Department of the Internal Military Service of Military Units of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs in Przemyśl Organizational and personnel structure, and scope of activity

The origin of the Military Interior Service of the Military Units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW) goes back to 1957, when pursuant to the Regulation No. 021/57 the Ministry disbanded the Information Division of the Border Guard Troops and the Information Department of the Internal Security Corps, later transformed into the Military Interior Service of the Internal Security Corps (WSW KBW) and the Border Guard Troops (WOP). In 1973, the Service of the Military Units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (WSW JW MSW) was appointed. Subsequently, new local structures were created in Białystok, Chełm, Przemyśl, Kętrzyn, Krosno Odrzańskie, Kłodzko, Koszalin, Katowice and Warsaw as branches of the WSW JW MSW. This formation shielded military units subordinated to the structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, i.e. the Border Guard Troops (WOP), the Vistula Military Units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (JN MSW) and the Government Protection Bureau (BOR), in the field of counterintelligence protection, as well as prevention and detection of crimes in military units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and prosecution of offenders subjected to the jurisdiction of military courts. When fulfilling their tasks, the WSW operational bodies subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs applied means, methods and forms of operational work, which were characterized by the specificity of activities and the diversity of the environment.




Introduction
The WSW was subordinated to the Ministry of National Defense was active until its liquidation in 1990 and the establishment of Military Information Services in its place. The other structure of WSW, i.e., the Department of the Military Interior Service of the Military Units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (WSW JW MSW), operated similarly until the same year, although it was formed slightly later -in the 60s of the last century, as will be discussed later.
Paweł Piotrowski's publications [1,2] are one of the first scientific texts devoted to WSW JW MSW. Jacek Wygoda and Radosław Peterman took the next step in the research in question [3].
The findings made by J. Wygoda and R. Peterman inspired the author of this study to conduct further research on the activities of WSW JW MSW. The resulting article aims at presenting the activities of WSW JW MSW on the example of the Department in Przemyśl. This stems from the fact that the author's scientific interests are related to the security apparatus, both civil and military, operating in the years 1944-1990 in south-eastern Poland. Moreover, he focused on discussing the geopolitical background of the region and Poland of the "decade" of Edward Gierek, as well as the period of Martial Law and the last years of the People's Republic of Poland.
In the publication, the author mainly used source materials developed by WSW JW MSW and held by the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN). The conducted query of these sources creates a one-sided view of the operation of this formation. The unilateral nature of the materials suggests a fairly critical approach and a certain degree of difficulty in their assessment, since at the moment there are no scientific studies dealing more widely with the activities of WSW JW MSW, apart from those mentioned in the introduction to this article. Valuable information was obtained from accounts of ex-soldiers of WSW MON as a structure parallel to WSW JW MSW. In this case, the profile of opinions originating from the environment of former WSW soldiers as an open source should also be taken into account.
In 1983, the personnel on structure of this outpost provided for 5 posts for officers and 1 for a civilian employee. In fact, there were 4 posts for officers and 1 for a civilian employee [12, k. 56].
In 1986, the WSW JW MSW Department in Przemyśl had four officer positions in the ranks ranging from Captain to Lieutenant Colonel and one civilian post [13, k. 113].
In the first half of 1989, WSW JW MSW had 5 officer positions, including 1 vacancy, and 1 post for a civilian employee [14, k. 147]. Furthermore, due to the restructuring of WOP, the outpost in question was personally strengthened by raising one officer post to higher rank and completing the vacancy. It was imposed by the necessity of providing a shield for the newly formed WOP battalion in Chełm, subordinated to the WOP Bieszczady Brigade [15, k. 151]. An additional task for this outpost stemmed from the fact that it protected the 4th Bieszczadzki Motorized Regiment of the Vistula Military Units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Kwaszenino [16, k. 89].
At the beginning of 1990, the manpower for the Department was raised to six positions for officers, all of which were filled, and the one civilian was left [17, k. 173  In accordance with the above cited normative act, the Head of the Branch/Department managed the work of this organizational unit within the limits set by the legal provisions on the organization and scope of activities of the WSW JW MSW, and was fully responsible for the results of the work. He reported directly to the head of the WSW JW MSW and his deputies. In general matters he shaped the proper moral and ideological -party attitude of the composition of the subordinate staff, and he was responsible for the state of the discipline, training and combat capability. He presented the necessary conclusions regarding personnel matters, such as promotions, reassignments, proposed appointments for higher positions and military grades, referral for training, courses, studies, penalties, distinctions, etc.
He prepared and submitted for approval the plans of the Branch/Department's work, reports and information. He supervised cooperation with commanders of protected military units, SB, Citizen's Militi, Prosecutor's Office, WSW MON and local authorities in the field of operations of the subordinate facility. He supervised and organized preventive work resulting from the applicable legal provisions as part of the division of tasks agreed with the commanders, the party-political apparatus and appropriate military prosecutors. He organized and supervised the performance of mobilization works, controlled the subordinate personnel for the observance of the provisions regulating the mode and scope of in terms of counterintelligence and prosecution -investigation work, supervised the operation of the secret registry and the compliance with provisions on the protection of state secrets and dealing with documents. Moreover, he controlled the organization of training and self-education of the soldiers of the Branch/Department [29, k. 7, 8].
In the counterintelligence work, the Head of the Branch/Department planned and organized the entire operational work based on current needs resulting from the situation in the protected units, developed the main directional objectives of counterintelligence work, and provided necessary guidance to subordinate officers. He made decisions and approved documents within the limits of the powers specified in the relevant provisions, organized and could personally conduct the reconnaissance of the counterintelligence situation in the protected military units and major operational matters in the necessary extent. He supervised the conduct of the operating records provided for by separate regulations. He analyzed operational materials so that he could determine the right directions of actions and procedures, as well as gave guidelines for operational cases and preliminary materials [29, k. 9].
In the scope of prosecution and investigation work, the Head of Division/Department made decisions in accordance with procedural rights on initiating preparatory proceedings or refusing to prosecute, approved investigation plans and investigative measures, and reviewed the most important criminal cases to assist the investigator. He supervised the ongoing proceedings in respect of compliance with applicable laws and the proper use of means of technology securing all evidence gathered. What is more, he submitted relevant applications to the prosecutor's offices supervising the criminal proceedings conducted by his subordinate organizational unit [29, k. 9].
In practice, the prosecution and investigation work was supervised by the Deputy Head of the Branch/Department. He presented proposals to the Head of the Branch/Department for approval or replaced him in this scope of duties [30, k. 51].
Deputy Head of the Branch/Department of WSW JW MSW was subordinated directly to the Head of the Branch/Department and was co-responsible for the proper organization and results of the work of this organizational unit. His duties included developing work plans, problem information and other documents generalizing the issues occurring in the operational and investigation work. He supervised the conduct of operational matters and explanation of preliminary materials (counterintelligence signals). He conducted personal work with operational sources of information in the most important organizational cells of the military unit. The Deputy Head did not protect the facility under the rules applying to object officers.
Subsequently, he supervised criminal proceedings and held all responsibility for the overall organization of the investigation work, thus ensuring its efficiency. He developed training programs for professional staff and soldiers of the compulsory military service and was responsible for their proper implementation. He supervised the supernumerary duty and convoy service, controlled the technical condition of operating and forensic equipment and its proper use. He prepared programs for briefings and working meetings within the branch and carried out other tasks ordered by his superiors [31, k. 13, 14].
A Senior Officer (Officer) in the division of the Branch/Department reported to his supervisor and was responsible for direct counterintelligence protection of the military unit/military facility with regard to organizing and conducting prevention, detection and recognition of criminal (hostile) activities. He accomplished the entrusted tasks through activities related to counterintelligence protection of a military unit or other military facility, determination and elimination of premises conducive to hostile activity -especially of a political nature, revealing the secret, committing desertion, theft of arms and ammunition or the formation of other negative events affecting the state of the combat readiness of a protected military unit. He selected, developed, acquired and operated operational sources of information for securing the protected military unit/facility, checking signals and explaining preliminary materials, as well as conducted operational matters. He systematically recognized the personnel of the military unit/facility with particular attention to suspicious contacts between soldiers, civilian employees and their families with criminal elements, foreigners and persons (institutions) from capitalist countries. He was liable for counterintelligence protection of military exercises, reporting to the command group of the Branch/Department on situations and extraordinary cases, the state and results of counterintelligence work. He kept the documentation provided for in separate regulations and carried out other tasks ordered by supervisors [31, k. 28, 29].
In this way, a Senior Officer (Officer) fulfilled tasks within the WSW JW MSW related to the counterintelligence protection of the Polish Armed Forces in the field of recognition of foreign intelligence activities of capitalist states, protected the Polish Armed Forces against propaganda of foreign ideological centers, or detected crime -especially of political nature -in the Armed Forces [32, k. 6].
A Senior Officer (officer) of the prosecution and investigation division carried out tasks in the field of conducting verification proceedings and other official explanations, as well as procedural steps within legal assistance for other authorities. He conducted preventive work in the military units protected by the Branch/Department and held responsibility for the recording of investigation work and for forensic equipment and its technical condition. He took part in major court hearings in cases in which the preparatory proceedings were conducted by the Branch/Department. He evaluated operational materials before making the decision to initiate criminal proceedings and cooperated with the counterintelligence officer during the preparatory proceedings. He could also provide the counterintelligence officer with other information relevant to the operational work [31, k. 27-9].
At this point, a few words should be devoted to the methodology of operational work in WSW JW MSW.
According to Piotr Piotrowski, probably the first and, as it seems, the only normative document in this respect is "Instruction on Counterintelligence Activity in Military Units of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs" constituting an annex to the Regulation No. 0014/85 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of February 20, 1985. The document specified in detail the methods and forms of the operational work in WSW JW MSW, which significantly differed from the methodology of the operational work of the Security Service, and were analogous to those practiced in WSW MON.
The Instruction defined two groups of the so-called personal sources of information: counterintelligence personnel that included secret collaborators and unofficial employees. In addition, this document mentioned the category of trusted people.
According to the Instruction, secret collaborators were obtained for detecting and recognizing criminal activity, or as it was defined -destructive activities, in the Armed Forces and the activity of "anti-socialist forces" targeted against the Polish Armed Forces (in the 1980s -the author's note). Their task was also to detect the operations of foreign special services or "centers of ideological diversion" for preventive purposes, i.e. to recognize the premises of such activities and to secure the implementation of special projects. In line with this Instruction, people such as generals, officers at generals' posts, military unit commanders at the level of regiment and above, political officers, prosecutors and judges, and secretaries of party instances could not be recruited. However, PZPR members could be obtained on grounds of ideological and political motives, i.e., the principle of voluntariness, and material/personal interest, i.e., on the substantive principle.
The so-called unofficial employees were obtained exclusively on a voluntary basis in order to coordinate the work of secret collaborators and to carry out the tasks provided for informal collaborators (TW).
In contrast, trusted people were a specific category in the military security organs. They were obtained from among the personnel of protected military units and their surroundings so as to ensure the flow of information about occurrences of interest of counterintelligence, which did not require engaging a secret collaborator to obtain it. They could not be persons with whom official contacts were maintained, e.g., military unit commanders [1, p. 415, 416].
The above resulted from recommendations for the cooperation of military counterintelligence officers with the cadre of the protected units/military facilities aimed at joint ventures designed to prevent events and phenomena adversely affecting combat readiness of the troops, and especially as it was then called "ideological-political content" and exchange of information [32, k. 40].
In accordance with the provisions of the Instruction of 1985, the following categories of operational matters were kept: operational cards and preliminary materials. However, operational inquiries were conducted in the form of the operational clarification of a case, the operational recognition of a case, and the operational search of a case [1, p. 416].
Operational inquiries were initiated on the basis of preliminary materials subsequently reclassified to a specific procedure. In this case, a specific sequence of events was applied: information -preliminary materials -the procedure initiated2.
A Military Counterintelligence Officer was responsible for the effective counterintelligence protection of military units and institutions stationed in the area of executive responsibility. Countering espionage was always a priority. For this purpose, it was necessary to organize a network of appropriately selected, properly placed, well-trained and effectively used personal information sources3.
A Counterintelligence Officer of the WSW JW MSW carried out his tasks through receiving information from various sources about interesting occurrences, facts and people. He analyzed and evaluated it, and was obliged to undertake further activity on their basis [33, k. 89].
When performing their tasks, WSW operational bodies subordinated to the Ministry of the Internal Affairs applied means, methods and forms of operational work, which were characterized by the specificity of activities and the diversity of the environment [33, k. 3].
In the second half of the 1970s, Poland was characterized by the emergence of opposition forces organizing groups of new origin, opposing the excessive influence of the Polish United Work The dominant reactions to the introduction of Martial Law were surprise, confusion, anxiety and anticipation of the further development of the situation. There was a widespread belief that interned people had been sent to Siberia. Strikes and protests in many regions of the country and the accompanying interventions of militia and the Armed Forces were talked about. People slowly got used to Martial Law. The daily inconvenience was checking documents and inspecting vehicles by patrols of militia and Armed Forces. Many people, even associated with the power apparatus, under the influence of information provided in the media became convinced that the introduction of Martial Law had put an end to the further deterioration of the situation [35, p. 408].
The authorities of WSW JW MSW monitored the social situation in the country during the above-mentioned period, both in military and civilian environments. Among the military personnel the opinions about the possible date of the abolition of Martial Law prevailed, which was supposed to affect the stabilization of the situation in the country [36, k. 36].
The progressive drop in social tension did not change the very bad social mood. In the vast majority of cases, the mood in the society was affected by the strains of everyday life. The increases in the prices of food and goods that were lacking in stores only added to the state of depression [35, p. 410, 411].
On the other hand, the process of forming a political opposition in Poland resulted in developing methods and forms of combating it by the Ministry of the Internal Affairs. In the 1980s there was a political struggle between the authorities and the underground "Solidarność" ("Solidarity"). The second half of this decade is the time of many initiatives undertaken by the communist authorities. The formation of the political opposition in Poland was closely watched by the decision-making party circles and by the Ministry of the Internal Affairs. The August strikes in 1980 and the emergence of "Solidarność" led to a situation in which the role of the Ministry of Internal Affairs became more significant, and substantial personnel changes took place in the structures of the Ministry and PZPR [2, p. 9, 10].
During the events of the years 1980-1981, people became convinced that they could organize and act together according to their will, and not necessarily according to the will of the authorities. The self-rule and independence of "Solidarność" were treated as the essential prey, and therefore the opposition against the state authorities despite the threat of the application of the penalty was expressed quite commonly [37, p. 442].
The decade 1980-1990, which proved to be the most revolutionary one in the whole period, has become a symbol of the deviation from totalitarianism. The movement of renewal was going through all segments of society, not coinciding with any religious or ideological orientation. Already at the beginning of the decade, a clear polarization was visible in the Polish society, which became the catalyst for the great movement embodied by the multi-directional NSZZ "Solidarność". Radical tendencies were revealed in various political camps. The last decade of the People's Republic of Poland announced new times and the elimination of anachronistic ideological forms [38, p. 7].
Recognizing the reasons for social apathy, the authorities were not willing to change their policy, at most trying minor and apparent steps that could not satisfy anyone [39, p. 87].
The analysis of documents produced by WSW JW MSW indicates that in the new political and social realities created in 1990 the leadership of this formation made a desperate attempt to adapt to the new reality.
The WSW JW MSW Department made efforts to recognize activities of foreign special services of the countries neighboring Poland, which had begun the operating activities and the creation of the agent network in Poland. At the same time, according to the data of WSW JW MSW, foreign special services in the framework of official contacts maintained by their officers in Poland initiated efforts to continue them and transfer them to the social sphere. These contacts were to concern Polish officers of institutions subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, soldiers of the Polish Armed Forces and civilian employees of the state administration. WSW JW MSW obtained information about attempts to recruit people for cooperation with foreign services for material benefits such as facilitations in trips to neighboring countries for private and commercial purposes.
In the opinion of the Department of WSW JW MSW, soldiers of WOP units were a category particularly exposed to aggressive activities of foreign special services. In addition, it was considered that the recruitment among national minorities and people of Polish nationality living in a cross-border belt was conducted. Foreign local smugglers and people with nationalist views were also mentioned as interesting environments for foreign services.
In connection with the above, the Head of the Department of WSW JW MSW recommended increasing operational and service recognition of the nature of official contacts maintained by WOP soldiers with representatives of border services of neighboring countries. Moreover, the Head recommended examining the background of unofficial contacts between WOP soldiers and people living in neighboring countries. What is more, he ordered to remain the operational control over persons suspected of illegal smuggling conducted under the guise of commercial activity, which could be used by foreign special services as a platform for the recruitment of information sources [40, k. 1, 2].
Despite performing tasks in another environment, the bodies of WSW JW under the MSW carried out analogous forms and methods of operational and investigation work as the Department of WSW of the Ministry of National Defense. They were an integral part of the military security apparatus, in this case responsible for working out the personnel of military units subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
The analysis of the source materials indicates that the WSW JW MSW officers, similarly to the WSW MON officers, devoted a significant part of their operational activities to the identification of "anti-socialist forces" in the protected military units. The counterintelligence profile of this formation is questionable, and the assessment of its operation is directed towards the repressive nature of the activity. In addition, through the profile of the staffing and organizational structure of the WSW JW MSW Department in Przemyśl, attention should be paid to the strong manning of the prosecution and investigation division. It dominated the number of officers with counterintelligence specialties. As far as this trend was maintained in other local departments of this service, one can come to the conclusion about the primacy of investigation work over operational one. This in turn indicates the repressive -police character of this formation, and shows counterintelligence in the background.

Conclusion
The author presented the activity of one of the organizational units for the reasons mentioned in the introduction to this article. However, when analyzing the source materials, it should be noted that WSW JW MSW implemented the same methods and forms of operational and investigation work at the central level, i.e., the department, and at the level of local branches. It protected military units subjected to the Ministry of Internal Affairs displaced in the area, at the same time taking account of the specificity of the region in which the given branch of WSW JW MSW was located. In the case of the Department in Przemyśl, it was crucial because the facility functioned in specific physiographic conditions and at the point at which the borders of three countries meet (tripoint of Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR).
The author did not manage to find archival materials, e.g., personal information sources of the Department of WSW JW MSW in Przemyśl, which would allow for the assessment of additional directions of this institution's operation. An interesting thread is to investigate the cooperation between WSW JW MSW and the civil security authorities. The author makes similar presumption as to the cooperation between WSW JW MSW and the reconnaissance of WOP.
Thus, the subject of "forgotten security organs" is an attractive field for further inquisitive research and historical disputes.