Unraveling Prapañca: A Yog¯ac¯ara Examination of Consciousness, Language, and Liberation in the La ˙nk ¯avat ¯ara S ¯utra

: In Yog¯ac¯ara epistemology, the term prapañca refers to various dimensions of the cognitive process in aspects ranging from consciousness, language formation, the conceptualization of subject–object duality, mental defilements, and ignorance. Given that the La˙nk¯avat¯ara S¯utra conveys the richness of early tenets for both the Yog¯ac¯ara and Madhyamaka traditions, an investigation of the meaning and discourse context of prapañca is a necessity. This paper conducts a contextual examination of the word prapañca , primarily addressing (1) a range of meanings, (2) possible characteristics, (3) conditions and consequences, especially the associations with the conceptualization ( vikalpa ) process, and (4) the significance of the elimination of prapañca that the corresponding dialogue implies. This paper finds that prapañca is associated with dualistic conceptualization and the evolution of consciousness within sam.s¯ara . It shows some qualities of the beginningless conceptual structure of sam.s¯aric conditioned negativity and is related to language formation. As the discourse in La˙nka adduces it as the root of suffering, liberation from it is a prerequisite for reaching enlightenment and achieving the state of Buddhahood.


Introduction
In Chapter 18 of M ūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) of Nāgārjuna which particularly addresses the concept of non-self, stanza 4 draws our attention to an antidote for suffering in sam .sāra, saying 'Internally and externally, when [the thought] 'I' and 'my' have ceased, appropriation (upādāna) ceases.Through the cessation of appropriation, birth ceases'. 1 Here, the ceasing of birth refers to liberation from sam .sāra.In other words, it concerns the path that leads to liberation from suffering by means of the cessation of the concept of self.Following this stanza, the word prapañca appears: Karmakleśaks .ayān moks .ah .karmakleśā vikalpatah ./ Te prapañcāt prapañcas tu ś ūnyatāyām .nirudhyate//MMK_18.5// 2 Through the cessation of karma and afflictive mental states comes liberation.Karma and afflictive mental states come from conceptualizations (vikalpa), and they come from fabrication (prapañca).That, however, ceases in emptiness. 3e textual picture that Nāgārjuna draws is a causal chain from conceptual structuring (prapañca) and conceptualizations (vikalpa) to afflictive mental status (kleśa) and karma.According to him, karma and afflictive mental status come from conceptuality, and conceptuality comes from fabrication or prapañca.In this regard, one needs initially to get rid of the fundamental cause-prapañca-so as to be free thereafter from conceptuality; one can then eliminate karma and the afflictive mental status and thus achieve liberation.Considering this, prapañca seems to be the fundamental trait that should be uprooted from one's mind, and it becomes salient when one foregrounds this account of salvation.
The treatment of prapañca in Madhyamaka underscores its significance in Buddhist soteriology.While both Madhyamaka and Yogācāra maintain the ultimate Buddhist objective of universal salvation, an analysis of its representations and characteristics in Yogācāra This study finds that the meaning of prapañca is related to dualistic conceptualization.It shows some of the qualities of a beginningless conceptual structure, which is conditioned by sam .sāric negativity and is related to language formation.As the discourse in La ṅka identifies prapañca as the root of suffering, liberation from it is a prerequisite for reaching enlightenment and achieving the state of Buddhahood.One can claim that the variations of meanings and connotations of prapañca in La ṅka underlies typical Yogācāra ideas about the function of the afflicted mind.Likewise, it is related to the emphasis on the problematic nature of language, especially the notion that the naming and claiming process involves merely conceptualized phenomena without any real referents.As such, prapañca-or, more precisely, it is elimination-is central to the understanding as well as the experience of emptiness (ś ūnyatā).This comprehension encompasses not only the realization of the absence of independent inherent existence in an ontological sense but also the emptiness of subject-object dualism from the Yogācāra epistemological perspective.

Background
The La ṅkāvatāra S ūtra is considered an essential work in the Mahāyāna tradition.However, the complexity of language usage, the multiplicity of layers and ideas, and the abundance of crucial concepts blended across schools make an academic analysis of the text considerably complex.Notably, the term prapañca appears in the Pali canon as well as many Yogācāra and Madhyamaka treaties, but despite its ubiquity and tight connection with the cognitive process, various interpretations by traditional commentators and academic scholars have given rise to divergent conclusions and definitions.
The date and author(s) of La ṅka are still unclear.Records for the earliest Chinese translation show that the time of its composition falls in the 5th century. 10The current primary texts comprise Sanskrit editions, two Tibetan translations, and three surviving Chinese translations.The edition provided by Bunyiu Nanji ō is currently considered a reliable Sanskrit edition, which is based on four Sanskrit manuscripts and some other primary materials. 11Nanji ō consulted the three versions of the Chinese translation to edit his copies as well. 12A later edition from Vaidya collated some of the previous work and arguably is overall an improvement.This study relies on the Sanskrit texts from both Nanji ō and Vaidya, facilitated by the digital resources of the Digital Sanskrit Buddhist Canon and GRETIL. 13Regarding modern English translations, this paper mainly makes references to Suzuki's work.Moreover, I have consulted the contemporary scholarship on the text.In that context, Japanese scholars, in particular, have made great efforts to examine various aspects of La ṅka, covering the concept of tathāgatagarbha (Ogawa 1961), citta (Kamiya 1975), dharma, and bhāva (Kamiya 1977) as well as cittamātra (Kan 1980).Regarding English secondary scholarship, the most relevant studies for this paper include works from Lambert Schmithausen (1969), Florin Giripescu Sutton (1991), Bikkhu Ñān .ananda (1997), Aucke D. Forsten (2006), and Ligeia Lugli (2011).
Turning now to the secondary scholarship in English, Sutton examined the concept of existence and enlightenment in La ṅka.Although touching upon Yogācāra epistemology and sketching the significance of liberation from the dual categories of discrimination (vikalpa) and language, he did not elaborate on prapañca specifically.Forsten focused on the second chapter of La ṅka, in which he approached the concept of svacittadr .śyamātra based on a text-critical analysis and translated the phrase as '[the threefold world is] merely something visible consisting of one's own mind', further emphasizing that the term alludes to philosophical idealism.However, Lugli criticized Forsten's approach to the term by questioning his contrast between philology and hermeneutics 14 and his unclear philological analysis.Later, Lugli examined the role of language in Indian Mahāyāna, which particularly took La ṅka as the reference.According to her exploration, La ṅka shows the Mahāyāna idea of verbalization as being "inefficacious and potentially misleading". 15She argues that, in La ṅka, "language cannot express what is undifferentiated", and "verbalization affects the speaker's conceptual representation of the world and informs the misperception of reality as diversity;" therefore, "enlightenment emerges in silence". 16It is undeniable that La ṅka lays weight on language and the cognitive distortions that emerge from language; nevertheless, the particular focus on language and the emphasis on the linguistic approach involve the risk of overlooking other possible interpretations and a range of meanings for particular concepts.
With regards to the specific term prapañca, earlier scholarships include works of Jacques May (Candrakīrti and May 1959), Lambert Schmithausen (1969), and Bhikkhu Ñān .ananda  (1997).In his edition of Prasannapadā, Jacques May points out that prapañca is more about "the operation of the function [of discursive thought] ("expansion", differentiation of the global real into distinct objects and concepts. ..), and the result of this operation" 17 instead of the function of mere expansion or proliferation.Lambert Schmithausen also underlines prapañca as an action, whereas he touches upon the interconnectedness of the action of "spreading" and maintains the objective sense of prapañca when it concerns the manifold appearance of the world.According to him, "prapañcah .simply means 'manifoldness'. ..". Bhikkhu Ñān .ananda draws attention to the use of papañca in the Pali canon and the commentarial literature thereof, and he reflects briefly on the term prapañca in Mahāyāna Buddhism.In accordance with his exploration, papañca (the Pali term for prapañca in Sanskrit) is essentially connected with the process of sense-perception, and "papañcasaññā-sa ṅkhā" could be interpreted as "concepts, reckonings, designations or linguistic conventions characterized by the prolific conceptualizing tendency of the mind". 18With regards to Mahāyāna tradition, Ñān .ananda particularly cites the Mādhyamikakārikā and La ṅka to underline the significance of prapañca in the philosophical system of Mādhyamika dialect in terms of conceptual constructions and rationality; 19 however, a context-based analysis of the meaning of prapañca is largely overlooked.
The scholarship on prapañca could be divided into two major trends.One launches into Madhyamaka treatises.Another tends to address the concept from the Yogācāra perspective.For example, based on an enumerative occurrence of the application of prapañca in M ūlamadhyamakakārika and its corresponding commentary, Akira Saito maintained that, for Nāgārjuna, prapañca means a "mental activity of conceptualization made in various sets of terms". 20He pointed out that although both Nāgārj ūna and Yogācāra thinkers consider prapañca as the fundamental cause of defilement, their understandings differ.However, he did not clarify the different understanding of prapañca in Yogācāra contexts nor its range of meanings.Furthermore, Mark Siderits claims that there is a paradox that prapañca entails in Madhyamaka discourse.According to him, the concept embodies the falsities of the conceptualization, which contrasts with the understanding of emptiness, as "Mādhyamikas claim there are indirect strategies one may use to rule out whole classes of candidates for dharmahood;" "but there can be no strategy that encompasses all uses of all concepts", and thus there is "no master argument for emptiness" as "a consequence of the emptiness of emptiness".However, the application of radical contextualist semantics shows a solution for the paradox that prapañca has shown.He contends that "to believe in ultimate truth-makers is to believe in context-transcendent truth-conditions", 21 and the presupposition entailed by the context-transcendent truth-conditions could be rejected by radical contextualist semantics.In terms of a successful reduction along with mistakes shown in hypostatizing concepts, prapañca is false yet useful as being reliably associated with our ultimate aims to see the false of presupposition.He underlines the use of prapañca to reveal the falsification of concepts for Mādhyamikas, and this discussion could be further developed by looking at the role of prapañca from Yogācāra's view.
With regards to the Yogācāra perspective, Lugli supplies a terminological investigation of prapañca from an etymological and linguistic perspective.According to her, prapañca-vāsanā, despite being a newly introduced term in La ṅka, semantically coincides with the term abhilāpa-vāsanā in the Mahāyānasam .graha and the vyavahāra-vāsanā in the Sam .dhinirmocana.They all collectively highlight the effects of verbalization and language on future perceptions.She took prapañca as "differentiation" and further maintained that it accounted for "why verbalization is the origin of conceptual fabrication (parikalpita) and causes the perpetuation of illusion through vāsanā". 22It is undeniable that La ṅka proposes prapañca as a beginningless factor that gives rise to "the cyclical arising of misperception through language". 23In spite of closely correlating to conceptualization (vikalpa) while distinguishing from it, Lugli did not clarify in what sense prapañca is distinguished from vikalpa and parikalpita, and whether there are possible connections.Moreover, an emphasis on its association with language could prompt one to overlook other features of prapañca, such as its relevance to pre-linguistic cognition that can still be characterized as conceptual and the possible consequences of attachment to prapañca, especially in that latter context.
Building on and departing from the prior work sketched above, I propose to reexamine and re-evaluate the range of meanings of prapañca in La ṅka.Setting aside a strong emphasis on its association with language, this paper will focus more on its nature as a beginningless and negative causal structure that results in mental afflictions.The occurrence of these afflictions can be understood as a conceptualization (vikalpa) process that appropriates phenomenal events in reality.

The Interpretation of Prapañca in La ṅka
This paper will examine the meaning of prapañca in La ṅka in four ways: (1) contextual analysis of its meaning in the compounds in which it is embedded; (2) its connection with vikalpa and vāsanā; (3) its significance for comprehending mere representations of mind; and (4) the necessity of its eradication in relation to Mahāyāna soteriology.

A Contextual Analysis of the Meaning of Prapañca
The precise meaning of prapañca in La ṅka and in Mahāyāna texts more generally is difficult to determine.Regarding the range of meaning that prapañca exhibits in La ṅka, this taxonomy of meanings could be helpful, but there appears to be more to say about prapañca.
The contextual analysis will help situate the term prapañca within its linguistic environment in the discourse of the La ṅkāvatāra S ūtra.This approach aims to specify the grammatical feature of the term concerning its morphological, semantic, and syntactical connections with other closely related terms.In the La ṅkāvatāra S ūtra, prapañca encompasses meanings such as beginningless conceptual structure, characterized by sam .sāric negativity and mental proliferation related to language formation.These meanings, detailed in the following sections, contrast with the use of this term in texts such as the Vastusam .grahan .ī section of the Yogācārabh ūmi (YBh) and the Cintāmayībh ūmi in the Basic Section of YBh, which explicitly emphasize the linguistic and verbal aspects over the mental aspects. 24Meanwhile, these meanings show some similarities to the usage in texts such as the Sam .dhinirmocana S ūtra (SNS), where prapañca serves as a mental proliferation that conceptualizes phenomenal events. 25n terms of the larger themes with which prapañca is connected in La ṅka, more than half of the lexical occurrences fall in Chapter 2, which concerns the operation and function of vijñāna (consciousness).Some other occurrences fall in Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and Chapter 6, whose themes mainly address self-nature, ignorance, self-realization, and enlightenment.Within the broad themes found in these various chapters, the discussion of prapañca relates more specifically to themes concerning the erroneous views held by brahmans and logicians, the function and operation of consciousness, the necessities of the realization of Buddhahood, word discrimination, dualistic notions of existence and perception, and the characteristics of self-nature.To understand more precisely how prapañca is involved in these themes, it is necessary to conduct a detailed exanimation of the several Sanskrit compounds in which it occurs because it is rarely used on its own outside of a compound.

Prapañca Compounds in La ṅka
According to the number of constituents in each compound, Table 1, the Morphological Structure of Compounds with prapañca (attached in Section 3.4), displays the variations of the morphological structure that involve prapañca.The compounds that appear more than once are marked by a number.Despite the complexity of compounds, there appears to be a rather regular sequence in the morphological structure-from anādikāla (beginningless time), prapañca, daus .t . hulya (sam .saric negativity) to vāsanā (imprint).Here, the word anādikāla, meaning beginningless (anādi) time (kāla), indicates the causal and innate nature of prapañca.It signifies that prapañca is intrinsic and arises in dependence on causes and conditions.According to Edgerton's Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, the term daus .t . hulya is associated with various forms of wickedness and depravity. 26When associated with prapañca and vāsanā, it conveys the meaning of sam .sāric negativity, highlighting the continuity of suffering in the cycles of life and rebirth.Vāsanā represents subtle tendencies that arise in consciousness as a result of repeated exposure to positive or negative phenomenal events.Vāsanā is also described as subtle forms of afflictions (kleśa) that obstruct the attainment of Buddhahood. 27pecifically, it is noticeable that prapañca is closely associated with vikalpa (conceptualization), daus .t . hulya, and vāsanā, and Table 1 manifests at least four tendencies: (1) Anādikāla occurs before prapañca, (2) vāsanā tends to be placed at the end of the compound, (3) daus .t . hulya tends to occur between prapañca and vāsanā and embodies a closer relation with prapañca, and (4) the position of vikalpa tends to be flexible; it appears either before or after prapañca, but in most cases, it is placed before vāsanā and after daus .t . hulya.The general trends in these compounds raise questions about the relation between prapañca, vikalpa, vāsanā, and daus .t . hulya.Accordingly, the next section of the paper will explore these connections and provide possible interpretations.As some passages offer clues for the grammatical relation between prapañca and vikalpa, let us examine this pair first.

29
"Moreover, Mahāmati, the cessation of the continuum is [the cessation of that] from which it occurs.Mahāmati, "that from which" means through that which is its basis and that which is its support.Here, the basis (āśraya) is the imprints of the sam .sāric negativity associated with beginningless prapañca; the support is the conceptualizations about the object of consciousness, namely, something perceptible that is [actually] one's own mind".
Here, the basis for the continued occurrence of perceptual consciousness (pravr .ttivijñāna) consists in the imprints for prapañca, while the support is the conceptualizations (vikalpa).While both contribute to the flow of the six forms of experiential consciousness, it is clear that prapañca and vikalpa connect to distinctive aspects of consciousness, namely, as their basis or foundation and as their "support"-i.e., their focal object. 30he next example comes again from the second chapter in a passage describing various forms of distorted cognition, including the "conceptualization that is an imputation of an unreal characteristic" (asallaks .an .asamāropavikalpa): punaraparam .mahāmate asallaks .an .asamāropasya laks .an .am .katamat? yaduta skandhadhātvāyatanānāmasatsvasāmānyalaks .an .ābhiniveśah .idam evam, idam .nānyathety etad dhi mahāmate asallaks .an .asamāropasya laks .an .am/es .a hi mahāmate asallaks .an .asamāropavikalpo 'nādikālaprapañcadaus .t . hulyavicitravāsanābhiniveśāt pravartate/ 31 "Mahāmati, there is another characteristic of the imputation of unreal characteristics.What is it?It is, namely, the fixation (abhiniveśa) on the unreal unique and shared characteristics of the aggregates, the constituents, and the spheres, as in [the thought], "This is just this, and not otherwise".Mahāmati, this very conceptualization that imputes unreal characteristics [to those things] occurs through fixation from the variegated imprints for sam .sāric negativity through beginningless prapañca".
The ablative ending of abhiniveṡa (fixation, attachment, grasping) 32 indicates that the origin of vikalpa is dependent on imprints of prapañca. 33In this regard, vikalpa and prapañca are not only syntactically separated but also semantically distinct from each other.The wording here indicates that these terms convey different connotations and specify their causal relation-the imprints in relation to prapañca lead to vikalpa, as mediated by abhiniveśa.
The following passage also comes from the second chapter, introducing four types of Speech (vāk) and the corresponding conditions that give rise to each type of Speech.The example here particularly shows the type of Speech associated with prapañca and its condition.
In this passage, Speech from conceptualization is categorized into four dimensions, and each dimension corresponds with one reason.The first two categories could be considered as Speech with apparently extra-mental reference, and Speech without extramental reference.Vikalpa occurs as a term in the third and fourth dimensions, which do not concern the reference of language; rather, it is about the formation of words, which is attributed to discrimination processes.On the one hand, words cannot exist without the application of concepts which is endowed with sam .sāric negativity.On the other hand, the formation of words concerns the beginningless conceptualization process.
The difference between the third and the fourth dimension lies in the causes of words that the prose notes: the cause of the third dimension is the anusamaran .a (recollection), while the fourth is vāsanā (imprints).In other words, recollection indicates that attachment/grasping of concepts involves intentional efforts, whereas imprints show the conceptualization process does not necessarily require an effort.However, regardless of whether there are efforts or not, words of conceptualization arise due to the imprints in the consciousness seed, which is influenced and ripened by sam .sāric negativity.And that negativity, which fuels the rebirth, comes from the grasping of prapañca.In this regard, prapañca underpins the basis of the conceptualization process.

Relation with Vāsanā
Another issue that the compound analysis raises is the relationship between vāsanā and prapañca.As we mentioned earlier, the imprints of prapañca are consequent to vikalpa (conceptualization).However, the direct relation between prapañca and vāsanā has not been clarified.According to the compounds collected in Table 1, prapañca closely associates with three words-anādikāla, daus .t . hulya, and vāsanā, and the word sequence in compounds shows anādikāla coming first, then prapañca, daus .t . hulya, and the last one is vāsanā.To analyze a Sanskrit compound, the foremost step is to clarify the grammatical relationship between constituents by analyzing the morphological layers in a compound.This step will determine the semantic association between constituents and contribute to a clearer and more accurate understanding of both the term prapañca and the meaning of the compound.
According to John Dunne's analysis of the two basic forms of imprints (vāsanā) as ( 1) "those that are 'placed' (āhita) in the storehouse by experiences", and (2) "those that are innate or 'beginningless' (anādi)", it is reasonable to take the second form of imprints which is in relation to "beginningless" into account.In the first layer of a prapañca compound, we can thus consider an attributive relation between anādikāla and vāsanā. 38With this in mind, a Karmadhāraya compound 39 indicates a meaning as "beginningless imprints/perfuming".
Then, the second layer of the compound is constructed by prapañca, daus .t .hulya (sams .āric negativity), and vāsanā (perfuming/imprints).There could be two ways of division of this compound: (1) prapañca [daus .t . hulya vāsanā], and (2) [prapañca daus .t . hulya] vāsanā.The linguistics feature and traces from commentary tell that the second reading should be adopted in this context.There are three reasons that we can consider.First, in terms of the linguistic feature of prapañca and daus .t . hulya, prapañca is a substantive noun while vāsanā, distinctively, is a verbal noun; thus, the first two constituents tend to be bound (see layer 3 in the diagram).For another thing, the phrase spros pa'i gnas ngan len shown in Jñānaśrībhadra's commentary on La ṅka survived in Tibetan indicates that spros pa (prapañca) and gnas ngan len (daus .t . hulya) become associated through a genitive relationship, which means "the sams .āric negativity of prapañca" 40 Moreover, with regard to sam .sāric negativity (dausthulya), which mostly appears between prapañca and vāsanā in the compound, it most likely assumes a Yogācāra account, whereby "the cycle perpetuates itself through karmic traces". 41In this regard, the relation of constituents in the third layer would be read as appositional or attributive, meaning "the sam .sāric negative prapañca," or "the prapañca which is the sam .sāric negativity".After clarifying the grammatical structures of layer 1 and layer 2, a problem arises concerning the relationship between prapañca (which is sam .sāric negativity) and vāsanā.It is important to outline all possible grammatical relationships between these two constituents to identify and determine the most reasonable interpretation within the context of the La ṅkāvatāra S ūtra.
According to Apte, the word vāsanā is a verbal noun meaning perfuming or imprinting, which derives from the verbal root √ vās. 43According to Sanskrit grammar, there could be the following possible interpretations: 1.

6.
Genitive Tatpurus .a Prapañcasya vāsanā, meaning the vāsanā of prapañca, which could indicate that the vāsanā is the cause or source of prapañca (as in, "the imprints for [the arisal of] prapañca"), or that the vāsanā is coming from prapañca (as in the imprints that have been placed by prapañca).

Dvandva, prapañca and vāsanā
To identify the relationship between vāsanā and the constituents preceded, we need to have a look at other applications of vāsanā in La ṅka.For example, here is a statement in which the position of prapañca is substituted by nagara (city).sā ca nagarākr .tir anādikālanagarabījavāsanābhiniveśāt khyāti tacca nagaram .nānagaram .na nagaram 44 "And the image of the city appears due to fixation on the seed-vāsanā for [cognizing] the city from beginningless time.And that city is not a non-city, nor is it a city".
According to this message, the nagara-bīja vāsanā is a karmic trace or imprint that prompts the appearance in cognition of an image identified as a city, but that imprint itself is presumably the result of previous experience of what is identified as a city.Thus, the relationship between the imprints and the city is reciprocal.In other words, the formation of imprints entails a cyclical process as a representing and re-enhancing mode, in which nagara-vāsanā indicates cognition by identifying a mental image as a city.In this regard, the imprints that come from previous cognition of a city can result in the present recognition of the city.
In addition, the formation of the notion of city is further represented and re-enhanced in a cyclic manner.The city presented in mind is not a real city nor an unreal city; instead, it is a mental event caused by a cyclically conceptualized operation.The cognition of the city resulted from a notion of the city.And, the notion of a city is re-produced and re-enhanced in the recognition of a city, in which the process leaves imprints of conceptual tendency behind.Therefore, it is possible to say the structure of a vāsanā with a genitive case preceded by a non-case noun conveys a relationship evincing mutual influences and productions between vāsanā and the noun.evameva mahāmate anādikālatīrthyapraprañcavādavāsanābhinivis .t . āh .ekatvānyatvāstitvanāstitvavādān abhiniviśante svacittadr .śyamātrānavadhāritamatayah ./ 45 "In this very way, Oh Mahāmati, those who are fixated on the beginningless imprints for the prapañca discourse of the Tīrthikas are fixated on discourses about identity/difference and existence/non-existence, [and as such] they have opinions that have not determined that [the objects of experience are actually] one's own mind [presented as] perceptual objects".In accordance with the example of nagara, the compound anādikāla-tīrthya-praprañcavādavāsanā-abhinivis .t .a in the example above maintains the same morphological structure as anādikāla-nagarabīja-vāsanā-abhiniveśā.Therefore, it is reasonable to interpret the relationship between praprañca-vāda and vāsanā as a genitive Tatpurus .a, meaning the words-imprints are the genitive object of prapañca; specifically, the imprints and prapañca are related in a mutually re-enforced mode.Imprints are left by mental activities that prapañca involved in (imprints result from prapañca), whilst prapañca leads to imprints, being interconnected as the cause and effect in a cyclic continuum of sam .sāra.In this regard, amongst the eight possible interpretations above, the sixth (genitive Tatpurus .a) that is most relevant means that prapañca could cause vāsanā to occur, and at the same time, the vāsanā is the latent propensity that causes prapañca to arise.

About Representation of the Mind
Some negative aspects of prapañca include obstacles to the true awareness of visible objects as representations of the mind.La ṅka see true awareness as having to do with the use of language.
jalpaprapañcābhiratā hi bālās tattve na kurvanti matim .viśālām/ jalpo hi traidhātukaduh .khayonis tattvam .hi duh .khasya vināśahetuh .//3.93// 46 "Indeed, childish people who are of verbiage and prapañca do not think extensively about the ultimate.Indeed, verbiage is the origin of suffering in the three worlds, and the ultimate is the cause for being free from suffering".This text makes it clear that one of prapañca's detrimental consequences is its propensity to acquire discourses, words, and names.And because of the verbiage propensity that childish people have, they fail to comprehend the ultimate.The following dialogue between Mahāmati and Buddha explains the erroneous nominalization by emphasizing that the awareness and the realization of representations of reality as mind should never be confused with a verbiage name of mind-only.The basic idea is that when one first adopts words and names, the mind has already conceptualized objects as external existence and has designated a name upon them.In this regard, one is only concerned with forms or labels of references, thus further making judgments of the reference in terms of whether the reference is existent or non-existent.Despite one's assertion that the mind is all that exists, it is still the name of the ultimate awareness instead of the awareness itself.True awareness should be a realization that awareness does not perceive an object that is taken as its focus because there are only representations of the mind, and there is even nonperception of the awareness, either.
Mahāmati specifically questioned the Buddha as to how it was possible that nothing could sustain awareness because he believed awareness exists wherever there is a knowing object.If one ignores individuality, generality, plurality, and self-nature, then the awareness that has nothing to focus on cannot possibly be awareness; rather, it is simply non-awareness.In other words, Mahāmati thinks that awareness should refer to a knowing object that evinces individuality, generality, multiplicity, and self-nature.Otherwise, knowledge is another word for non-awareness.
punar api mahāmatir āha/yat punar idam uktam .bhagavatā-yadā tv ālambyam artham .nopalabhate jñānam .tadā vijñaptimātravyavasthānam .bhavati/vijñapter grāhyābhāvād grāhakasyāpy agrahan .am .bhavati/tadagrahan .ān na pravartate jñānam .vikalpasam .śabditam/ tat kim .punar bhagavan bhāvānām .svasāmānyalaks .an .ānanyavaicitryānavabodhān nopalabhate jñānam?atha svasāmānyalaks .an .avaicitryabhāvasvabhāvābhibhavān nopalabhate jñānam/atha kud .yakat .avapraprākārabh ūjalapavanāgnivyavahitātid ūrasāmīpyān nopalabhate jñānam .jñeyam/atha bālāndhavr .ddhayogādindriyān .ām .jñeyārtham .nopalabhate jñānam/tad yadi bhagavan svasāmānyalaks .an .ānanyavaicitryānavabodhān nopalabhate jñānam, na tarhi bhagavan jñānam .vaktavyam, ajñānam/etad bhagavan yad vidyamānam artham .nopalabhate/atha svasāmānyalaks .an .avaicitryabhāvasvabhāvābhibhavān nopalabhate jñānam, tad ajñānam eva bhagavan na jñānam/jñeye 47 sati bhagavan jñānam .pravartate, nābhāvāt/tadyogāc ca jñeyasya jñānam ity ucyate/ 48 "And again, Mahāmati said: But there is this that the Blessed one said, namely, that when awareness is not perceiving an object which is taken as its focus, then there is the establishment of mere representation (vijñaptimātra).Because the representation has no object to be grasped, there is the no apprehension of a grasper also.Since there is no apprehension of that, an awareness called 'conceptual' does not occur.Also, the Blessed one, does awareness not perceive [objects] because there is no cognition of the non-different variegation of particular and general characteristics, or does awareness not perceive [objects] without realizing of the nature and variations of their particular and general characteristics?Or is it that awareness does not perceive an object to be known because of the proximity or distance of what is obscured by walls, mats, ramparts, fences, the earth, the water, the wind, or fire?Or is it due to having the senses of one who is infantile, blind, old, and so on that awareness does not perceive an object to be known?If, Blessed One, awareness does not perceive [objects] because there is no cognition of the non-different variegation of particular and general characteristics, then, Blessed One, it should not be called awareness, [it should be called] non-awareness.This is not perceiving a presently existing object, Blessed One.Because of not realizing the nature and variations of [objects'] particular and general characteristics, awareness does not perceive [objects], then it is just non-awareness; it is not awareness, Blessed One.When there is an object to be known, awareness occurs, Blessed one; it does not occur due to something non-existent.And because of its connection with the object to be known, it is called 'awareness'." The Buddha answers in the following way.
Bhagavān āha/na hi tan mahāmate evam ajñānam .bhavati/jñānam eva tan mahāmate, nājñānam/na caitat sam .dhāyoktam .mayā-yadā tvālambyam artham .nopalabhate jñānam .tadā vijñaptimātravyavasthānam .bhavatīti/kim .tu svacittadr .śyamātrāvabodhāt sadasator bāhyabhāvābhāvāj jñānam apy artham .nopalabhate/tadanupalambhāj jñānajñeyayor apravr .ttih ./vimoks .atrayānugamāj jñānasyāpy anupalabdhih ./na ca tārkikā anādikālabhāvābhāvaprapañcavāsitamataya evam .prajānanti te cāprajānanto bāhyadravyasam .sthānalaks .an .abhāvābhāvam .kr .tvā vikalpasyāpravr .ttim .cittamātratām .nirdeks .yanti/ātmātmīyalaks .an .agrāhābhiniveśābhinivis .t . āh .svacittadr .śyamātrānavabodhāj jñānam .jñeyam .prativikalpayanti/te ca jñānajñeyaprativi-kalpanayā bāhyabhāvābhāvapravicayānupalabdher ucchedadr .s .t . im āśriyante/ 49 "Said the Blessed One: Oh Mahāmati, it is not non-awareness in this way; it is just awareness, and not non-awareness, Mahāmati.It is not intending this, that I said the following: when awareness does not perceive an object which is taken as its focus, then there is the establishment of mere representation.Rather, awareness indeed is not perceiving objects because, through recognizing that [apparent objects] are merely one's own mind presented as perceptible, there are no external objects, whether real or unreal.And through the nonperception of those [external objects], there is no occurrence of awareness and what is to be known.And through realizing the three forms of liberation, there is also the nonperception even of awareness.Also, the Sophists (tarkikā), with their minds perfumed with prapañca about existence and non-existence from beginningless time, do not know wisely in this way.And not wisely knowing this, having construed [mererepresentation] as the absence of external substance, shape, characteristics, and existence, would teach that mind-only is just the non-occurrence of conceptuality.Attached by the attachment and grasping to the characteristics of 'I' and 'Mine', they conceptualize awareness and objects of awareness due to not recognizing that [what is appearing] is merely one's mind presented as perceptible.And due to conceptualizing awareness and objects of awareness, they resort to a nihilistic view because they do not perceive the distinction between the existence and non-existence of external things".
The verses 3.58, 3.59, and 3.60 following this dialogue briefly summarize the response to Mahāmati's inquiry, which highlights the aforementioned wrong views because of nonawareness.I did not list verses here because the content of these verses has been explicitly exhibited by the passage above.
Then, the Buddha's answer continues on as below: Punar aparam .mahāmate bālapr .thagjanā anādikālaprapañcadaus .t .hulyasvaprativikalpanānāt .ake nr .tyantah .svasiddhāntanayadeśanāyām akuśalāh .svacittadr .śyabāhyabhāvalaks .a-n .ābhinivis .t . ā upāyadeśanāpāt .ham abhiniviśante, na svasiddhāntanayam .cātus .kot .ikanayaviśuddham .prativibhāvayanti/ 50 "Furthermore, Mahāmati, those childish ordinary people, who are dancing the dance of their own conceptualizations due to the sam .sāric negativity of beginningless prapañca, are unskilled in the teaching of their own philosophical system and attached to the characteristics of the external things that are [actually] their own minds presented as perceptible.As such they are attached to the teaching of means, and they do not cultivate a form of their own philosophical system that has been purified by the use of the four options".The Buddha's response conveys a crucial message that the awareness that is not perceiving an object, which is taken as its focus, is the actual awareness because the realization-awareness is not perceiving-entails a cognition: visible objects are merely a representation of the mind, and nothing exists externally.It is because there is not the kind of external object that could be perceived, nor is there the awareness whose perceiving should rely on objects.Moreover, because there is no external object to be perceived as awareness, there is neither the awareness of objects nor the perception of awareness.
Buddha uses the Sophists 51 as an example to show how true awareness should be understood.On the one hand, Sophists construe the representation of the mind as an absence of external objects and, therefore, claim that the mind-only is just the non-occurrence of conceptuality.This comprehension of the representation of the mind falls into the problematics of external-internal duality and nihilism.The Sophists' dualistic conceptualization concerns their distinction between the mind as internal and objects to be known as external.The negation of external objects presupposes the existence of an internal mind, creating a dualistic conceptualization of reality.However, the true approach to mind-only should be nondual.
Second, the Sophists conceptualize both awareness and the object of awareness due to the lack of understanding of objects as merely mental representations presented as perceptible in the mind.This is because the Sophists fail to understand the structural relationship between external objects and the internal mind as the essential problem of dualistic mental afflictions.Their attachment to the negation of objects of awareness indicates their attachment to awareness itself.However, according to the Buddha's answer to Mahāmati's question, both awareness and the object of awareness belong to the category of representations of mind.There are neither real nor unreal external objects to be perceived; therefore, there is neither the perception of external objects nor the perception of the occurrence of awareness.Through such a realization of the nonperception, there is even a nonperception of awareness.A realization of the structural relationship between awareness and the object of awareness contributes to the understanding of the nonperception of awareness, which is a nondual awareness.This is because, in negating the existence of the object of awareness, the existence of awareness itself, as the dualistic pair of the object, is simultaneously negated. 52he Buddha further implies the causes of the Sophist's misunderstanding, which is the attachment to the self and its belongings and the perfuming effect from prapañca.As a result, they mistakenly take external objects with various characteristics as mere representations of the mind and attach them to only the means of teaching.
Two key messages are notable, to put it briefly.First, it is important to distinguish between the Sophist's understanding of mind-only and the real meaning of mind-only.Sophists use the term "only seeing one's own mind" 53 (svacittadr . s . yamātra) to distinguish between the categories of "mind" and "external objects", as well as between existence and non-existence, rather than pursuing real awareness of mental representations.They fail to understand that the representation of the mind does not concern the absence of external objects; rather, it is about the nonperception of both awareness and objects of awareness.Second, the Sophists' claim of mind-only, which is a conceptualization process that results in nihilism and the discrimination of mind and external objects, should never be an appropriate approach to the real awareness of the representation of mind; instead, Sophists' teaching merely keeps one distant from the real and truthful mind-only, and their teaching of the mind-only is not only incorrect but even worse than teaching nothing.

Relation with Consciousnesses
Another important factor is how the imprints of prapañca affect consciousness (vijñāna).In particular, the message that follows shows how the consequences of imprints of prapañca influence consciousness.tatra khyātivijñānam .mahāmate acintyavāsanāparin .āmahetukam/vastuprativikalpavijñānam .ca mahāmate vis .ayavikalpahetukam anādikālaprapañcavāsanāhetukam .ca// 54 "In this regard, Mahāmati, consciousness of appearances has as its cause the evolution of inconceivable imprints, and the consciousness that constructs real things has as its cause the conceptualization of objects, and it also has as its cause the beginningless prapañca-imprint".
In the Buddha's response about the divisions and nature of consciousness, 55 khyāti consciousness 56 and the vastuprativikalpa consciousness 57 mutually function as cause to each other, but the two kinds of consciousness arise based on other different conditions.khyātivijñāna refers to the first five activated consciousness, whilst the vastuprati consciousness is designated to the sixth and seventh consciousness. 58For one thing, the prose specifies the distinctions between the khyāti-vijñāna and vastuprativikalpa-vijñāna. 59 For another thing, it points out different conditions that give rise to the operation of the two types of consciousnesses.One of the factors that activate the object-discriminating consciousness (vastuprativikalpa-vijñāna) in this context is the imprint of prapañca.As prapañca happens preceded vikalpa (the conceptualization of objects), prapañca could be understood as the circumstance or mental framework that produces the distinction between subject and object.

anādikālavividhaprapañcadaus . t
. hulyavāsanāvāsitah .ālayavijñānasam .śabdito 'vidyāvāsanabh ūmijaih .saptabhir vijñānaih .saha mahodadhitaram .gavan nityam avyucchinnaśarīrah .pravartate anityatādos .arahita ātmavādavinivr .tto 'tyantaprakr .tipariśuddhah ./ 60 "Influenced by the imprints of sam .sāric negativities of the variegated beginningless prapañca, the so-called Ālaya consciousness-which is the uninterrupted constituent element as itself, along with the other seven consciousness-which produced the imprints of ignorance, like waves arisen on the great ocean.[The constituent element itself] is free from the fault of impermanence and is devoid of the word of self, whose absolute nature is supreme purity".
In this prose, the relation between prapañca and Ālaya-vijñāna is explicitly uttered, which is implied by the word "avāsita" (influenced by).Ālaya-vijñāna has an absolutely pure nature that is free of self-grasping.Although if Ālaya-vijñāna is interrupted and immutable, the effect of prapañca causes the seven vijñāns, which exhibit the propensity for ignorance, to emerge.It is important to emphasize that while prapañca can activate the seven consciousnesses, which leads to ignorance, prapañca is powerless to change the pure nature of Ālaya-vijñāna. 61Because the writing does not demonstrate a direct connection between prapañca and ignorance, it would be risky to assert that the imprints about prapañca result in ignorance or that the imprints about prapañca are ignorant.The most likely interpretation here is the following: The imprints about prapañca effect on eight consciousnesses, but the pure nature of the Ālaya-vijñāna (the eighth consciousness) cannot be altered; in addition, the arising of the other seven consciousnesses, under the impacts of prapañca, becomes the base of unknowing and leads to ignorance.Moreover, regarding the originally pure nature of Ālaya-vijñāna, as the prose has shown, one of the necessities to avoid the production of defilements and to maintain the pure nature of consciousness is to be free from the influence of the imprints of prapañca.This utterance evinces an insight for the realization of liberation which is about an antidote for ignorance.

The Elimination of Prapañca
As mentioned earlier, prapañca consists of negativity (as being modified by daus .t . hulya) and is continuously entangled with the cyclic rebirth.This sort of feature is closely associated with ignorance and suffering.In terms of the Buddhist purpose for liberation, the elimination of suffering, uprooting ignorance and the cause of ignorance are supposed to be the fundamental antidote.The conversations in La ṅka propose some hints for the eradication of prapañca, which concerns the ideal mental status and the antidote Buddhists are supposed to look for.ye punaranye mahāmate śraman .ā vā brāhman .ā vā nih .svabhāvaghanālātacakragandharvanagarānutpādamāyāmarīcyudakacandrasvapnasvabhāvabāhyacittadr .śyavikalpānādikālaprapañcadarśanena svacittavikalpapratyayavinivr .ttirahitāh .parikalpitābhidhānalaks .yalaks .an .ābhidheyarahitā dehabhogapratis .t . hāsamālayavijñānavis .ayagrāhyagrāhakavisam .yuktam .nirābhāsagocaram utpādasthitibha ṅgavarjyam .svacittotpādānugatam .vibhāvayis .yanti, nacirātte mahāmate bodhisattvā mahāsattvāh .sam .sāranirvān .asamatāprāptā bhavis .yanti/ 62 "Furthermore, Mahāmati, those monks and brahmans, by perceiving the beginningless prapañca which leads to the conceptualization of visible objects perceptible outside the mind, with [an understanding of] the nature of oneself like a dream, a moon in water, an illusory mirage, the unreal city Gandharva, a wheel of firebrand, and the cloud which have no essence, understand that such occurrences is merely one's own mind.Without the occurrence of the conceptualization in one's own mind, in avoidance of names, the defined and definitions, discourse and conceptualization, without the subject-object dualistic appearance in Ālaya consciousness which is the store of form and body, without arising, sustaining and cessation in a sphere of no fallacious appearance (without any appearance), Oh Mahāmati, they will shortly become the great beings-Bodhisattvas, accomplishing the synthesizing of sam .sāra and nirvān .a".This discourse highlights the significant role that the elimination of prapañca plays on the path to enlightenment.For one thing, the perception of prapañca as a recognition of the negativity of prapañca could lead to the avoidance of words, names, and definitions, which concerns the illusory appearance in the mind as incorrect recognition of something outside the mind.The second benefit of the elimination relates to the prevention of dualistic conceptualization, especially the subject-object duality.The subject-object duality comes along with the Ālaya consciousness (not the nature of Ālaya, but after being activated, there are other consciousness evolving from it).Having been free from the dualistic consciousness, there appears a sphere without fallacious appearance regarding arising, sustaining, and cessation.Indeed, we still need further exploration to determine whether there could be an underlying causal chain between the grammatical chunks.Nevertheless, it is possible to contend that the eradication of prapañca is one of the necessities to achieve an enlightened state.Also, based on the mental defilements listed, in aspects ranging from language definition, the thinking of objects as things outside of the mind, the subject-object dualistic conceptualization, and the arising, sustaining, and cessation of appearance, it is possible that the eradication of prapañca contributes to the elimination of defilements and the accomplishment of the ultimate enlightenment.

Summary
This paper focuses on a few key issues regarding the concept of prapañca, including its defining characteristics, its relationship to vikalpa, its association with linguistic applications, and its connection with the mechanism.It is worth noting that the current study of prapañca in La ṅka clarifies its role as an innate mental affliction rooted in dualistic conceptualization, whose elimination is a necessary condition for the experience of nondual awareness and the realization of emptiness that transcends linguistic and conceptual constructions.
In specific, this study includes the following essential aspects: (1) Prapañca differs from vikalpa, which relates to the subject-object conceptualization process and is likely a fundamental mechanism for mental operation; (2) it exerts significant influences on seed consciousness, which can activate other consciousness but cannot alter the pure nature of the seed; (3) prapañca is innate, which exhibits the essence of beginningless-ness and is structurally conditioned by negativities; (4) given that language is a key conceptualization tool, it may have something to do with language formation, language use, and the impact of language on consciousness.
The characteristics of prapañca concern beginningless and sam .sāric negativities.Nonsam .sāric beings, including the enlightened Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, are devoid of birth and rebirth; therefore, the imprints of prapañca and prapañca itself could not affect them.The feature implies that only when one is free from prapañca could one obtain enlightenment-a state devoid of ignorance and sufferings of sam .sāra.In addition, an analysis of prapañca's relation with conceptualization (vikalpa), subject-object duality, and mind-only (citta-matra) helps in approaching an ontological inquiry-"what is prapañca?"On the one hand, prapañca not only distinguishes from conceptualization but also appears to be the cause that leads to conceptualization.It is a mechanism that shapes and reshapes the categorization and conceptualization process.However, it is noticeable that features and functions of prapañca that have been articulated in La ṅka are endowed with fluidity and flexibility because of the mediation of "vāsanā" (imprint/tendency).With this in mind, it is risky to pin down a single determinative definition of prapañca without further clarification of the relationship between prapañca and vāsanā.Thus far, amongst the potential grammatical implications, it is reasonable to maintain that prapañca and vāsanā evince a mutually reinforcing relation, simultaneously operating as the cause and result for each other, and this relationship connects prapañca with the foundational operation of mind and consciousness.This reading unfolds the significance of the role that prapañca plays in framing the structure of the conceptualization mechanism.
Another important aspect of understanding prapañca is its association with the representation of the mind.According to La ṅka, Sophists attach to words, names and the concept of self and self-belongs, thus giving rise to the wrong view of mind-only.The Buddha's answer indicates that, because of the perfuming of prapañca, Sophists not only conceptualize both the awareness and the object of awareness but also simply consider the representation of the mind just as an absence of external objects.Their means of teaching via linguistics application become a hindrance to true awareness, as the language used in Sophists' teaching of the mind-only refers to nothing but concepts without real reference.Also, according to the Buddha, real awareness of the representation of the mind is a nonperception of awareness due to the absence of both awareness and the object of awareness.This emphasis on the nonperception of awareness induces a tendency to transcend "mind-only", potentially bringing the voice of Madhyamaka with a focus on the empty nature of concepts and conceptualization and giving rise to the understanding of the lack of inherent existence for both awareness and the object or awareness.
Given the complexity of the language application of La ṅka, which shows an extent of the fluidity of the meaning of prapañca in the textual conversations, it might be necessary to further address the meaning of prapañca by referring to other influential Buddhist treaties around the 4th century.So far, it is undeniable that the meaning of prapañca still shows variations.Regardless of the wide range of thesis that prapañca might associate with, it is crucial to be aware that its coexistence with other important notions in the Yogācāra system reveals the value of further clarification and illustrations.

Notes
Translated by Dr. John D. Dunne.I want to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Dunne's generous help with the Sanskrit translations from La ṅka in this paper and his assistance with the edition.
Translated by Dr. John D. Dunne.Prapañca was translated as conceptual structuring.Mark Siderits translated the verse as "Liberation is attained through the destruction of actions and defilements; actions and defilements arise because of falsifying conceptualizations; those arise from hypostatization; but hypostatization is extinguished in emptiness", in which prapañca was translated as hypostatization.Other translation choices include "proliferation", "expansion", "elaboration", etc.
According to Akira Saito's analysis of Prapañca in the piece "Prapañca in the M ūlamadhyamakakārikā", he mentioned that Nāgārjuna considered it as the root cause of defilements.The usage thereof in MMK reveals that prapañca represents "the mental activity of 'conceptualization', objects of mental activity, and the instruments of mental activity".See (Saito 2019).
For detailed analysis about the meaning of papañca in Pali canon.See (Ñān .ananda 1997, p. 5).
The dictionary edited by Edgerton briefly introduced the ambiguity that the term prapañca conceys, see (Edgerton 1953, pp.380-81).This information can also be found in Suzuki's An Index to the La ṅkāvatāra-s ūtra.See (Suzuki 2000).Jinchuan Wan's serial of works about prapañca underlines its connotation on speech act, see (Wan 1984).Beier Wang brough up the usage of prapañca in the form of imprint in conceptualization and world-making through the mediation of language, see (Wang 2022).
Saito's article focuses on prapañca's meaning in the tradition of Madhyamak, but he introduced Yogācāra's interpretation and drew us attention to their silimarities and differences.See (Saito 2019).
For more detailed discussion about this issue, please see (Lugli 2011, p. 137).
In terms of the current study of La ṅka, a bibliographical summary by Florin Deleanu supplies detailed information about the state of scholarship on the text.Dharmaks .ema 曇無識's Lengqie jing 楞伽經, in four scrolls was said to have been translated in 414, which attribution and date are found in the Lidai sanbao ji 歷代三寶紀 (T49.84b7) by Fei Changfang費長房 in 597.However, this version of translation is not survived and is widely regarded as a false attribution, according to Florin Deleanu.There are three versions of Chinese translation survived today, respectively the four volumes Lengqieabaduoluo bao jing 楞伽阿跋多羅寶經 by Gun .abhadra 求那拔陀羅 (394-468), the ten volume Ru Lengqie jing 入楞伽經 by Bodhiruci (d.527), and seven scroll Dasheng ru Lengqie jing 大乘入楞伽經 by Śiks .ānanda 實叉難陀 (652-710).See (Deleanu 2018).Nanji ō's critical edition of Saddharmala ṅkāvatāra is based on four Sanskrit manuscripts, respectively the MS in the royal Asiatic Society, London, the MS in the University Library, Cambridge, the MS in the possession of Rev E. Kawaguchi, acquired in Nepal, and the MS in the possession of J. Takakusu, acquired in Nepal.See (Nanji ō 1956).The information of the Sanskrit manuscript can be found in the Digital Library of University of Cambridge.https://cudl.lib.cam.ac.uk/view/MS-ADD-00915/1 (access on 2 Feburary 2024).
More detailed information about the process of editing the text can be found in (Nanji ō 1956, p. 7).
More details about this debate can be found in (Lugli 2010).
Lugli's idea about the role of La ṅka can be found in (Lugli 2011, p. 2).
Lugli's exploration about the meaning of prapañca as differentiation can be found in (Lugli 2011, p. 143).
For the discussion about the usage of prapañca in early Yogācāra treatise, such as Yogācārab ūmi and Cintāmayībh ūmi, see (Wang  2022).
For more detailed discussion of prapañca in Samdhinirmocana S ūtra, see (Wang 2022).
The texts come from page 38 of (Nanji ō 1956).The yasmāt sa in the Tibetan version shows as yasmān na, which means "the cessation of the continuum is not [the cessation of that] from which it occurs".However, since the previous passage are talking about another type of nirodha (cessation), it makes more sense to follow Nanji ō's reading that took it as sa instead of na.
See footnote 39.According to Baosheng Huang, Khyātivijñāna is designated to the seed consciousness in La ṅka's discourse, while the vastuprativikalpa refers to the pravr .tti consciousness, which the six consciousness(es) that are generated from the base consciousness.
abhiniveṡāt.The ablative case in Sanskrit could be used to indicate reason and source.
The relationship between vāsanā (imprint) and prapañca will be addressed in the following section.The most possible relationship could be indicated by "of" in translation.
The original word is nih .svabhāvaghanālātacakragandharvanagarānutpādamāyāmarīcyudakacandrasvapnasvabhāvabāhyacitta-dr .śyavikalpānādikālaprapañcadarśanena.The compound could be segmented into nih .svabhā-vaghana-alātacakra-gandharvanagaraanutpādamāyāmarīci-udakacandra-svapna-svabhāva-bāhya-citta-dr .śya-vikalpa-anādikāla-prapañca-darśanena.Since constituents before bāhya could be separated as some instances to explain their lack of essence, and the darśana at the end participate in the sentence level meaning "perceive", the morphologically related constituents in this compounds left for prapañca is bāhya-citta-dr .śya-vikalpaanādikāla-prapañca.Therefore, merely this part was included in the table.
One of the compounds is asadbh ūtavikalpaprapañca.Likewise, asadbh ūta and vikalpaprapañca could be firstly separate as two trunks, and vikalpaprapañca is the most relevant part; thus it was counted.
The original word is nih .svabhāvaghanālātacakragandharvanagarānutpādamāyāmarīcyudakacandrasvapnasvabhāvabāhyacitta-dr .śyavikalpānādikālaprapañcadarśanena.The compound could be segmented into nih .svabhā-vaghana-alātacakra-gandharvanagaraanutpādamāyāmarīci-udakacandra-svapna-svabhāva-bāhya-citta-dr .śya-vikalpa-anādikāla-prapañca-darśanena.Since constituents before bāhya could be separated as some instances to explain their lack of essence, and the darśana at the end participate in the sentence level meaning "perceive", the morphologically related constituents in this compounds left for prapañca is bāhya-citta-dr .śya-vikalpaanādikāla-prapañca.Therefore, merely this part was included in the table.
One of the compounds is asadbh ūtavikalpaprapañca.Likewise, asadbh ūta and vikalpaprapañca could be firstly separate as two trunks, and vikalpaprapañca is the most relevant part; thus it was counted.
In other words, according to Sanskrit grammar, it is a Karmadhāraya compound.See (Deshpande 2014, p. 267).
Nanji ō, The La ṅkāvatāra S ūtra, page 186, line 8 to 9. See (Nanji ō 1956).Barclay underlines the significance of the language issue that has been expanded in La ṅka.According to Barclay, La ṅka "sees the use of words in the form of discourse as a practical tool to direct the reader toward an experience to which the application of words is impossible, the internal realization of the truth.The sutra seeks to use words as a lever to detach individuals from attachment to the world by meeting certain problems in the minds of its ignorant readers and to destroy erroneous views which block realization.It seeks to drive the reader to the level on which he may become conversant with meaning rather than words".See (Barclay 1975).Nanji ō's edition prints as jñāye, see Nanji ō, The La ṅkāvatāra S ūtra, 170.According to the previous discussion, it makes more sense to consider it was a typo.jñeye, meaning the object of knowledge in locative case, grammatically aligns with the following passage.
The word "Sophist" was translated from tarkikā.This translation aims to maintain the connotation of Buddhist attitude towards non-Buddhists.The Buddha's message about awareness as non-awareness, or knowledge as non-knowledge, can be further explored from philosophical perspectives.The passages here attempt to reveal true nondual awareness through negation.This approach demonstrates an effort to use linguistic discussion to evoke non-linguistic experience and to use conceptual mind to reveal the experience of non-dualistic awareness that transcends prapañca and subject-object duality.
According to what Buddha has expressed about the division of consciousness, there are three categories, and in details there are eight categories.The passage here refers to the latter two type of consciousness in three-category division.Nanji ō, The La ṅkāvatāra S ūtra, 37.
Huang Baosheng thinks ākhyātivijñāna (显现识 xianxian shi) refers to Ālaya-vijñāna which in contrast to the second type of consciousness-vastuvikalpa-vijñāna (分别事物识 fenbie shiwu shi).Also, according to him, the usage of ākhyāsyati, a future form from ākhyā meaning 'will explain', in the previous passages does not make sense.However, based on the context, despite the variated application of ākhyā, it is still clear that it refers to the perceiving consciousness.See (Huang 2011, vol.9, p. 85).
Since the khyāti in this text is still different from ākhyāti, it is risky to simply regard the khyātivijñāna as Ālaya-vijñana.Thus, I adopt perceiving-consciousness and object-discriminating consciousness to address the division.
It noticeable that the 'prapañca' and 'avidyā (ignorance)' are both followed by 'vāsanā', meaning imprints or tendency carries the operation of prapañca and avidyā.However, more research needs to be done about the application and the meaning of vāsanā.

Table 1 .
Morphological structure of compounds with prapañca.