Replication data for: Equilibrium Selection in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Axiomatic Approach and Experimental Evidence

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Matthias Blonski; Peter Ockenfels; Giancarlo Spagnolo

Version: View help for Version V1

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Project Citation:

Blonski, Matthias, Ockenfels, Peter, and Spagnolo, Giancarlo. Replication data for: Equilibrium Selection in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Axiomatic Approach and Experimental Evidence. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2011. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114383V1

Project Description

Summary: We propose an axiomatic approach for equilibrium selection in the discounted, infinitely repeated symmetric Prisoner's Dilemma. Our axioms characterize a unique selection criterion that is also useful as a tool for applied comparative statics exercises as it results in a critical discount factor δ* strictly larger than δ, the standard criterion that has often been used in applications. In an experimental test we find a strong predictive power of our proposed criterion. For parameter changes where the standard and our criterion predict differently, changes in observed cooperation follow predictions based on δ* . (JEL C72, C73, C92, D81)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      C72 Noncooperative Games
      C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
      C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
      D81 Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

Data Type(s): experimental data

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V1 [2019-10-12]

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