.Václav Šmejkal – Department of European law, Charles University, Faculty of Law, nám. Curieových 901/7 116 40 Prague 1,
Czechia
DOI: https://doi.org/10.31410/ERAZ.2020.1
6th International Conference – ERAZ 2020 – KNOWLEDGE BASED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Online/virtual, May 21, 2020, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
Published by: Association of Economists and Managers of the Balkans – Belgrade, Serbia
Conference partners: Faculty of Economics and Business, Mediterranean University, Montenegro; University of National and World Economy – Sofia, Bulgaria; Faculty of Commercial and Business Studies – Celje, Slovenia; Faculty of Applied Management, Economics and Finance – Belgrade, Serbia
ISSN 2683-5568, ISBN 978-86-80194-33-2, DOI: https://doi.org/10.31410/ERAZ.2020
Abstract
The European Commission and the competition authorities of the EU member states responded
to the coronavirus crisis with assurances about sufficient flexibility of their instruments. They
enabled temporary cooperation between competitors to ensure the supply of essential medical products
and services. At the same time, they warned against any misuse of the crisis for overpricing or other
monopolistic practices. However, the crisis has also intensified long-term pressures for a fundamental
adaptation of European competition rules. The first challenge is represented by Chinese state-backed
enterprises as potential acquirers of weakened European competitors. The second source of pressure is
the increasingly dominant role of global online platforms. Their role as an irreplaceable infrastructure
for management, communication, counselling and distance learning was reinforced in the coronavirus
crisis. The Commission and other experts are already discussing appropriate responses. This paper
maps the discussion on possible EU responses to these challenges, and tries to show the strengths and
weaknesses of the proposed solutions and on this basis to estimate the future development of EU antitrust
in the post-coronavirus period.
Key words
Coronavirus, Antitrust, European Commission, Chinese State-owned enterprises, Online
platforms.
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