Analysis of Asymmetric Quantity Commitment in Decentralized Supply Chains

Zhaoqiong Qin, Wen-Chyuan Chiang, Robert Russell

Source Title: International Journal of Operations Research and Information Systems (IJORIS)12(2)

ISSN: 1947-9328|EISSN: 1947-9336|EISBN13: 9781799861218|DOI: 10.4018/IJORIS.20210401.oa5

MLA

Qin, Zhaoqiong, et al. "Analysis of Asymmetric Quantity Commitment in Decentralized Supply Chains." IJORIS vol.12, no.2 2021: pp.83-102. http://doi.org/10.4018/IJORIS.20210401.oa5

APA

Qin, Z., Chiang, W., & Russell, R. (2021). Analysis of Asymmetric Quantity Commitment in Decentralized Supply Chains. International Journal of Operations Research and Information Systems (IJORIS), 12(2), 83-102. http://doi.org/10.4018/IJORIS.20210401.oa5

Chicago

Qin, Zhaoqiong, Wen-Chyuan Chiang, and Robert Russell. "Analysis of Asymmetric Quantity Commitment in Decentralized Supply Chains," International Journal of Operations Research and Information Systems (IJORIS) 12, no.2: 83-102. http://doi.org/10.4018/IJORIS.20210401.oa5

Export Reference

Favorite Full-Issue Download

View Full Text HTML

View Full Text PDF

Abstract

Quantity commitment chosen by firms in competition has been demonstrated by previous studies to mitigate price competition. This study demonstrates that asymmetric quantity commitment can always arise when one firm (e-tailer) shortens lead times or adopts just-in-time systems to circumvent quantity commitment while another firm (retailer) does not. To study the asymmetric quantity commitment in decentralization, a multi-stage game is analyzed, and backward induction is adopted. The authors find that the retailer always adopts the quantity commitment in the decentralization to achieve a higher profit.