A Lightweight Three-Factor Authentication Scheme for WHSN Architecture

Wireless Healthcare Sensor Network (WHSN) is a benchmarking technology deployed to levitate the quality of lives for the patients and doctors. WHSN systems must fit IEEE 802.15.6 standard for specific application criteria, unlike some standard criteria that are difficult to meet. Therefore, many security models were suggested to enhance the security of the WHSN and promote system performance. Yu and Park proposed a three-factor authentication scheme based on the smart card, biometric, and password, and their scheme can be easily employed in three-tier WHSN architecture. Furthermore, they claimed that their scheme can withstand guessing attack and provide anonymity, although, after cryptanalysis, we found that their scheme lacks both. Accordingly, we suggested a three-factor authentication scheme with better system confusion due to multiplex parametric features, hash function, and higher key size to increase the security and achieve anonymity for the connected nodes. Moreover, the scheme included initialization, authentication, re-authentication, secure node addition, user revocation, and secure data transmission via blockchain technology. The formal analysis of the scheme was conducted by BAN logic (Burrows Abadi Nadeem) and the simulation was carried out by Tamarin prover to validate that the proposed scheme is resistant to replay, session hijacking, and guessing attacks, plus it provides anonymity, perfect forward secrecy, and authentication along with the key agreement.


Introduction
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is widely spread through various firms such as shrewd homes, shrewd manufactory, shrewd businesses, and smart health systems such as in WHSN [1][2][3][4][5][6][7]. This technology aims to reduce the patient's need to go to the hospital for checkups and allow the doctors to monitor the patients' health status from a remotely far location at any time. In the latest years, the adaptability of WHSN consists of small sizes, lower power, cheap sensors, and enables the communication among them to occur in a short-range [8]. Those sensors can be micro-controller, transceiver, memory, and battery. WHSN architecture supports sensors cooperation with each other's to build the connected sensor network architecture and inspect the user's health [9], as depicted in Figure 1.
The data collected by the sensor are saved for long time to increase its quality and to make better processing and analysis for better treatment choices [10]. Also, WHSN architecture consists of weak sensors that infringe the privacy of the patient data. Many authentication schemes were proposed to solve this issue along with many others such as anonymity, eavesdropping, DoS (Denial of Service Attack), and nodes impersonation attack [11]. After thorough analysis for the proposed schemes, we found that each has its strengths and weaknesses. Recently, Yu and Park [12] proposed three-factor authentication scheme (SLUA-WSN) for WSN network smart homes to enable the user of authenticating themselves in a secure manner. They claimed that their scheme is protected against impersonation, stolen integrated circuit card, and guessing attacks, and provides user-anonymity with un-traceability. However, we identified a lack of smart card data protection that leads to node impersonation and guessing in cases where stolen smart card attack occurred. Also, issues in anonymity and un-traceability arise, when all the previously mentioned acts are committed by the intruder i. Their scheme can be improved regarding computation and communication costs on both the foreign network side and gateway side too. Therefore, we propose a robust authentication scheme based on three-factor for WHSN higher performance and capacity efficiency besides advanced security to overcome the weaknesses in [12] scheme.

Contribution and Motivation
In continuation to the development of the WHSN authentication scheme that is proposed in our previous research [13]. We considered that the sensor node data is secure, and we proposed a secure authentication scheme between the foreign network node and the hub node. The main contributions of this article are as follows: • Performing cryptanalysis of Yu and Park [12] scheme and show its vulnerability regarding anonymity protection, un-traceability protection, impersonation, guessing, and stolen smart card attacks.

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Proposing a lightweight three-factor authentication and re-authentication schemes consist of the biometric, smart card, and password with better key management, and less operations to increase the scheme efficiency. Also, introducing additional mechanisms such as secure node addition, secure user revocation, and data transmission via blockchain.

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Validate the scheme BAN logic, and Tamarin simulation tool to prove its authentication, key agreement, and security. The results validated the scheme security versus replay, and session hijacking attacks, plus it achieved perfect forward secrecy along with authentication and key agreement.

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Calculate the efficiency of the new scheme with computation in line with communication costs and storage. It showed an advantage of our scheme over [12] structure regarding computation cost, communication cost, and storage capacity.
The motivations of our work are described below: • The noticeable drawbacks in most of WHSN structures, and their weaknesses towards most well-known attacks such as impersonation, session hijacking, and stolen smartcard attacks.
Sensors 2020, 20, 6860 3 of 31 • Designing authentication scheme needs to achieve system scalability along with security. • WHSN authentication schemes must provide appropriate complexity algorithm in conjunction the system capabilities along with capacity.
Accordingly, we proposed a lightweight authentication scheme to enhance the security and solve the performance deficiencies in [12]. The newly proposed scheme will provide more security with less hash functions and high parameters confusion. It is secure against offline/online shared secret guessing, brute force, replay, impersonation, eavesdropping, collision, and jamming attacks. Also, it provides numerous security features such as anonymity, integrity, un-traceability, key agreement, and mutual authentication. Likewise, the scheme is appropriate for WHSN constraint system due to its efficiency in comparison to other authentication schemes.

Organization
The remaining of this article is structured as follows. We present the state-of-art for WSN architecture in Section 2 and explain the preliminaries in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes Yu and Park's structure, and Section 5 illustrates a protected and efficient authentication schemes for WHSN architecture to improve the downfalls of Yu and Park's scheme. Section 6 assesses the security evaluation of the new scheme by executing informal and formal analysis containing BAN logic along with Tamarin simulation. Section 7 shows the outcomes of the efficiency analysis of the new scheme in comparison with the associated schemes. Finally, the conclusion is discussed in Section 8.

Related Works
In recent years, numerous access control and authentication systems were suggested to secure the data in WHSN technology. Some schemes are non-cryptographic based schemes that rely on the physiological signal, channel-based schemes that rely on special software or sensor, and cryptographic based schemes which are more popular [14].
Chang et al. and Park et al. [15,16] had offered an authentication structure between the user node and the gateway node and utilized a honeyword checker for the password security. Also, their scheme used random number generator from the Elliptic curve along with a hash function right before sending the authentication request. Consequently, C. Wang et al. [17] had cryptanalyzed both schemes and exposed their lack of anonymity along with their vulnerability to known session-specific temporary information (KSSTI), and privileged-user attacks. Therefore, ref. [17] suggested an improved anonymity three-factor authentication scheme utilizing an Elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC). The structure relied on the biometric fuzzy extractor method to enhance scheme security against password guessing and identity spoofing. Unfortunately, their scheme suffered from issues in anonymity as well as backward secrecy attack when the user loses his/her smartcard, and due to some parameters lack protection.
Similarly, Challa et al. [18] recommended an authentication system with three factors in wireless body area network (WBAN) architecture based on the pubic key and Elliptic curve structure to create a secure system. They declared that their system is strong versus several types of attacks such as insider attack, password cracking, stolen smart-card, denial-of-service, known session key, masquerading, session hijacking, and replay attacks. However, their scheme lacked anonymity of the user and sensor identities. Also, the weak protection to the public key by the user phone and temporary identity made the scheme weak toward anonymity and guessing attack due to the exposure of random parameters in the open channel.
Mo and Chen [19] had analyzed the security flaws in the proposed three-factor scheme in WSN by Lu et al. [20] and found that their structure is suspectable to offline password cracking, known session-specific temporary information attacks, and lack of session key backward secrecy. Therefore, ref. [19] had offered a three-factor authentication structure utilized user biometric, smart card and key where they used hash function and Elliptic curve (ECC) to protect the passwords and security parameters. But the issue is the user anonymity might be compromised because the user identity is • Gen: After the biometric input Bio is imprinted by users, Gen produces a consistent random string σ {0, 1}, a random auxiliary string σ {0, 1}, and a probabilistic function.

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Rep: It reproduces σ with value σ when a disruptive biometric BIO new is inscribed, where σ is a public replication value connected with Bio.

Intruder Model
To analyze our model security, we discussed a very well-known Dolev-Yao (DY) threat model [27]. In the DY design, the intruder i capabilities are as presented below.

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Referring to the DY model [27] an intruder i can inject, delete, intercept, and eavesdrop the data exchanged over wireless networks. • Using the DY model [27], the data transmitted over wireless networks can be implanted, modified, recorded, and snooped by an intruder i.

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An intruder i can capture legal users' smart cards and can use power-analysis to retrieve confidential keys stored in memory [28]. • An intruder i can undertake numerous attacks after extracting the smart card's secret credentials, such masquerade, offline key guessing, trusted insider, and forward secrecy attacks [29,30].

Review on Yu and Park Scheme
In this section, we reviewed [12] to discover its weaknesses and points of enhancements, also we conducted cryptanalysis of the scheme, and we found that it lacks anonymity and the protection against secret shared key guessing. We discuss the scheme symbols in Table 1 as well as the registration and authentication phases. Ui's password SID j Sj's identity K GWN Master key of GWN X pub Public key of GWN x j Secret key of Sj E, F p Elliptic curve E defined on the finite field Fp with order p G A group for an elliptic curve P The generator of G E k , D k Symmetric key encryption/decryption SK Session key T i Timestamp BIO Biometric of Ui h(.) Hash function ⊕ XOR operation Concatenation operation

Registration Phase of Yu and Park Scheme
In the registration phase of [12], the user and GWN communicate with one another to produce username, password, biometric, and smartcard values: The user U i , inputs his/her password, username, and biometric, extract the biometric features using reproduction function and send those value over a secure channel to GWN. 2.
GWN produces random value r g , calculates identification values MID i , X i , Q i , and W i to store {Qi, Wi, MIDi} in the SC, and save r g in secure database. The number of saved parameters in the smartcard causes a weakness, that the attacker can seize to exploit the system parameters, by performing a smartcard impersonation attack along with database hijacking to retrieve the random value and user biometric.

1.
Intruder i computes the ID i = h(MID i h K GWN r g ) , and discovers the identity of the real user that brings lack of anonymity issue.

2.
Calculate X i = h MID i r g K GWN , MPW i = h(MID i X i ) ⊕ Q i .

3.
Start authentication operation use the spoofed BIO and evade the threshold value of the biometric checking. 4.
U i computes the security parameters X i , W * i , MPW i , then checks the W * i =? W i provided by the attacker. If they are the same then the attacker can generate any random value instead of R u which is R f ake and current time T 1 to deduce the following: CID f ake = ID i SID j ⊕ h(MID i , R f ake ), M UG = h ID i , R f ake , X i , T 1 , then send the following parameters to GWN M 1 , MID i , CID f ake , M UG , T 1 .

5.
GWN first checks the timestamp, if it is valid, then it will check other security parameters without validating the random number R f ake whether similar to the random R u in the database or whether it is used before or not. Moreover, if the GWN does not have a mechanism to check the validity of the random number generated by the U i node then the Intruder i can generate fake random values and bypass the system security. 6.
Then GWN chooses any random number R g the same random number known by the intruder i, and the current time T 2 to calculate M 2 , M GS by performing the following equations M 2 = R f ake R g ⊕ h SID i X j T 2 and M GS = h MID i SID j R f ake R g T 2 . Then, GWN sends the parameters {M 2 , MID i , M GS , T 2 } to S j . 7.
Intruder i can intercept the parameters {M 2 , MID i , M GS , T 2 } between the channels to get the sensor node identity by applying this formula SID j = h MID i M GS R f ake R g T 2 .
Sensors 2020, 20, 6860 7 of 31 After repeating these steps from 1 to 7 by the intruder i, the intruder can discover all the security parameters alongside predict, intercept, and impersonate all the next upcoming parameters between the channels. This cryptanalysis showed that a smart card attack with little effort from the attacker can jeopardize the nodes anonymity and evade the system security.
In the next section, we propose the enhanced protocol to improve the security of [12] scheme that covers different phases in the authentication process.

Proposed Protocol
We explain our suggested authentication scheme assuming that our sensor node is trusted node and we want to secure the communication between the hub node and foreign network node. As the foreign network node works as a data collector for the sensor node and ensures the security of the transmitted parameters to the hub node. The scheme ensures strong authentication between FN-HN due to its three-factor authentication nature, and complex parametric system. In the below explanation, we showed the system five phases such as FN pre-deployment and registration, FN-HN authentication, re-authentication, safe node addition, user revocation, and secure data transmission via blockchain. Refer to Table 2 below for the notations. Gateway node (hub) SC Smart card ID u , PW U User identity and password picked by the user SID U , SPW U , SID * * U User shadow identity and shadow password/updated shadow identity ID SN , ID + SN , Second-level node identity generated by SM/hidden ID SN updated/changed ID SN constantly. Session key computed by SM SK + , SK + n Renewed session key/updated symmetric key rand, rand * , rand + Random nonce/renewed random nonce BIO Biometric of the user DB HN Database of the hub node E, F i1 , F (i+1) , A, B, J, K Verification parameters ⊕ XOR operator h(.) Cryptographic hash Concatenation operation

Initialization Stage
In this stage, the parameter generation and registration of this protocol engaged the SM to choose secret identities, parameters and keys and allow all the entities to share securely the generated arguments over an offline and secure channel to SN, FN, and HN:

1.
The SM stores the ID SN , ID FN , and ID HN in the SM memory.

2.
SM chooses secret key K MS , and l * as a secret parameter to be added to the node's keys for the confusion. 3.
SM computes the secret key between the parameters

5.
HN communicates with SN to generate secret parameters in a secure channel to authenticate each other during the communication.
6. SN saves the newly generated secret parameter in a secure location. 7.
HN communicates with FN to generate secret parameters in a secure channel to authenticate each other during the communication. 8.
FN keeps the new produced secret parameter in a secure location to enable the user from registering securely in the WHSN authentication system.

Registration Phase
In this phase, the client uses his/her smartphone to enter the password, identity, and biometric to allow the HN from generating an authentication smart card securely: 1.
The user inputs his/her ID u and PW U and imprints the biometric BIO to compute the user identity and password for SC registration: where δ i : is the user biometric feature and τ i : Is the threshold. Then, FN sends these values {ID U , SPW} to HN in a secure channel.

2.
HN receives the parameters, generates random value rand, and computes the following: 3.
HN hides the value of rand with this equation: 4. Store the parameters F (i+1) , G, H in the SC and send it to the user.

5.
FN receives the parameters and retrieves the random number from Formula (12) to store it securely in the memory and deletes H from the smart card to avoid stolen smart card attacks. The set of new parameters will be F (i+1) , G }, as depicted in Figure 2.
Sensors 2020, 20, x FOR PEER REVIEW 9 of 31 5. FN receives the parameters and retrieves the random number from Formula (12) to store it securely in the memory and deletes H from the smart card to avoid stolen smart card attacks. The set of new parameters will be { ( ) , }, as depicted in Figure 2.

P-I: Authentication Phase
In this section, we assumed that the SN is a trusted node and FN authenticates itself and SN to the HN. Furthermore, it encompasses four phases of communications including FN, HN, and SN depicted in the Figure 3 below and denoted as follows: Step 1: The user inserts the smart card, enters his/her , , imprints the biometric , and calculates ( ) = ⟨ | ⟩ from Formula (7) and = ℎ( ∥ ∥ ) from Formula (8). Also, • FN checks whether * =? , then continue, else abort the session. FN generates a new timestamp random value * and calculates the following:

P-I: Authentication Phase
In this section, we assumed that the SN is a trusted node and FN authenticates itself and SN to the HN. Furthermore, it encompasses four phases of communications including FN, HN, and SN depicted in the Figure 3 below and denoted as follows: Sensors 2020, 20, x FOR PEER REVIEW 10 of 31   Step 1: The user inserts the smart card, enters his/her ID u , PW U , imprints the biometric BIO, and calculates Gen(BIO) = δ i |τ i from Formula (7) and SPW = h BIO ID + FN δ i from Formula (8). Also, computes G * = h(SID U SPW l * rand) from Formula (11).

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FN checks whether G * =?G, then continue, else abort the session. FN generates a new timestamp t i1 random value rand * and calculates the following: The previous step is very important to prevent jamming attack in any communication session. It allows both FN and HN to be part of generating random numbers that supports the session key formation.
FN sends the parameters to the HN in the open channel F (i+1) , A, B, t i1 .
Step 2: HN → FN M2 = J, K, t j2 HN performs the following: • Verify the time ∆t = t j2 − t i1 to prevent a replay attack.
• Check if SID * u =? SID U to validate the user identity and remain, else terminate the process.

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HN should keep track of each used random number in the scheme to avoid replay attack or impersonation attacks. (13) and check if the rand * has been used before, if it is not continue to extract ID + SN = A ⊕ F i1 ⊕ rand * , and check if the ID + SN =? ID + SN to authenticate the sensor node. (6) to authenticate the FN. SK = rand * ⊕ B from Formula (14) to validate the shared secret key. After authenticating the SN and FN, HN generates new random nonce rand + , new timestamp t j2 and calculates the following (10), G new = h(SID * * u SPW l * rand + ) from Formula (11). The above formulas ensure our scheme robustness towards jamming attack, due to the usage of old identities and keys in the generation of the new system parameters.

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Create security parameters to hide the new values: HN sends the parameters to the FN in the open channel J, K, t j2 .
Upon receiving the parameters FN calculates the following: • Deduce SID * * u = rand ⊕ J from Formula (15), ID ++ SN = ID + SN l * ID + HN from Formula (2), from Formula (11), and add the new parameters to the SC { F new (i+1) , G new .
FN sends the parameters to the SN in the open channel {K, t i3 }.
Step 4: → SN (M 4 = {K, t i3 }) Upon receiving the parameters SN calculates the following: • Verify the time ∆t = t S4 − t i3 to prevent a replay attack.

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If ∆t = t s4 − t i3 > 0 then proceed, else terminate the session. (1). Save the new parameters in the SN memory and establish the new session key.

P-II: Re-Authentication Phase
After an effective authentication session, the user is qualified to approach the system services. The authentic client might want to reach to some facilities throughout the day before night-time. Furthermore, it is timewasting, and un-efficient to compute all the values of the updated authentication session for the verified client. Hence, it necessitates the concept of re-authentication to improve the scheme efficiency, as shown in Figure 4. The stages of the re-authentication are as follows: 1.
The user enters to his/her account to approach some data from the smartphone.
Step 1: The FN calls the last SID U , PW U before the night-time to confirm the FN to the GW.
• Imprint the biometric BIO.

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Check G * =?G if no abort, and if yes continue.

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Generate new time stamp t i1 and calculate 2. Send the following parameters {F (i+1) , A i , t i1 } to the HN for authentication.

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If ∆t = t j2 − t i1 > 0 then remain, else cancel the session. • HN checks if F (i+1) was generated throughout the past 12 h.
• If yes, then HN gets the newest random nonce and computes the fresh key  (10), G new = h SID U SPW l * rand (i+1) from Formula (11).
• Produce recent time t j2 and confirm the HN response. • Check the time validity ∆t = t i3 − t j2 . If ∆t = t i3 − t j2 > 0 then proceed, else halt the connection. (18).

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Change the parameters with the fresh ones F new (i+1) , G new , and save them to the SC.
• HN checks if ( ) was generated throughout the past 12 h.

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If yes, then HN gets the newest random nonce and computes the fresh key * = * ⨁ ⨁ ⨁ from Formula (16 3. Send the following parameters { , , } to FN.

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Change the parameters with the fresh ones { ( ) , }, and save them to the SC.
A protected connection can be initiated between FN and GW.

Secure Node Addition
SM adds new nodes to the system and performs the following: Step 1: User sends a request to add new . A protected connection can be initiated between FN and GW.

Secure Node Addition
SM adds new nodes to the system and performs the following: Step 1: User sends a request to add new SN new i . The client needs to normally log into the session with his/her credentials, inserts SC, enters ID u and PW U , imprints the biometric BIO, and generates time stamp t i1 .
• After a successful log in the user generates secret value for request validation.
• Send this message to SM for node addition.
Step 2: SM receives the request of the user to create new SN new i .

Secure User Revocation
In the below steps, SM revokes the user card from the system to add new one and performs the following: Step 1: The user sends a request to remove his/her previous card and adds a new SC NEW to the system.
The user needs to normally log in to the session with his/her credentials, inserts SC, enters SID u , PW U , imprints the biometric BIO, and generates time stamp t i1 . • After a successful log in the user generates secret value for the request validation.
• Send this message to SM for card/mobile revocation.
Step 2: SM receives the user request to revoke from the system.
• SM checks the secret parameters and the request of the user via E = h ID SN h l * ID + HN from Formula (5 • The user sends the new parameter securely over the secure one-time link to the SM. • SM receives the request, generates new random value rand new , and computes the following: • Add the new values to the smart card SC NEW . • User receives the new smart card SC NEW , replaces the new parameters F (i+1) , G new , H new , and retrieves the random number from H new , then deletes it from the new smart card in a secure channel. The new set of parameters will be F (i+1) , G new .

Secure Data Transmission via Blockchain
In [12] scheme, there is no defined strategy to protect the stored data for retrieval or other usages after successful authentication. Since most of the WHSN structures are based on main centralized data storage that is accessible by the assigned doctor. So, this could put patient information in danger due to this source of error. Whereas the blockchain adds-up the data to blocks and splits them. Therefore, the integrity of the data is kept, each transaction is encrypted. Access control policies guarantee privacy [31]. Several methods were proposed to aid the purpose smart contract establishing along with patient identity tracking. In the case of government authorities who want to evaluate a medical facility service or measure the spread of a disease, the authorities need to have access to all the citizens' information.
We adopted [32] method who proposed a Hyperledger blockchain which supports consensus algorithms that only permit the authenticated patients, and communications, and only accept reserved as well as confidential transactions. The Hyperledger blockchain consists of the transaction log that tackles all the changes made to the connections and changes the value of the world state. The blocks are built by a collection of transactions sent to the evaluator peer to simulate it, vote on it, and approve it. The structure of communication, electronic contracts, access policies are stored in the business network that the user can interact with from a mobile application connected to a server, where all the communication are encrypted by hashing to be able to access the blockchain for data storage and retrieval.
Another method is discussed by [21] that utilized the blockchain technology to store the individual data safely in the cloud. The sensor nodes contain some data that needs to be stored in the gateway safely for another retrieval or processing. The sensor sends encrypted data with the shared key to the foreign network along with the current timestamp. The foreign network node checks the timeliness and decrypts the data to get the information, then encrypts the data again with its pre-shared key to be sent to the hub node. The hub node decodes the info and checks the timestamp for validity to start building a data block. The block is added to the blockchain when all the communicated entities agreed upon the block contents in peer to peer cloud server network. After successfully gathering a group of valid data, the hub node starts to build transaction values and adds them together in one block to enable the system manager to create a blockchain of data for storage, deletion, update, and retrieve. The proposed method suggested the usage of cryptographic hash to encode the transmitted blocks and compute the "Merkle tree root" (MR) for the tree building. MR is a technique used in cryptocurrency to assure the data integrity in a peer-to-peer network structure. All the block information such as block owner and block payload are computed with the current block hash (CBHash). The hub node embeds the hashed identity of the user and sends the block of data to the system manager which uses "Ripple Protocol Consensus Algorithm (RPCA)" [33] for node verification and addition. Suppose that a user wants to access some data from a specific block, the user has to log in successfully to the connected hub node. So, as the hub node uses the user key that matches the user identity from the block, performs a hash function on data, decrypts the encrypted data to extract the hashes values and compare them with the computed hash for integrity check. Then, the hub node transmits the data to the user and the user decrypts the data with his/her key to retrieve the information from the block, as depicted in Figure 5.

Security Analysis
In this section, we discussed informal security analysis to analyze our scheme robustness against attacks in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3, we conducted a mathematical proof with BAN logic to confirm our structure mutual authentication and key agreement. Also, we simulate our model with Tamarin interactive tool to prove that our scheme is secure against session hijacking, replay attack, and attains perfect forward secrecy in Section 6.3.

Security Analysis
In this section, we discussed informal security analysis to analyze our scheme robustness against attacks in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3, we conducted a mathematical proof with BAN logic to confirm our structure mutual authentication and key agreement. Also, we simulate our model with Tamarin interactive tool to prove that our scheme is secure against session hijacking, replay attack, and attains perfect forward secrecy in Section 6.3.

Informal Security Evaluation
The below list indicated our system qualities.

Mutual Authentication
Mutual authentication ensures that all communicating objects authenticate each other at the same time. In our protocol, we conducted the mutual authentication phase and all interactions between FN and HN in the authentication phase, and we conducted BAN logic formal proof along with simulation in Tamarin protocol to prove the mutual authentication. Thence, our scheme accomplishes mutual authentication because HN checks both user identity in the formula SID * u = SID U along with the sensor node identity in ID + SN ? = ID + SN before calculating the secret parameter. So, the mutual authentication is achieved in our scheme.

Offline/Online Secret Shared Key Guessing
Regarding DY model, the intruder i can obtain all the parameters saved in the smart card, phone, FN, SN, and HN. Also, i can guess the perfect combination between username and password without the need to have SC or user mobile phone. Many elements protect our scheme from the attacks such as secret parameter l * , the fresh biometric of the user BIO, the random values rand * , and rand + that are checked observing their freshness, the secret parameters between nodes F i1 and E, and the one-way hash function. Therefore, our scheme is robust against i shared secret key guessing in the online mode or offline mode.

Nodes Anonymity
In the initialization phase, we masked all the important communicating objects identities with random values, and secret parameter. We concealed the SN, FN, HN, ID U , nodes identities, and biometric BIO in Formulas (2)-(4), (8), and (9), respectively. Therefore, the intruder i cannot trace where the data came from and where it goes because of the anonymity and dynamicity of the connected objects' identities. Moreover, the intruder i cannot guess the real identity of the user from SID U because it is protected by the power of hash function and a random number. Also, the biometric of the user is a unique value and it is hashed with the threshold value which stop any kind of guessing to this parameter. As a result, both protocols are holding the anonymity feature.

Brute Force Attack
Intruder i can run a brute force attack on any identity, key or security parameters and can successfully know the correct parameters. Although our scheme makes it hard for the intruder i to guess the secure value correctly in polynomial time because we are implementing SHA-2 group of keys with size 224 bit, so by calculating the run-time of our key with one-way hash which is 2 224 . The intruder i cannot perform a brute force attack on our scheme due to the hash key size. The system's key size fits our authentication procedure. However, it can be raised when necessary to attain security preliminaries in the future.

Stolen Smartcard Attack
In [34] scheme, they did not specify a method to prevent brute force attacks in case of the lost smart card. Their paper did not mention the concept of encrypting and locking smartcard data information with user biometric or password. Therefore, we suggest in the cryptanalysis to reduce the number of parameters, random number checking, as well as smart card blocking policy after three times error in entering the authentication biometric, and password. Moreover, encrypting and locking the card information with a password, and user biometric at each time to authenticate the user to the smartcard will guarantee the tamper-resistant feature when the card is lost. Thus, our scheme prevents stolen smartcard attack.
6.1.6. Replay Attack All the communications between nodes during the authentication phase are protected by time stamp such that the communicating nodes generate new timestamp in each new parameter set creation. In the first communication between FN and HN, FN generates t i1 and computes A = rand * ⊕ F i1 ⊕ ID + SN and B = rand * ⊕ SK for secret key as well as secret parameter confusion. In the second communication between HN and FN, HN generates t j2 before updating the security parameters along with masking values. Therefore, Intruder i will not be able to crack the real session key or the hidden arguments in a valid time during successful communication.

Integrity
Our scheme achieves integrity because all the security parameters, smart card parameters, biometric identity, and keys are protected with the one-way hash function. Moreover, the shadow identity of the user smart card is guarded with the formula SID * U = h F (i+1) ID + FN rand , and the secret session key is protected by the formula SK = h(ID SN h(l * K MS ) ID FN ID HN ). So, integrity is held in our both proposed protocols withal anonymity and un-traceability.

Node Impersonation
Intruder i can compromise one communicating node and get its correct identity such as ID FN the real identity of the user stored in the smartphone memory. Although that the SC password SPW along with session key SK is protected by one-way hash function h(.) along with the biometric, valid random number and secret parameter l * . Besides, the intruder i is not able to compromise any other secret value or credential of the same communicating node or other nodes such as HN or SN. Subsequently, the proposed protocols are robust against any impersonation attack.

Session Hijacking Attack
Intruder i can freely hijack any passing message in the public insecure medium. Also, the intruder i can hijack all the parameters sent among the communicated entities, collect them, and process them differently to elude the system security. Our security parameters are transmitted in the public medium are as few as possible, so the attacker will not get any useful information from collecting and intercepting the transmitted parameters between channels. The identity of the user is shadowed and protected by a one-way hash function (F (i+1) , A, B, t i1 ) and ( J, K, t j2 ) where the attacker cannot guess the hidden parameters from the transmitted tuples. So, our proposed protocols are secure towards the session hijacking attack.

Collision Attack
Intruder i goes for many permutations to crack the cryptographic hash and recovers arguments. This malicious act is useless in the proposed techniques since it is difficult to obtain two distinct messages that encompass the equal value in hash function h(m1) = h(m2). Thence, the robust hash function should stop collision [35]. So, in line with [17] the SHA-2 cryptographic hash operation with size of the keys: 224 bit, 256 bit, and 384 bit, respectively, is protected versus collision attack.

Scalability
Scalability is maintained when the growing of the system does not quite affect the performance of the system by increasing or decreasing a sensor or unit. In the case of fresh component adding or illegitimate component detection, our scheme is scalable by registering each user valid card, a sensor with unique security parameters, and IDs. Consequently, GW only permits the reliable nodes to make the connection and removes illegal nodes or cards in any future connection. Also, as per [36], to achieve scalability in the scheme, we should reduce the computation complexity for WHSN participating parties. Therefore, the core objective of this work is to boost the performance of [12] so we had accomplished our objective by decreasing cost of telecommunications. 6.1.12. Forward/Backward Secrecy Forward secrecy evading is the capability of the intruder i to anticipate the potential key pair. Whereas backward secrecy happens when the attacker gathers as many previous keys as necessary to infer the former keys. The session keys are dynamic and secured in our schemes by several parameters such as random nonce, new foreign network identification, hidden value, and the timestamp. Thus, even though the intruder i correctly identified the keys, due to the complicated parametric method, he/she is unable to predict the future keys or breach the prior keys. In addition, the intruder i needs to correctly predict the following: rand + to be able to disclose all the hidden data in the session. Consequently, optimal forward and backward secrecy is accomplished by our protocols.

Jamming Attack
Intruder i tries to disrupt the authentication process by generating a jamming signal to prevent the exchanging of some parameters during the communication. In our scheme, we enabled FN and HN to generate two random numbers that aided the key establishment. The last generated key and identities are used in the creation of the new parameters. So, the Intruder i needs to be aware of the formed session keys, identities, and random values to generate a successful jamming attack. Also, our scheme is protected by a timestamp that prevents the attacker from using old parameters after a long-time passage because the scheme will halt the expired session.

Ban Logic Proof
In this section, a formal proof with BAN logic method is conducted to prove our scheme mutual authentication and key agreement for P-I:

Essential Symbolization
The following covers the over-all fundamental representation for BAN logic to be employed in protocols P-I and P-II, see Table 3:

P-I: Goals
The goals to be achieved by P-I are stated below: Below, we mentioned the ideal messages forms on the P-I: Table 3. Symbols used in the BAN (Burrows Abadi Nadeem) logic.

Symbols Description
Pre-shared key used in connection P-I: Assumptions In the following, we explained the assumption of P_I: The BAN logic proof is processed as follows.

HN
Step 18: because SPW = h(rand rand + ), according to Step 4 and Step 8 (Goal 4) Step 19: from A9 and Step 17 (Goal 1) Step 20: from A10 and Step 18 (Goal 2) In this section, a formal proof with BAN logic method is conducted to prove our scheme mutual authentication and key agreement for P-II:

P-II: Goals
The ideal goals to be achieved by P-II are stated as follows: Below, we illustrated the idealized form of the message to be transmit between nodes in P-II:

P-II: Assumptions
Same assumption as before just change A5-A8: The BAN logic proof then proceeds as below.

Simulation with Tamarin Prover
We simulated our scheme with Tamarin prover [37] to prove our scheme robustness against session hijacking, replay attacks, perfect forward secrecy, and mutual authentication. It is a tool used for formal protocols validation and written in the Haskell language. The simulation was operated on MacBook Air, it ran on MacOS Catalina, with processor 1.8 GHz Dual-Core Intel Core i5, Memory 8 GB 1600 MHz DDR3, and Intel HD Graphics 6000 1536 MB. Also, we uploaded some tools to help our system to simulate the protocol which are graphviz version 2.44.1, maude tool, SAPIC tool, and sublime text to show colorful coding for the protocol syntax.

Haskell Specification
We specified our nodes in the communication model as FN (user), HN (gateway), and SN (sensor node) to be represented in the Tamarin environment with their specified interaction along with attack simulation to ensure the scheme validity and robustness against the simulated attacks.
In Figure 6, we showed how nodes, secret key, biometric, and smart card are registered by the SM over a secure channel. Then when the user received the smart card, the user registers the biometric BIO, the identity SID U , and the password to form the following parameters F (i+1) , G Gen( ), Rep( ), h ( ) . The registered client inserts the smart card SC, and starts the authentication between the FN and HN.
We simulated our scheme with Tamarin prover [37] to prove our scheme robustness against session hijacking, replay attacks, perfect forward secrecy, and mutual authentication. It is a tool used for formal protocols validation and written in the Haskell language. The simulation was operated on MacBook Air, it ran on MacOS Catalina, with processor 1.8 GHz Dual-Core Intel Core i5, Memory 8 GB 1600 MHz DDR3, and Intel HD Graphics 6000 1536 MB. Also, we uploaded some tools to help our system to simulate the protocol which are graphviz version 2.44.1, maude tool, SAPIC tool, and sublime text to show colorful coding for the protocol syntax.

Haskell Specification
We specified our nodes in the communication model as FN (user), HN (gateway), and SN (sensor node) to be represented in the Tamarin environment with their specified interaction along with attack simulation to ensure the scheme validity and robustness against the simulated attacks.
In Figure 6, we showed how nodes, secret key, biometric, and smart card are registered by the SM over a secure channel. Then when the user received the smart card, the user registers the biometric , the identity , and the password to form the following parameters { ( ) , ( ), ( ), ℎ ( ) } . The registered client inserts the smart card , and starts the authentication between the FN and HN. We showed how the FN gets all the parameters from the user and calculates the masking parameters ( ( ) , , , ) to be transmitted to the HN, as depicted in Figure 7.  We showed how the FN gets all the parameters from the user and calculates the masking parameters ( F (i+1) , A, B, t i1 ) to be transmitted to the HN, as depicted in Figure 7.

Simulation with Tamarin Prover
We simulated our scheme with Tamarin prover [37] to prove our scheme robustness against session hijacking, replay attacks, perfect forward secrecy, and mutual authentication. It is a tool used for formal protocols validation and written in the Haskell language. The simulation was operated on MacBook Air, it ran on MacOS Catalina, with processor 1.8 GHz Dual-Core Intel Core i5, Memory 8 GB 1600 MHz DDR3, and Intel HD Graphics 6000 1536 MB. Also, we uploaded some tools to help our system to simulate the protocol which are graphviz version 2.44.1, maude tool, SAPIC tool, and sublime text to show colorful coding for the protocol syntax.

Haskell Specification
We specified our nodes in the communication model as FN (user), HN (gateway), and SN (sensor node) to be represented in the Tamarin environment with their specified interaction along with attack simulation to ensure the scheme validity and robustness against the simulated attacks.
In Figure 6, we showed how nodes, secret key, biometric, and smart card are registered by the SM over a secure channel. Then when the user received the smart card, the user registers the biometric , the identity , and the password to form the following parameters { ( ) , ( ), ( ), ℎ ( ) } . The registered client inserts the smart card , and starts the authentication between the FN and HN.   Next, HN receives the authentication parameters and authenticates the user to start calculating the new set of parameters ( J, K, t j2 ) for the card secret data renewal as well as the nodes' identities and secret keys, as depicted in Figures 8 and 9.    We specified some lemmas to ensure our parameters and nodes secrecy in a matter of session hijacking and guarantee that our scheme holds perfect forward secrecy, as depicted in Figure 10. Also, we specified other lemmas to prove our scheme parameters secrecy against replay attack, as depicted in Figure 11. We specified some lemmas to ensure our parameters and nodes secrecy in a matter of session hijacking and guarantee that our scheme holds perfect forward secrecy, as depicted in Figure 10.  We specified some lemmas to ensure our parameters and nodes secrecy in a matter of session hijacking and guarantee that our scheme holds perfect forward secrecy, as depicted in Figure 10. Also, we specified other lemmas to prove our scheme parameters secrecy against replay attack, as depicted in Figure 11. Also, we specified other lemmas to prove our scheme parameters secrecy against replay attack, as depicted in Figure 11. The below results describe that the scheme holds the property by highlighting the codes in green color. Our scheme fulfils the perfect forward secrecy, resistance against replay attack, and session hijacking attack in both HN and FN, as depicted in Figures 12 and 13, respectively. The below results describe that the scheme holds the property by highlighting the codes in green color. Our scheme fulfils the perfect forward secrecy, resistance against replay attack, and session hijacking attack in both HN and FN, as depicted in Figures 12 and 13, respectively. The below results describe that the scheme holds the property by highlighting the codes in green color. Our scheme fulfils the perfect forward secrecy, resistance against replay attack, and session hijacking attack in both HN and FN, as depicted in Figures 12 and 13, respectively.  The below graphs illustrate, that our scheme fulfils the perfect forward secrecy, resistance against replay attack, and session hijacking attack in both HN and FN with absence of the red arrows in the figures, as depicted in both Figures 14 and 15.  The below graphs illustrate, that our scheme fulfils the perfect forward secrecy, resistance against replay attack, and session hijacking attack in both HN and FN with absence of the red arrows in the figures, as depicted in both Figures 14 and 15.  In the next section, we provided the performance analysis to the scheme to show its efficiency in comparison with other schemes.

Performance Analysis
In the following, we deliberated the efficiency of the proposed protocols regarding their computation, communication, and storage.

Computational Cost
In this section, the computation cost calculation is performed for the proposed protocols that employed a cryptographic hash which takes 0.00032 s along with a biometric reproduce operation that takes 0.0171 s based on the metrics in [38]. The computational cost of the proposed scheme is better than all other schemes in the foreign network side by 60% and 65% and HN side [17,19,22] with a 80% by using P-I and 85% by using P-II. Besides, P-I and P-II perform better than [12,16] in the foreign network side along with HN side with 5% and 15% reduction, respectively, as depicted in Figures 16  and 17. Furthermore, we chose a hash function with a 224 bit key size to allow the foreign network to have an adequate level of security better than [12] which takes a 160 bit key size, and [19,22] which takes a 128 bit size key, (see Tables 4-7). In the next section, we provided the performance analysis to the scheme to show its efficiency in comparison with other schemes.

Performance Analysis
In the following, we deliberated the efficiency of the proposed protocols regarding their computation, communication, and storage.

Computational Cost
In this section, the computation cost calculation is performed for the proposed protocols that employed a cryptographic hash which takes 0.00032 s along with a biometric reproduce operation that takes 0.0171 s based on the metrics in [38]. The computational cost of the proposed scheme is better than all other schemes in the foreign network side by 60% and 65% and HN side [17,19,22] with a 80% by using P-I and 85% by using P-II. Besides, P-I and P-II perform better than [12,16] in the foreign network side along with HN side with 5% and 15% reduction, respectively, as depicted in Figures 16 and 17. Furthermore, we chose a hash function with a 224 bit key size to allow the foreign network to have an adequate level of security better than [12] which takes a 160 bit key size, and [19,22] which takes a 128 bit size key, (see Tables 4-7).
In this section, the computation cost calculation is performed for the proposed protocols that employed a cryptographic hash which takes 0.00032 s along with a biometric reproduce operation that takes 0.0171 s based on the metrics in [38]. The computational cost of the proposed scheme is better than all other schemes in the foreign network side by 60% and 65% and HN side [17,19,22] with a 80% by using P-I and 85% by using P-II. Besides, P-I and P-II perform better than [12,16] in the foreign network side along with HN side with 5% and 15% reduction, respectively, as depicted in Figures 16  and 17. Furthermore, we chose a hash function with a 224 bit key size to allow the foreign network to have an adequate level of security better than [12] which takes a 160 bit key size, and [19,22] which takes a 128 bit size key, (see Tables 4-7).    Table 5. Key sizes of the schemes.

Scheme
Key Size [16] 1024 bits  Reproduce operation 0.0171 Table 5. Key sizes of the schemes.

Communication Overhead
We assumed the length of the hash function, keys, and security parameters = 224 bits, and the timestamp = 32 bits. Besides, our system contains four tuples in the foreign network side (F (i+1) , A, B, t i1 ) that results in = 224 + 224 + 224 + 32 = 704 bit. Moreover, we have ( J, K, t j2 ) from HN to FN that results in = 224 + 224 + 32 = 480 bit. Those results demonstrate that our system has the least overhead in a GW side more than all schemes in the comparison [16,17,19,22], with more strength versus numerous attacks, as shown in Table 8.

Storage Overhead
We determined the storage cost of our work in contrast to [16,17,19,22] schemes to analyze the schemes' capacities. Assuming that each function and parameter of the following have different storage bytes such that hash, ECC, AES symmetric, RSA asymmetric, parameters identifications, random number, and time are 20, 20, 20, 20, 4, 4, and 16 bytes, respectively, and the prime p in Ep (a, b) is 20 bytes. The suggested scheme requires storage for the stored arguments F (i+1) , G new that results in (20 + 20 = 40 bytes) for the smartcard, and rand requires 20 bytes for the gateway. The storage cost distinguishes our scheme from others because it is the lowest of all on the smart card side. Moreover, the number of stored security parameters in the proposed structure will provide better security among other schemes, as shown in Tables 9 and 10. Table 9. Storage overhead computation.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.
HSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be ted. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. ore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient cure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to e both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on metric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN nd simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. ver, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security ments like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and n attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and nd out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will y blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the if tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.
modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be eived major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who n increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. alyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to urity and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on mart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN lated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. nformal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security e, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force personation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and at our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and tion than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will ain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the HSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be ted. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. ore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient cure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to e both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on metric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN nd simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. ver, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security ments like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and n attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and nd out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will y blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the if tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.
modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be eived major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who n increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. alyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to urity and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on mart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN lated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. nformal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security e, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force personation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and at our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and tion than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will ain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the HSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be ted. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. ore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient cure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to e both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on metric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN nd simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. ver, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security ments like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and n attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and nd out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will y blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the if tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.
modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be eived major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who n increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. alyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to urity and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on mart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN lated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. nformal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security e, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force personation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and at our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and tion than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will ain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

clusions
HSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be ted. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. ore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient cure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to e both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on metric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN nd simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. ver, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security ments like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and n attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and nd out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will y blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the if tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

clusions
HSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be ted. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. ore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient cure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to e both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on metric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN nd simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. ver, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security ments like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and n attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and nd out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will y blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the if tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude, the future direction of our research will employ blockchain technology in WHSN authentication in-depth and more attacks simulation in the proverif tool.
From Table 6, we compared our proposed scheme computation cost to schemes, and we identified that our scheme performs better than all in both foreign network and hub node sides. Y. Park and Y. Park scheme [16] scheme contains 20 hashes, a fuzzy extractor, and 2 ECC point multiplications. C. Wang et al. scheme [17] requires 8 hashes, and 26 ECC point multiplications. Mo and Chen scheme [19] takes 22 hashes, a reproduction operation, 2 Modular exponentiations, and 1 symmetric encryption. Similarly, Ali et al. scheme [22] scheme needs 7 hashes, 3 ECC point multiplications, and a fuzzy extractor. Yu and Park scheme [12] takes 22 hashes, and a reproduction function. In comparison to the proposed scheme, our authentication protocol requires 12 hashes along with 1 reproduction function, and the re-authentication protocol requires 4 hashes and 1 reproduction function. This manifests that our scheme has a lower computational cost and low energy consumption.

Conclusions
WHSN is a modern trend that deals with significant information from the patients that must be protected. It received major attention from the information security developers and vendors, who put big efforts in increasing the guardedness of the WHSN system and speed up the performance. Therefore, we analyzed the latest schemes in the field and we found that [12] to be the most efficient and secure one. So, we cryptanalyze it and we discovered that the scheme needs enhancement to achieve both security and performance. Consequently, a three-factor authentication scheme based on the biometric, smart card, and password is proposed. The scheme was formally validated by BAN logic and simulated with Tamarin prover to confirm its security and mutual authentication. Moreover, the informal analysis proved that the above scheme achieved the suggested security requirements like, anonymity, offline/online shared secret guessing, FN-SN replay attack, brute force attack, FN/HN impersonation, integrity, session hijacking, eavesdropping attack, un-traceability, and collision attack. Finally, we conducted performance evaluation to compute our scheme efficiency and we found out that our scheme has better computation cost, communication cost, storage cost, and energy consumption than the related schemes. To conclude,