Interpretation of the World by Aleksander Bregman, a Far-Sighted Commentator on International Affairs in Exile , in the London-Based Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza

: The article presents the views and journalistic activities of the foreign-educated doctor of political science, émigré Polish journalist, correspondent, anti-communist Aleksander Bregman, a pioneer of Polish-German reconciliation, who preached the unpopular post-World War II views of German reunification, and the creation of an economic community of European states. This international relations expert was one of the few publicists in exile who managed to make a name for himself outside the circle of the Polish diaspora. Gifted with Benedictine diligence, he left behind countless articles scattered in the émigré press, English, French, Swiss and German journals, as well as many books whose contents are still relevant today. He was also a contributor to Radio Free Europe. Throughout all of his wartime and subsequent exile life in the UK, he was particularly associated with the London-based Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza , where he served as editor-in-chief from 1959 to 1962. In Poland, the magazine was completely banned from printing until 1989. Methods used in writing the article: qualitative press content analysis, press, heuristic, historical-critical microbiography.

Aleksander Bregman was born on August 14, 1906 in Warsaw, where he graduated from high school. 1After Poland regained independence in 1918, he studied in Vienna, Paris (Ecole des Sciences Politiques) and at the University of Geneva, where he earned a doctorate in political science in 1932 for his dissertation on Poland's place in the European system.He then began a career in journalism.From 1932, he was a correspondent for the Polish Telegraphic Agency in Geneva -the headquarters of the League of Nations and Gazeta 1 Biographical data taken from: Aleksander Bregman, "Zaczęło się pod namiotem w Szkocji, " Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza [hereafter: DPiDŻ], July 12, 1960, 5; Paweł Ziętara, "Aleksander Bregman, " in Dopóki jest "Dziennik" -jestem…, ed.Katarzyna Bzowska (London: Polska Fundacja Kulturalna, 2000), 319-20; Jacek Tebinka, "Słowo wstępne, " in Najlepszy sojusznik Hitlera, ed.Aleksander Bregman, (Warsaw: Fronda, 2009), 7-11; Jacek Tebinka, "Słowo wstępne, " in Dzieje pustego fotela.Konferencja w San Francisco i sprawa polska (1945-1946), ed.Aleksander Bregman (Warsaw: Fronda, 2009), 11-4.Articles written by Bregman, "a seasoned journalist who has been familiar with international politics for many years, " 8 appeared every day on page 3 of DŻ.For the 20th anniversary of Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza in 1960, the journalist presented the early days of editing the paper, which became very popular among soldiers. 9eneral Sikorski's conciliatory policy towards the USSR had many opponents in the army.This critical attitude was evident in the articles of the DŻ, which was repeatedly published with the whitewash of censorship.Among other things, these issues influenced the forced merger with the government-owned London-based Dziennik Polski in December 1943, 10 as described by Aleksander Bregman in the July 1960 anniversary issue of DPiDŻ.Among other things, he recalled Tadusz Horka's uncompromising article that appeared after the discovery of the Katyn graves in April 1943.The political dispute between Stanisław Mikołajczyk, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile, and Stanisław Kot, Minister of Information, and General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces in the West, reached its climax in autumn 1943.The civilian authorities realized that they had to absolutely control the Polish press, and the only way to do this was to neutralize the military source of information, the DŻ, which the soldiers trusted.After many weeks of heated discussions, a compromise solution was found in the form of a merger of the two titles, henceforth known as Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza (Polish Journal and Soldier's Journal), based in London, in the initial phase of the new formula headed by Kot's man, Democratic Party and National Council member Mieczysław Szerer.From DŻ, the new editorial team was augmented by Aleksander Bregman, Maciej Feldhuzen, Tadeusz Horko, Marek Święcicki and Bohdan Witwicki, who arrived from Scotland.
Karol Zbyszewski commented on the situation with his usual sarcasm: "The newcomers from Glasgow blew away the entire London team.It was an invasion of thugs on the headquarters of idiots." 11In addition to him, who previously also worked at DP, the editorial board included Horko, Bregman, Święcicki, Mikołaj Szumski and Witwicki. 12regman claimed that from January 1, 1944 (issue 1 of DPiDŻ went out on January 3, Monday), an internal struggle began between the two editorial teams.It ended only 7 For more information, see: Chwastyk-Kowalczyk, Londyński "Dziennik Polski".

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Th e E x i l e Hi st o r y R e vi e w 2023, Vol. 2 after the fall of the Mikołajczyk government and the change of the editor-in-chief to Jan Czarnocki (in 1945-1947).
After the war ended, Bregman remained in London, providing commentary on international affairs.It was he who, as a journalist in the spring of 1945, observed the founding conference of the United Nations in the United States, publishing, through the publishing house of the Polish Press Agency Światpol three years later in 1948 in London, a book entitled Dzieje pustego fotela.Konferencja w San Francisco i sprawa polska.(1945-1946).
The San Francisco Conference began on April 25, and ended on June 26, 1945 with the signing of the UN Charter.It was attended by 46 Allied countries -but without representatives of Poland, through Stalin's political efforts.Bregman outlined in his publication the circumstances of how this happened and who courted the presence of representatives of the Polish government-in-exile at this meeting.By the time it appeared on the publishing market, there was no longer any hope, after the communist had rigged elections to the Sejm, that Poland would remain outside the Kremlin's sphere of influence.Bregman's earlier journalistic activity in the émigré press in February and March 1945 proved that he had no illusions about this issue after the Yalta arrangements.
Despite the passage of 75 years, Bregman's journalistic book, which combines elements of reportage and memoir, does not lose its value, fully capturing the drama that befell Poland.Its reading for the Polish reader is shocking because it clearly shows the times when the Poles, the previous Allies with their Polish government in exile in London, were not allowed to participate in the founding conference of the UN.The United States of America and Great Britain did not agree to Stalin's demand that Poland be represented in San Francisco by envoys of the Communist Provisional Government, resulting in an empty seat for the Poles.
In Dzieje pustego fotela, we learn about the American and British reaction to the event, as well as other Polish aspects of the UN founding conference.At the time, Bregman, other journalists or even the FBI had no knowledge of Soviet spies who were active in American structures, such as American diplomat Alger Hiss, responsible for keeping the minutes of the conference proceedings, and also an agent of the NKVD. 13regman considered it his duty to write this book, as he was there "as the only Polish observer of the events in San Francisco who was present for the entire nine weeks of its duration." 1413 Ibid., 14. 14 Aleksander Bregman, "Słowo wstępne do pierwszego wydania, " in Dzieje pustego fotela.Konferencja w San Francisco i sprawa polska (1945-1946)  The journalist as a correspondent for DPiDŻ attended more than a dozen international conferences, in addition to the one in San Francisco, including the so-called Geneva Summit on July 18-23, 1955.
As early as February, Bregman discussed in a London daily the Yalta resolutions from the perspective of a decade, stating that they were the logical culmination of Allied strategy and policy during the war. 15Beginning in March 1955, in a new series of Dokumenty jałtańskie -his regular political commentaries and other articles -he described the background and atmosphere of the event, recalling the shattered illusions of regaining freedom by Poles and other nations under Moscow's rule. 16He saw no chance of an agreement. 17That he was not wrong was shown by the proceedings of the Geneva conference and his further reflections on the subject, published on an ongoing basis in the journal -in the column titled Idee, ludzie, zdarzenia, 18 until the end of the year and in subsequent years.The narrative of these articles boiled down to the claim that the meeting resembled a growing auction of peace platitudes, concern was raised about the appeasement and ultimate capitulation of Dwight D. Eisenhower toward the Soviets, there was talk of a "propaganda battle, " of the total defeat of the "subjugated nations, "  Aleksander Bregman, "Ustępliwość Eisenhowera budzi niepokój, " DPiDŻ, July 22, 1955, 1, 4; Bregman, "Bitwa propagandowa w Genewie, " DPiDŻ, July 23, 1955, 1, 4; Bregman, "Zachód wreszcie stracił cierpliwość w obliczu brutalnego "niet" Mołotowa, " DPiDŻ, November 10, 1955, 1, 4; Bregman, "Idee…Kartki z genewskiego notatnika, " DPiDŻ, November 10, 1955, 2; Bregman, "Dzięki nieustępliwości Mołotowa koniec złudzeń w Genewie.Plan Eisenhowera też pogrzebany, " DPiDŻ, November 12, 1955, 1; Bregman, "Agonia konferencji w Genewie, " DPiDŻ, November 14, 1955, 1, 4; Bregman, "Jak dyplomaci USA tłumaczą bierność w sprawie narodów ujarzmionych, " DPiDŻ, November 15, 1955, 1, 4.
Th e E x i l e Hi st o r y R e vi e w 2023, Vol. 2 about Molotov's killing of the "the spirit of Geneva." 20He wondered who would win the big game for Germany. 21His summary of 1955 came out very pessimistic. 22regman published in émigré journals, and became one of the most important Polish commentators on international affairs in the press of the free world after the war. 23His reflections were also featured in foreign journals such as Scotsman, Daily Telegraph, Tribune de Genève and others.
Politically, he was associated with the Polish Freedom Movement "Independence and Democracy" (PRW "NiD"), "promoted in his journalism the Movement's federation concepts and the idea of creating a neutral belt in Central Europe.He took a keen interest in the integration processes taking place in the western part of our continent, analyzing their significance from the point of view of Polish interests, " 24 also in the pages of the London-based Trybuna, which was the organ of the PRW "NiD".Bregman's activity in this field and in his Radio Free Europe program "Kalejdoskop" has been researched and described. 25We can find observations of the directions of changes taking place in Western Europe and the idea of federalism in addition to Bregman   Bregman's writing and journalism reached Poland thanks to the efforts of Radio Free Europe.In Polish People's Republic, Bregman was banned as a fierce enemy of communism.The Security Service gave him the code name "Emu." 27 In the decade after his death, Communist censors ordered "the unconditional elimination of his name and any mention of his work (except in scientific works and specialized books)." 28e became very popular among Polish readers in exile with his book Najlepszy sojusznik Hitlera.Studium o współpracy niemiecko-sowieckiej 1939-1941 (London: Orbis, 1958).Notably, there was a formal ban on its citation in scientific publications in the country until 1989.It was created on the basis of microfilmed archival documents of the German Foreign Ministry, hidden in a park near Schönberg Castle, which were transported to London.The most valuable document is the secret protocol of the non-aggression treaty signed on August 23, 1939 in Moscow by the heads of diplomacy of the USSR and the Third Reich, Vyacheslav Molotov and Joachim von Ribbentrop.The document included plans to divide Central and Eastern European countries, including Poland, into spheres of influence.The German original was burned in Berlin by Allied air raids. 29acek Tebinka, describing the context of these materials in the Foreword to the Polish edition (Fronda 2009), cited other publications on the subject.He reminded his readers that with the onset of the Cold War in 1948, the Americans published a collection of captured German diplomatic documents titled Nazi-Soviet Before the War Against the Third Reich 1939-1941, revealing the behind-the-scenes cooperation between the two dictators, to which Poland fell victim in September 1939 Stalin responded with a personally edited book titled Fałszerze historii (Forgers of History), attacking the policy of appeasement that Britain and France pursued against the Third Reich.Kremlin denied the existence of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact until 1989.
Bregman questioned the theses of this publication in his Polemiki (Polonia Book Fund, London, 1963).He was also critical of contemporary Soviet publications: a book by Grigory Deborin titled Second World War (Polish translation, Warsaw 1960) and the 2-volume Second World War 1939-1945, edited by Semyon Platonov (Warsaw 1961).
A publicist, one of the leaders of PPS at home and in emigration -Adam Ciołkosz, in his Foreword to the London the third edition ("Orbis", 1967) wrote that "Despite the passage of time, this publication is valuable, it has not been made obsolete by new historical studies.They did not undermine Bregman's thesis, claiming that the German-Soviet 27 Tebinka, "Słowo wstępne, " 13.Th e E x i l e Hi st o r y R e vi e w 2023, Vol. 2 pact of August 23, 1939, whose cement was the joint partition of Poland, enabled Hitler to start the war." 30regman's study has been reprinted in London nine times (the last one in 1987).It has become one of the most popular historical studies providing a behind-the-scenes look at the totalitarian dictatorships ruled by Hitler and Stalin.Having lived to see twelve editions, it was also a best-seller of the second publishing circuit in Poland in the 1980s.
Bregman's book is a document of the struggle for historical truth, which is the greatest advocate of the Polish cause.Bregman has done his country a great service by gathering and organizing the facts of the critical years 1939-1941.The narrative of these facts is more powerful than the entire apparatus of Soviet and Communist propaganda. 31 addition to the cited best-known publications, he has also published other works, such as: Taking over as editor-in-chief of the London-based DPiDŻ in October 1959, Bregman laid out his journalistic credo in an introductory article, outlined his views on the role and tasks of the only Polish daily newspaper in Britain. 32According to him, the most important task of the Polish press in exile is "to provide reliable, honest and objective information about the life of the country, emigration and world events." 33He believed that the pages of the journal were to be a platform for an all-encompassing broad exchange of the various political views of the émigré independence movement.While rejecting the possibility of compromise with the communist system and assessing the Soviet Union in unequivocally negative terms, he also saw the need to seek ways of understanding with Germany, becoming a forerunner of Polish-German reconciliation. 34e believed that it was the duty of émigré journalism to point out the omissions of those in power in Germany on issues of settling accounts with Nazism because former Nazis took positions in Germany that world public opinion rightly demands their removal.He also reminded that the Soviets also continue to have close associates of Stalin remaining in power.In his view, Hitler would not have started the war had he not secured friendly neutrality on his part in the form of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.He called for the remembrance of Auschwitz, the countless places of execution, Katyn, the gulags, Kolyma and the graves at the bottom of the White Sea.He also noted that anti-Semitism is now stronger in communist countries than in West Germany.
Bregman had exceptionally broad horizons and covered a wide range of topics in his articles.He was interested in current world politics.
With no illusions, he commented on Khrushchev's meeting with President Eisenhower in December 1959 at Camp David. 35He demonstrated the failure of these talks and subsequent efforts at relaxation and peaceful existence, that they only fostered the status quo of the fate of subjugated nations. 36He diligently followed developments in the case of halting nuclear experiments. 37He wrote about nuclear fears affecting the international policies of the superpowers, and the changes in both blocs, seeing "missile diplomacy" and subsequent conferences and meetings as "new forms, but old content." 3832 Bregman, "Dziennik wczoraj, dziś i jutro, " DPiDŻ, October 30, 1959, 1.In the 1960s, he commented extensively on Russian-Chinese relations. 39Bregman reviewed the two countries' interactions from 1921 to 1962, looking for similarities in the ways in which the regimes acted against their own societies, i.e., leading through internal and external policies to famine, economic collapse, escalating terror and purges. 40e also published his reviews of scholarly books on the subject that appeared on the British publishing market, for example, The Sino-Soviet Conflict by Donald S. Zagoria (Priceton University Press and Oxford University Press, 1962). 41regman also focused his attention during this period on national liberation movements around the world, the dismantling of colonial empires in Asia and Africa. 42He wrote about Soviet efforts to colonize Africa, especially the new countries that had broken free from white supremacy. 43He warned that the Communists are trying to take advantage of any upheaval in Asia, Africa, or South America.
Journalist even discussed a book by a disillusioned young Nigerian, Aderogba Ajao, who spent six years of his life in East Germany, where the Russians tried to make him an agent and agitator, titled On the Tiger's Back (London: George Alen & Unwin, 1962).
According to him, the civil war in Greece of 1944-1949 or the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 dispelled the Yalta illusions.Having signed the Atlantic Pact, the West once again hoped that the Soviets would respect the established lines of political division.In 1955, the "spirit of Geneva" was born, and a year later it was buried by Soviet tanks murdering Hungarians.He then recalled the "Camp David spirit" fiasco.
In the late autumn of 1962, he explained the context of the China-India border conflict. 44He reflected on the presidential election campaigns in the United States of America, political leadership in Germany and the effects of the elections on the world. 45He returned repeatedly in his journalism to the issues of nuclear arms control, 46 as well as to the mood of the pragmatic US administration. 47He explained Algeria's fate, and America's intransigence on Berlin. 48He denounced all the misrepresentations of Soviet propa- ganda on issues of relations with Washington. 49He followed and explained the political situation in Cuba to readers in real time. 50e bitterly commented on the 1960 UN assembly to be held, where "the old countries with a thousand-year tradition, will be represented by Soviet puppets, or, like Hungary, by the most monstrous oppressors in its history, such as Kadar, and territories that in their historical development did not exceed the 10th or 11th century in Europe, [...] will have their own representatives." 51e explained to readers in early 1961 the impasse over Communist China's admission to the UN. 52This was important because China was working on its own atomic bomb, and no disarmament deal would be an option once it was banned from becoming a UN member.The issue at the time was complicated because none of the divided countries were admitted to the organization: neither West Germany, East Germany, South Korea, North Korea or any of the Vietnams.National China, on the other hand, belonged to the organization because it became part of the UN even before the Communist victory on Chinese soil.UN issues periodically returned in Bregman's 53 comments.
Bregman was a keen observer of national affairs, always showing them in a broader political context. 54He believed that Radio Free Europe's 18-hour broadcast was a breath of freedom for the oppressed Polish nation, but above all a truth that could not be drowned out. 55e discussed political, economic, social, cultural events in the UK on an ongoing basis.He was particularly interested in the intricacies of political life -elections, 56 the activities of political parties, 57 successive prime ministers, 58 the granting of complete independence to India, 59 Anglo-Soviet meetings -where he insisted that "peaceful coexistence, is just a new Soviet label for the Cold War, " 60 activities regarding nuclear arms issues. 61Bregman was Th e E x i l e Hi st o r y R e vi e w 2023, Vol. 2 particularly critical of the political statements made by Labour Party representatives during the Vietnam War (1955-1975), when they sharply criticized the United States of America for providing aid and sympathizing with pro-Western and anti-communist forces in Laos. 62e alleged that politicians did not understand what was happening in Southeast Asia and that trying to hand Laos over to the Kremlin was a crime.
His account of the 1962 negotiations in Brussels on Britain's accession to the European Economic Community was also interesting. 63According to him, the success was hindered by anti-European propaganda in the British Isles and the de Gaulle government in France. 64regman was also highly critical of some British historians who "fantasized" about World War II in their studies.One of these was a publication by A.J.P. Taylor titled The Origins of The Second Word War (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961). 65Nevertheless, he shared the opinion of David J. Dallin, who in his work Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin (London: Methuen and Co., 1962), argued that Russia was an empire that must fall. 66e considered morally indefensible the excerpts published in the British press of diplomatic documents released in the U.S. in 1942, containing an extremely harsh assessment of British ideas at the time to acknowledge Soviet conquests on the part of U.S. diplomats. 67It should be added that the American documents were supplemented with Polish records issued at the time by the Sikorski Institute in London.The course of events was well-known, if only from Churchill's memoirs.They show that "Roosevelt, so tough in early 1942, competed against Churchill in appeasement toward the Soviets in the following years and decisively surpassed him." 68e noted the publication in the winter of 1962 of two books on the issue of nuclear proliferation by British authors: the well-known politician of socialist orientation, former Minister of War in the Labour Party government -John Strachey -On the Prevention of War (London: Macmillan, 1962) and two journalists from the liberal daily newspaper The Guardian -Leonard Beaton and John Maddox -The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (London: The Institute of Strategic Studies of London University, 1962). 69Introducing the subject, Bregman wrote that "the entire Labour Party, not just its left wing, and the entire Liberal Party are in favour of Britain renouncing its nuclear weapons and leaving them to allied America.These two parties have a majority vote in society." 70He criticized Strachey's idea for the United States of America to form an alliance with the USSR to jointly thwart further work by other countries to acquire nuclear weapons.According to other authors, only China had a realistic chance of joining the club of nuclear powers between 1963 and 1975.Bregman showed that India, Canada, Sweden and Israel had the same capabilities.
In detail and with expertise, Bregman discussed the published new secret documents of German diplomacy, in broad political contexts of various countries, covering the years 1918-1945 -Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945.Series D, Volume XI (London: HMSO, 1961). 71e engaged in substantive polemics with various views of émigré journalists, such as Wacław A. Zbyszewski, Zdzisław Stahl, Zygmunt Zaremba on the issues of the Polish diaspora in the United Kingdom and concerning Poland. 72s the Berlin crisis developed and deepened, Bregman intensified his commentaries concerning the essence of the processes taking place in the summer of 1961. 73The situation posed a real threat of another war, which made Bregman readdress these issues. 74e was of the opinion that the West should prepare a plan to create a wide neutral belt encompassing Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Germany -a plan to restore independence to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and reunify Germany on mutually acceptable terms.From under his pen emerged the fundamental question of whether "the United States should risk nuclear war for the defence of Berlin." 75n the context of international political tension, Bregman argued in his articles that the issue of German reunification is important to the interests of Poland. 76He argued with émigré supporters of the idea that German reunification was not in Poland's interest, and believed that the current situation perpetuates the status quo and condemns Poland to remain in communist captivity. 77n the first anniversary of the division of Berlin by the wall on August 13, 1961, Bregman wrote that it "became the most glaring symbol of communist tyranny and the Th e E x i l e Hi st o r y R e vi e w 2023, Vol. 2 tragic division of the world, and at the same time of the bankruptcy of communism, which will solve nothing." 78n October and November 1962, he anxiously reported on the new crisis over Berlin, and criticized Western politicians who proclaimed that "Berlin is not worth the war, " who thereby deepened the lack of unity between the allies, which the Soviets painstakingly exploited with propaganda. 79He expanded his deliberations with publications in the self-contained Saturday-Sunday supplement to DPiDŻ, Tydzień Polski. 80He analyzed the inevitable confrontation, as well as the mistakes of Kennedy and calculations of Khrushchev. 81regman monitored the policies of Charles de Gaulle and Poland's role in France's international policy at the time. 82He stigmatized attacks by the French terrorist group Organisation de l' Armée Secrète, OAS, which operated from 1961 to 1962 in France and Algeria, 83 also the failed assassination attempt on President Charles de Gaule in 1962. 84e explained the causes of the tensions between Paris and Washington caused by the refusal of the United States of America to help France obtain its own nuclear weapons. 85s regards the development of television, he was also preoccupied with the possibilities, problems and dangers of a free press in various countries in Western Europe and the Americas. 86He was an optimist, believing that, despite the many difficulties, crises and pressures it must resist, the press of the free world remains a powerhouse.
In the early 1960s, Bregman analyzed various aspects of European unity, mainly matters of the political forms of European union, Britain's participation, in general the borders and defense of Europe and its position in the world. 87As a proponent of the idea of 78 Bregman, "Pierwszy rok berlińskiego muru, " DPiDŻ, August 14, 1962, 2. European unification, he saw its positive consequences for Poland: regaining independence from Russia, recognition of the Polish-German border, and finally benefits in the economy.The ideal situation for him was the participation of a free Poland in a united Europe. 88Years before Poland's accession as a member of the European Union (May 2004), although he knew it was a distant process, Bregman predicted that full European unification would end the centuries-old Polish-German antagonism.He argued with conviction that the more closely West Germany was fused with other Western European countries, the more difficult it would be for them to put forward revisionist slogans.
Bregman supported the idea of creating a European strike force that would avoid the proliferation of independent national nuclear forces in Europe. 89He considered it natural to combine British and French capabilities.He called for reminding the free world that Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Romanians, and Baltic nations are the same Europeans as Belgians, French, Italians, and English.He also called for maintaining and developing economic, cultural ties.In the context of the functioning of the European Community, Bregman outlined the direction of German policy in the 1960s, noting that while German-French friendship would remain an important element, cooperation with the United States of America and the United Kingdom would be equally crucial. 90He predicted a change in Germany's policy toward Eastern European countries, especially Poland, and proclaimed the twilight of the French language on the continent. 91t the end of 1962, Bregman compiled a summary of international politics in the world of the past period in Tydzień Polski. 92He claimed that the outcome looked more optimistic than for previous years: the Cuba issue settled, the clear military superiority of the United States of America, the end of the war in Algeria, the success of the Common Market, the failures in the communist world -the reduction of Soviet influence in Africa and Asia, the bankruptcy of the policy of threats in Berlin.On the negative side, he noted: the worsening of the Soviet-Chinese conflict and the crisis in agriculture.

Conclusion
While observing the ongoing state of rivalry between the two ideological blocs, the Communist and the free world since 1947, Bregman sought to comment on the major events of the Cold War.The last major event of this period, to which he devoted his at- His journalistic output in the years 1959-1962, when he was editor-in-chief of DPiDŻ, was consistent, coherent and sought to create the opinion of the Polish émigrés on international politics.It should be added, however, that Bregman had a de facto influence on the magazine's policy until his death in 1967.
Bregman -as editor-in-chief, appreciated debuting journalistic talents.Krystyna Cywińska recalled the following words: "She is being a bit controversial.But let her try.I tried.We hit it off." 93She said he was guided by his own judgement of the international political situation, away from stereotypes, and preached views that were unpopular at the time."He wrote about and promoted reconciliation with Germany, when hatred and bitterness, understandable at the time, made us all unreasonable.And of all the predictions of the future, the ones that was most stigmatized in the emigration past have turned out to be true." 94atarzyna Bzowska-Budd believed that the creation of the Saturday edition of Tydzień Polski 95 -a self-contained supplement of DPiDŻ, was an excellent idea. 96In her opinion, Bregman, "a journalist of real standing, " taking over as editor-in-chief of DPiDŻ made it a magazine full of flair because "he looked at Poland in the context of the whole of Europe, not limiting himself to the emigration perspective." 97She recalled that Bregman conducted many radio interviews -mainly for Radio Free Europe with politicians, primarily Englishmen.He had a great sense of who was worth talking to.Even after his death, many of his interlocutors made significant political careers, becoming ministers and members of the House of Commons.The interviews were conducted in the studio in English and then translated into Polish.
Bregman was also described as a leading publicist of DPiDŻ by Józef Garlinski, who had been publishing in Tydzień Polski from 1961. 98Bogdan Czaykowski and Bolesław Sulik praised him as such in their study entitled Polacy w Wielkiej Brytanii. 99  that during this period Dziennik was a daily newspaper "reporting impartially and reliably on world and domestic events, and providing a platform for a broad exchange of opinions." 100 Bregman as an anti-communist, argued for reconciliation with Germany.This international relations expert was one of the few publicists in exile who managed to make a name for himself outside the circle of the Polish diaspora.He was gifted with impressive diligence and left behind countless articles scattered in the émigré press, English, French, Swiss and German journals.
The perspective of decades separating his insights, observations and analyses, allows us to consider his journalism as far-sighted, his comments on the current foreign policy practiced by the countries of the two blocs, the free world and the communist one in the international arena, as accurate, and his predictions as on-point.He was right that eventually the hegemony of the Soviets would collapse, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe would free themselves from the supremacy of communist influence, and that a European Union would be formed, with new democracies joining it.He fully understood the problems facing the modern media and that journalists are absolutely essential to the functioning of all democracies.The tragic timeliness of Bregman's anti-communist stance and warnings directed to the politicians of the free Western world against the Soviets' imperialist inclinations and their quest for restitution was reflected in the occupation of Crimea by Russian troops in 2014, as well as the unleashing of war by the Russians in Ukraine on February 22, 2022.After the schisms and divisions that have taken place so far in the 20th and 21st centuries, Europe appears united for the first time and, together with the US, is trying to remedy the situation that threatens a third world war.Bregman with all his journalism, argued that one should only talk to the Soviets from a position of strength and constantly rearm, because only such arguments will stop Russia from trying to change the established world order.
Aleksander Bregman died on August 8, 1967 in London.His journalistic heritage is still waiting to be fully explored and described.
151Th e E x i l e Hi st o r y R e vi e w 2023, Vol. 2 Tydzień Polski, no.50 (1962): 3. for three years, was the Vietnam War, which began in 1965, when U.S. military forces defended South Vietnam against an invasion by North Vietnam, supported by the communist states -the USSR and China.Bregman, who died in 1967, did not live to see its end in 1975.