "it is always wrong to…;" and "it is generally or usually wrong to…" The deontological norms include both the "hypernorms" and "local norms" of the integrative social contracts theory of Donaldson and Dunfee (1994) and Dunfee, Smith, and Ross (1999). Contrasted with specific, community-based, "local norms, " hypernorms are universal norms that represent "principles so fundamental to human existence that…we would expect them to be reflected in a convergence of religious, philosophical, and cultural beliefs" (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994, p. 265). These hypernorms represent "a thin set of universal principles that would constrain the relativism of community moral free space" (Dunfee, Smith, & Ross, 1999, p.19 We stress that the formula represents an interpretation of the teleological evaluation process. We do not posit that people actually make these detailed calculations.
Instead, we propose, people actually go through an informal process for which the formula is an idealized, formalized representation.
The core of the model comes next. The H-V theory posits that an individual's ethical judgments (for example, the belief that a particular alternative is the most ethical alternative) are a function of the individual's deontological evaluation (i.e., applying norms of behavior to each of the alternatives) and the individual's teleological evaluation (i.e., an evaluation of the sum total of goodness versus badness likely to be provided by each alternative for all relevant stakeholders). That is, EJ = f(DE, TE), where "EJ" is Ethical Judgments, "DE" is Deontological Evaluation and "TE" is Teleological Evaluation. It is possible that some individuals in some situations will be strict (e.g., "Kantian") deontologists and, therefore, will completely ignore the consequences of alternative actions (i.e., TE = zero). However, the theory Similarly, though it is possible that some people in some situations might be strict (e.g., "utilitarian") teleologists (i.e., DE = zero), such a result is unlikely across many individuals and situations.
Consistent with general theories in consumer behavior (e.g., Engel, Blackwell, & Kollat, 1978;Howard & Sheth,1969) and the Fishbein and Ajzen (1975)  What is called action control in the model is the extent to which an individual actually exerts control in the enactment of an intention in a particular situation (Ajzen, 1985;Tubbs & Ekeberg, 1991). That is, situational constraints may result in behaviors that are inconsistent with intentions and ethical judgments. One such situational constraint may be the opportunity to adopt a particular alternative. Zey-Ferrell, Weaver, and Ferrell (1979) empirically document the influence of opportunity on behavior in situations having ethical content. Similarly, Mayer (1970) identifies opportunity as being a condition that impinges on ethical behavior.
After behavior, there will be an evaluation of the actual consequences of the alternative selected. This is the major learning construct in the model. These actual consequences provide feedback to the category of variables labeled "Personal Characteristics. " He-garty and Sims (1978) examined whether a system of perceived rewards and punishments could change behaviors in a situation involving ethical content.
They concluded that "the results lend support to the notion that many individuals can be conditioned (i.e., can "learn") to behave unethically under appropriate contingencies" (p. 456). Conversely, of course, the H-V theory maintains that individuals can be conditioned to behave ethically.
The H-V model identifies several personal characteristics that might influence specific aspects of the ethical, decision-making process. Unquestionably, an individual's personal religion influences ethical decision making. A priori, compared with nonreligious people, one might suspect that (1)  An individual's value system would also impact the decision process. In general, we urge researchers to explore many different values and the extent to which these values impact ethical decision making. Consider, for example, "organizational commitment" as one such value. Hunt, Wood, and Chonko (1989) found corporations that have high ethical values will, subsequently, have employees more committed to the organization's welfare. This is an apparently positive outcome. However, is it possible that individuals exhibiting high organizational commitment (even because of the organization's ethical values) will then place such great importance on the welfare of the organization that they may engage in questionable behavior if such behavior were thought to be beneficial to the organization? A four-country study (Vitell & Paolillo, 2004) indicates a link between organizational commitment and the decision maker's perception that ethics should be a long-term, top priority of the organization.
Trust, Personal Moral Codes, and the Resource-Advantage Theory of Competition: Explaining Productivity, Economic Growth, and Wealth Creation "Belief systems" focuses on the individual's set of beliefs about the world. For example, one might consider Machiavellianism as a belief system, as has been explored by Singhapakdi and Vitell (1991 The subject of cognitive moral development (Kohlberg, 1984;Rest, 1986;Trevino, 1986) (Bebeau, Rest, & Yamoor, 1985), professional counseling (Volker, 1979), and accounting (Shaub, 1989).
In marketing, Sparks and Hunt (1998) explored the ethical sensitivity of marketing researchers and found, among other things, that their sample of practitioners was more ethically sensitive to research ethics issues than a sample comprised of marketing students. They conclude that "the greater ethical sensitivity exhibited by marketing research practitioners can be attributed to their socialization into the marketing research profession, that is, by their learning the ethical norms of marketing research" (Sparks & Hunt, 1998, p. 105).
The H-V model stresses the importance of "Cultural Environment" in influencing the process of ethical decision making. As components of culture, the H-V model suggests that researchers focus attention on religion, legal systems, and political systems.
The boxes in the model labeled "Industry Environment, " "Professional Environment" and "Organizational and Vasquez-Parraga (1993), Mayo and Marks (1990), Menguc (1997), Singhapakdi andVitell (1990, 1991), and Vitell and Hunt (1990). In general, empirical results tend to support the theory. I turn now to using the H-V model to explicate the concept of personal moral code and its relationship to trust and distrust.

Personal moral codes, trust, and distrust
The H-V model provides a framework for explicating people's personal moral codes, trust, and distrust. According to the H-V model, differences in personal moral codes result from differences in: • the rules for combining the deontological and teleological evaluations; • the deontological norms held; • the relative importance of particular norms; • the rules for resolving conflicts among norms; • the rules for interpreting the applicability of norms in particular situations; • the importance weights assigned to particular stakeholders; • the rules for combining the teleological components; • the perceived positive consequences for particular (e.g., highly important) stakeholders; • the perceived negative consequences for particular (e.g., very unimportant) stakeholders; • the perceived probabilities of positive and negative consequences for particular stakeholders.
Some people's personal moral codes emphasize deontological factors; others emphasize teleological factors.
Some codes are trust-inducing; others produce distrust.
Consider the personal moral code implied by the neoclassical tradition in economics. Neoclassical economics assumes that everyone is a utility maximizer, which is interpreted as self-interest maximization. In terms of the H-V model, Deontological Evaluation is zero, and all ethical judgements are formed solely by Teleological Evaluation. Furthermore, the importance weights assigned to all stakeholders other than one's self are assigned zero. Therefore, in the neoclassical tradition in economics, all persons have personal moral codes that lead them to choose the alternative that has the highest score in a highly circumscribed Teleological Evaluation process in which the importance weights for all stakeholders other than one's self are zero.
For example, Williamson's (1975, p. 255) transaction cost economics assumes that "economic man…is thus a more subtle and devious creature than the usual selfinterest seeking assumption reveals. " For transaction cost economics, homo economics not only self-interest maximizes but does so with opportunistic "guile. " Williamson argues for assuming universal opportunism because it is "ubiquitous" (1981, p. 1550), "even among the less opportunistic types, most have their price" (1979, p. 234), and opportunistic "types cannot be distinguished ex ante from sincere types" (1975, p. 27) or, at the very least, "it is very costly to distinguish opportunistic from nonopportunis-tic types ex ante" (1981, p. 1545). Even though, as Williamson acknowledges, "to craft credible commitments… is to create functional substitutes for trust, " (1994, p. 7) he maintains that "the study of economic organization is better served by treating economic organization without reference to trust" (1993, p. 99).
The preceding shows how some personal moral codes spawn distrust. Specifically, if a society's dominant culture actually focuses solely on Teleological Evaluation, with importance weights of zero for all stakeholders other than one's self, then social trust cannot exist: the universal opportunism of such a restricted moral code implies that one must always presume nontrustworthy behavior by others. As a consequence, Etzioni (1988) points out: "The more people accept the [utility maximization part of the] neoclassical paradigm as a guide for their behavior, the more their ability to sustain a market economy is undermined. "( p. 257) Etzioni (1988) cites empirical studies suggesting that neoclassical theory, as interpreted by students, licenses opportunism. For students, "is" becomes "ought. " For example, the studies of Marwell and Ames (1981) find a positive correlation between formal training in economics and the frequency of free riding. If everyone free rides, students apparently conclude that they might as well free ride also. As a second example, Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1993)  If personal moral codes that presume utility maximization spawn distrust, which moral codes present trust? Etzioni (1988) argues for personal moral Trust, Personal Moral Codes, and the Resource-Advantage Theory of Competition: Explaining Productivity, Economic Growth, and Wealth Creation codes that-in terms of the H-V model-focus on the top half of the model, that is, the Deontological Evaluation. Specifically, he argues for codes that are based on deontological ethics because a society whose dominant culture embraces deontological ethics can sustain social trust and enjoy its wealth-creating attributes. That is, when the people of a society share a moral code based primarily on deontological ethics, trust can exist. When trust exists, the costs that firms and societies have that are associated with opportunism, i.e., shirking, cheating, stealing, dishonesty, monitoring, free-riding, and "hostage-taking, " are avoided.
Consequently, argues Etzioni (1988), a culture that emphasizes deontological ethics should contribute to a society's productivity.
If (at the micro-level) the primary objective of firms is superior financial performance (e.g. more profit than last year or a return on investment greater than one's competitors), but (at the macro-level) a key factor distinguishing wealthy from nonwealthy societies is trust-promoting institutions, the challenge for any theory of markets and any dynamic theory of competition within markets is to explicate the process by which such macro-level, trust-promoting institutions as moral codes can contribute to (or from) firm-level, superior financial performance. A detailed example shows how R-A theory explicates this process.
The knowledge content of a research tradition derives from its foundational premises. As introduced in Hunt and Morgan (1995;1997) and further explicated in Hunt (2000b), the foundational premises of resource-advantage theory are: P1. Demand is heterogeneous across industries, heterogeneous within industries, and dynamic.
P2. Consumer information is imperfect and costly.
P3. Human motivation is constrained self-interest seeking.
P4. The firm's objective is superior financial performance. P5. The firm's information is imperfect and costly.
P7. Resource characteristics are heterogeneous and imperfectly mobile.
P8. The role of management is to recognize, understand, create, select, implement, and modify strategies.

The structure and foundations of R-A theory
Our overview of the structure and foundations of R-A theory will follow closely the theory's treatment in Hunt (2000b). Resource-advantage theory is a general theory of competition that describes the process of competition. Figures 2 and 3 Hunt and Morgan (1997). READ: Competition is the disequilibrating, ongoing process that consists of the constant struggle among firms for a comparative advantage in resources that will yield a marketplace position of competitive advantage and, thereby, superior financial performance. Firms learn through competition as a result of feedback from relative financial performance "signaling" relative market position, which, in turn signals relative resources.

Consumers
Public Policy

Figure 3: Competitive Position Matrix
Read: The marketplace position of competitive advantage identified as Cell 3A, for example, in segment A results from the firm, relative to its competitors, having a resource assortment that enables it to produce an offering that (a) is perceived to be of superior value by consumers in that segment and (b) is produced at lower costs than rivals.  Figure 2. A Schematic of the Resource-Advantage Theory of Competition. Adapted from Hunt and Morgan (1997). READ: Competition is the disequilibrating, ongoing process that consists of the constant struggle among firms for a comparative advantage in resources that will yield a marketplace position of competitive advantage and, thereby, superior financial performance. Firms learn through competition as a result of feedback from relative financial performance "signaling" relative market position, which, in turn signals relative resources.  Hunt and Morgan (1997). Read: The marketplace position of competitive advantage identified as Cell 3A, for example, in segment A results from the firm, relative to its competitors, having a resource assortment that enables it to produce an offering that (a) is perceived to be of superior value by consumers in that segment and (b) is produced at lower costs than rivals. Note: Each competitive position matrix constitutes a different market segment (denoted as segment A, segment B,…).
Trust, Personal Moral Codes, and the Resource-Advantage Theory of Competition: Explaining Productivity, Economic Growth, and Wealth Creation At its core, R-A theory combines heterogeneous demand theory with a resource-based view of the firm (see premises P1, P6, and P7). Contrasted with perfect competition, heterogeneous demand theory views intra-industry demand as significantly heterogeneous with respect to consumers' tastes and preferences.
Hence, it is inappropriate to draw demand curves for most industries. Indeed, because of heterogeneous intra-industry demand, industries are best viewed as collections of market segments. Therefore, viewing products as bundles of attributes, different market offerings or "bundles" are required for different market segments within the same industry.
Contrasted with the view that the firm is a production function that combines homogeneous, perfectly mobile "factors" of production, resource-based theory holds that the firm is a combiner of heterogeneous, imperfectly mobile entities that are labeled "resources. " These heterogeneous, imperfectly mobile resources, when combined with heterogeneous demand, imply significant diversity as to the sizes, scopes, and levels of profitability of firms within the same industry. Resource-based theory parallels, if not undergirds, what Foss (1993) calls the "competence perspective" in evolutionary economics and the "capabilities" approaches of Teece and Pisano (1994) and Langlois and Robertson (1995). Figures 2 and 3, R-A theory stresses the importance of (1) market segments, (2) heterogeneous firm resources, (3) comparative advantages/ disadvantages in resources, and (4) marketplace positions of competitive advantage/disadvantage. In brief, market segments are defined as intra-industry groups of consumers whose tastes and preferences with regard to an industry's output are relatively homogeneous.

As diagramed in
Resources are defined as the tangible and intangible entities available to the firm that enable it to produce efficiently and/or effectively a market offering that has value for some market segment(s). Thus, resources are not just land, labor, and capital, as in neoclassical theory. Rather, resources can be categorized as: • Financial (e.g., cash resources, access to financial markets), • Physical (e.g., plant, equipment), • Legal (e.g., trademarks, licenses), • Human (e.g., the skills and knowledge of individual employees), • Organizational (e.g., competences, controls, policies, culture), • Informational (e.g., knowledge from consumer and competitive intelligence), and • Relational (e.g., relationships with suppliers and customers).
Each firm in the marketplace will have at least some resources that are unique to it (e.g., very knowledgeable employees, efficient production processes, etc.) that could constitute a comparative advantage in resources that could lead to positions of competitive advantage (i.e., cells 2, 3, and 6 in Figure 3) in the marketplace.
Some of these resources are not easily copied or acquired (i.e., they are relatively immobile). Therefore, such resources (e.g., culture, competences, and processes) may be a source of long-term competitive advantage in the marketplace.
Just as international trade theory recognizes that nations have heterogeneous, immobile resources, and it focuses on the importance of comparative advantages in resources to explain the benefits of trade, R-A theory recognizes that many of the resources of firms within the same industry are significantly heterogeneous and relatively immobile. Therefore, analogous to nations, some firms will have a comparative advantage and others a comparative disadvantage in efficiently and/or effectively producing particular market offerings that have value for particular market segments.
Specifically, as shown in Figure 2 and further explicated in Figure 3, when firms have a comparative advantage in resources, they will occupy marketplace positions of competitive advantage for some market segment(s). Marketplace positions of competitive advantage then result in superior financial performance.
Similarly, when firms have a comparative disadvantage in resources they will occupy positions of competitive disadvantage, which will then produce inferior financial performance. Therefore, firms compete for comparative advantages in resources that will yield marketplace positions of competitive advantage for some market segment(s) and, thereby, superior financial performance. As Figure 2 shows, how well competitive processes work (to, for example, foster productivity and economic growth) is significantly influenced by five environmental factors: the societal resources on which firms draw, the societal institutions that form the "rules of the game" (North 1990) Consistent with its Schumpeterian heritage, R-A theory places great emphasis on innovation, both proactive and reactive. The former is innovation by firms that, although motivated by the expectation of superior financial performance, is not prompted by specific competitive pressures-it is genuinely entrepreneurial in the classic sense of entrepreneur. In contrast, the latter is innovation that is directly prompted by the learning process of firms' competing for the patronage of market segments. Both proactive and reactive innovation can be "radical" or "incremental, " and both contribute to the dynamism of R-A competition.
Firms (attempt to) learn in many ways-by formal market research, seeking out competitive intelligence, dissecting competitor's products, benchmarking, and test marketing. What R-A theory adds to extant work is how the process of competition itself contributes to organizational learning. As the feedback loops in Fig Competition, then, is viewed as an evolutionary, disequilibrium-provoking process. It consists of the constant struggle among firms for comparative advantages in resources that will yield marketplace positions of competitive advantage and, thereby, superior financial performance. Once a firm's comparative advantage in resources enables it to achieve superior performance through a position of competitive advantage in some market segment(s), competitors attempt to neutralize and/or leapfrog the advantaged firm through acquisition, imitation, substitution, or major innovation. R-A theory is, therefore, inherently dynamic. Disequilibrium, not equilibrium, is the norm. In the terminology of Hodgson's (1993) taxonomy of evolutionary economic theories, R-A theory is non-consummatory: it has no end-stage, only a never-ending process of change. The implication is that, though market-based economies are moving, they are not moving toward some final state, such as a Pareto-optimal, general equilibrium.  (pp. 186-190), predicts correctly that technological progress dominates the K/L (i.e., capital/labor) ratio in economic growth (pp. 193-194), predicts correctly that increases in economic growth cause increases in investment (pp. 194-199), predicts correctly that most of the technological progress that drives economic growth stems from actions of profit-driven firms (pp. 199-200), predicts correctly that R-A competition can prevent the economic stagnation that re-

Trust, personal moral codes, R-A theory, and the wealth of nations
We turn now to explicating the process by which In contrast, B is an attractive partner for C because C recognizes that B's moral code lessens the likelihood of B engaging in opportunistic behavior. Thus, B will be able to align itself with C, and A will have to do without C's competence. B's strategic alliance with C will then become what R-A theory calls a "relational resource" that makes B more effective in competing with A. That is, B is now more likely to achieve marketplace positions identified as cells 2 and 3 in Figure 3 and, thus, enjoy superior financial performance. in A because B's firms will be both more efficient and more effective in producing valued market offerings. Therefore, nation B is better able than A to reap the gains from trade with C, resulting in further increases in B's productivity and growth, relative to A.
Recall that a resource is any entity, tangible or intangible, that is available to (not necessarily owned by) the firm that enables it to produce valued market offerings.
The preceding analysis implies that, just as employees having a moral code stressing deontological ethics constitutes a firm resource, a society having a dominant culture with a moral code stressing deontological ethics has a societal resource upon which firms can draw. Thus, R-A theory-alone among theories of competition-can explain how such macro-level, informal institutions as moral codes can contribute to (or from) firm-level, superior financial performance.
In so doing, it contributes to explaining how societal institutions that promote social trust also promote the wealth of nations.

Conclusion
Scholars from numerous disciplines maintain that societal-level moral codes that promote social trust promote wealth creation. Despite this consensus, the nature of the kinds of societal-level moral codes that promote social trust remains unclear. Also remaining unclear is the specific competitive process by which social trust promotes productivity and economic growth, that is, wealth creation. Using the Hunt-Vitell theory of ethics, this article explicates the concept of personal moral codes as a means of understanding societal-level moral codes. We show that societal-level codes based on utility maximization promote social distrust. In contrast, societal-level codes based on deontological ethics promote social trust. Furthermore, we show how, using the resource-advantage theory of competition, that societal-level moral codes that produce social trust also promote productivity and economic growth. Thus, we explain how social trust promotes the wealth of nations.