Distinguishing belief objects

The problem of intentional identity (Geach 1967) has a counterpart that concerns
the notion of distinctness for intentional objects. It arises when expressions
linked to distinctness, like plurals or numerals, occur in the scope of intensional
operators. Focussing on plurals in belief contexts that have a cumulative reading
relative to a plural attitude subject, we argue for a notion of distinctness that appeals to
the attitude subjects’ counterfactual beliefs: two partial individual concepts count
as sufficiently distinct if each attitude subject believes that if both were
instantiated, they would yield different individuals. After providing a general paraphrase
of cumulative belief sentences, we outline potential advantages of this approach
over analyses of intentional identity that appeal to real-world “causes” of the
intentional objects, or to notions of attitude content that are sensitive to discourse
referents.