ABSTRACT
In the wake of the spectacular success of Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic injustice, philosophers have paid a great deal of attention to testimonial injustice: the injustice that occurs when recipients of testimony discount it in virtue of its source (usually, their social identity). But Fricker identifies another kind of epistemic injustice: hermeneutical injustice: when someone cannot articulate their own experience or understand their situation for lack of the hermeneutical tools. This chapter points to a possible tension between these kinds of injustice. Sincere testimony may fail to identify significant harms the testifier is subject to (or fail to register their magnitude or kind) in virtue of a lack of hermeneutical resources. This tension raises the possibility that there are situations in which experts – those who possess hermeneutical tools – may be able to correct the testimony of those who experience harms in virtue of their identity. This chapter investigates possible cases in which epistemic injustice might be reduced through such correction. It also suggests ways in which the dangers of a too-great readiness to see testimony as in need of expert correction might be mitigated, and how the expert might suggest corrections without ceasing to listen.
