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Dealing with the crisis : The Brexit Spin

Alma-Pierre Bonnet
p. 103-125

Résumé

The professionalization of the political class has led to the emergence of key actors in public relations: the so-called “spin doctors”. Frank Esser offers the following definition: “‘spin doctor’ is an amalgam of ‘spin’, meaning the interpretation or slant placed on events (which is a sporting metaphor, referring to the spin a pool player puts on a cue ball), and ‘doctor’, derived from the figurative uses of the word to mean patch up, piece together, and falsify”. Through catchphrases and soundbites, they help candidates present their ideas in the best light possible.

As political parties have become brands, the importance of those special advisers has grown, with the rise of powerful figures such as Peter Mandelson, Alistair Campbell or more recently Dominic Cummings. The marketing strategy developed over the past few decades has reinforced a feeling of distrust in politicians and a clear resentment towards the London elite. Far from undermining the role of spin doctors, it seems that the Brexit crisis has strengthened their positions.

This paper analyses the influence of spin doctors on Prime Ministers during the Brexit debate, from the referendum campaign in 2016 to the delivery of Brexit in early 2020. Because the first role of spin doctors is to enhance the image of their candidate, we will focus on key moments when the incumbent Prime Minister was in the front line: the 2016 referendum campaign and the 2017 and 2019 general elections.

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Texte intégral

Introduction

1Jay G. Blumler recently said that political communication was entering a fourth age in which abundance was reinforced. Thanks to the internet boom, people are now connected all the time. Blumler noticed that:

  • 1 Blumler, J. G., “The Fourth Age of Political Communication”, Politiques de communication, vol. 6, n (...)

In this situation, political communicators may be under pressure to think more about the presentational appeals of their messages than about what they want to put across substantively.1

  • 2 Manson, N. C., “Making Sense of Spin”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, vol. 29, no. 3, 2012, p. 200.
  • 3 Fall, L.T., “Spin and Double-Speak”, The International Encyclopedia of Communication, (Vol. X), Lon (...)

2“Spin”, which Neil C. Manson defines as “a form of selective claim-making, where the process of selection is governed by an intention to bring about promotional perlocutionary effects”2, is therefore a prerequisite for any would-be communicator. Spin, as a political tool, relies on the ideas that truth is not absolute and that “every issue has two sides; hence, there are two viewpoints”3. This is one of the reasons why politicians now depend on communication experts to make sure their messages come across in the best light possible. Those who master the art of spin, the so-called “spin doctors”, are now essential:

  • 4 Sharlamanov, K. and Jovanovski A., “Sociological analysis of spin and spin doctors” International J (...)

Spin doctors are people who stand between politicians and the media. They have the responsibility to create and sell to the public the image of politicians […] Spin doctors are experts for communication that are using techniques and skills to place a specific message in public in a way that will cause the desired feelings and reactions.4

  • 5 Esser, F., et al., “Spin doctors in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany: Metacommunicatio (...)
  • 6 Louw, E, The Media & Political Process, London, Sage, 2010, p. 76.
  • 7 Sumpter, R. and Tankard, J., “The spin doctor: An alternative model of public relations”, Public Re (...)
  • 8 Schlesinger, Philip, et al, Open Scotland?: Journalists, Spin Doctors and Lobbyists, Edinburgh Univ (...)
  • 9 Rivière-De Franco, K. « Les spin doctors et la communication politique en Grande-Bretagne », Quader (...)
  • 10 Michie, D, The Invisible Persuaders, London, Bantam Press, 1998, p. 297.

3Spin doctors operate at “the porous borders”5 of both the political world and the media. They enjoy a very close relationship with their employers and more often than not, they overstep their communication prerogative and become confidantes, sometimes eminences grises, which questions their influence in a democratic system, as they are not elected. This strategic role seems nonetheless indispensable in today’s politics and if it originated in the United States during the second half of the 20th century6 and was somewhat institutionalised under Richard Nixon7, British politicians soon adopted this new trend, in particular on the right, at first8. Bernard Ingham, Gordon Reece and Tim Bell reshaped Margaret Thatcher’s image to make her electable9. Similarly, Peter Mandelson and Alistair Campbell made the most of Tony Blair’s youthful appearance to modernize the Labour Party and they were instrumental in Blair’s electoral successes10.

4This article aims to determine how influential spin doctors were in influencing Prime Ministers and shaping the Brexit debate through the analysis of three key moments in the Brexit crisis – the 2016 referendum, the 2017 and 2019 general elections (GE).

David Cameron : Business as usual

  • 11 Alexandre-Collier, A., Les habits neufs de David Cameron, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2010, p. 1 (...)
  • 12 Heppell, T., The Tories, From Winston Churchill to David Cameron, London, Bloomsbury, 2014, p. 136.
  • 13 Vielcanet, F., La fabrique de présidents, Paris, La Martinière, 2011, p.193.
  • 14 Schnapper, P., “The Elephant in the Room: Europe in the 2015 British General Election”, Revue Franç (...)

5David Cameron will mainly be remembered for his fateful decision to hold an in-out referendum on EU membership. However, it should not be forgotten that before that, he had been quite successful, at least as far as communication was concerned. He put the emphasis on what three previous Tory leaders had failed to do11: to “decontaminate”12 the Conservative brand. Cameron’s belief that the political image of the Conservative Party had to be upgraded should not come as much of a surprise, as he had himself worked as a PR manager for various Tory politicians and for Carlton Communications, a media company13. In January 2013, he committed to an in-out referendum on Britain’s continued membership of the EU. It was used as bait in the 2015 Conservative manifesto. Pauline Schnapper explains that “David Cameron had agreed to a referendum in part to avoid Eurosceptic pressure during the campaign and limit the damage UKIP could do to his electoral chances”14. However, his traditional approach during the referendum failed to deliver the outcome he was hoping for.

Teams and strategies

  • 15 Behr, R., “How remain failed: the inside story of a doomed campaign”, The Guardian, 5 July 2016.

6On 13 April 2016, after weeks of deliberation, the Electoral Commission chose the official groups for the campaign: Britain Stronger in Europe (Stronger In for short) and Vote Leave. Stronger In was a cross-party group to support the Remain side15.

  • 16 Cowley, P., Kavanagh, D., The British General Election of 2015, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p (...)
  • 17 Schnapper, P., « David Cameron et la campagne du ‘Remain’ », Revue Française de Civilisation Britan (...)
  • 18 Behr, op. cit., 2016.

7The overall strategy of Stronger In followed the 2015 election playbook designed by Australian spin doctor Lynton Crosby for the Conservatives16: offering voters a clear choice between economic stability in the EU or gambling on the unknown if the country left, what David Cameron called “a leap in the dark” on 22 February 2016 in Parliament. Cameron would take centre stage. However, he decided to remain agnostic on the European question (whether he would be in favour of leave or remain) until late February 2016. His strategy was to go to Brussels first and to renegotiate the British/ EU agreement. His neutral stance was meant to convince undecided voters17. Stronger In pollster, Andrew Cooper, showed that the group should aim for voters in the centre ground: “these were people who would never love the EU, but could be persuaded to stick with it for safety’s sake”18.

The campaign

  • 19 Schnapper, P., Avril, E, Où va le Royaume-Uni ?, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2019, p. 47.
  • 20 Clarke, J., Newman, J., “‘People in this country have had enough of experts’: Brexit and the parado (...)
  • 21 Spence et al., “How David Cameron blew it”, Politico, 25 June 2016
  • 22 Stephenson, P., “How to win a referendum”, Politico, 9 December 2016.

8The Remain campaign followed a two-step process: first, Cameron had to renegotiate the British/ EU agreement and second, he would campaign in favour of staying in19. We will deal with the second phase. Stronger In focused on the economy. The official slogan was “Stronger, Safer, Better Off”. Stronger In called on experts to back up the (economic) argument that Britain was better off in the EU20. One of the key messages was that should Britain leave the EU, the average household would be £4,300 a year worse off by 2030. Even Barack Obama was called upon. He said that Britain would be “at the back of a queue” for a trade deal with America if it left the EU21. The strategy was to own the economic argument. Hence, the Leave side would have to focus on immigration, which would make them look racist and xenophobic. To drive their point home, Stronger In repeatedly asked Vote Leave members what they wanted in place of the EU: an economic agreement akin to that of Norway, Iceland or Switzerland?22 The message Stronger In tried to convey was that leaving the EU would undermine Britain’s place in the world.

  • 23 Travis, A., “The leave campaign made three key promises – are they keeping them?” The Guardian, 27 (...)
  • 24 Schnapper, P., Avril, E, op. cit. 2019, p. 51.

9Unexpectedly, Vote Leave did not shy away from the economic debate. As they had no credible alternative to the EU, they focused instead on economic sovereignty. On 15 April, Labour MP Gisela Stuart claimed: “Every week we send £350m to Brussels. I’d rather that we control how to spend that money, and if I had that control, I would spend it on the NHS”23. This promise, which was rapidly debunked, was painted on the side of the red battle bus of Vote Leave. As the debate shifted towards the question of immigration, it became difficult for Stronger In to counter Vote Leave’s populist rhetoric24. In the end, British people voted to leave by almost 52%.

Analysis

  • 25 Fox, S., “Political alienation and referendums: how political alienation was related to support for (...)
  • 26 BBC, “Backlash after Barack Obama EU referendum intervention”, BBC News, 23 April 2016.

10A detailed analysis of the Brexit spin during the referendum campaign highlights two opposing conceptions: what we might call the “new world” and the “old world”. Stronger In’s approach might be described as “business as usual”. What had worked in 2015, and actually, what had always worked, that is, to focus on the economy and to reinforce the fear of the unknown, was bound to work this time around. It did not. With hindsight, it is possible to say that the Remain campaign lacked clarity, as far as spin was concerned. Some basic communication mistakes were made. First, Cameron’s decision to wait until he had renegotiated Britain’s membership sent a bad signal: he implied that the Britain/ EU relationship was inherently flawed and needed to be changed. Besides, this delay meant that he entered the race quite late. On top of that, everybody knew that he wanted the UK to stay in the EU. So, this whole plan to wait was seen as once again the elite manipulating normal people. This was all the more damaging as Brexit can be seen as “an expression of anti-establishment sentiment, outrage and dismay from a politically alienated majority”25. The Barack Obama stunt did not work either. As Brexit was mainly about sovereignty, it was arguably irrelevant to bring in a foreigner to tell British people what to do. Besides, Obama’s quote “The UK is going to be in the back of the queue” was derided by Brexiteers as Americans are more likely to use “line” instead of “queue”. Barack Obama was depicted as following a script written by Remainers26, which arguably reduced the impact.

  • 27 Oliver, C., Unleashing Demons: The Inside Story of Brexit, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 2016, p. 10- (...)
  • 28 Schnapper, P., Avril, E., op. cit. 2019, pp. 209-213.

11The overall strategy to focus mainly on the economy was somewhat ill-considered. Craig Oliver, Cameron’s chief spin doctor, believed that “electorates don’t vote against their own pockets”27. This made sense and it would have certainly worked during an election. But the Remain camp seemed to be unaware of the public they were addressing and the cause they were fighting for. Stronger In failed to reach out to those people who usually do not vote. A referendum is different from an election. It offers a clear alternative and is therefore more appealing to those who feel let down by traditional politics, in particular in the first past the post system28.

  • 29 Curtice, J., The Vote to Leave the EU, British Social Attitude, 34, p. 11.
  • 30 Goodwin, M., Heath, O., “The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind: An Aggregate-level Analys (...)
  • 31 Spence et al, op. cit., 2016.
  • 32 Wallace, T., “Voters really have had enough of experts: trust in economists has slumped since refer (...)
  • 33 Curtice, J., The Economics of Brexit in Voters’ Eyes, NatCen Social Research, 2016, p. 3.
  • 34 Hay, C., “Brexistential Angst and the Paradoxes of Populism: On the Contingency, Predictability and (...)
  • 35 Hay, op. cit. 2019, p. 198.
  • 36 Hay, op. cit. 2019, p. 200.
  • 37 Worley, Will. “Donald Trump inspired Brexit campaign because facts don't work, says Leave founder A (...)
  • 38 Iakhnis, E. et al. “Populist Referendum: Was ‘Brexit’ an Expression of Nativist and Anti-Elitist Se (...)

12Topics like immigration and sovereignty mattered and the question of identity29 was key30. As Spence et al argue: “the depth of public anger over the influx of workers from other EU countries, and more broadly the rejection of political and business elites, was more significant than [Stronger In] had anticipated”31. For that matter, the use of experts eventually backfired. As Brexiteer Michael Gove noted: “I think the people in this country have had enough of experts with organisations from acronyms saying that they know what is best and getting it consistently wrong”32. Experts had not foreseen the 2008 crisis, so why should people trust them now?33 In addition, the idea of focusing on experts was not in tune with the evolution of society. Stronger In reinforced the gap between ordinary people and the technocratic elite. Colin Hay explains that “Brexit represents a rejection of the politics of expertise, at least in its current form, and of expert paternalism in particular”34. The Remain campaign seems therefore to have misinterpreted what was at stake in this referendum35. The Brexit vote can be considered as a clear rejection of so-called “expertocracy” and the Leave campaign understood it perfectly, as Hay explains: “[Vote Leave’s] mantra – ‘taking back control’ – is not just about taking back control from Brussels, but taking back control of politics from experts too”36. Arron Banks, who financed the Leave.EU campaign, summarizes: “the Remain campaign featured fact, fact, fact, fact, fact. It just doesn’t work. You have got to connect with people emotionally. It’s the Trump success”37. This is why Vote Leave focused on sovereignty, anti-elitism, patriotism – some might say jingoism, even nativism38 – and fear of mass immigration.

  • 39 Rosa, J., Ruiz, C., Reason vs. emotion in the Brexit campaign: How key political actors and their f (...)
  • 40 Schapper, P., Avril, E, op. cit., 2019, pp. 54-55.

13As a result, it can be argued that the Remain side’s approach was politically sound, and their economic argument made sense: it was backed by experts and it relied on reason39, when the Leave approach was mainly about (negative) emotions40.

  • 41 Curtice J., “The Emotional Legacy of Brexit: How Britain Has Become a Country of ‘Remainers’ and
  • 42 On the importance of emotion in the Brexit debate: Moss J, Robinson E, Watts J., “Brexit and the Ev (...)

14However, as the referendum stirred up a very high degree of political passion41, their traditional, reasonable, business-as-usual approach was no match for the emotional appeal42 of the Leave campaign.

Theresa May(be)

  • 43 Atkins, J., Gaffney, J., “Narrative, persona and performance: The case of Theresa May 2016–2017”, T (...)
  • 44 Espiet-Kilty, R., « Cameron and Big Society. May and Shared Society. Same Party : Two Visions ? », (...)
  • 45 Kavanagh, D., « Preface », Observatoire de la société britannique, 21 | 2018.

15David Cameron resigned on the day after the Brexit referendum. He was replaced by Theresa May who had been concerned about the image of the Conservative brand for a long time. As soon as 2002, she had warned that the Conservatives would have to get rid of their “nasty party” image if they ever wanted to return to power43. Just like Cameron, whom she had supported during the 2005 leadership election, she was in favour of reforming the party to “shift [it] to the centre ground”44. During the 2016 referendum, she campaigned to remain, but she was not a vocal EU supporter. She became Prime Minister without a proper final contest in the leadership election (out of her five initial rivals, two were eliminated and three withdrew), but she was seen as a sensible choice: she had worked as Home Secretary and she was considered as serious and diligent45.

  • 46 Schnapper, P., « Brexit, or Theresa May’s Headache », Observatoire de la société britannique, 21 | (...)
  • 47 Atkins and Gaffney, op. cit. 2020, pp. 294-300.

16Atkins and Gaffney argue that “on becoming Prime Minister, May elaborated and performed a persona based on the mythological archetype of the healer”. However, as she interpreted the referendum as a mandate to leave the EU, she tried, very early on, to establish her Brexit credentials46 and decided to “firmly aligned herself with the Leavers”. She therefore failed to live up to her positive – and popular – initial image and she reinforced political divisions within her party and in the country at large47.

  • 48 Kavanagh, D, « Brexit, the Conservatives and the General Election 2017 », Revue Française de Civili (...)

17The main argument in favour of the 2017 general election was to strengthen her position to secure a better Brexit deal48. This would be a good tactical message to win over poll-weary voters. Unsurprisingly, Brexit was at the heart of the election, yet it would not be the sole focus during the campaign.

Team and strategy

  • 49 Cowley, P., Kavanagh, D, The British General Election of 2017, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, p. (...)

18Theresa May’s most senior advisers were Nick Timothy and Fiona Hill. They worked as chiefs of staff and they knew May perfectly49, but they had never run a campaign, this is why:

  • 50 McTague et al. “How Theresa May lost it”, Politico, 11 June 2017.

May assembled a team with a proven track record. Marshalled by experienced Tory insider Stephen Gilbert, the prime minister […] brought back Jim Messina, the U.S. data expert, Lynton Crosby, the Australian messaging guru, and pollster Mark Textor, all of whom helped Cameron secure a surprise majority in the 2015 election50.

  • 51 McTague et al, op. cit. 2017.
  • 52 Cowley & Kavanagh, op. cit. 2018, p. 7.

19Thanks to focus groups, Crosby and Textor had made it very clear what the Tories should do, in an election strategic note. They had to frame the election as a choice between continuity and stability, or chaos and uncertainty. They had to focus on stability as British people wanted “the world to calm down, not speed up”51. The key message was “Strong and Stable”. Focus groups and polls had shown that May was more popular than her party and that therefore she should be at the heart of the campaign. She would be the main communication vehicle52, just like in a presidential campaign.

The campaign

  • 53 It is even believed that the Tories spent up to £1.2 M on negative anti-Jeremy Corbyn social media (...)
  • 54 McTague et al, op. cit., 2017.

20When Theresa May officially announced that a general election would be held on 8 June, she first talked about stability and depicted Jeremy Corbyn as a terrible leader who would lead a coalition of chaos, following Crosby’s playbook53. Very soon, May started to attack the EU. McTague et al. argue that “it was a deliberate attempt to create an enemy to encourage the electorate to rally around May as their Brexit champion”54. Crosby thought that this enmification was essential as he feared that people might not turn up to vote. Indeed, the polls showed that it would be an easy win for the Conservatives, so Team May had to give voters a reason to actually go to the polling booths. The idea was to show that British people would not be bullied by the EU and that May would defend them.

  • 55 Timothy, Nick, “Where we went wrong”, The Spectator, 14 June 2017.
  • 56 Atkins and Gaffney, op. cit. 2020, p. 305.

21It was a positive start and May kept exactly to Crosby’s script. However, it soon became problematic. As Nick Timothy acknowledged after the campaign, Theresa May “is never comfortable hogging the limelight”55. Hence, the very strict discipline she showed, repeating over and over the same slogan “Strong and Stable”, made her appear mechanical and unable to be spontaneous. She looked robotic and she earned the nickname “Maybot”56.

  • 57 Timothy, op. cit. 2017.
  • 58 Hood, A., Simpson, P., “Social care – a step forwards or a step backwards?”, Institute for Fiscal S (...)

22But the real problem was the Conservative manifesto which was deemed to be the brainchild of Nick Timothy57. Timothy was said to have followed his own political agenda as he saw the 2017 election as a way to change the political landscape. He broke Crosby’s discipline and instead of focusing on the Tories’ traditional strongpoints, like security and the economy, he decided to talk about the NHS, schools and public services. One key element concerned social policy whereby the rules governing who is eligible for government funding for social care would be changed58. Asthana and Elgot explain:

Under the Tory proposals, people needing social care at home would have to pay for it until the value of their assets – including their home – reached a floor of £100,000. The party also promised that a family home would never need to be sold in a person’s lifetime, with costs instead recouped after death.

  • 59 Asthana, A. and Elgot, J., “Theresa May ditches manifesto plan with 'dementia tax' U-turn”, The Gua (...)

23Opposition parties called it “the dementia tax” as “payments after death could eat into the inheritance of offspring whose parents were unlucky enough to suffer from a condition – like dementia – in which reliance on social care is inevitable”59. Theresa May had to make a U-turn on the policy, which eroded her “Strong and Stable” slogan and dealt a huge blow to her campaign. Her positive polls collapsed almost overnight and the so-called “dementia tax” contributed to the retoxification of the Tory brand.

Analysis

  • 60 Ross, T. and McTague, T., Betting the House, London, Biteback Publishing, 2017, p. 184.
  • 61 Timothy, op. cit. 2017.
  • 62 Belam, M., “Theresa May awkwardly eating chips could be 2017's 'bacon sandwich'”, The Guardian, 2 M (...)

24As they had “little time to research and design a fresh strategy”60, May’s team decided to seek inspiration in the 2015 playbook. The problem was that the context was different, and so was the candidate. Besides, not everyone saw eye to eye in the campaign team. At first, Nick Timothy and Fiona Hill had wanted to run a traditional campaign in which policies would be centre stage and each minister would participate61. This was quickly dismissed as it would have given journalists the opportunity to grill the government. However, focusing on May alone, as Lynton Crosby advocated, was also problematic. Very soon, it became clear that a “presidential-style” campaign would not work. On top of that, some basic mistakes were made, in particular when she was photographed eating chips. This was a clear reminder of Ed Miliband’s bacon sandwich and alongside her robotic answers, May or “Maybot” was mocked on Twitter as trying to eat “human food”62.

  • 63 McTague et al., op. cit., 2017.
  • 64 Cowley & Kavanagh, op. cit. 2018, p. 10.
  • 65 Shipman, T., Fall Out: A Year of Political Mayhem, London, William Collins, 2017, p. 290.
  • 66 Atkins and Gaffney, op. cit. 2020, p. 305.
  • 67 May, T., “Statement from the new Prime Minister Theresa May”, Gov.uk, 13 July 2016.

25The manifesto fiasco was the coup de grace. The most sensitive points, such as the social care policy, had not been tested on focus groups, which is “a basic error of judgment” and “the reaction tends to be ‘very, very strong’” according to Craig Oliver63. Worse, this mistake showed disunity within May’s team. The opposition was mainly between May’s closest aides, Timothy and Hill, who wanted the election to be about change, and the old guard of spin doctors, led by Crosby, who wanted to focus on stability64. It means that her communication was about stability when her proposals, in the manifesto, were about change. On top of that, the so-called “dementia tax” came to be seen as “an assault on pensioners”65, which undermined her initial persona as a “healer” and also risked antagonising party grassroots whose average age is quite high. If anything, this apparent lack of empathy served to deepen “the idea of the division between ‘the many’ and ‘the few’”66, in contradiction with her 2016 pledge to help the “just about managing”67.

  • 68 Michie, op. cit., 1998, p. 299.
  • 69 Ridge-Newman A. “‘Strong and Stable’ to ‘Weak and Wobbly’: The Conservative Election Campaign”. In: (...)
  • 70 Ross & McTague, op. cit. p. 183.

26Political communication experts and spin doctors tend to highlight the importance of strict discipline and the concept of “on-message”, that is, the repetition of the same messages so “they stick in voters’ minds”68. This was somewhat lacking from May’s 2017 campaign. As a result of her communication miscalculations, her slogan was soon derided from “Strong and Stable” to “Weak and Wobbly”69. It seems that the wrong messenger carried out the wrong message70 which created confusion and annihilated May’s chances of delivering her vision of Brexit.

27This electoral disaster, as the Tories lost their majority in Parliament and had to rely on the votes of 10 DUP MPs from Northern Ireland, increased the state of political chaos in the country.

Boris Johnson’s personal touch

  • 71 Yates, C., “On the Psychodynamics of Boris Johnson and Brexit”, 2018, Bournemouth University, pp. 2 (...)
  • 72 Margulies, B., “Understanding Boris Johnson’s appeal: performative rebelliousness, impishness, and (...)

28Communication scholar Candida Yates argues that: “Johnson has constructed a persona as a benign, old-school English eccentric, who refuses to identify with superego figures of authority such as […] the out of touch ‘metropolitan elite’”. For that matter, he has managed to bypass today’s undermined “paternal identification” to develop a “more horizontal, ‘sibling’ structures of identification”. Johnson’s image is therefore more that of a brother than an authoritative father figure71, which seems to reinforce his populist appeal in post-Brexit Britain72.

Team and strategy

  • 73 On Cummings’ controversies: Turnnidge, S., “Dominic Cummings' 5 Most Controversial Moments”, Huffpo (...)
  • 74 Morrison, S., “Key players in Boris Johnson's election campaign: From Dominic Cummings to Isaac Lev (...)
  • 75 Mason, R., “Lynton Crosby protege positioned at heart of Tory election machine”, The Guardian, 30 O (...)
  • 76 Bonnet, A-P., “As Easy as Bojo’s ‘Oven-ready’ Brexit Pie? The Conservative Campaign”, Revue Françai (...)
  • 77 McTague, op. cit. 2019.
  • 78 Power, S., Bale, T., Webb, P., “‘Mistake overturned, so I call it a lesson learned’: The Conservati (...)
  • 79 Piper, E., “How Boris Johnson's election gamble paid off”, Reuters, 13 December 2019.

29Even though Johnson’s Brexit rhetoric rejected the so-called “expertocracy”, he did rely on a powerful team of communication experts. His most notorious spin doctor was Dominic Cummings73, the Prime Minister's de facto chief of staff. He played a decisive role during the 2016 referendum and before the 2019 campaign but during the campaign, he deferred to a young (35 years old) Australian political strategist, Isaac Levido74 who was Lynton Crosby’s protégé and was seen as his most trusted lieutenant75. During the 2019 general election, he brought together a team of young talents76 and displayed the clarity and firm-handedness that the 2017 campaign had lacked. After the 2017 setback, Boris Johnson’s spin team knew that a new approach was needed. But they did not carry out a clear and comprehensive overhaul of the 2017 Conservative strategy. Quite ironically, they sought inspiration in what political strategist Lynton Crosby had suggested they do back then. As Tom McTague puts it, they fought the 2019 election with the 2017 script77. However, running a campaign with Boris Johnson as the main protagonist is no easy task78. Some may consider his magnetism as an asset, but his unpredictability may also be a liability. This is why the whole campaign can be equated to a pendulum swing between running away from problems and trying to counterattack, while focusing on Boris Johnson as the main communication vehicle79.

30For that matter, as we will see in the analysis, one episode seems to epitomize the 2019 Conservative spin: the fridge incident. One day before the election, on 11 December 2019, Boris Johnson tried to dodge an unplanned television interview for ITV’s “Good Morning Britain” by hiding in a walk-in fridge during a publicity stunt. After a few minutes of confusion, he emerged carrying a crate of milk bottles that he later delivered to a house in nearby Guiseley.

  • 80 Flinders, M., “Not a Brexit Election? Pessimism, Promises and Populism ‘UK-Style’” in Britain Votes (...)

31A similar pattern emerged during the four weeks that the campaign lasted: the Conservatives would try to run away from any difficult situations; most of the time they would counterattack to create a distraction, what Matthew Flinders calls “distracting dramaturgy” so as to prevent “the discussion of deeper policy-related issues”80; eventually they focused on one simple message, “Get Brexit Done”. Before analyzing the fridge incident, we will have a look at how this “fleeing/ counterattacking” pattern materialized during the campaign.

The campaign

The art of dodging

  • 81 Power, S., Bale, T., Webb, P., op. cit., p. 66.
  • 82 Flinders, op. cit. 2020, p. 234.
  • 83 Vielcanet, op. cit. 2011, p. 41.
  • 84 Barbet, D., Honoré, J. P., « Ce que se taire veut dire. Expressions et usages politiques du silence (...)

32One of Levido’s leading principles during the campaign was to limit Johnson’s public appearances to carefully stage-managed events81. This made sense because when he did accept to give interviews early in the campaign, he had to face harsh criticisms. For example, when asked by an audience member during the BBC Question Time Leaders’ Debate: “How important is it for someone in your position of power to always tell the truth?” the question, and the following answer by Johnson “I think it is absolutely vital”, were met with laughter from the audience. These initial setbacks reinforced the idea that Johnson should be kept away from interviews. This approach became all the more obvious when Johnson refused to participate in the Channel Four News Climate debate. Similarly, the PM declined an interview by BBC’s broadcaster, Andrew Neil. Dodging interviews (the so-called “submarine strategy”82) and remaining silent is often resorted to by spin doctors83 in order to send a clear message: they set the agenda; they are in control, not the media. Besides, political silence highlights the sound and the fury of the opponents84, and their potential contradictions and doubts, in particular concerning controversial topics such as Brexit.

  • 85 BBC, “General election 2019: Donald Trump criticises Johnson's Brexit deal”, BBC News, 31 October 2 (...)
  • 86 Archer, K., Ray, J., “Britons' Approval of U.S. Leadership at New Low”, Gallup, 5 November 2020.

33Foreign interference posed a clear risk. As the Tories staunchly refused to publish a parliamentary report on Russian interference in British politics, a bigger threat emerged from the US. During an interview with Nigel Farage, Donald Trump strongly criticized Johnson’s new Brexit deal with the EU: “To be honest with you, this deal, under certain aspects of the deal, you can’t do it. You can’t trade. We can’t make a trade deal with the U.K.”85. As Trump was quite unpopular in the UK86 , this kind of intervention was not really appreciated by Johnson’s team. The art of dodging became obvious during the NATO summit held in London in early December. The Prime Minister’s spin team avoided any one-to-one talks with the visiting US President. The Prime Minister and Mr. Trump were kept apart as much as possible and held no bilateral talks during the two-day summit. They met only once, discreetly, at Downing Street.

The Tories strike back

  • 87 Alexandre-Collier, A., « Boris Johnson est-il populiste ? Le leader conservateur à l’épreuve du Bre (...)
  • 88 Greenslade, R, “Brexit bias? BBC faces a difficult balancing act in polarised nation”. The Guardian(...)

34The Conservatives did run away from tricky situations, but often, they counterattacked. When Channel 4 News decided to replace Boris Johnson with a melting block of ice during the leadership debate on the climate crisis, the Conservatives complained to Ofcom, the media regulator, that the channel broke strict broadcasting impartiality rules. Channel Four was eventually cleared of bias. The bulk of the wrath was actually aimed at the BBC. The Tories described BBC broadcaster Andrew Neil’s criticism of Johnson dodging interviews as supposed evidence of anti-Tory, pro-remain bias at the corporation. The Conservatives retaliated: Boris Johnson threatened to take the BBC’s license fee away claiming that public funding was no longer justifiable. This attack on the BBC was a political message to show that the BBC was not almighty. It can be seen as a populist move87: the BBC is depicted as elitist and anti-Brexit. It was even dubbed the “Brussels Broadcasting Corporation”88. The Conservatives were therefore portrayed as being on the side of the people, against the elite. As Brexit was, in part, a vote of protest against the London elite, attacking the media establishment was fertile ground to seduce some voters who felt left behind.

Analysis

  • 89 Ford, R., Goodwin, M., Revolt on the Right, London, Routledge, 2014.

35Even if the fridge episode was a fiasco, it nonetheless enabled the Conservatives’ spin doctors to bring their point home: Boris Johnson will deliver Brexit. If we put aside the embarrassing decision to run away into a fridge, the image of the milkman could be actually interpreted as a masterstroke, since nostalgia was at the heart of the Brexit rhetoric. What better example of bygone Britain than the milkman knocking at your door in the morning? The milkman symbolizes a sense of community and therefore a sense of belonging. This was identity politics at its best and a strong lever to seduce those voters who feel abandoned by traditional, and London-based, politics89. The milkman imagery works as a twofold metaphor as it shines a light on two essential elements: the actual person who delivers, the agent, and the thing that is being delivered, that is, the object. We will first analyze the agent.

The Boris factor

  • 90 Bale, T. and Webb, P., “The Conservatives: their Sweetest Victory?”, Revue Française de Civilisatio (...)

36As policy debates are becoming increasingly complex, more and more voters are coming to rely on leadership evaluations as “a heuristic simplification to guide their decision”90. This is when Johnson comes in extremely handy. He is quite popular as he has been a household name for decades, in particular concerning Europe. His eccentric and preposterous allegations about the EU have influenced at least two generations of British Eurosceptics when he was working as a Brussels correspondent for the Daily Telegraph. His journalistic contribution should not be underestimated as his twisted reports on the EU enabled him to establish a personal connection with his readers and provided some kind of comic relief in time of uncertainty. Besides, his Brexit credentials did not need to be established as he was a figurehead in the referendum campaign.

A clear and simple message

  • 91 Payne, S., “UK election: how the Tories ‘got it done’”, FT, 22 December 2019.

37If Johnson was portrayed as a milkman, the actual message, and the core of the campaign, was that he could deliver Brexit. This metaphorical approach was meant to be a clear reminder that he would personally deliver Brexit. There would be something for everyone. It would be a personal, individual, bespoke Brexit. The official Conservative slogan seems to epitomize his catch-all approach: “Get Brexit Done”. This key phrase came up during a focus group session with Tory voters in Bury91. This bottom-up approach, designed to make people feel good about themselves, worked quite well.

  • 92 Yates, op. cit. 2018, p. 4.

38Contrary to the Labour campaign, which was marred by antisemitism and an unpopular leader, Boris Johnson was depicted as a cheerful figure with a positive message: just like an old friend, he would come round and give you a taste of fantasied, rural England92. The Conservative campaign echoed what Brexit supporters wanted, without making them feel guilty or remorseful about the current political situation.

Conclusion

  • 93 Schnapper, op. cit. 2017.
  • 94 Curtice, op. cit. 2018, p. 7.
  • 95 Flinders, op. cit. 2020, p. 229.

39Our initial aim was to determine how influential spin doctors were during the Brexit crisis through the analysis of three key campaigns. This article has made it clear that there is a correlation between the public personas developed or reinforced during the campaigns and the eventual success or failure of the candidate. Cameron’s traditional and arguably elitist image with a “Heads vs Hearts”93 line of argument did not take into consideration the cultural – and emotional – dimension of the Brexit debate. Similarly, Theresa May’s presidentialisation was not suitable for such a candidate. Besides, the lack of unity displayed by her campaign team somewhat blurred her “healer” persona. Boris Johnson’s anti-elite campaign, in contrast, seemed to correspond with the general political mood in post-referendum Britain, in which Brexit identities tend to prevail over party allegiance94. His populist touch seemed to resonate with “left-behind” voters, as “Johnson and those around him recognised the changing emotional landscape of British politics”95.

40We can argue that the Brexit crisis ignited a spin reversal whereby the key element on which spin doctors had to focus was not so much the candidate but the political situation. It seems that there was a relational interdependence between Johnson and Brexit. If Johnson was instrumental in the 2016 Brexit result, he became Prime Minister precisely because of the Brexit chaos, and his spin doctors made the most of it.

41To summarize, we can argue that David Cameron’s top-down approach failed to connect with people emotionally and Theresa May’s uncertainty and mixed message did not work. Boris Johnson’s 2019 triumph, on the other hand, shows that the bottom-up strategy devised by his spin doctors was the key to attracting a majority of British voters. It nonetheless opened the way for a more populist style of communication which might affect the image of the Conservative Party for years to come.

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Notes

1 Blumler, J. G., “The Fourth Age of Political Communication”, Politiques de communication, vol. 6, no. 1, 2016, p. 24.

2 Manson, N. C., “Making Sense of Spin”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, vol. 29, no. 3, 2012, p. 200.

3 Fall, L.T., “Spin and Double-Speak”, The International Encyclopedia of Communication, (Vol. X), London: Blackwell, 2008, p. 4788.

4 Sharlamanov, K. and Jovanovski A., “Sociological analysis of spin and spin doctors” International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research, Volume 7, Issue 12, December-2016, p. 74.

5 Esser, F., et al., “Spin doctors in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany: Metacommunication about media manipulation”. Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 6, 2001, p. 23.

6 Louw, E, The Media & Political Process, London, Sage, 2010, p. 76.

7 Sumpter, R. and Tankard, J., “The spin doctor: An alternative model of public relations”, Public Relations Review, Volume 20, Issue 1, 1994, p. 20.

8 Schlesinger, Philip, et al, Open Scotland?: Journalists, Spin Doctors and Lobbyists, Edinburgh University Press, 2001, p. 111.

9 Rivière-De Franco, K. « Les spin doctors et la communication politique en Grande-Bretagne », Quaderni [En ligne], 101 | Été 2020

10 Michie, D, The Invisible Persuaders, London, Bantam Press, 1998, p. 297.

11 Alexandre-Collier, A., Les habits neufs de David Cameron, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2010, p. 11 and pp. 70-73.

12 Heppell, T., The Tories, From Winston Churchill to David Cameron, London, Bloomsbury, 2014, p. 136.

13 Vielcanet, F., La fabrique de présidents, Paris, La Martinière, 2011, p.193.

14 Schnapper, P., “The Elephant in the Room: Europe in the 2015 British General Election”, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XX-3 | 2015.

15 Behr, R., “How remain failed: the inside story of a doomed campaign”, The Guardian, 5 July 2016.

16 Cowley, P., Kavanagh, D., The British General Election of 2015, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p. 63.

17 Schnapper, P., « David Cameron et la campagne du ‘Remain’ », Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXII-2 | 2017, p. 8.

18 Behr, op. cit., 2016.

19 Schnapper, P., Avril, E, Où va le Royaume-Uni ?, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2019, p. 47.

20 Clarke, J., Newman, J., “‘People in this country have had enough of experts’: Brexit and the paradoxes of populism”, Critical Policy Studies, 11:1, 2017, p. 110.

21 Spence et al., “How David Cameron blew it”, Politico, 25 June 2016

22 Stephenson, P., “How to win a referendum”, Politico, 9 December 2016.

23 Travis, A., “The leave campaign made three key promises – are they keeping them?” The Guardian, 27 June 2016.

24 Schnapper, P., Avril, E, op. cit. 2019, p. 51.

25 Fox, S., “Political alienation and referendums: how political alienation was related to support for Brexit”, British Politics, 16, 2021, abstract.

26 BBC, “Backlash after Barack Obama EU referendum intervention”, BBC News, 23 April 2016.

27 Oliver, C., Unleashing Demons: The Inside Story of Brexit, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 2016, p. 10-11.

28 Schnapper, P., Avril, E., op. cit. 2019, pp. 209-213.

29 Curtice, J., The Vote to Leave the EU, British Social Attitude, 34, p. 11.

30 Goodwin, M., Heath, O., “The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind: An Aggregate-level Analysis of the Result”, The Political Quarterly, 87 (3), 2016, p. 331.

31 Spence et al, op. cit., 2016.

32 Wallace, T., “Voters really have had enough of experts: trust in economists has slumped since referendum”, The Telegraph, 22 November 2019.

33 Curtice, J., The Economics of Brexit in Voters’ Eyes, NatCen Social Research, 2016, p. 3.

34 Hay, C., “Brexistential Angst and the Paradoxes of Populism: On the Contingency, Predictability and Intelligibility of Seismic Shifts”, Political Studies, vol. 68, no. 1, Feb. 2020, p. 199.

35 Hay, op. cit. 2019, p. 198.

36 Hay, op. cit. 2019, p. 200.

37 Worley, Will. “Donald Trump inspired Brexit campaign because facts don't work, says Leave founder Arron Banks”, Independent, 30 June 2016.

38 Iakhnis, E. et al. “Populist Referendum: Was ‘Brexit’ an Expression of Nativist and Anti-Elitist Sentiment?” Research & Politics, Apr. 2018, p. 8.

39 Rosa, J., Ruiz, C., Reason vs. emotion in the Brexit campaign: How key political actors and their followers used Twitter, First Monday, Volume 25, Number 3 - 2 March 2020.

40 Schapper, P., Avril, E, op. cit., 2019, pp. 54-55.

41 Curtice J., “The Emotional Legacy of Brexit: How Britain Has Become a Country of ‘Remainers’ and

‘Leavers’”, What UK Thinks: EU, 2018, p. 16.

42 On the importance of emotion in the Brexit debate: Moss J, Robinson E, Watts J., “Brexit and the Everyday Politics of Emotion: Methodological Lessons from History”, Political Studies, vol. 68, no. 4, Nov. 2020, pp. 837–856

43 Atkins, J., Gaffney, J., “Narrative, persona and performance: The case of Theresa May 2016–2017”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 2020, Vol. 22(2), p. 297.

44 Espiet-Kilty, R., « Cameron and Big Society. May and Shared Society. Same Party : Two Visions ? », Observatoire de la société britannique, 21 | 2018.

45 Kavanagh, D., « Preface », Observatoire de la société britannique, 21 | 2018.

46 Schnapper, P., « Brexit, or Theresa May’s Headache », Observatoire de la société britannique, 21 | 2018.

47 Atkins and Gaffney, op. cit. 2020, pp. 294-300.

48 Kavanagh, D, « Brexit, the Conservatives and the General Election 2017 », Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXIII-2 | 2018.

49 Cowley, P., Kavanagh, D, The British General Election of 2017, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, p. 54.

50 McTague et al. “How Theresa May lost it”, Politico, 11 June 2017.

51 McTague et al, op. cit. 2017.

52 Cowley & Kavanagh, op. cit. 2018, p. 7.

53 It is even believed that the Tories spent up to £1.2 M on negative anti-Jeremy Corbyn social media adverts. Source: White, C., “Tories spent £1,200,000 on negative anti-Jeremy Corbyn social media adverts”, Metro, 10 June 2017.

54 McTague et al, op. cit., 2017.

55 Timothy, Nick, “Where we went wrong”, The Spectator, 14 June 2017.

56 Atkins and Gaffney, op. cit. 2020, p. 305.

57 Timothy, op. cit. 2017.

58 Hood, A., Simpson, P., “Social care – a step forwards or a step backwards?”, Institute for Fiscal Studies, 19 May 2017.

59 Asthana, A. and Elgot, J., “Theresa May ditches manifesto plan with 'dementia tax' U-turn”, The Guardian, 22 May 2017.

60 Ross, T. and McTague, T., Betting the House, London, Biteback Publishing, 2017, p. 184.

61 Timothy, op. cit. 2017.

62 Belam, M., “Theresa May awkwardly eating chips could be 2017's 'bacon sandwich'”, The Guardian, 2 May 2017.

63 McTague et al., op. cit., 2017.

64 Cowley & Kavanagh, op. cit. 2018, p. 10.

65 Shipman, T., Fall Out: A Year of Political Mayhem, London, William Collins, 2017, p. 290.

66 Atkins and Gaffney, op. cit. 2020, p. 305.

67 May, T., “Statement from the new Prime Minister Theresa May”, Gov.uk, 13 July 2016.

68 Michie, op. cit., 1998, p. 299.

69 Ridge-Newman A. “‘Strong and Stable’ to ‘Weak and Wobbly’: The Conservative Election Campaign”. In: Wring D., Mortimore R., Atkinson S. (eds) Political Communication in Britain. London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.

70 Ross & McTague, op. cit. p. 183.

71 Yates, C., “On the Psychodynamics of Boris Johnson and Brexit”, 2018, Bournemouth University, pp. 2-4.

72 Margulies, B., “Understanding Boris Johnson’s appeal: performative rebelliousness, impishness, and indiscipline”, LSE Blog, 1 August 2019.

73 On Cummings’ controversies: Turnnidge, S., “Dominic Cummings' 5 Most Controversial Moments”, Huffpost, 13/11/2020, https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/dominic-cummings-most-controversial-moments_uk_5fae4284c5b6370e7e31cf12.

74 Morrison, S., “Key players in Boris Johnson's election campaign: From Dominic Cummings to Isaac Levido and Lee Cain”, Evening Standard, 13 December 2019.

75 Mason, R., “Lynton Crosby protege positioned at heart of Tory election machine”, The Guardian, 30 October 2019

76 Bonnet, A-P., “As Easy as Bojo’s ‘Oven-ready’ Brexit Pie? The Conservative Campaign”, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXV-3 | 2020, p. 6.

77 McTague, op. cit. 2019.

78 Power, S., Bale, T., Webb, P., “‘Mistake overturned, so I call it a lesson learned’: The Conservatives” in Britain Votes: The 2019 General Election, London, Hansard Society, 2020, p. 67.

79 Piper, E., “How Boris Johnson's election gamble paid off”, Reuters, 13 December 2019.

80 Flinders, M., “Not a Brexit Election? Pessimism, Promises and Populism ‘UK-Style’” in Britain Votes: The 2019 General Election, London, Hansard Society, 2020, p. 234.

81 Power, S., Bale, T., Webb, P., op. cit., p. 66.

82 Flinders, op. cit. 2020, p. 234.

83 Vielcanet, op. cit. 2011, p. 41.

84 Barbet, D., Honoré, J. P., « Ce que se taire veut dire. Expressions et usages politiques du silence », Mots. Les langages du politique, 103 | 2013, p. 17.

85 BBC, “General election 2019: Donald Trump criticises Johnson's Brexit deal”, BBC News, 31 October 2019.

86 Archer, K., Ray, J., “Britons' Approval of U.S. Leadership at New Low”, Gallup, 5 November 2020.

87 Alexandre-Collier, A., « Boris Johnson est-il populiste ? Le leader conservateur à l’épreuve du Brexit », Observatoire de la société britannique, 2021.

88 Greenslade, R, “Brexit bias? BBC faces a difficult balancing act in polarised nation”. The Guardian, 27 October 2019.

89 Ford, R., Goodwin, M., Revolt on the Right, London, Routledge, 2014.

90 Bale, T. and Webb, P., “The Conservatives: their Sweetest Victory?”, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XX-3 | 2015.

91 Payne, S., “UK election: how the Tories ‘got it done’”, FT, 22 December 2019.

92 Yates, op. cit. 2018, p. 4.

93 Schnapper, op. cit. 2017.

94 Curtice, op. cit. 2018, p. 7.

95 Flinders, op. cit. 2020, p. 229.

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Alma-Pierre Bonnet, « Dealing with the crisis : The Brexit Spin »Observatoire de la société britannique, 27 | 2021, 103-125.

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Alma-Pierre Bonnet, « Dealing with the crisis : The Brexit Spin »Observatoire de la société britannique [En ligne], 27 | 2021, mis en ligne le 01 juin 2022, consulté le 28 mars 2024. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/osb/5365 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/osb.5365

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Alma-Pierre Bonnet

PRAG de civilisation britannique à Sciences Po Lyon

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