Consistency and inconsistency

It is not possible to fit intuitive acts to every signitive intention in the manner of an 'objectively complete intuitive illustration'. ¹ Meaning-intentions may accordingly be divided into the possible (internally consistent) and the impossible (internally inconsistent, imaginary). This division, and the law underlying it, does not concern acts in isolation — this applies also to all other propositions propounded here — but their epistemic essence in general,and therein their 'matters' taken generally. For it is not possible that a signitive intention with matter M should find a possibility of fulfilment in some intuition, while another signitive intention with the same matter M, should lack this possibility. These possibilities and impossibilities do not refer to intuitions actually found in certain empirical interweavings of consciousness: they are not real (reale), but ideal possibilities, with their sole ground in specific character. In the sphere of the verbally expressed, to which we may without essential loss limit ourselves, the axiom runs: Meanings (i.e. concepts and propositions in specie) divide into the possible and the impossible (the real and the imaginary).