Moving beyond the sanctuary paradigm: Canada must face up to the reality of a contested and dangerous space environment

This article outlines historical shifts in US and Canadian space policies using the sanctuary-contested policy framework. It highlights how sanctuary policies were born out of necessity rather than the pursuit of a peaceful global commons; they were never intended to, and did not, prevent the militarization and weaponization of space. The paper then describes challenges to global space governance and argues that diplomacy will not prevent conflicts in space. After introducing elements of deterrence theory, this paper concludes that Canada should move beyond the sanctuary ideology, make space a national whole-of-government issue, and align its space policy and strategy with allies and partners, credibly communicating Canada's resolve to protect and defend space assets. It further recommends that Canada develop niche capabilities that contribute to more effective national and collective deterrence and defence in space. Those capabilities should build upon existing niche strengths, not create space debris, and leverage industrial innovation in space.

In November 2021, Russia irresponsibly fired a ground-based missile that destroyed one of its satellites in orbit close to the International Space Station (ISS). This destructive test, which generated over fifteen hundred tractable debris with the potential to create hundreds of thousands of smaller pieces, forced astronauts and cosmonauts on board the ISS to shelter in crewed spacecrafts. 1 While it is impossible to know what motivated Russia to endanger the space station, this reckless anti-satellite test demonstrates Russia's capability to hold Western space assets at risk. 2 Space is rapidly changing in the current era of accelerated technological development and great power competition. Space is more accessible by commercial, non-state, and state actors. 3 State actors realize the ubiquitous role of space in countries' daily functioning and prosperity, and as a critical enabler of modern military operations. Potential adversaries increasingly develop counter-space weapons designed to degrade, disrupt, and destroy American and other allied satellites.
Canada has a long history of promoting peaceful uses of space and opposing space weaponization. There is insufficient Canadian policy and strategy for dealing with an increasingly congested, competitive, contested, and dangerous space environment. While the current Canadian space strategy acknowledges, for the first time in recent decades, the contested nature of space, it remains piecemeal and insufficiently focused on economic growth. 4 Canada urgently needs to align its national space 1. Antony J. Blinken, "Russia conducts destructive anti-satellite missile test," US Department of State, press statement, 15 November 2021, https://www.state.gov/russia-conducts-destructive-anti-satellite-missiletest/ (accessed 7 February 2022). 2. Various theories have been proposed to explain Russian motivations. Some believe that this destructive event was not a test. Rather, considering internal Russian issues with their civil space program and commercial space sector falling behind compared with the US and China, Russia could have made a certain orbital layer unusable to deny its competitors from using, thereby retaining some control. It is also possible that Russia simply wanted to showcase its military space program by demonstrating its capability and willingness to conduct military operations in space. For example, see Jon Kelvey, "This could be why Russia blew up its own satellite," Inverse, 27 November 2021, https://www.inverse.com/science/why-didrussia-blow-up-its-own-satellite (accessed 25 April 2023); Eric Berger, "Russia acknowledges antisatellite test, but says it's no big deal," Ars Technica, 16 November 2021, https://arstechnica.com/science/ 2021/11/russia-acknowledges-anti-satellite-test-but-says-its-no-big-deal/ (accessed 25 April 2023); Deganit Paikowsky, "Why Russia tested its anti-satellite weapon," Foreign Policy, 26 December 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/26/putin-russia-tested-space-asat-satellite-weapon/ (accessed 25 April 2023). 3. "Challenges to security in space," US Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington DC, 2019, 7. There are now more than one hundred countries involved in space. As of 2018, more than fifty countries and multinational organizations owned active satellites in orbit, nine of which had organic launch capability. 4. "Exploration, imagination, innovation: A new space strategy for Canada," Canadian Space Agency, St-Hubert, Quebec, 2019, 9, 14. The Canadian Space Agency designated the "space sector as a national strategic asset that is essential for Canada's sovereignty, security, and economic growth." The strategy mentions that emerging threats exist and that space services must remain reliable and secure. It does not provide any information on the nature of threats in space and on how to deal with them. Rather, it refers to Canada's defence policy, "Strong, Secure, Engaged," which lays out funding for space situational awareness, Earth observation, and satellite communication projects. policy and strategy with its principal allies to provide more effective collective deterrence and, if necessary, defensive actions against aggressions. Strengthening deterrence and defence in space will require the political will to stop treating space as a peaceful sanctuary and to develop a comprehensive national approach to space security that better synchronizes the development of strategies and capabilities across government departments and agencies, including the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). This paper proceeds as follows. The first section introduces the sanctuarycontested framework recently used by the Aerospace Corporation's Center for Space Policy and Strategy to characterize historical shifts in US space policy. 5 After differentiating between space militarization and weaponization, the first section discusses how Canada has continued to promote peaceful uses of space despite the US shifting its vision of space from being a peaceful sanctuary to a contested domain in the late 1970s. The second section describes how competitors and adversaries exploit the space domain and threaten Canadian and allied prosperity and security. It then highlights challenges to global space security governance and argues that developing international laws and norms alone will not prevent irresponsible and threatening actions in space. The last section reviews elements of contemporary deterrence theory. It then examines how Canada can reinforce national and collective deterrence and defence in space by moving beyond the mindset of the peaceful sanctuary policy. Finally, the conclusion summarizes recommendations for Canada to better prepare for a near-future marked by dangerous threats in space.
The sanctuary-contested framework: Comparison of US vs Canadian space policies

Historical evolution of US space policies
Since the beginning of the Space Age, US policymakers have debated between preventing conflict in space by, on the one hand, delegitimizing offensive actions and, on the other, preparing for conflict; in other words, by treating space either as a sanctuary or a contested domain. While there is no consensus on the definition of space sanctuary, space policy analyst Robyn Dickey uses the term to refer to "protecting space assets through political, diplomatic, and strategic methods of preventing or avoiding conflict." 6 For example, a sanctuary space policy pursues preventing weapons-testing in space through developing international treaties, terminology, 5. Robin Dickey, "The rise and fall of space sanctuary in US policy," The Aerospace Corporation, US, 2020, 2-3. The original use of the "sanctuary" school of thought was from David E. Lupton, On Space Warfare: A Space Power Doctrine (Montgomery: Air University Press, 1988). The other doctrines proposed by Lupton were survivability, control, and high ground. 6. Dickey, "The rise and fall of space sanctuary in US policy," 1-3. and norms of responsible behaviors. Conversely, contested domain policies assume that space cannot remain conflict-free and legitimize deterring, denying, and defending against attacks in space, as well as attacking adversaries' space assets. 7 This section first situates the terms "militarization" and "weaponization" of space in relation to Dickey's sanctuary-contested framework. The militarization of space refers to employing space assets to support national security or military operations on Earth. In contrast, the weaponization of space involves employing weapon effects in, from, or through space or transforming space into a domain of military operations. 8 While contested space policies legitimize the militarization and weaponization of space, sanctuary policies do not necessarily involve delegitimizing space militarization or weaponization. 9 For example, the US's (and Soviets') sanctuary policies of the first decades of the Space Age supported using strategic military satellites and testing antisatellite and ballistic missiles.
The US has never assumed that space was uncontested or safe from attacks. The weaponization of space began in the early 1950s as part of the first intercontinental ballistic missile tests, given that those missiles were at times travelling through space. The militarization of space began after the US and Soviet Union launched military intelligence satellites in the early 1960s. The use of space as a military war-fighting domain began when the Soviet Union tested anti-satellite weapons in 1963, then deployed its "fractional orbit bombardment system" designed to launch nuclear warheads into orbit, then into the North American continent across the Arctic. 10 In response to the Soviet bombardment system, the US developed its anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missile programs.
US space policies have been more complicated than a binary categorization as either sanctuary or contested. For example, under President John F. Kennedy, the US government overtly favoured diplomatic efforts to establish a space sanctuary enabling the unrestricted use of its military reconnaissance satellites, while covertly supporting the development of anti-satellite weapons. 11 Nonetheless, the sanctuary-contested framework is a helpful tool that can provide historical context by capturing the dominant national policy goals and priorities for different periods since the beginning of the Space Age.
Sanctuary policies dominated the first two decades of the Space Age-from 1957 to 1976. This was an era characterized by a limited number of space superpowers: the US and Soviet Union. Most space assets were military-strategic satellites supporting reconnaissance, intelligence collection, and nuclear warning, command, and control. The unhindered use of these satellites provided nuclear stability by allowing the two 7. Ibid. space powers to detect nuclear detonations within each other's countries, thereby building transparency and confidence from an arms control perspective. 12 Both superpowers considered it advantageous to maintain stability in space to prevent nuclear strikes, which could lead to their mutually-assured destruction. Additionally, until the 1970s, nascent American and Soviet rocket and space technology lacked reliable guidance and precision. These technological limitations meant that anti-satellite weapons would require nuclear warheads to destroy a target effectively in space. During that period, the preponderance of sanctuary policies had more to do with the lack of attractive satellite targets short of nuclear escalation and precision-guided antisatellite weapons than the ideal pursuit of international laws banning weapons in space. 13 The US and Soviet Union never agreed on a binding treaty prohibiting the employment of anti-satellite weapons. On the contrary, the two space powers ensured that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty only prohibited weapons of mass destruction in space. 14 Although early sanctuary policies were never intended to prevent the militarization and weaponization of space, other countries, like Canada, continue to describe space as a peaceful sanctuary. However, contrary to the common belief that contested US space policies are a relatively new phenomenon, Dickey showed that since 1976, the US has continuously rejected treating space as a sanctuary. 15 With an increased number of Soviet anti-satellite tests with greater precision and lethality in the late 1970s, the US prepared to deter and defend in space by developing their counter-space capabilities rather than delegitimizing attacks in space.
The US continued to treat space as a contested domain even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, albeit more quietly, in light of the enabling role that space capabilities played during the First Gulf War, specifically with regards to weather information, missile warning, earth observation, communications, navigation, and timing using the Global Positioning System (GPS). 16 While this period saw a softening of some elements of contested space policy and greater collaboration with Russia, the US called for the requirement to control the space domain to guarantee its freedom of action in support of terrestrial military operations. Overall, the post-Cold War period saw more continuity than change in US contested space policies.
The twenty-first century emergence of counter-space capabilities from competitors like Russia, China, India, Iran, and North Korea, combined with the rapid transformation of the commercial space sector, led allied countries to characterize space as "congested, contested, and competitive." 17 The diversity of state and non-state actors, be they nuclear or non-nuclear, increases the likelihood of misperceptions, miscalculations, and escalation. This increased complexity means that old notions of Cold War deterrence involving massive nuclear retaliation in case of attack are not adequate anymore. 18 Many adversaries are incentivized to target and strike satellites upon which the US and its allies depend to deploy forces and conduct operations. In the face of a more diverse, complex, and dangerous space environment, the US has pursued a closer integration of all elements of national space power across military, intelligence, civil, commercial, and allied space programs, in its efforts to deter, protect, and defend American and allied space assets. 19 The last decade saw an evolution of contested US policies from considering space as a domain enabling operations in other domains to a distinct operational or warfighting domain on its own. Indeed, President Barrack Obama's administration directed the development of "capabilities, plans, and options to deter, defend against, and, if necessary, defeat efforts to interfere with or attack US or allied space systems." 20 Donald Trump's presidency created the US Space Force, re-established the US Space Command as a unified combatant command, and mandated the department of defense to deter and defeat adversaries' malicious use of space, and defend US, allied, partner, and commercial space infrastructure.
The renewed US contested space policy and strategies present an opportunity for Canada to rethink and align its approach to national space security and potentially benefit from more robust collective deterrence and defence through closer partnership. The US Defense Space Strategy identifies the need to enhance collective security through partnership with international allies, in order to promote burden-sharing and leverage opportunities for cooperation in policy, strategy, and capabilities. 21 However, aligning Canada's space policies and strategies closer with the US's could 17. Ibid., 17-19. See also Bahney, Pearl, and Markey, "Antisatellite weapons and the growing instability of deterrence," 122. be controversial, given Canada's opposition to space weaponization over the last several decades.
Sanctuary or contested space: Where does Canada stand?
Canada has a seemingly long history of promoting space as a sanctuary and opposing space weaponization despite the US's shift to a contested space policy in the late 1970s. However, contrary to the Canadian government's claims of always opposing space weaponization, Canadian official discourse on space has not been consistently peaceful. 22 Space history expert Andrew Godefroy uncovered several key declassified documents demonstrating a Canadian space and missile defence program under bilateral cooperation with the US during the first fifteen years of its space program. 23 Godefroy also demonstrated that Canadian government documents contained erroneous information and were part of a narrative distancing the government from any form of militarization of its space program. Godefroy explained that the early Cold War had brought the Canadian scientific and military communities together to develop, test, and launch the Black Brant series of rockets from Churchill, Manitoba. The need for security against Soviet nuclear ballistic missiles with the ability to fly over the Arctic meant that Canada did not treat space as a peaceful sanctuary; instead, it supported American initiatives involving "missile defence, space control, and the potential deployment of space-based weapons" to deter against a Soviet attack on the North American continent. 24 Canada became the third country to place a satellite in orbit with Alouette 1 in 1962. 25  Despite Canada's early achievements in space, the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963 during the American era of sanctuary space policies provided a greater sense of security. Canadian priorities shifted from continental defence to international peacekeeping missions and imposed budgetary cuts to the department of national defence. 27 Toward the end of the 1960s, Canada ended its military rocketry program, including the capability to independently access space, favouring a wholly civilianized space program focused on developing commercial telecommunication satellites.
The 1967 Chapman report served as a basis for a new Canadian vision for space: developing domestic satellite communications to connect and unite sparsely populated communities dispersed over vast territories. 28 This vision led to the creation of Telesat Canada, a Crown corporation that successfully launched the Anik A-F series of domestic communication satellites in 1972 and subsequent decades. 29 With the Anik series of communications satellites, Canada's space program effectively transitioned from defence and scientific to commercial technology development. 30 The scope of Canada's space program eventually expanded to include other niche capabilities in space robotics, Earth observation, and human spaceflight, later re-introducing scientific research and exploration activities. Since then, Canada has pursued a sanctuary national space program despite the US continuously rejecting sanctuary space policies from 1976 onwards.
In 1989, pursuant to a recommendation of the 1967 Chapman report, the Canadian government established the Canadian Space Agency (CSA) under the Minister of Industry (now called Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada or ISED) as the agency responsible for coordinating Canadian space policies and programs to "promote the peaceful use and development of space, to advance the knowledge of space through science, and to ensure that space science and technology provide social and economic benefits for Canadians." 31  asymmetric contribution of two ground-based optical sensors (or Baker-Nunns cameras) to the American Space Surveillance Network. 32 This network tracks space debris, notably to ensure that any object re-entering the Earth's atmosphere is not confused with a ballistic missile warhead. As a replacement to the now-retired Baker-Nunn cameras, Canada's single military satellite, Sapphire, launched in 2013, becoming Canada's single optical-sensor contribution to the American Space Surveillance Network and the only Canadian commitment to the space portion of the NORAD aerospace mission. While Canadian military involvement in space has grown slightly since the 1990s with the creation of a Directorate of Space Development (now Director General Air and Space Force Development and 3rd Canadian Space Division under the Royal Canadian Air Force), Canada's military space program mainly relies on accessing US space capabilities as an end user in exchange for minimal contributions. As the lead Canadian government agency for space, CSA's vision and internal priorities in promoting the peaceful exploration and utilization of outer space naturally influence the Canadian space program. This reality means that DND/CAF must compete with other government departments and advocate for its national security space requirements to CSA, an agency whose mandate excludes defence and security, and attempt to ride along with CSA's projects and initiatives. 33 As of 2012, sixteen departments and agencies had space-related expenditures or consumed satellite data. 34 The increased diversity of Canadian government departments with stakes in space indicates that the importance of space is rising along with the requirement for a national and whole-of-government approach to developing strategies and capabilities. James Fergusson and Stephen James of University of Manitoba's Centre for Defence and Security Studies highlight several issues with the Canadian space program, notably the lack of integrated national security space policy and strategy, the marginalization of space security issues, and the planning and management of space activities that do not reflect a whole-of-government approach. Their report emphasizes how Canada's understanding of space security issues, ranging from the access to, use of, and security of vital space-based assets that support national security, economic, and environmental interests, has not kept pace with the twentyfirst century's rise of actors, threats, and vulnerabilities in space. 35 In particular, archaic Cold War notions of bipolar nuclear deterrence and stability continue to influence Global Affairs Canada's understanding and promotion of space as a peaceful sanctuary. According to Fergusson and James, Global Affairs Canada, which contributed to the 1967 United Nations Outer Space Treaty, accepts that 32. James G. Fergusson and Stephen L. James, "Report on Canada, national security and outer space," Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, Calgary, 2007, 26-29. The American Space Surveillance Network also includes the ballistic missile early-warning radars as contributing sensors. 33. Ibid., 35-45. 34. Aerospace Review, "Space working group report," 44. 35. Fergusson and James, "Report on Canada, national security and outer space," i-ii. space is militarized but not weaponized. From the perspective of Global Affairs Canada, diplomacy, arms control, and international treaties are the only way to manage military activities in space. 36 Fergusson and James further explain that Global Affairs Canada's policy on the non-weaponization of space acts as a "psychological obstacle" to DND/CAF's initiatives and projects in space. 37 This barrier to Canada's military involvement and influence in space is exacerbated by Canada's political reluctance to participate in North American ballistic missile defence initiatives.
Canadian politicians have opted out of continental missile defence projects since the late 1950s. 38 Ballistic missile defence became a Canadian political debate about space weaponization, which in turn fostered the erroneous belief that Canada's participation in continental missile defence would contravene the Outer Space Treaty. 39 Canada's sanctuary policies opposing space weaponization and ballistic missile defence marginalized Canada's influence as part of NORAD and Canada's overall diplomatic influence on space security and continental defence with the US, significantly increasing the dependency of Canada's security on the goodwill of the US. 40  entirely with the US, which, according to the 2017 testimony of the former NORAD deputy commander Lieutenant-General Pierre St-Amand, is increasingly less inclined to protect Canada, given that US policy excludes defending Canada against ballistic missile attack. 42 This non-guaranteed protection against ballistic missiles makes Canada extremely vulnerable, especially with Russia's invasion of Ukraine, during which Vladimir Putin put his strategic forces on high alert, threatened to use nuclear weapons, and launched a hypersonic missile into the Arctic ocean. 43 The assumption that Canada and North America are protected by geography is no longer valid: China and Russia have developed hypersonic and cruise missiles that can carry nuclear warheads, which NORAD's North Warning System cannot detect effectively. Andrea Charron, the director of the University of Manitoba's Centre for Defence and Security Studies, warns that Russia could launch a limited attack in North America's low-populated Arctic region while threatening to conduct larger-scale nuclear attacks to sue for peace in Ukraine or to prevent the US and Canada from sending NATO reinforcements to Europe. 44 Canada should prioritize NORAD modernization and continental defence and reconsider its position against ballistic and hypersonic missile defence. 45 Supporting American anti-ballistic missile programs would not be unprecedented: Canada backed and contributed to similar initiatives during the early Cold War era. Before providing additional recommendations on how Canada should transform its approach to space security, the next section will describe how space is more dangerous than ever and why diplomacy alone will not prevent conflicts in space.

Challenges to space security governance
Why is space more dangerous than ever before?
Space is congested with over six thousand satellites and one hundred million pieces of debris, each larger than one millimetre, orbiting fast enough to damage satellites significantly. 46 With costs to access space declining and the rise of mega-constellations in low-Earth orbits (LEO), such as SpaceX's Starlink, the number of space objects will continue to grow at an alarming rate. 47 Space is increasingly competitive as the gap between the US's and competing states' technological progress is narrowing. 48 In particular, China aims to become a powerful space power by investing in the research and development of space technology at a rate faster than the US. China is building space infrastructure with a vision to control global telecommunications, energy, transportation, and manufacturing by 2049. 49 Accordingly, it focuses all its diplomatic, information, economic, and military (DIME) power instruments toward this goal, emphasizing military-civil fusion and dual-use technology development. 50 Space is also increasingly contested and dangerous, given the increased development and proliferation of counter-space weapons. Since the Cold War, space capabilities developed for communications, navigation, precision guidance, intelligence, surveillance, and early warning have advantaged the US military tactically. However, in the post-Cold War 1990s, the US developed expensive unique capabilities without focusing on redundancy and survivability because of the perception of lowered threats in space. 51 Western countries now depend on these vulnerable space systems to support conventional military operations. In turn, China and Russia developed organizations, doctrine, techniques, and capabilities designed to disrupt, degrade, or destroy American and allied space assets. Denying access to space capabilities would effectively send Western militaries back to industrial-age warfare. 52 For instance, China possesses ground-to-space capabilities that can destroy satellites in LEO and target satellites up to the geostationary orbit (GEO). 53 Recently, China tested a new nuclear-capable hypersonic missile that circled and cruised back toward the Earth, demonstrating an advanced space capability with military applications of significant concern to the US. 54 China's 2007 ground-based anti-satellite demonstration became a central security concern because of the large number of debris generated, which still threaten satellites in LEO. According to the Secure World Foundation, "the deliberate destruction of the satellite created more than 3,000 trackable pieces of orbital debris . . . [and] perhaps as many as 150,000 pieces of debris too small to track." 55 With those tests, China demonstrated to the US and its allies that it could hold its space systems at risk.
Besides usually at an altitude of two thousands kilometres or less, and used for human spaceflight, Earth observation, or communications. Satellites in geostationary orbit are much farther from the Earth. They circle the Earth above the equator following Earth's rotation at an altitude of 35,786 km, travelling at exactly the same speed as the Earth's rotation. Satellites in GEO appear to be "stationary" over a fixed position. GEO is notably used by telecommunication satellites that need to remain above one particular place over Earth. capability to strike Western countries' space-based capabilities. 56 In addition to ground-to-space systems, Russia recently conducted a series of sophisticated and unusual manoeuvres in LEO and GEO that led to international denunciation. In one instance, a Russian satellite manoeuvred close to a US reconnaissance satellite in LEO and released an object exhibiting the characteristics of a weapon. 57 The US Space Force's chief of space operations, General John Raymond, concluded that these unusual manoeuvres in the proximity of a US government satellite were aggressive and intentional. 58 In another case, the Russian satellite abnormally manoeuvered nineteen times within GEO and close to a US commercial satellite and a French-Italian military satellite. This threatening behavior led the French government to accuse Russia of espionage. 59 These incidents suggest that Russia likely takes advantage of the lack of international space laws and norms to conduct operations in the space domain under the threshold of armed conflict. Besides kinetic space weapons, which are designed to cause irreversible damage to satellites, other non-kinetic, cyber, and electronic methods, such as lasers or radiofrequency jamming devices, can be used to attack space infrastructures. For example, as part of its current occupation of Ukraine, Russia conducts cyberattacks on the commercial satellite communication company Viasat and SpaceX's Starlink systems. 60 While Russia and China possess advanced electronic and cyber counterspace capabilities, other adversaries, such as Iran and North Korea, develop and use jamming and spoofing systems to threaten allied space systems. For instance, North Korea routinely uses GPS jamming to interfere with bilateral US-South Korean military exercises. 61 Irresponsible acts in space could have severe implications that extend far beyond military activities. Space enables all economic activities. The day-to-day well-being of Canadians depends on space infrastructure for communications, climate change monitoring, banking, power infrastructure, positioning, and timing and navigation services, to name a few. The geography of Canada, with dispersed communities in remote areas, increases its reliance on communication satellites. Canada's public dependence on space-based services will only continue to grow, yet the country still relies heavily on space applications provided by the US and others, making it increasingly vulnerable. As Canada is open to attack from ballistic missiles, so too is Canada's ability to respond independently in space limited: it has no sovereign launch capability and little to no capacity to reconstitute lost services without external assistance. 62 The lack of Canadian access to and limited influence in space is a growing national security issue, especially considering that conflicts will inevitably extend into space, just as they did in the sea and global cyber common domains. Space has been militarized and weaponized for a long time and is now becoming an independent defence and security domain. Canadian and allied commercial, civil, and military satellites will need to be protected and defended against aggressions, whether they be above or below the threshold of armed conflict. This reality runs contrary to Canada's policy of non-weaponization of outer space. The following section will explain why a space sanctuary approach involving only multinational treaties and diplomacy will not be sufficient to prevent conflicts in space.

Why are treaties, norms, and diplomatic efforts insufficient?
There are significant challenges to global space security governance. First, international space treaties are antiquated and insufficient, and norms of responsible behaviors cannot hold accountable countries that jeopardize space security. The UN produced five international space treaties during the 1960s and 1970s. 63 Since then, the UN has not created any new binding space treaties. While the UN was the right international body for space governance in the mid-twentieth century, the diverging interests of its members, limited budgets, and the requirement for consensus decision-making are all challenging the efficacy of the UN. 64 Besides the UN's inefficacy in renewing international legislation, the existing treaties insufficiently address space's weaponization. None of the legally binding treaties prohibits placing or using weapons including nuclear weapons, in space. The only exception addressed by the Outer Space Treaty is the ban on placing weapons of 62. Fergusson and James, "Report on Canada, national security and outer space," 57. mass destruction in space. 65 The UN's inability to evolve multilateral space treaties has led to bottom-up development of new diplomatic tools, such as non-binding guidelines and norms of acceptable behaviors, to fill gaps in space governance. Despite its efforts to develop voluntary guidelines for space sustainability, the international community has not been able to agree on fundamental definitions, for example, defining the nature of peaceful space activities, formalizing the right to self-defence, or regulating manoeuvre operations. 66 The dual nature of satellites that can serve military or civil purposes exacerbates the issue: technologies used by civil and commercial satellites can also form part of anti-satellite weapons. 67 Therefore, discriminating between the peaceful or hostile use of dual-use technologies remains challenging.
Second, while Russia and China continue to conduct irresponsible anti-satellite destructive tests, they paradoxically propose space treaties deemed disingenuous by many countries. Both countries advocated for arms control in space by proposing the draft Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty (PPWT) in 2008, then again in 2014, at the UN Conference on Disarmament. The US and other states view the proposed Sino-Russian PPWT, which does not prohibit the development or testing of ground-based anti-satellite weapons, as a disingenuous attempt to restrict other nations. According to the former US assistant secretary of state for international security and non-proliferation, Christopher Ford, Russia and China have no intention of halting the development and testing of their counter-space capabilities. 68 Recently, the US secretary of state Antony Blinken called into question Russia's true intentions of opposing the weaponization of outer space in light of the country's 2021 destructive missile test, which continues to imperil the sustainability and exploration of space by all states. 69 Third, promoting stability and sustainability in space has not prevented its weaponization. Former Canadian ambassador to the UN Conference on Disarmament, Paul Meyer, criticized the US decision to dismiss the PPWT without providing alternatives to prevent an arms race in space. 70 In 2009, Canada attempted to provide an alternative to the PPWT, suggesting that states commit to security pledges to refrain from placing weapons in outer space, conducting destructive ASAT testing, or using satellites as weapons. However, the proposed security pledges received little traction at the UN as Canada failed to promote them enough. Meyer acknowledged that many challenges remain to achieve a non-weaponized status for outer space. Strong political will would be required, especially from the US. Considering that the US abrogated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and outrightly refused to support the PPWT at the UN General Assembly, it appears unlikely that the US would accept any constraints on their abilities to defend its space infrastructure. 71 The reality is that the three dominant space powers, Russia, China, and the US, no longer effectively cooperate in space, notably since Russia occupied Ukraine. 72 This lack of cooperation in space undermines the strength of existing treaties, agreements, norms, or guidelines.
Nevertheless, Canada's interests remain to promote stability and cooperation in space rather than conflict and weaponization. Promoting norms of responsible behavior in space may deter irresponsible actions by delegitimizing the actions of actors who would attempt to break those norms. While "deterrence by delegitimization" can contribute to diplomatically isolating irresponsible state actors, it is insufficient to prevent unacceptable behaviors or conflicts in space. It is in Canada's interest to embrace a more comprehensive approach to deterrence and defence of critical national and allied space infrastructure.
Moving beyond the sanctuary paradigm: Integrated national and allied space deterrence and defence

Notions of contemporary space deterrence
Political scientists Ryder McKeown and Alex Wilner examined three options for Canada's space deterrence: denial, punishment, and delegitimization. 73 Besides delegitimization, which is addressed above, "deterrence by denial" entails the promise to deny the expected goals of an adversary by leveraging effective defences. "Deterrence by punishment" involves threatening to punish an aggressor through retaliatory responses. McKeown and Wilner suggest that Canada should, on the one hand, pursue further integration of its space capabilities and operations with allies, thereby enhancing the collective posture of "deterrence by denial." On the other hand, the authors also recommend that Canada take the necessary actions to be prepared to defend Canadian and allied space assets using "deterrence by punishment" capabilities. The US, NATO, and other Five Eyes (FVEY) countries see space as a critical operational domain against which they should deter acts of aggression. 74 Canada relies on the US and allied space systems to support CAF operations in exchange for small asymmetric contributions to the US-led Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative, alongside the UK, Australia, New Zealand, France, and Germany. 75 Through its contribution to and integration into the CSpO space architecture, Canada is enhancing the ability of all CSpO partners to "deter by denial." 76 For example, Canada's Sapphire satellite's contribution to space situational awareness enhances CSpO's collective ability to detect and attribute irresponsible behaviors or aggressive actions. Given the attribution challenge in space, credibly demonstrating the ability to detect and attribute irresponsible behaviors better than adversaries provides an asymmetric advantage that enhances deterrence by denial for all CSpO partners. 77 If adversaries decided to target Canada's space assets, Canada could leverage CSpO partners' space resources to counter the threat, making it more complicated and potentially more costly for adversaries to strike. 78 In addition to planning for the next generation of space surveillance satellites and developing ground-based sensors, Canada should leverage its academic and industrial innovation in artificial intelligence to contribute enhanced data exploitation and analytics capabilities to space situational awareness. 79 Besides contributing to CSpO, Canada must also retain some degree of self-sufficiency by enhancing the resiliency and survivability of its national space assets. The Canadian government currently operates nine satellites serving civil, military, or dual purposes. 80 Noteworthy examples of dual civil-military space capabilities include RADARSAT-2 and the RADARSAT Constellation Mission, which DND/CAF typically uses for maritime and arctic domain awareness. To highlight the requirement to maintain some degree of sovereign control over its space assets, McKeown and Wilner describe how, during the Ukraine crisis, Canada unilaterally provided remote-sensing imagery acquired from its Radarsat-2 satellite. 81 While it is unlikely that Canada would plan and conduct expeditionary operations in the land environment independently of alliances and coalitions, this would not necessarily be the case in the cyber and space domains, which contain capabilities with global coverage and reach, unlike those in other domains. In doing so, Canada should build upon its existing niche strengths: space robotics, space surveillance, earth observation, data exploitation and artificial intelligence, and satellite communications. 82 In particular, Canada should leverage its historical partnership with Telesat to provide high-capacity LEO communications globally for civil and military purposes, including in the Arctic. 83 As satellites become smaller and cheaper, Canada should leverage LEO satellites at large for defence and security purposes and consider regaining a modest sovereign launch capability, as it did during the early Cold War. A national launch platform would enhance Canada's ability to access space independently, reconstitute its space capabilities, especially those in LEO, and possibly assist in defending its space assets if required. 84 It is in Canada's interest to invest in defensive technologies, such as hardening, encryption, cyber security, or anti-jamming, to ensure the resiliency of its national space assets. Any commercial or government Canadian satellite should undergo a series of cyber and space assurance tests before launching. Apart from "deterrence by denial" capabilities, Canada should prepare for a near-future reality that will require punishment capabilities. This reality is already happening in the cyber domain, where a solely defensive posture is no longer sufficient. Military space strategists emphasize the importance of maintaining offensive capabilities, given the difficulty of ensuring effective defence in space. 85 However, Canadian offensive space capabilities would preferably not create space debris. These could include targeting satellite ground stations, jamming satellite links, or conducting offensive cyber operations. Given the political sensitivity associated with space weaponization, Canada could invest in technologies that serve non-deterrence purposes, 81 such as clearing space debris, but that could also be repurposed into "deterrence by punishment" capability in the future if necessary. 86 To pursue this goal, Canada could exploit its space robotics expertise, which has successfully developed robotic arms servicing the US space shuttles (Canadarm) and the ISS (Canadarm2). 87 While Canada could meaningfully contribute to enhancing allied collective deterrence in space, these efforts will continue to be hindered by Canada's sanctuary space policies and strategies. Effective deterrence requires three elements: capability, credibility, and communication. Credibility is required to persuade an adversary that the deterring state can deny or respond to aggression. Communication is necessary to demonstrate both capability and credibility. 88 Canadian space policy and strategy must align to a large extent with how its principal allies, especially the US, face the issue. Accordingly, a holistic and coherent space strategy addressing Canada's economic, industrial, and environmental objectives, as well as defence and security priorities, well-aligned with the US and other allies, is essential for credible national and collective deterrence. 89 Such a strategy should unquestionably communicate Canada's resolve to protect and defend all its commercial, civil, and military satellites. The first step would be to gain the political will and leadership to move away from old sanctuary paradigms.
Whole-of-government approach to space security Over the last decade, the Canadian government's views on space have slightly shifted away from a pure sanctuary paradigm. However, more should be done. Canada's Space Policy Framework of 2014 was the first policy document to recognize space as a national interest, with "overarching strategic goals of jobs and growth, sovereignty, security, and the advancement of knowledge." 90 Further, the policy 86. McKeown and Wilner, "Deterrence in space and cyberspace," 407-409. McKeown and Wilner argue that while Canada should continue to focus on developing and fostering responsible norms of behaviours and defending national and allied space assets, it must also be prepared for a future reality like the weaponization of the high seas or the cyber environment. In comparison with the cyber domain, the Canadian strategy mentions that, for the first time, a purely defensive strategy is no longer sufficient given the potential for cyber retaliation and punishment. While DND emphasizes denial and delegitimization, its cyber operators are also prepared to "conduct defensive cyber operations and, where feasible, active cyber operations." 87. For more information on Canadarm and Canadarm2, see: "Canadarm, Canadarm2, and Canadarm3-A comparative framework describes space as "increasingly congested, contested, and competitive." 91 In the same vein, Canada's 2019 space strategy for the first time recognizes emerging threats and the need for another department to take appropriate measures to protect space assets, referring to Canada's defence policy, "Strong, Secure, Engaged," to "confront emerging threats, deliver new capabilities, and ensure mission resiliency" in space. 92 Strong, Secure, Engaged reaffirms that space capabilities are critical to Canadian national security, sovereignty, and defence. It further states that the CAF will "defend and protect military space capabilities, including by working closely with allies and partners to ensure a coordinated approach to assuring continuous access to the space domain and space assets." 93 Nevertheless, Strong, Secure, Engaged does not provide information on how DND/CAF will defend its space capabilities and ensure mission resiliency. 94 Canada's space policies, constrained by the CSA and Global Affairs Canada's idealistic view of space as a peaceful sanctuary, remain stove-piped and lack coherence. Many Canadian government departments have, or should have, roles to play in space beyond DND/CAF and the CSA. As an agency of ISED, CSA produced the recent 2019 space strategy on behalf of the Government of Canada without much integration and coordination with other government departments. Yet, twenty-first century threats and vulnerabilities in space require an integrated national space policy and strategy, reflecting a whole-of-government approach. 95 For example, Public Safety Canada should recognize space as critical infrastructure and work with its allied partners to manage risks and reduce vulnerabilities. 96 Natural Resources Canada could provide space weather forecasts and intelligence as part of space domain awareness, centred on Canada's unique geography and, importantly, the Arctic region. 97  the Communications Security Establishment and Canadian Security Intelligence Service should be involved in providing intelligence and enhancing the cyber security of space assets. As a result of the 2014 Space Policy Framework, ISED and the CSA have taken some steps to improve the coordination of the space program across the government, notably by implementing a space advisory board, which provides strategic advice to the minister of industry, as well as other governance committees on space. 98 While these steps are welcome additions, the new government space committees focus on the programmatic management of space-related investments. No appropriate forum exists in Canada's political and governmental structure to address threats and challenges in space from a national security perspective. There is no cabinet nor deputy ministers' committee on space security, let alone on space at large. 99 Nor is there a voice for addressing space security challenges as part of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of parliamentarians. ISED and the CSA are not part of the core members of the National Security and Intelligence Advisory team. Only Global Affairs has a small voice in line with its mandate to promote peace and security in space from an arms control perspective. 100 Space security issues should be accorded a level of importance commensurate with cyber security and brought up to the attention of senior political and governmental officials, who, in turn, should set the policy and priorities. The role of the CSA should not include setting policy but rather advising and coordinating.
An integrated approach to national space security relates to the contemporary notion of "cross-domain deterrence," which involves using threats of one type, or in one domain, to dissuade an adversary from undertaking actions of another type, or in another domain, or from changing the status quo. 101 For example, Canadian political leaders could threaten to apply economic sanctions to any country conducting antisatellite tests generating space debris, just as they did after Russia invaded Ukraine. Similarly, Canada could threaten to retaliate in the domain and at a time of its choosing. Some of Canada's principal allies embrace a truly integrated approach to national space security. For example, the UK and the US have a national space council, chaired by the prime minister and vice-president respectively, which considers diplomacy, economics, and national security issues in guiding space policies and strategies across government sectors. 102 Space policy experts Cassandra Steer and Malcolm Davies recently highlighted the requirement for a combined civil, military, and diplomatic approach to Australia's space policies, strategies, and governance. 103 Similarly, the UK has an integrated civil and defence national space strategy, and it envisions creating a national space operation centre supporting the civil, military, and industrial sectors. 104 In line with its principal allies, Canada should expeditiously create a national space council with appropriate political and public service leadership to advance Canada's space interests, consider threats and challenges in space from a national security perspective, and provide integrated national direction across the military, civil, and commercial sectors. Such an integrated approach to space security would provide better coherence and credibility, thereby contributing to greater national and collective deterrence.

Conclusion
This paper outlined historical shifts in US and Canadian space policies. Peaceful sanctuary space policies emerged in the early 1960s because the US and Soviet Union wanted to maintain nuclear stability and access to space. Sanctuary policies were born out of necessity rather than the ideal pursuit of a peaceful global common, and they were never intended to prevent the militarization and weaponization of space. Although the US has treated space as a contested domain since the late 1970s, Canada has continued to promote space as a peaceful sanctuary, even to this day.
Space has become more congested and dangerous than ever before. Yet, Canadian and allied security and prosperity depend on their unhindered access and utilization of space infrastructure.
Canada must understand that space is no longer a guaranteed peaceful sanctuary; the diplomatic promotion of norms and guidelines is insufficient to prevent conflicts in space. After recognizing space as it is, not as it should ideally be, Canada should urgently develop the requisite policy, strategy, and capabilities to deter and protect national and allied critical space infrastructure. Canada's space policy and strategy must better align with, and leverage existing NATO, NORAD, FVEY, and CSpO alliances and partnerships, to provide more effective collective deterrence and, if necessary, defensive actions against aggressions. Strengthening deterrence and defence in space will require the political will to move beyond the peaceful sanctuary paradigm by convincingly communicating Canada's commitment to defend national and allied infrastructure in space. Canada must adopt a comprehensive whole-of-government approach to space security across the civil, industrial, and national security sectors. Such an approach would ensure that Canada leverages the growing commercial space sector in developing smaller and cheaper space capabilities that could serve commercial, civil, and military purposes.
With the requisite policy and strategy that supports deterrence and defence in space, Canada should develop capabilities in existing niche strengths: space robotics, space surveillance, earth observation, data exploitation and artificial intelligence, and satellite communications. Canada should consider leveraging industrial innovation with LEO satellites for defence and communications and regaining a modest sovereign launch capability. Canada should also invest in defensive technologies that do not create space debris and prepare for a near-future reality that will require punishment capabilities.
The stakes of maintaining the status quo are high. Failure to elevate space as a whole-government national security issue means that Canada will continue to provide small, unintegrated, and piecemeal contributions to existing partnerships like NORAD or CSpO, reducing Canada's perceived relevance and influence. Canada will continue to lack the flexibility to operate independently in space and will remain vulnerable to the goodwill of others. Failure to coherently align policies and strategies with partners affects trust, which, in turn, can negatively impact interoperability and information sharing. Divergent political visions can leave Canada out of defence-related information-sharing partnerships, as is the case with the new Australia-UK-US cooperation (AUKUS), which shares information on artificial intelligence, cyber, quantum, underwater systems, and long-range strike capabilities. Ultimately, failure to provide credible national and allied deterrence means that the Canadian and Western way of life could soon be degraded or lost altogether.