From Critical Theory to Critical Hermeneutics

From their beginning in the 1930s, critical theory and the Frankfurt school had their focus on a critique of disturbed social relations in western society dominated by totalitarian political regimes like Stalinism, Fascism, Nazism, and by capitalism as an oppressive and destructive economic system and culture. The main theoretical references were Freud and Marx. According to Rolf Wiggershaus, the historian of the Frankfurt School, it was appropriate to talk about a school in the 1930s insofar as Max Horkheimer was a charismatic “managerial scholar”, who was able to formulate a theoretical program for the school that was institutionalized into the Institut für Sozialforschung (Wiggershaus 1986: 9-10). Horkheimer was able to attract many brilliant scholars like Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Franz Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer to participate in the critical theory program. They all wanted in different ways to contribute to an interdisciplinary social science that could embrace the many specialized forms of social sciences, and express a critique that united the moral and social scientific perspectives. However, as Wiggershaus remarks, even in the 1930s there was no paradigmatic unity in the brilliant scholars’ different perspectives. Therefore one could say that even in the 1930s it was misleading to speak about critical theory as the expression of one single theory. There was, to a certain degree, only a common understanding that the task of social sciences is to exercise critique. But what could be meant by critique was not at all clear and univocal.

From their beginning in the 1930s, critical theory and the Frankfurt school had their focus on a critique of disturbed social relations in western society dominated by totalitarian political regimes like Stalinism, Fascism, Nazism, and by capitalism as an oppressive and destructive economic system and culture.Now, 80 years later, this has all become history and thus it is time to leave the concept of critical theory behind us, and instead bring the concept of critique to a broader theoretical framework like hermeneutics.This allows the possibility of retaining the theoretical intentions of the old Frankfurt school and at the same time there will be no boundaries by specific dominant theoretical perspectives.In this paper, such a framework for a critical hermeneutics is discussed on the basis of Weber's, Gadamer's, and Habermas' theories on hermeneutics within the social sciences.

The origin of critical theory in the Frankfurt School during the 1930s
From their beginning in the 1930s, critical theory and the Frankfurt school had their focus on a critique of disturbed social relations in western society dominated by totalitarian political regimes like Stalinism, Fascism, Nazism, and by capitalism as an oppressive and destructive economic system and culture.The main theoretical references were Freud and Marx.According to Rolf Wiggershaus, the historian of the Frankfurt School, it was appropriate to talk about a school in the 1930s insofar as Max Horkheimer was a charismatic "managerial scholar", who was able to formulate a theoretical program for the school that was institutionalized into the Institut für Sozialforschung (Wiggershaus 1986: 9-10).Horkheimer was able to attract many brilliant scholars like Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Franz Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer to participate in the critical theory program.They all wanted in different ways to contribute to an interdisciplinary social science that could embrace the many specialized forms of social sciences, and express a critique that united the moral and social scientific perspectives.However, as Wiggershaus remarks, even in the 1930s there was no paradigmatic unity in the brilliant scholars' different perspectives.Therefore one could say that even in the 1930s it was misleading to speak about critical theory as the expression of one single theory.There was, to a certain degree, only a common understanding that the task of social sciences is to exercise critique.But what could be meant by critique was not at all clear and univocal.Now, 80 years later, this has all become history and thus it is time to leave the concept of critical theory behind us, and instead bring the concept of critique to a broader theoretical framework such as hermeneutics.This allows for the possibility of retaining the theoretical intentions of the old Frankfurt school and at the same time there will be no boundaries by specific dominant theoretical perspectives such as Marx's, Freud's, etc.This does not mean that these specific theories no longer have any relevance.But today we have another horizon of understanding and we live in another époque.
In the following, I would like to sketch a framework for such a critical hermeneutics with a discussion of the concept of hermeneutics by Weber, Gadamer and Habermas.
What is paradoxical in the formulation is that Weber turns the usual discussion of objectivity completely on its head.For Weber, it is a matter of guarding against the conception that the empirical could give our subjective values an objective sheen and turn them into an ideology (Larsen 1996: 81).It is not the purpose of science to justify values; the purpose of science is, with the help of values, to clarify empirical relationships (Collin 1996: 54 ff.).Yet, this clarity can never be final.It is a Vol. 9, no. 3 (2014) Category: Conference paper Written by Øjvind Larsen hermeneutic relationship, because it depends on the value point of view taken on the social relationship.In an extension thereof, it becomes an important, perhaps, the most important task of sociology to clarify what values lay the groundwork for the evaluation of the empirical social relationship.
Weber discusses this, among other places, in "Wissenschaft als Beruf", where he reaches the conclusion that science has four professional tasks (Weber 1988d: 606-609).The first is technical insight into social reality.The second is training in a methodological procedure for inquiry.The third is clarity of thought, including, among other things, clarity in the choice between goals and means.The fourth is clarity about what values are at the basis of those assessments.Thus, science as a professional calling ("Beruf") must serve "self-knowledge"' and "knowledge of interrelated facts" (Weber 1988d: 609).
It appears from this quote and the whole discussion in "Der Sinn der 'Wertfreiheit' der soziologischen und ökonomischen Wissenschaften" that Weber attributes discussions about fundamental values a decisive significance to scientific work, because it is through this discussion that what values are to be at the basis for scientific assessments are clarified.According to Weber, there is no such thing as a value-neutral scientific statement, which means that positivist sociology is, in Weber's view, nonsense.On the other hand, according to Weber, there is no ultimate justification of values (Bruun 1996: 33 ff.; Crone 1996: 72 ff.).Scientific investigation is at the focal point of this contradiction (Bertilsson 1996: 11 ff.).Therefore, scientific investigation for Weber is ultimately grounded in a passionate 'calling,' whose virtue is "schlichte intellektuelle Rechtschaffenheit" (Weber 1988c: 613).

Critical Theory and the Frankfurt School
Critical theory is an attempt to get beyond the positivist and hermeneutic views of the social sciences.The social sciences must not merely explain and understand; they must also criticize.Horkheimer states this programmatically in the article "Traditionelle und kritische Theorie" from 1937 (Horkheimer 1970a) (Wiggershaus 1986: 13-14).
From its beginning, critical theory was borne by three interlinked views of criticism.
The first view of criticism deals with a critique of social relations as they appear in contemporary society.It is this desire for critique that makes it obvious to link it to the young Marx, who develops his critical theory from an immediate critique of bourgeois society and its limitations.In this sense, there is not so much a link to a particular theory, but to a particular theoretical matter and a particular theoretical practice in which the young Marx is a model.In this view, there is a strong desire to change society through criticism, as it was expressed in Marx' 11 th thesis on Feuerbach: "Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden interpretiert; es kommt darauf an, sie zu verändern" (Marx 1968a: 341).This leads to the second view of critical theory, which deals with a much broader traditional concern, i.e., that it is the task of every theory to be critical (Larsen 1991).In Plato's dialogues, the philosopher is compared to a doctor, and Plato's dialogues are permeated by the disparity between idea and phenomenon.Aristotle takes the Nordicum-Mediterraneum [nome.unak.is]Phoca PDF true task of philosophy further in his phenomenological critical theory.Thus, from the beginning with Plato and Aristotle, there is a conception that the job of theory is to be critical.It is also this concern that leads to positivism and hermeneutics.In both these theories, there is a desire to be critical, even though the concept of criticism is entirely different.
Finally, the third understanding of critical theory is linked to a specific view of criticism, developed by Marx in his later work, as summarized in his critique of political economy.
It is no longer possible to refer unilaterally to Marx' theory, as there is a tendency to do among a number of members of the Frankfurt School, without thereby disparaging the meaning of Marx' work.On the other hand, the concerns of critical theory mentioned here are still relevant to the understanding of the purpose and significance of theoretical work (Larsen 1991).It is this concern in critical theory I will maintain as I take it into a broader hermeneutic horizon of understanding, as it will appear in the following.
In Gadamer's hermeneutics, language has a fundamental ontological meaning as the fundamental horizon of human life, and it is the task of hermeneutics to interpret this horizon of understanding, so that it not only expresses the tradition of theology, literature, and the humanities but also concrete living conditions insofar as these concrete living conditions, according to Gadamer, must be seen as a hermeneutic linguistic matter.It is the latter that leads to the relevance of hermeneutics for the social sciences, insofar as hermeneutics' view of human life as a linguistically-mediated relationship must also be expressed in the social sciences.Hermeneutics is often viewed as a conservative view of social life -in part, because hermeneutics is traditionally bound to texts of the past and, in part, because emphasis is laid in Gadamer's interpretation of hermeneutics on the problem of the hermeneutic circle, which consists of the fact that we are always in a previously given view, a pre-understanding, or, in a true sense, prejudice and that we are bound to it (Gadamer 1990: 270 ff.).
However, one must be aware that Gadamer's hermeneutics can also be read in such a way that it is inquiry and criticism, which are the important things in hermeneutics.Gadamer develops this in his discussion of the hermeneutic priority of the question, "Der hermeneutische Vorrang der Frage" (Gadamer 1990: 368 ff.).Gadamer notes that it is an inquiry and a radical negativity that is the decisive thing in hermeneutics.Gadamer puts it this way: "Damit ist uns der Gang der weiteren Untersuchung vorgezeichnet.Wir fragen nämlich …, welche Bedeutung bei der Analyse der hermeneutischen Situation dem Begriff der Frage zukam.Daß in aller Erfahrung die Struktur der Frage vorausgesetzt ist, liegt auf der Hand.Man macht keine Erfahrung ohne die Aktivität des Fragens.Die Erkenntnis, daß die Sache anders ist und nicht so, wie man zuerst glaubte, setzt offenbar den Durchgang durch die Frage voraus, ob es so oder so ist.Die Offenheit, die im Wesen der Erfahrung liegt, ist logisch gesehen eben diese Offenheit des So oder So.Sie hat die Struktur der Frage.Und wie die dialektische Negativität der Erfahrung in der Idee einer vollendeten Erfahrung ihre Perfektion fand, … so ?ndet auch die logische Form der Frage und die ihr einwohnende Negativität ihre Vollendung in einer radikalen Negativität, dem Wissen des Nichtwissens.Es ist die berühmte sokratische docta ignorantia, die in der äußersten Negativität der Aporie die wahre Überlegenheit des Fragens eröffnet.… Es gehört zu den größten Einsichten, die uns die platonische Sokratesdarstellung vermittelt, daß das Fragenganz im Gegensatz zu der allgemeinen Meinung -schwerer ist als das Antworten" (Gadamer 1990: 368).
It is the central significance of an inquiry, a critique and a negation that leads me to be able to view hermeneutics as a critical science, which can also be applied within the social sciences.In an extension thereof, I will try to unite the concerns of critical theory, mentioned above, with the view presented of hermeneutics through which I  (Wellmer 1969: 48f).
As it appears, Habermas has a positive relationship to hermeneutics, but he does not link hermeneutics to a given tradition as an ultimate arbiter of truth, because the tradition is also interwoven into a power relationship.Therefore, according to Habermas, it is a matter of taking a position with the help of reason as a critical  (Habermas 1970: 99-100).
In the 1970s, Habermas developed the fundamental principles, which were later developed in his theory of communicative action.It is worth noting that "the principle of rational discourse" is a regulative principle, which is the same as a critical principle for distorted speech and discourse.Thus, from the beginning, there is a critical principle embedded in Habermas' ideas about language, which makes it legitimate to look at Habermas' theory of language as a theory of critical hermeneutics, even though, in Habermas' theory, there is also a strong tendency to look at language in positive consensus-oriented terms.
Concerning Habermas' critique of Gadamer, Allan How's The Habermas-Gadamer Debate and the Nature of the Social can be recommended, in which How recounts the way Habermas incorporates large parts of the hermeneutical view of language, even as he advances the above-mentioned critique (How 1995: 116 ff.).In this context, Paul Ricoeur's essay "Herméneutique et critique des ideologies" in Du texte à l'action.Essais d'herméneutique II should also be mentioned, in which Ricoeur discusses the debate between Habermas and Gadamer (Ricoeur 1986: 333 ff.).It is in this connection that Ricoeur introduces his concept of critical hermeneutics (Ricoeur 1986: 362 ff., see also Hermansen and Rendtorff (2002: 11 ff.)).
It is this critical perspective in Habermas' theory that I have further developed in a more detailed way in the treatise The Right to Dissent, as I discuss the central meaning of the principle of Das Nein-sagen-Können in Habermas' later theory of communicative action and his subsequent political and jurisprudential development of this principle (Larsen 2009 210 ff.;220 ff.).Das Nein-sagen-Können, the right to dissent, represents the final critical perspective in Habermas' theory of communicative action.
In the treatise Ethik und Demokratie, I use the concept 'dialectical hermeneutics' instead of 'critical hermeneutics' related to the problem of a hermeneutical understanding of the ancient Greek democracy compared to modern democracy (Larsen 1990: 3 ff.).However, the two concepts are pretty much used in the same way.