ABSTRACT
We update our previous review on the development of interrelations between theory of mind and morality by incorporating more recent discoveries. We focus on age-related differences and continuities from 3 to 12 years and between childhood and adulthood in reasoning about relations between mental states (e.g., intentions, beliefs, emotions) and moral judgments (e.g., evaluations of wrongness, assessments of blame). For example, intentions influence children’s and adults’ views of moral character and blame (e.g., intentional harm is worse than accidental harm), and moral aspects of a situation can bias perceived intentions (e.g., negative outcomes appear more intentionally caused than positive outcomes). We incorporate neuroscientific evidence to underscore connections between mental state reasoning and moral judgments, and we consider how development and individual differences in theory of mind and moral cognition shape behavior. We conclude with suggestions to expand empirical inquiry. For example, we urge researchers to examine additional cognitive processes (e.g., executive function, counterfactual reasoning) that likely shape concepts of mind and morality across the lifespan, as well as to innovate new multi-method paradigms that capture the incredible complexity of how people think about mental and moral lives both inside and outside of the laboratory.
