The Optimization of Supply Chain Financing for Bank Green Credit Using Stackelberg Game Theory in Digital Economy Under Internet of Things

Hui Zhang, Fengrui Zhang, Bing Gong, Xuan Zhang, Yifan Zhu

Source Title: Journal of Organizational and End User Computing (JOEUC)35(3)

ISSN: 1546-2234|EISSN: 1546-5012|EISBN13: 9781668492604|DOI: 10.4018/JOEUC.318474

MLA

Zhang, Hui, et al. "The Optimization of Supply Chain Financing for Bank Green Credit Using Stackelberg Game Theory in Digital Economy Under Internet of Things." JOEUC vol.35, no.3 2023: pp.1-16. http://doi.org/10.4018/JOEUC.318474

APA

Zhang, H., Zhang, F., Gong, B., Zhang, X., & Zhu, Y. (2023). The Optimization of Supply Chain Financing for Bank Green Credit Using Stackelberg Game Theory in Digital Economy Under Internet of Things. Journal of Organizational and End User Computing (JOEUC), 35(3), 1-16. http://doi.org/10.4018/JOEUC.318474

Chicago

Zhang, Hui, et al. "The Optimization of Supply Chain Financing for Bank Green Credit Using Stackelberg Game Theory in Digital Economy Under Internet of Things," Journal of Organizational and End User Computing (JOEUC) 35, no.3: 1-16. http://doi.org/10.4018/JOEUC.318474

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Abstract

The aim is to improve small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)' core competitiveness and financing attainability using deep learning (DL) under economic globalization. Accordingly, this work constructs a supply chain symbiosis system based on DL, economics, and Stackelberg game theory following a status quo analysis of the financing status of SMEs. Afterward, a structural framework of supply chain financing (SCF) is designed. Further, it verifies the effectiveness of the proposed back propagation neural network (BPNN) credit evaluation model through specific enterprise data. The results show that the proposed internet of things (IoT)-based SCF SMEs-oriented BPNN credit evaluation model reaches a prediction accuracy of 91.4%. It effectively eliminates information asymmetry between banks and various capitals. As a result, banks can guarantee operation funds for the supply chain SMEs and help them minimize project risks by lowering financing leverage and through information transparency.