Horizon Insights

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Influencing and Promoting Global Peace and Security

Regime Type and Counterterrorism: Revisiting the Debate

NATO Prepares for the Absence of INF Treaty

Analysis of Projects related to the Integration of Migrants

Book Review: Energy Kingdoms
Beyond the Horizon International Strategic Studies Group (ISSG) is a non-partisan, independent, and non-profit think tank organisation. The mission of Beyond the Horizon is to influence and promote global peace and security by empowering decision and policy makers and advocating paths to build a better world and prevent, mitigate or end crisis and conflict.

Beyond the Horizon is determined to be a unique think tank with a focus on realistic policies and in-depth analyses to offer comprehensive solutions on topics related to international politics and security, peace and conflict studies.

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Dear Reader,

As an independent voice, Beyond the Horizon ISSG aims to translate applied and policy-oriented research into a language that is understandable, reliable and accessible for wider audience. We focus on realistic policies and in-depth analyses to offer comprehensive solutions on topics related to international politics and security.

In accordance with its focus areas, this issue is focused on terrorism, warfare and migration through articles as follows:

- the debate addressing the link between regime type and terrorism. In the extant literature, the studies predominantly test the effect of regime type on number of terrorist incidents experienced,

- the INF Treaty is the only Cold War era U.S.-Soviet arms control agreement that remains in force up to now. Yet, the fate of the treaty after August is to be seen. In this regard, NATO’s solid stance will be crucial against mounting Russian aggression in Europe and its efforts to drive a wedge among NATO alliance.

- projects related to the integration of migrants. This study analyses the projects related to the integration of migrants and refugees in Flanders.

This issue is concluded with a book review, “Energy Kingdoms”. The author of the book, Jim Krane, is an expert who spent considerable time actually living in the Gulf. The book analyzes; the drivers behind the Gulf States’ domestic energy policies, the internal consumption problem that came out as a result of these policies and how the regimes dealt with the problem in a way that defied the extant political theory on rentier states. It exclusively focuses on six countries in the Persian Gulf: Saudi Arabia, The United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain. Exclusion of Iraq and Iran is intentional due to dissimilarities such as the regime type and historical development which become important in the narrative.

Sincerely yours,

Beyond the Horizon ISSG
Regime Type and Counterterrorism: Revisiting the Debate

Michael Sanchez* & Onur Sultan**

1. Introduction

The U.S. President George Bush’s speech at National Defense University in 2005 caused a debate circulating for some time to gain more currency. He said: “It should be clear the best antidote to radicalism and terror is the tolerance kindled in free societies.” (VandeHei, 2005) This was an effort to justify the invasion of Iraq and to package it as a holy effort to bring democracy to the country in the absence of alleged WMDs and links to Al-Qaeda. He, in fact, redefined terrorism as a function of democracy. (VandeHei, 2005)

Global Terrorism Database (GTD) defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by non-state actors to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.” (LaFree, Dugan, & Miller, 2015, s. 17) Crenshaw notes the watermark distinguishing ordinary organized crime and terrorism is the latter’s political motivation. (Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017) In other words, terrorism is a method used by political actors unwilling/unable to attain their goals under peaceful conditions. Since then we have been observing scholars making effort to understand the true nature of relationship between the two concepts, namely terrorism and democracy.

On the one side of the debate, there are proponents claiming democracy obviates terror. They argue democracy provides fertile grounds for peaceful solution of differences and probable conflicts. It allows free articulation of grievances and participation of individuals or groups to participate in the political processes to bring about proposed change within legal settings. They depart from the point that if a peaceful solution is possible, there would be no revert to costly violent tactics. Thus, they posit that terrorism is unlikely to flourish in democracies. This position is also a prescription for policymakers to cure terrorism and violent extremism. (Schmid, 1992) (Eyerman, 1998) (Li, 2005), (Abrahms, 2007), (Ash, 2014)

On the other side, opponents argue that the wide range of freedoms and permissiveness associated with democracy offer ample opportunities for terrorist groups to form and actively pursue political agenda. The inability to take harsh measures and low threshold to stand human loss based on electoral and social calculations make democracies even greater target for terrorism. (Eubank & Weinberg, 2001) (Chenoweth, 2013). Despite reaching the same conclusion, Chewoneth attributes motivation for terrorist attacks in democracies to intergroup dynamics, finding meaningful correlation between number of political competitors and occurrence of terror events (Chenoweth, 2010).

A third group of scholars can be cited as those not finding a meaningful relationship between democracy and occurrence of terrorism but associate the core reason to other factors. Piazza, dismissing direct link

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between terrorism and democracy, attributes the reason for the former to state failure (Piazza, 2007). Findley and Young attribute it to the regime’s potential to abuse power. They opine that an independent judiciary restrains governments, and make their commitments more credible irrespective of regime type. This further provides less incentive for terrorism. (Findley & Young, 2011)

The problematic and even perplexing dimension of the issue is that all three camps support their theories with statistical data, based on their selection of the dataset. By penning this article, our intention is not to take a side in this debate but to test the link between regime type and terrorism with a different way. All studies hereto address the debate from the source side, meaning the chance of occurrence of terrorist events in states. Therefore, the unit of analysis in these studies is country-year. We, however, structure our dataset in a way that take terror groups as unit of analysis with a temporal variation, and test the impact of regime type on terrorist group termination. In doing that, we focus on the effect of different types of regimes, such as democracy, autocracy and anocracy. Furthermore, we also perform our statistical analyses not only with a way that tests the effect of certain regimes on terrorist group termination, but we also test the impact of the degree of said regime types on terrorist group failure. More specifically, we look at what effects the degree of democracy, anocracy and autocracy have on terrorist group survival. In the next section, we outline the data sources, measurements and methodology that are used to assess the link between regime type and terrorist group termination.

2. Research Design

In creating the sample of terrorist groups, we use Young and Dugan’s (2014) dataset on terrorist groups that they have constructed based on the terrorist attacks covered in Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (LaFree & Dugan 2007). According to Young and Dugan’s (2014) rules of identifying terror groups, the terror groups in the data are defined as terrorist groups as long as they use terrorist tactics. There are 2,223 terror groups that engaged in terrorist violence between 1970 and 2010. Our unit of analysis is terrorist group-year. Young and Dugan (2014) assigns each terror group to a country, which is named as “primary country”, in which the terror group mostly carries out its terror attacks during its existence.

2.1. Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is “terrorist group termination”. We measure our dependent variable with Young and Dugan’s (2014) data, and consistent with their dataset, a terrorist group has been coded as “terminated” if it ceases to exist or it stopped using terrorist tactics. If the group has been terminated, it has been coded 1, and it is coded 0 for the otherwise. Once the group has been coded 1, it exits the data. In analyzing the data, we use discrete time survival model as the estimation technique due to our data structure.

In terms of the survival patterns of terrorist groups in the data, the average survival rate for the terrorist groups is 3.33 years, and almost 68% percent of the groups stopped operating within their first year. About 20 percent of all groups managed to survive five years after they started operating (Young and Dugan 2014, 7-8). Figure 1 below is Kaplan-Meier survival estimate for 2223
terror groups in Young and Dugan’s (2014) data. In the figure, Y axis represents the risk of failure, and X axis represents the years terror groups survive. The figure has been borrowed from Young and Dugan’s (2014) article.

**2.2. Independent Variable**

The independent variable is regime type. We measure regime type with Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers 2015). The dataset gives us a scale ranging from 10 to -10, and 10 represents the most democratic edge of the scale whereas -10 represents the most autocratic edge. As the scores in the scale increase, the level of democracy increases. We also create dummy variables for democratic, autocratic and anocratic regimes. The states scoring 6 or higher in the dataset are coded democracy. Those scoring between 5 and -5 are coded anocracy. Finally, states scoring -6 or lower are coded autocracies. In addition to creating dummy variables for certain regime types, we have also assigned dummies to measure the degree of these regime types. We code states scoring 9 or 10 as strong democracies, 6, 7 or 8 as weak democracies. Likewise, states scoring -9 or -10 are coded strong autocracies whereas those scoring -6, -7 or -8 are coded as weak autocracies. For anocratic regimes, we code states scoring 0 to 5 as open anocracies, and those scoring -1 to -5 as closed anocracies.

There is no consensus on definition of anocracy. These regimes are incoherent in a way that intermingle democratic and autocratic regimes. They allow opposition groups to participate in politics at some extent but they lack or have incomplete mechanisms to redress grievances (Regan & Bell 2010; Gandhi & Vreeland 2008; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Benson & Kugler 1998). In closed anocracies, political challengers emerge from within elites whereas those may come from all segments of society. (Cole & Marshall 2014).

**2.3. Control Variables**

We control for some factors that might potentially blur the relationship between regime type and terrorist group termination. To start with, existence of an ongoing civil war is controlled due to the reason that the phenomenon arises commonly within civil war context (Findley & Young 2012) and the same context has potential to enhance durability of terror groups. To that end, UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002) is used to denote existence of civil war in a given year. A dichotomous civil war variable is coded, 1 to indicate existence and 0 otherwise. Some terrorist group characteristics are also controlled because these characteristics play a significant role on the survival of such groups. Group size is controlled because it might be harder to defeat larger terror groups as they recruit more people and increase their capacity in size. We control for group ideology, and terror groups adopting a nationalist ideology because these groups are relatively more
durable than other terror groups, such as LTTE, IRA, PKK, ETA. We code nationalist/ethnic terror groups 1, and those not ethnic/nationalist agenda 0. We measure group size and group ideology variables by using Jones and Libicki’s (2008) data. Jones and Libicki’s (2008) data include 648 terror groups in their sample, and provide some variables capturing group characteristics, such as group size, ideology, the breadth of group goal(s). We also control for attack diversity of the terror groups since more diverse types of attacks enhance the terrorist group survival (Blomberg, Gaibulloev & Sandler 2011). Global Terrorism Database distinguishes those in eight categories (e.g., assassinations, armed assaults, and bombings). The variable ranges between 0 and 1, with larger numbers corresponding to greater diversity. If the terror group uses bombings during its lifespan, its diversity is 0. Operating in multiple countries (foreign presence) is also controlled because when the terror group has foreign presence, they may find more resources for survival. In addition to group characteristics, we control for a systemic factor, the Cold War. Post-cold war is coded due to the reason that terrorism becomes increasingly a transnational security challenge in this period. Finally, GDP per capita and population are controlled. This has been done to remain consistent with literature on terrorism as these two factors have been usually controlled in those.

3. Results

Table 1 presents the results of logit discrete time survival analysis. The analyses have been conducted with STATA 13. The robust standard errors, which are in parentheses below the coefficients, are reported and clustered on terror groups. In interpreting the empirical results, we focus on the coefficients. The coefficients take positive or negative signs. The positive coefficients suggest that a given variable increases the likelihood of terrorist group termination, and the negative coefficients decreases. The coefficients with stars indicate that they are statistically significant, suggesting that the variable has a significant impact on terrorist group termination. One star represents the statistical significance at 90 percent confidence level. Two stars represent the statistical significance 95 percent, and three stars represent 99 percent confidence interval. There are four models in the table. The first model presents the finding on polity score, and the rest of the models has the findings on three regime type dummy variables. The control variables are included in all models.

According to the first model, polity score variable’s coefficient is not statistically significant, suggesting that the changes in the scale of polity score variable do not have a significant impact on terrorist group termination. In terms of the results on the regime type dummy variables, the democracy variable in the second model is statistically significant at 90 percent confidence level and has a negative sign, which indicates that being a democratic regime significantly reduces the likelihood of terrorist group termination. For the autocracy variable, however, it does not achieve a statistical significance, and this suggests that being an autocratic regime does not have a significant effect on terrorist group termination. Finally, the coefficient for the anocracy variable is statistically significant at 95 percent confidence level, and it has a positive sign, suggesting that being anocracy increases the likelihood of terrorist group termination. This finding is interesting in the sense that the extant literature converges on the idea
that anocracies experience more instability and political violence than democracies and autocracies. Our finding on the effect of being anocracy on terrorist group termination shows that they are actually more successful in eliminating terror groups than democracies and autocracies.

In terms of the effect of the degree of these regime types on terrorist group termination, the results on Table 2 suggest that while the role of being a strong democracy is not significant, terror groups are less likely to fail in weak democracies. For the strong and weak autocracy variables, they both don’t have a statistically significant impact.

| Table 1 Logit Discrete Time Survival Results on The Effect of Regime Type on Terrorist Group Termination |
|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Variables                                      | Model 1                                        | Model 2                                        | Model 3                                        | Model 4                                        |
| Polity score                                   | -0.00805                                      | -0.145*                                       | -0.0226                                       | 0.188**                                       |
|                                                | (0.00637)                                     | (0.0749)                                      | (0.113)                                       | (0.0866)                                      |
| Democracy                                     | -0.145*                                       |                                                  | -0.297***                                     |                                                  |
|                                                | (0.0749)                                      |                                                  | (0.0733)                                      |                                                  |
| Autocracy                                      | -0.0226                                       | -0.0267                                       | -0.0329                                       | -0.0231                                       |
|                                                | (0.113)                                       | (0.0426)                                      | (0.0430)                                      | (0.0425)                                      |
| Anocracy                                       | 0.188**                                       | 0.172**                                       | 0.138*                                        | 0.145*                                        |
|                                                | (0.0866)                                      | (0.0772)                                      | (0.0773)                                      | (0.0774)                                      |
| Cold war                                       | 0.209***                                      | 0.213***                                      | 0.202***                                      | 0.211***                                      |
|                                                | (0.0680)                                      | (0.0681)                                      | (0.0680)                                      | (0.0683)                                      |
| Civil War                                      | -0.293***                                     | -0.291***                                     | -0.295***                                     | -0.297***                                     |
|                                                | (0.0734)                                      | (0.0733)                                      | (0.0733)                                      | (0.0733)                                      |
| The size of the group                          | -0.0267                                       | -0.0329                                       | -0.0231                                       | -0.0346                                       |
|                                                | (0.0426)                                      | (0.0430)                                      | (0.0425)                                      | (0.0431)                                      |
| Nationalist terror groups                      | -0.138*                                       | -0.145*                                       | -0.138*                                       | -0.145*                                       |
|                                                | (0.0772)                                      | (0.0773)                                      | (0.0772)                                      | (0.0774)                                      |
| Foreign presence                               | -0.588***                                     | -0.586***                                     | -0.582***                                     | -0.582***                                     |
|                                                | (0.158)                                       | (0.158)                                       | (0.158)                                       | (0.159)                                       |
| Attack diversity                               | -0.508***                                     | -0.508***                                     | -0.511***                                     | -0.511***                                     |
|                                                | (0.0904)                                      | (0.0903)                                      | (0.0904)                                      | (0.0904)                                      |
| GDP per capita                                 | 0.128***                                      | 0.131***                                      | 0.105***                                      | 0.121***                                      |
|                                                | (0.0382)                                      | (0.0372)                                      | (0.0363)                                      | (0.0364)                                      |
| Population                                     | -0.0345**                                     | -0.0312*                                      | -0.0401**                                     | -0.0311*                                      |
|                                                | (0.0161)                                      | (0.0161)                                      | (0.0157)                                      | (0.0161)                                      |
| _spline1                                       | 0.000217**                                    | 0.000216**                                    | 0.000215**                                    | 0.000212**                                    |
|                                                | (0.000101)                                    | (0.000100)                                    | (0.000101)                                    | (0.000100)                                    |
| _spline2                                       | 0.0236***                                     | 0.0235***                                     | 0.0235***                                     | 0.0233***                                     |
|                                                | (0.00376)                                     | (0.00376)                                     | (0.00375)                                     | (0.00375)                                     |
| _spline3                                       | -0.00617***                                   | -0.00616***                                   | -0.00613***                                   | -0.00609***                                   |
|                                                | (0.00119)                                     | (0.00119)                                     | (0.00119)                                     | (0.00119)                                     |
| Constant                                       | -0.635                                        | -0.648                                        | -0.375                                        | -0.691                                        |
|                                                | (0.488)                                       | (0.476)                                       | (0.473)                                       | (0.485)                                       |
| Observations                                   | 3,484                                        | 3,484                                        | 3,484                                        | 3,484                                        |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
on terrorist group termination. The results on open and closed anocracies report no significant connection between being an open anocracy and terrorist group termination. But they also report that being a closed anocracy significantly increases the likelihood of terrorist group termination.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.200***</td>
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<td>-0.473</td>
<td>-0.327</td>
<td>-0.446</td>
<td>-0.621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>3,484</td>
<td>3,484</td>
<td>3,484</td>
<td>3,484</td>
<td>3,484</td>
<td>3,484</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The findings on the control variables in both tables suggest that terror groups are more likely to end in the post-cold war era. The coefficients of the civil war variable suggest that terror groups operating in a civil war context are less likely to terminate than those operating in non-civil war context. The size of the terror group, unexpectedly, does not have a significant impact on the terrorist group termination, which is not consistent with the conventional wisdom that the larger terror groups are the more likely will they survive longer. The other variables that might capture the strength of the terror group, namely, attack diversity and operating in multiple countries significantly affect terrorist termination. More specifically, terror groups operating in multiple countries and have diverse attack strategies are less likely to fail than those not operating in multiple countries and not adopting diverse attack strategies. In terms of the effect of the ideology of the terror group, the coefficients of the nationalist terror group dummy variable show that ethnic terror groups are less likely to survive longer than non-ethnic terror groups. Finally, the results on GDP per capita and population suggest that terror groups are more likely to end as the target state has higher economic development, and they are less likely to fail as the population size of target state gets greater. After reporting the findings, we now turn to discuss these findings in the last section of the paper.

4. Conclusion

In this paper, we have revisited the debate addressing link between regime type and terrorism. In the extant literature, the studies predominantly test the effect of regime type on number of terrorist incidents experienced. Central to this paper’s goal is to build the literature in a way that conduct the same statistical tests for terrorist group termination in order to show how the different regimes perform in fighting terror when they experience it. The results of our empirical analysis demonstrate that terror groups are less likely to fail in weak democracies. They also suggest that there is no significant relationship between being an autocratic regime and terrorist group termination regardless the strength of the autocratic regime. Our findings with respect to the effect of being an anocratic regime on terrorist group end demonstrate that closed anocracies, which include more authoritarian characteristics than open anocracies seem to be more successful than other regimes in eliminating terror group. This finding is interesting in the sense that the extant literature has demonstrated that anocracies are more vulnerable to experience terrorism (Piazza 2008; Abadie 2004). In other words, anocracies seem to experience more terrorist violence but when they experience terrorism, they seem to be more likely to achieve success in eliminating terrorist groups. Since the goal of our paper is to revisit the debate focusing on the link between regime type and terrorism in a way that only test the effect of the different regimes on countering terrorism, we don’t have a strong theory that can explain why anocracies are more prone to terror, but they are more successful in eliminating it. Future studies addressing this debate should focus more on the counterterrorism capability of different regime types, particularly anocratic regimes. Likewise, the finding that terror groups are less likely to be terminated in weak democracies also need plausible theoretical explanations. While the literature includes studies looking at the effect that the degree of democracy has on experiencing terrorism (Findley & Young 2011), more research seems to be needed that should
address the role of the degree of democracy on eliminating terrorism. As a concluding remark, the debate on the regime type and its link to terrorist violence is primarily studied to show which regimes are more prone to terror in the first place. This debate, however, should also be studied further in the sense of exploring the varying degree in the counterterrorism capacity of the different regimes in order to help us better understand the variation among these different regimes in countering terrorism.
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1. Background

Euromissile crisis of the mid-1970s, which had started with Soviet Union’s deployment of newly-developed SS-20 intermediate-range missiles instead of intermediate-range SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, had led to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The 5,000-kilometer range of SS-20s, posed a direct threat to targets in North Africa, Middle East, Western Europe, Asia, Southeast Asia, and Alaska. The United States (U.S.) lacked intermediate range missiles; it had only short-range missiles deployed in Europe, incapable of reaching Soviet territory, and had long-range missiles aboard submarines or deployed within U.S. territory. In 1979, the U.S. and its NATO allies initiated a “dual-track” policy that aimed to both intimidate and contain Soviet Union. The objective was to provide security and to assure Europe by deploying intermediate-range ground-launched cruises (GLCM) and Pershing II ballistic missiles and simultaneously pursuing an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union to reduce INF forces at both sides (FAS, 2019).

The INF Treaty was signed in 1987 by then U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. The treaty focused eliminating nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometres. Owing to the INF Treaty, by June 1991, the U.S. and the Soviet Union had destroyed a total of 2,692 ballistic missiles. After the dissolution of Soviet Union, the treaty was extended to cover former Soviet states, including Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan; subsequently Germany, Hungary, Poland, the Czech, Slovakia and Bulgaria also eliminated their stocks of intermediate-range missiles (Kimball, 2019).

As both the U.S. and Russia suspended the treaty as of early 2019, we need to look into preceding developments to make sound judgements regarding the future of the treaty.

2. Recent Developments

On 8 March 2017, General Paul Selva, the vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced that the ground-launched cruise missile deployed by Russia ‘violated the spirit and intent’ of the INF Treaty. He
had warned ‘Absent some pressure from the international community and the United States as a -- as a cosigner of the same agreement there is -- there is no trajectory in what they are doing that would indicate otherwise’ (US DoD, 2017). However, there are ongoing discussions on who betrayed first the ‘spirit and intent’ of the agreement. Those recent developments may urge NATO to reconsider its missile defence architecture over the eastern flank.

The U.S. initiated sea- and land-based configurations of the Aegis missile defence system to consolidate NATO’s missile defence system and protect Europe against ballistic missiles of short, medium, and intermediate ranges. As part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), Turkey has been hosting a radar at Kürecik and Germany has been hosting a Command and Control Centre at Ramstein Air Base (Phase 1-operational since 2012); Romania has been hosting an Aegis Ashore site at Deveselu Air Base since May 2016 (Phase 2), and Poland will host another Aegis Ashore site at the Redzikowo by 2020 (Phase 3) (Reif, 2019). In response, Russia accused the U.S. of violating the INF Treaty by deploying missile launchers to Romania, and preparing to deploy the same systems to Poland. In 2014, the U.S. claimed that Russia had tested a weapon, the 9M729 (SSC-8) ground-launched cruise missile, at a range that fell under the treaty. In 2017, it was reported that Russia operationalized two battalions of SSC-8 providing coverage of all Western Europe and if fired from the Eastern Siberia potentially extending along the west coast of the U.S. (Gibbons-Neff, 2017)

On 20 October 2018, President Donald Trump declared the U.S.’s intension to withdraw from the INF treaty and accused Moscow of violating the treaty by deploying new intermediate-range, nuclear-capable missiles, namely the 9M729 missiles. (BBC News, 2018) Considering President Trump’s reference to Russia’s noncompliance, China’s development of intermediate-range nuclear missiles (European Parliament, 2019) and U.S. National Security advisors’ claim that INF Treaty prevents U.S. countering its strategic rival China in the Pacific and its medium-range missiles (Borger & Pengelly, 2018), it can be deducted that the U.S. has broader concerns than Russia and was questioning the advantages of the INF Treaty, regardless of Russian noncompliance.

One month later, on 20 November 2018, Jens Stoltenberg welcomed unprecedented levels of cooperation between the EU and NATO ahead of a meeting with the EU Foreign Affairs Council. The Secretary General noted that he would discuss the INF Treaty with EU ministers. He announced SSC-8s were putting the INF Treaty in jeopardy and warned: “We should all call on Russia to ensure full and transparent compliance with the INF Treaty because we do not want a new arms race, and the INF Treaty has been
important for our security for decades.”. (Stoltenberg, 2018)

On 4 December 2018, the U.S. announced that Russia was in material breach of the INF Treaty, and warned that unless Russia returned to full compliance within 60 days, the U.S. would suspend its obligations under the treaty within six months. Eventually, on 02 February 2019, the Trump administration officially initiated withdrawal process from the INF Treaty between the U.S. and Russia. The same day, NATO members agreed on the following statement:

‘Following nearly six years of U.S. and Allied engagement with Russia, on 4 December 2018, NATO Allies declared that Russia has developed and fielded a missile system, the 9M729, which violates the INF Treaty, and poses significant risks to Euro-Atlantic security. Allies strongly supported the finding of the United States that Russia is in material breach of its obligations under the INF Treaty and called upon Russia to urgently return to full and verifiable compliance...As a result, the United States is suspending its obligations under the INF Treaty in response to Russia’s material breach, and is providing the requisite six-month written notice to Treaty Parties of its withdrawal under Article XV of the INF Treaty. The United States is taking this action in response to the significant risks to Euro-Atlantic security posed by Russia’s covert testing, production, and fielding of 9M729 ground-launched cruise missile systems. Allies fully support this action...We urge Russia to use the remaining six months to return to full and verifiable compliance to preserve the INF Treaty.’ (North Atlantic Council, 2019)

Jens Stoltenberg characterized the nature of the threat posed by SSC-8 to Europe by saying ‘These new missiles are mobile, hard to detect, nuclear-capable, can reach European cities and they have hardly any warning time at all, so they reduce the threshold for any potential use of nuclear weapons in a conflict.’

On 2 February 2019, Vladimir Putin announced that Moscow was officially suspending the agreement as well and Russia would start developing new missiles. He gave instructions to avoid from talking with Washington on the issue and stressed that the willingness for an equal and substantive dialogue with the U.S. is needed. (BBC News, 2019)

Russia denies the material breach of INF claims by underlining 9M729 ground-launched cruise missile range is below 500 km. Should the 9M729’s range exceeds 500 km, the treaty requires its elimination. (Pifer, 2018) However, elimination of the missiles is highly unlikely as the treaty is on a path for demise and there is no tangible communication between parties.

Russia denied U.S. claims and accused the U.S. of violating the INF Treaty by deploying missile launchers to Romania and soon to be deployed to Poland. While the Mk-41 Vertical Launching System’s stated purpose is launching SM-3 missile interceptors, Russia asserts that Mk-41s used at the Aegis Ashore missile defence facility in Romania are capable of launching ground-based cruise missiles, namely the BGM-109 Tomahawk1 (Pifer, 2018; Kimball, 2019). U.S. officials refuted Russian claims that the Mk 41s placed in Europe are cruise missile launch capable including the BGM-109, as

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1. The Tomahawk has a range of about 1,500 kilometers.
they do not have the software installed for launching those cruise missiles.

Russia’s development of 9M729 ground-launched cruise missiles was on the agenda of two important meetings in early 2019. In NATO Defense Ministers’ latest gathering on 13-15 February 2019 in Brussels, NATO Secretary General reiterated that Russia keeps violating the INF Treaty by fielding the SSC-8 missiles and all 29 NATO Allies unequivocally perceive deployed SSC-8s as posing a threat to Alliance security (Stoltenberg, 2019). On 20 February 2019, in his State of the Nation address Putin stated, “Russia will have to develop and deploy weapons that can be used not only against areas from which a direct threat will come but also against territories where decision-making centres are located.” He announced that the U.S. had ignored the INF Treaty by deploying missile launchers to Romania and Poland as well. (Luhn, 2019)

NATO Foreign Ministers also met in Washington, D.C. on 3 and 4 April 2019. Foreign Ministers of NATO Allies urged Russia to return to full and verifiable compliance with the treaty. They discussed options should Russia insist on not returning to full compliance. The Secretary General Stoltenberg assured NATO response would be “measured and coordinated,” which will “maintain credible and effective deterrence and defence” while also underlining that, NATO was not planning to deploy ground-launched nuclear missiles in Europe. (Stoltenberg, 2019)

The next meeting of NATO heads of state and government will be in the UK in December 2019. The Secretary General Stoltenberg said: ‘The meeting in London will be an opportunity for allied heads of state and government to address the security challenges we face now and, in the future, and to ensure that NATO continues to adapt in order to keep its population of almost 1 billion people safe.’ (NATO, 2019a) It is highly likely that the heads of state and government will focus on the consequences of post INF Treaty era.

3. Assessment

While Washington accuses Moscow of being in material breach of the INF Treaty by fielding intermediate-range missiles, Moscow blames the U.S. for ignoring and violating the treaty by deploying Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defence systems to Romania and planning deployment for Poland as well. The recent row between the U.S. and Russia reminds the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis where each side had used strategic choices as a bargaining chip with a game-theoretic perspective. The U.S. had pledged publicly, it would not invade Cuba and had reassured U.S. controlled missiles in Turkey would eventually be dismantled, and in return, the Soviets agreed to withdraw the missiles. In that regard, the strategic choices of each side within the context of the INF Treaty needs further consideration.

As Trump administration began the official withdrawal process from the INF Treaty between the U.S. and Russia, Russia gained the opportunity to exploit the situation and use U.S. move as a justification and pretext for future deployments of intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles, which will threaten U.S. allies and other countries in Europe and Asia. There is a more significant threat as a knock-on effect of the potential collapse of the treaty: a nuclear arms race that could follow causing other states to pursue military nuclear capability. Moreover, in the absence of the treaty, the arms control relationship between the U.S. and Russian
will substantially be undermined and the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which expires in early 2021, will highly likely be the next victim (Sokov, 2019b). It is almost certain U.S. Congress will not support New START which aimed to reduce and limit Strategic Offensive Arms unless Russia returns to full compliance with the INF Treaty. (Williams, 2016)

The course of future developments will be contingent upon the real intentions of the U.S. and Russia. With the current trajectory, the INF Treaty is highly likely to end in August 2019. Even though both parties seem to have already made up their mind to obliterate the INF Treaty, we cannot rule out a compromised solution which might meet both parties’ expectation and of some European countries, who are extremely anxious about the pending escalation of an arms race to be confined primarily in Europe.

In the meantime, the U.S. announced its plans to test two types of missiles immediately after the treaty officially ends: a cruise missile with a potential range of around 1,000 kilometers; a ballistic missile with a range up to 4,000 kilometers. The flight tests for the new generation cruise missile are scheduled for August 2019 and it will be ready for deployment in the following 18 months. There is no clarity about the potential deployment country for systems to be developed. However, there is speculative information from the U.S. official sources that suggest the intermediate-range ballistic missile could be deployed on Guam, a U.S. territory to pose a potential threat to China and Russia. If the U.S., alternatively, insists on deploying those weapon systems somewhere in NATO-member European countries, it has the potential to instigate an arms race that would destabilize Europe (Burns, 2019). This will test NATO solidarity and likely undermine cohesion within NATO. As the security of the whole of Europe will be at stake in case of an arms race in the region, European nations may be reluctant to host the weapons systems. However, the former Eastern-bloc states in Europe could seize the opportunity to deploy U.S. missiles in their country as a source of substantial deterrence against Russia (Barrie, 2019). The energy dependency of Europe to Russia will likely factor in formulating the response to alleged Russian violation and further armament efforts that would pose a further threat in the region.

The proposal that prescribes NATO not to deploy new INF-range missiles in Europe in exchange for Russia not deploying 9M729 missiles west of the Ural Mountains is a substitute for their elimination, which is not likely to be accepted by U.S. and other NATO Allies as those missiles can be moved beyond the Urals much faster than American missiles could be shipped to Europe (Sokov, 2019a)

The best course of action for the U.S. and NATO is to urge Russia back into compliance with the treaty. If the treaty collapses, it would have other effects. Absent the treaty, Russia might deploy intermediate-range

2. The New START Treaty entered into force on 5 February 2011; the U.S. and Russia agreed to meet the Treaty’s limits on strategic arms by 5 February 2018. LIMITS: 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments; 1,550 nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments; 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. (New START, https://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/)
missiles without any caveat and restriction. On the other hand, Moscow might choose to reinforce its existing arsenal with new intermediate-range ballistic missiles. If so, Russian threat will grow not only for NATO but also for other countries in Europe and Asia.

If the U.S. and NATO fail to force Russia full compliance to the INF Treaty by incurring political, economical and security costs, which is the most expected outcome, the alliance should have a post-INF plan to counter the Russian threat and ensure the security of the allied member states. As Moscow will likely aim to build new intermediate-range ballistic missiles, it is expected that the U.S. will consider firmer reassurance measures to protect NATO partners in close proximity to Russia if the U.S. administration is committed to help protect Europe.

It is highly doubtful whether any conventional weapons deployments to Europe or Asia will urge Russia to change its stance against INF compliance; however, this could lead to the phased formation of firmer posturing of NATO alliance in response to mounting Russian aggression in multiple areas. The U.S. could deploy more non-nuclear air-launch cruise missiles and bombers to Europe. The U.S. has deployed strategic bombers in Europe as early as 2014 regularly. Since then, all three U.S. bomber variants – the B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers – have been deployed to Fairford Airbase for exercises with European NATO Allies noting B-52s can carry both conventional and nuclear weapons. (NATO, 2019b) On 01 April 2019, B-52s which were deployed to RAF Fairford, England two weeks earlier, conducted flights to Poland and the Netherlands. (USAFE, 2019). The U.S. might also consider having strategic bombers permanently stationed in Europe on a rotational basis.

The U.S. Navy could also increase its presence in the North Sea with surface and sub-surface assets equipped with sea-launched cruise missiles. (Acton, 2018) the Black Sea should also be taken into consideration for potential deployments. Moreover, the U.S. and NATO could deploy its ships and submarines periodically to European ports with sea-launched cruise missiles. The U.S. Navy might also consider home-porting sea-launched cruise missile-capable warships at another European port similar to Aegis-class destroyers based in Rota, Spain (Acton, 2018).

These measures; deployment of B-52 or B-1 bombers on a rotational basis to Europe or increasing the presence of ships in the North Sea and the Black Sea, will reassure alliance commitment to protect its members and potentially will help deter Russian aggression.

4. Conclusion

In conclusion, the NATO alliance has been facing a significant challenge as a result of recently strained relations with Russia. NATO’s – in particular U.S.- solid stance will be crucial against mounting Russian aggression in Europe and its efforts to drive a wedge among NATO alliance. The outcome of the current crisis has the potential to influence the cohesion within the NATO Alliance. The majority of the NATO Nations will not be willing to increase the tension further with Russia, along with nuclear and conventional arms race as Europe will be more under threat than the U.S. Europe’s energy dependence to Russia will highly likely influence EU policy towards Russia. There are doubts about Trump
administration’s willingness to cooperate with Russia in order to prevent the collapse of the INF Treaty. If the U.S. is determined to back paddle Russian attempts to violate INF and urge Russia to full compliance, the U.S. has two options. The first option is to incur Russia powerful enough military, political, and economic costs to coerce Moscow to demolish 9M729. The promise of not deploying 9M729s to west of Urals will not satisfy U.S. concerns, nor most of other NATO members. The second option is pursuing diligent diplomacy with the involvement of other NATO partners which will require the U.S. to give concessions and show a willingness to negotiate the terms of a potential resolution of the current conflict, so that Russia might reconsider its commitment to INF and potentially New START.

Based on the legend of St. George slaying the Dragon, this sculpture was given to the United Nations by the former Soviet Union in 1990 to mark the U.N.’s 45th anniversary. Created by Zurab Tsereteli, a native of the country of Georgia (once part of the USSR) Good Defeats Evil serves as a symbol of nuclear disarmament, incorporating parts from dismantled nuclear missiles (the Soviet SS-20 and the American Pershing rocket) for the body of the dragon. Both weapons were eliminated under the terms of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.
NATO Prepares for the Absence of INF Treaty

Bibliography


This study analyses the projects related to the integration of migrants and refugees in Flanders. The author conducts a systematic review of related projects appearing in the ESF and AMIF** Project database between 2013 and 2019. The results of the research revealed that integration related projects comprised 8.1% of ESF and AMIF Projects in numbers (235 of 2,900). The research indicates that projects aiming at integration of migrants/refugees have increased by 40% in number after 2015, a sharp increase when compared to earlier periods, a fact attributable to the outbreak of migration crisis in Europe. Relevant projects under study define migrants, refugees, other language speakers, third-country nationals (non-EU) as the target group and social inclusion, integration, labour market integration, human capital, mentoring, coaching as topics and tools. The current body of integration projects focus mainly on language education and employing migrants in bottleneck sectors. This study clearly shows that a conventional mapping and evaluation of these projects needs to be undertaken for an effective allocation of funds on most needed subjects and fields addressing human and social capital.

Keywords: Integration, labour market, immigrant, refugee, social capital, systematic review, AMIF, ESF.

1. Introduction:

Having peaked in 2015 (1.3 million), number of refugees in Europe has first stabilised in 2016 and has fallen just below 600.000 by 2018, a more manageable size for the EU. From the distribution perspective, by the end of 2018, 64% of asylum applicants resided in five North-West European Countries, namely Belgium, Germany, France, United Kingdom and Sweden. (United Nations, 2017). Total number of asylum applications in Belgium in the last ten years constitutes 2,25% of the host population, which is twice of the EU28 average. It was difficult to anticipate the flow in 2015 and coordinate efforts to respond as required within and across different levels and offices of governments. (OECD, International Migration Outlook 2018, 2018) The integration of the coming migrants has emerged as an essential part of this response, and many countries have primarily tried to cope with this problem depending on their existing tools and mechanisms.

The purpose of the study is to make a systematic review of projects funded through ESF and AMIF to integrate migrants and refugees in Flanders between 2014 and 2019, in order to illustrate existing efforts and identify underexplored areas or approaches. This article is an attempt to provide an answer to “What are the underexplored areas in integration of migrants via ESF and AMIF Projects?”. This research has been built upon data in the project map and database of ESF Flanders. After identifying the universe of such funded projects, the author conduct

* Erdem Taskin is project manager and research fellow at Beyond the Horizon ISSG.
** ESF refers to European Social Funds whereas AMIF stands for Asylum Migration Integration Fund.
analysis of the integration-related projects, including a content analysis of 235 projects.

2. Conceptual Framework

In this study projects of two different organisations’ projects are analysed, namely the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and the European Social Fund (ESF). AMIF is established by Directive 2014/516/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 16 April 2014. Directive underlines some thirty tasks, seven of which are related to the integration. These tasks are;

• to promote effective integration of refugees and displaced persons identified as eligible for resettlement by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’),

• preparation of the integration process already in the country of origin of the third-country nationals coming to the Union,

• to pursue a more targeted approach, in support of consistent strategies specifically designed to promote the integration of third-country nationals at national, local and/or regional level, where appropriate,

• to ensure a comprehensive approach to integration, taking into account the specificities of those target groups including applicants for international protection,

• to ensure the consistency of the Union’s response to the integration of third-country nationals,

• to enhance the capacity of Member States to develop, implement, monitor and evaluate in general all immigration and integration strategies,

• to take account of ... anti-discrimination principles.

On the other hand, the European Social Fund (ESF) was established by Directive 2013/1304/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 17 December 2013. ESF was also put forward to support integration. Some responsibilities of ESF are similar to AMIF such as social inclusion, sustainable labour market integration, education and training, thereby enhancing social inclusion, reducing inequalities, in particular for those who are prone to discrimination, to strengthen social inclusion.

Definition of “integration” is “the action or process of successfully joining or mixing with a different group of people” or “the action or process of combining two or more things in an effective way” and “the process of becoming part of a group of people” in business English. Many scholars (Nauck, 1989) (Safi, 2010) (Rudmin, 2003) use the term of integration as a step-in assimilation and acculturation process. Within the context of this study, the term will refer to either “joining to the society as a regular member” or to “employment in a sector in accordance with the previous education and experience at the same or similar level”. On the other hand, so many scholars (Leitner & Ehrkamp, 2006) (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006) (Kofman, 2005) stressed discrimination between migrants and host nation citizens in their studies. We can conclude as a result of these definitions and studies that “discrimination” is deemed to be an obstacle before integration or has been used as the opposite of the latter.

According to (Xhardez, 2016), the challenge of immigration and in particular the integration of new migrants to the host society is particularly tangible in Belgium. Implementation of different integration policies within different federate entities has caused a dualism or more precisely
two distinct integration programmes in the same country. This institutional situation has consequences for the stakeholders, especially the migrants themselves. Integration works in Flanders (which is applicable in Brussels [not compulsory for residents]) consist of social integration, language learning, career guidance (professional, educational and social perspectives) and programme counselling. Extant research mainly focuses on social and educational policies, although integration policies were about identities according to (Adam, 2013) who has focused on immigrant integration policy issues.

Christof Roos categorises migration according to motivations such as economic migration, labour/educational migration, family-related migration or humanitarian immigration. This research doesn’t cover the third motivation type immigrants who possibly have more diverse educational levels. (Roos, 2013) (IOM, 2009)

According to Wiesbrock education levels of native citizens and immigrants does not have a significant impact on the disparities in employment rates for low level educated people (up to secondary education). The gap for the immigrants with tertiary education and same level citizens becomes wider, although education has a positive impact on the employability of migrants. This gap gets wider as immigrants with higher education usually face difficulties in the recognition of their qualifications obtained abroad. (OECD, International Migration Outlook, 2008) Furthermore, some employers tend to consider formal foreign qualifications to be inferior to national ones. (OECD, International Migration Outlook 2016, 2016).

While the labour market performance of refugees mainly depends on their previous education and skills, language and technical training improve their integration into the labour market. Good formal education for supplementary skill acquisition is not sufficient to remove obstacles in the labour market integration such as discrimination and low esteem on existing qualifications. (Peschner, 2017)

3. Methodology
The author scrutinized the ESF and AMIF projects, which are mostly related to integration, social inclusion of migrants and refugees into the labour market, between May and June of 2019. “Migrant”, “refugee”, “other language speakers”, “integration”, “discrimination”, “third-country nationals”, “human capital”, “mentoring” and “coaching” were the key words in advanced search. The period was limited to January 2014 through May 2019. The search turned 253 results that constituted the universe of the research. Finally, the results were classified, analysed, and visualised for the research question.

4. Results
There are a total of 2,900 projects funded through AMIF and ESF in Flanders between 2014 and 2019. Through integration related project calls (Active Inclusion, Social economy flow, Sustainable integration, European Integration Fund, Integration measures, Integration measures and Socio-economic integration) 314 projects have been funded which constitute 10,83% of total project calls in numbers (See Table 1-2). Among these integration related projects, “active inclusion” theme has the most prominent portion by %48, while “sustainable integration” takes the last place by 1,27%. When these figures are compared with the number of responsibilities of AMIF (7 of 30 was related to the integration) it can be argued that these numbers don’t correlate
with the responsibilities. Additionally, when we detract projects which are not focused on the refugees and migrants this number decreases to 235. So, insecurity in these countries grew all this time and people could not continue to survive this environment at the beginning of this century because these gangs have not been fought with efficiency by governments. The experiences from migrants in the caravan were that they had to pay for having their businesses, to be careful about displacing from their homes to any place in the city because they could be robbed, kidnaped, killed or even being violated.

According to the regional comparison of integration related projects, Antwerp takes the first place by 27% while Brussels is the second by 21%. It is understandable that Antwerp has the first place since it is the biggest city in Flanders with its significant business sector and great diversity. Brussels, on the other hand, has been home to projects with more general focus rather than regional. Other municipalities’ project shares have been proportionate to their population with no statistical significance. (see table 4)
on having a specific target to hire or educate a fixed number of refugees/migrants to a particular sector. In such projects, the undertaker seeks to make batches of migrants (about 25 on average) receiving social help from OCMW to benefit from Art.60. Such projects are far from being sustainable. Rather than integrating the migrant / refugee, they seek to shift the local social benefit pool to the federal one. In the long run, those projects provide a temporary solution for a limited number of people. What is more, the system is sector or target oriented instead of being system and customer oriented.

Although discrimination is one of the most significant barriers in front of migrants and refugees to be employed, only 12 projects use the “discrimination” term in their projects. 8 of these projects aim to prevent or decrease the level of discrimination in different societies whereas only remaining four aim to prevent discrimination in the integration process.

When we compare integration related projects according to their focus groups and methodologies through a word search, we see that main focus is immigrants with 31.91% while foreign language speakers and refugees take the second and third priorities with 14.89% and 8.51% consecutively. “Article 60”, “coaching” and “integration” were the most focused terms in the methodology search. Coaching projects mainly focus on internship or temporary employment whereby a fixed sample group in a specific labour field train/inform apprentices from bottom to up or adapt previous training and experiences to regional needs.

As can be seen on Table 5, 75 projects (27.23% of integration related projects) intend to adapt target groups with a subsidy from the government to the labour market. These projects mainly focus on a fixed amount of people for specific jobs and does not seek to establish continuous stand-alone systems.

There are some projects which are focused
5. Discussion

Most of the projects focus on the fixed sample group of migrants and refugees while none of the projects, but two, focus on the highly educated refugees and migrants. As can be understood from the definition of integration, which is joining, mixing, combining two different groups of people, needs and expectations of both host society and the coming group should be taken into account. Nearly all of the projects have tried to integrate migrants and immigrants according to the gaps, needs, expectations of the host society or labour market. In order to reach a successful integration, more ways should be explored to accommodate those of the migrants / refugees.

Another important aspect of the projects is the closed eco-system they form. It is not possible to reach the results of these projects for researchers. A stipulation of providing the project results may lead to more sophisticated evaluation which could better equip policy makers / officials with more insight on achievements, accomplishments and failures of these projects and make better choices in following project calls.

AMIF and ESF databases give access to the information of promoters rather than the whole consortium to include project partners. Lack of this information prevents researchers from evaluating the comprehensiveness of these projects. Reaching only to the information of the promoter does not give a full picture which further precludes understanding if migrant and refugees have taken a driving role in those projects or if the latter has been just subjects. It might be argued that unilaterally established and implemented projects cannot produce intended results and success entails ensuring active engagement of this target group.

As one of the main obstacles to the labour market integration, discrimination has not
been sufficiently focused. Additionally, labour market integration is based on three pillar pillars: labour market, migrants/refugees and government institutions. This research shows that many projects focused on integration of immigrants into the labour market, whereas some others focus on the business world. Only few projects combine these two. It is unfortunate that none of the projects follow a holistic approach by focusing on government institutions and engaging officials. The projects which aim at the third pillar of integration (government institutions) and especially social assistants of those organisations will arguably contribute to the integration.

Many local projects such as employing/training/internship in an organisation by using article 60 might be useful locally or within pilot projects. It would be better to generalise and institutionalise these kinds of projects instead of repeating with the same principles when they succeed.

6. Conclusion

After the refugee surge in 2015, Flemish authorities tried hard to tackle with the urgent problem at hand and its aftershocks. Integration of these refugees and migrants was a task that was considered to come after pressing issues such as housing. ESF and AMIF proved to have been excellent tools for the administrators to handle this strategic issue of integration which required a foresight and long term planning while they were deeply involved on daily needs of the migrants such as accommodation and food. Both organisations have funded many projects in all regions of Flanders. However, as can be easily seen from this analysis, successful bottom-up projects (regional, sectoral, timely narrow-scaled) were replicated in the same regions and on the same basis instead of institutionalisation and their expansion to other regions/municipalities.

Second, little evidence, if any, found on regional or sectoral cooperation among projects or know-how, experience sharing which, at the end, would be time saving as well as source friendly.

Third, some key concepts such as discrimination have not been sufficiently addressed which is one of the main barriers between the migrants/refugees and the labour market. There is need for a thorough gap analysis in integration projects with the collaboration of scholars and NGO’s for further project calls.

To sum up, as immigrants continue to clutter in Flanders, the integration problem will continue to grow like a snowball. There is a need for an in-depth analysis of projects which have been in effect up to now, and a comprehensive approach for further project calls.

This analysis is done via project summaries from the ESF and AMIF databases. Further analysis needs to be undertaken based on access to project results which would provide better view of these projects.
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“Energy Kingdoms” is written by Jim Krane, an expert who spent considerable time actually living in the Gulf. The book analyzes; the drivers behind the Gulf States’ domestic energy policies, the internal consumption problem that came out as a result of these policies and how the regimes dealt with the problem in a way that defied the extant political theory on rentier states. It exclusively focuses on six countries in the Persian Gulf: Saudi Arabia, The United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain. Exclusion of Iraq and Iran is intentional due to dissimilarities, such as the regime type and historical development which become important in the narrative.

Krane starts out by analyzing the pre-oil period and concludes that the region experienced the colonialism different than the other regions as the colonial powers were unwilling to send their citizens to this isolated and rough part of the world. Thus, rather than formally colonizing the region, they pushed for concentration of power in “favorable” tribal ruling families through which they could seek interests. They also pushed these leaders to define their boundaries for ease of control.¹

The durability of the ruling families in the region despite rapid political changes in the rest of the globe is puzzling. The author compares this oddity with an analogy where the North American Indian tribes retain power despite widespread immigration and invasion. Krane explains this political phenomenon with “rentier state” theory, which claims that - rentier states exchange welfare benefits for political support through an unwritten social contract between state and society. The key is to avoid taxation which is the link for accountability between the government and people in democracies. It is fascinating to see that this system worked despite numerous political storms such as pan-Arabism, modernization, globalization and even violent extremism.

Gulf monarchies survived by buying the support of their people.² Once oil arrived it became the chief source of rents. The windfall of 1973 where the gulf monarchies were able to increase their revenues immensely allowed them to go “all in”. Saudi Arabia dismantled tax bureaucracy and even stopped collecting social security contributions. One important step was that, Kingdoms also started to almost fully subsidize energy services such as electricity, water and gas for transportation. The state was funding the national treasury by the oil export rather than taxation.

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¹ It should be noted that British were the main architect of this system and they exerted considerable influence in the region until 1971.
² Gulf sheikhs signed treaties with the foreign powers, because foreign powers provided rents as part of the bargain. Sheikhs considered this as personal income and a source to fund rentier structure.
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However, the picture is not all rosy for the autocrats, the theory also lays out a fundamental problem: once the rentier institutions were established, they would prove hard to change. First generation that experience the free handouts would be grateful for them, but the next generations would claim them to be entitlements. The bargain would seem sacrosanct once the precedent is established. Overtime the subsidies would morph from ruler's gift into political right of the citizen.

So, what would happen if the rentier state regime is pushed to takeaway those entitlements? Political scientists likened the removal of the subsidies to a massive tax increase in a democracy. Without the democratic legitimacy, survival of the regimes depended on safeguarding the patronage network. Since the welfare services to the local population is the most important part of the political legitimacy, cutbacks would bring political instability and possibly the collapse of the state. The main finding of the book answers the question of whether this proposition is true or not.

The one crucial effect of the energy subsidies in the monarchies, is on the energy consumption. There is an alarming trend of increasing energy

4. Water consumption is directly tied to electricity as the region uses desalinated water
6. Part of the reason is that Saudi’s are still burning oil to generate electricity – a very inefficient method. 70% of the all electricity consumption goes to air conditioners. Seasonality of demand worsens the situation by requiring investment in power generation that is only used in few months of the year.
demand in the region. Gulf monarchies are now consuming more oil than the “Japan, India, Russia – or the entire continent of Africa”. Population, income, technology, climate and price all play a role in high demand of the region, but the consumer behavior is the most important in this case. Consumer behavior is mainly driven by the price of energy. Price dictates the consumer decision on how much fuel, electricity, water etc to use. Also, low prices give little incentive to buy energy efficient products or replace low efficiency systems such as old air conditioners.

For gulf monarchies energy subsidies and consumption have double effect; they manifest themselves in revenues as well as costs. Arithmetic reality is that; whatever the monarchies spend on domestic consumption comes out of the exports. Average percentage of oil production, that is consumed domestically, rose from 8% in 1960s to 24% after 2010. In one striking example Saudi Arabia uses 30% of the oil it produces in domestic consumption. Natural gas is no different, despite the abundant gas in the region, all gulf monarchies except Qatar are net gas importers. The problem becomes worse as the associated gas (byproduct of oil) becomes insufficient and extracting tight gases comes with cost. As a result, the burden of subsidies on the national economy kept increasing overtime. In 2014, subsidies reached to 9.5% of GDP for Saudi Arabia, 4.4% for UAE, 5% in Kuwait and 9% in Oman.

Increasing cost of subsidies along with the opportunity cost of lost revenues pushed the rulers towards change. The first to act in the region were Iran and Dubai. Iranian solution was to come up with a tiered price scheme along with cash deposits instead of subsidies followed up by a price increase in electricity and petroleum products. These efforts halved the subsidy burden and also resulted in a 10% decrease in energy consumption. Price increases later on was implemented to combat the effects of inflation. As a result, Iran’s energy subsidy burden went from 25% of the GDP in 2010 to 4% in 2016. Dubai’s initial efforts to increase prices came in 2010 but as the Arab Spring set on, the prices were quickly rolled back. An eventual increase in electricity prices of 15% managed to stick despite protests.

Author conducted a poll in 2011, after the initial successes of Iran and Dubai in 2011 and the results showed that, only 42% of the population in gulf monarchies thought they were entitled to free energy and water. Unlike the political theorists predicted, people showed inclination to support hardship measures, if it was distributed fairly and explained to them well.

Reforms in Saudi Arabia came after Muhammad Bin Salman took power in July 2017. Saudis were initially very careful with the price increases and tried to shield the poor as long as they keep the consumption low. Salman fired the Minister of Water and Electricity when he suggested citizens “drill wells” in response to the public outcry. Saudis followed with 260% increase in electricity and started selling gas at prices approaching the US prices. Much like Iranian policies, Saudis also started a cash compensation program for the poor. Cash compensation along with intensified repression persuaded the Saudis not to take the streets. The publicization of wasted resources and national interest arguments also played a role in convincing the Saudi public. Price increases also changed the consumer behavior and electricity usage actually declined.

The experiences in Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, UAE and Kuwait also resembled Saudi experience with some variation. The surprising part was that unlike the rentier state theory predicted, in none of the countries there was a large uproar when the subsidies were taken away. Prices were raised usually without replacement benefits. A combination of increasing consumption, fiscal realities, external pressures, changing leadership and threat of chaos in the region upon Arab Spring, resulted in a set of empirical evidences that oppose the rentier state theory. Citizens of these states held security and progress over entitlement. Getting rid of the unsustainable subsidies actually streamlined

7. They also executed 47 Shiite prisoners including a well-known Sheikh, which is interpreted as an effort to obscure the raise in energy prices.
and strengthened the political systems rather than threatening it.

“Energy Kingdom” sits at the intersection of political theory, history and economics for the Persian Gulf region from an internal consumption aspect. The experiences of the author reflect well in the book along with his meticulous research. He is able to support his claims almost always with empirical evidence. It is possible that the political implications of author’s findings on rentier theory may change based on different regime types with varying authoritarianism, previous democracy experience or religious make-up of the population, which is admittedly out of scope of the book. I am also content that book has very good “readability” and author manages to use a style that keeps the reader connected to the topic. Although rare, there are dubious comparisons, perhaps given for the dramatic effect. For example, author compares the energy consumed in the “largest homes” in Saudi Arabia with the “average” households in US and UK and finds differences in the order of magnitude. Scrutiny reveals later that, over 50% household in Saudi Arabia average at the same levels with US. However, overall, I believe “Energy Kingdoms” is a well-researched and well written book that would benefit anyone interested in oil and the Middle East.