The Epistemological Model of Vedantic Doxography According to the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha for the Study of Indian Philosophy

Since there is no proper Sankrit word corresponding to the English ‘doxography’, the literary genre of the compendium (saṃgraha) is examined, in the context of the school of the kevalādvaitavāda. The work chosen for the analysis is the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha (Compendium of all the darśanas) by Mādhavācārya. Some critical remarks on the structure of this work allow to conclude that a possible alternative hermeneutical model used to explain the particular attitude of Indian doxography, such as ‘Inclusivism’, is not entirely satisfactory. The doxographic and hermeneutical structure of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha seems an entirely coherent theoretical model, within the limits of its own cultural context.


Methodological Remarks about Indian Doxography
There is no proper Sanskrit word corresponding to the English 'doxography' (from δόξα 'opinion, point of view' + γράφειν 'to write, to describe'). This is not surprising, due to the fact that the term is a neologism, invented by the German philologist Hermann Diels (1848Diels ( -1922, in his work Doxographi Graeci (1879), being used properly for the works of classical historians, describing the points of view of past philosophers and scientists. This notwithstanding, in fact doxography is a largely diffused literary genre in Indian philosophical tradition. Indian philosophical production employs an ample range of different literary genres, each one of them corresponding to different conceptual and pedagogical requirements. Within this perspective, the founding text of a system is generally speaking a sūtra, 'aphorism', a genre that, due to its characteristic feature of stylistic concision, needs to be explained in a number of different types of commentaries, such as the kārikā (mnemonic strophe), a sort of versified sūtra, the vārttika (explanatory gloss) inspired by a criterion of brevity, the bhāṣya (commentary), etymologically 'that about which it is to be spoken of', more detailed and extensive in style, with a particular propensity for long nominal compounds and a technical use of inflectional cases in order to indicate different causal, temporal or situational relationships, and the ṭīkā (delucidation), more colloquial in style, in order to delucidate the meaning of the glossed text, this one being often referred to as the 'root' (mūla) of all the entire textual stratification. But the conceptual building is not exhausted in the stratification starting with the mūla text and ending with the ṭīkā. In order to better vehiculate the concepts and technicalities of a philosophical system a further step is needed. This step must be accomplished by the treatises. So to the founders of a system, a large rank of scholars must follow, so that the scholastic thought could assume its final form as a structured system, and not simply a muddle of intuitive statements without a clear internal order. Coordination, elimination of apparent internal contradictions, internal coherence, are some of the goals that this kind of production is called to satisfy. More than this, a confrontation with different systems of thought is now necessary, because all of the Indic thought lives and grows in the continuous and fruitful debate with different schools of thought, being them internal (related to the same central tenets of one's own school, and differing in matters of detail), or external (related to altogether different worldviews). To this demand a definite class of works may offer an answer, the so-called 'summaries' (saṃgraha). A saṃgraha is a compendium, a synopsis, being able to build a conceptual scheme including a wide range of different philosophical tenets and organizing them into an intellectual model. This model fulfils a double requirement: it offers a clear structure of the main tenets of the school, and at the same it offers a useful pedagogical summary of the interrelated positions of one's own school and of rival schools, a summary used in public debates in order to support one's own position and to contrast the opponent's position. So its scope is not only, or not properly, a theoretical one, but rather a practical one, in accord with the practical undertone of all Indic classical philosophical tradition, being always connected with the main human goal (puruṣārtha), the liberation (mokṣa) from the cycle of rebirths (saṃsāra).
This epistemological and pedagogical model centred on the literary genre of the compendium (saṃgraha) is not restricted to brahmanical tradition, but it is shared beyond the pale of the Vedic milieu. As we will see, at least one important work comes from the context of Jainism. It is to be noted that the literary genre of the compendium (saṃgraha) must be accurately distinguished from an only apparently similar genre, this second one being the scholastic résumé, sāra. A sāra collects the main tenets of a school for a better mnemonic study of the system, but it is not so diffused in technicalities as the compendium, and above all it has no specific reference to other schools' point of view, it is no fit for a confrontation with different intellectual positions. For the Vedantic milieu the classical example of a sāra is the Vedāntasāra by Sadānanda (fifteenth century CE) (Kumar 1987).
The doxographical production of the school of Śaṅkara, the kevalādvaitavāda (doctrine of absolute non dualism), offers a complete review of nearly all the existing philosophical tendencies in Indian classical thought. This review is not an objective, impartial or impersonal one: it presents the thought of rival schools as seen through a particular filter. This is precisely what distinguishes a doxography from a history of philosophy, the conscious intention of the author is not to offer an unrealistic, cold and aseptic report of different views, a position impossible from the point of view of many Indian schools of thought, e.g. the jaina epistemological model, according to which only a multilateral view could avoid the risk of an over-simplification of the object studied, through the 'doctrine of the may be' (syādvāda) applied through the so-called 'sevenfold application [of syāt]' (saptabhaṅginaya) (Jaini [1979(Jaini [ ] 2001. Rather, a doxography offers a record of positions different from one's own, but from the point of view of the same one's own tenet, in order to offer to the disciple a sort of road map to find his way out of a difficult route. This is not to be considered as a biased or partial presentation of intellectual facts, it is rather the intellectually honest acknowledgement that in philosophy simply does not exist a neutral point of view, a point of view above all other ones, but that to declare one's own position is the only way to be clear and sincere in the exposition of concepts and beliefs. It should be noted that an intellectual caveat of this sort is at the root of contemporary interreligious dialogue, be it a theological or an existential one: only those who declare frankly and honestly their position could compare it with others, there is no possibility for an 'outside from the mêlée' position, everyone must seat on a particular chair if a productive dialogue could start (Coward 1990;Prabhu 1996;Sharma 2011;Swindells 1997).
In the production of the Śaṅkarite school, all surrounding schools are arranged into a system of concentric orbits, in such a way that the school of Śaṅkara is situated at the very centre, with all the other ones gravitating around it according to different orbits corresponding to a degree of lesser or greater approach to the centre, represented by the kevalādvaitavāda. The Veda authorizes the people eligible for its teachings (Śaṅkara, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya [Commentary on the Aphorism about the Absolute] 1, 3, 25-6), determining a sphere of legitimate 'differentiation of disciples' (vineyabheda), a hierarchy based upon the concept of 'differentiation of eligibility' (adhikārabheda) (Śaṅkara, Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣadbhāṣya [Commentary on the Big Secret Teaching] 3, 9, 9), a differentiation depending upon the different grade of knowledge, character, inner disposition, sensitivity of disciples, in a word, depending upon their individual peculiarities. The subsequent use of the concept of adhikārabheda by thinkers like Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (Prasthānabheda, a commentary upon the seventh verse of the Śivamahimnastotra by Puṣpadanta, stating that the systems of triple Veda, sāṃkhya, yoga, doctrine of Paśupati and vaiṣṇava faith are just different paths towards one and the same religious goal) (Norman Brown 1983;Hanneder 1999) redefines the term in a more accentuated inclusivistic nuance, opening the way to the contemporary use of the concept of adhikārabheda as a definitely inclusivistic tool for neo-hinduistic apologetic literary production, being able to absorb every sort of alien issues into one's own system of values (Young 1981(Young , 1982; see also Bouthillette 2013).
The most famous text of the saṃgraha literary genre is probably the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha (Compendium of All the Darśanas) by Mādhavācārya (fourteenth century CE). 1 The vast majority of manuscripts have only 15 chapters, and do not contain the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy. To the very same master Śaṅkara (Śaṅkarācārya, Ādiśaṅkara, sixth-seventh century CE) it has been attributed (with not so much plausibility) the possibly earlier work of this kind, the Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasārasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Résumé of All the Definitive Conclusions of the Vedānta'), nearly contemporary of an important jaina work, the Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya (Collection of the Six Darśanas) by Haribhadra Sūri (eighth century CE). The scene is enriched with an anonymous treatise (date unknown), the Sarvamatasaṃgraha (Compendium of All Opinions), with the Siddhān- 1 Abhyankar 1978;Apte et al. 1977;Cowell, Gough [1892, 1894   , and completed with the Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha (Compendium of All the Definitive Conclusions) by a group of scholars (under the patronage of the marāṭha king of Tañjāvūr of Śāhajī, 1685-1711) (Winternitz 1967, 506-8).
As far as the authorship of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha (floruit 1350) is concerned, a great debate is active about the identity of its author: should we consider Mādhava as the same as Vidyāraṇya (born to Māyaṇācārya and Śrīmatīdevī in Pampakṣetra), the brother of Sāyaṇa, or identical with Sāyaṇa, or what else? Should we consider Vidyāraṇya as a different person, and Mādhava and Sāyaṇa as his disciples? The author of the treatise should be identified with Mādhava-Sāyaṇa, or with Bharatītīrtha, or with Cinnambhaṭṭa? (Thakur 1961). Cinnambhaṭṭa (alias Cannibhaṭṭa, Cinnabhaṭṭa, Cennubhaṭṭa), one of the many scholars in the court of Mādhava, raised to the position of royal preceptor, rājapaṇḍita, was a younger contemporary of Mādhava and Sāyaṇa, son of Sarvajñaviṣṇu who was the teacher of both of them, and is considered as the author of a commentary (Prakāśikā) on Keśava Miśra's Tarkabhāṣā (Definition of Reasoning), and of another commentary (Vivaraṇa) on Varadarāja's Tārkikarakṣāsārasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Essence of the Protection of Dialectician).

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(or popularly, vedānta), derives from the root (dhātu) dṛś, 'to see', and it could be usefully compared (from the semantic point of view, not etymologically) with the Greek term θεωρία. Both darśana and θεωρία are linked with roots meaning 'to see', both seem to envisage a sort of objective perspective of the philosophical enquiring, aiming at discerning the essence of truth beyond the veil of the phenomenic level. This notwithstanding, the Sanskrit term darśana is perpetually hangling in the balance between a weak acceptation, -and in this sense it is potentially synonymous with naya (principle, method, procedure), vāda (doctrine), mata (opinion), dṛṣṭi (vision, conception), all of them being potentially used in a disdainful undertone (similar to the Greek δόξα) -, and a strong acceptation, referring properly to the well structured worldview of a philosophical school, be it theistic or not. In this second acceptation, darśana could be considered as almost synonymous with siddhānta (definitive conclusion, ultimate point of view). The architecture of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha is very interesting to enquire, because it says something about the mutual relationships of the different darśanas contained in it from the author's perspective. It works as a sort of planetarium, a model of a solar system for educational purposes. The first darśana presented is the more external or peripheral orbit, and the structure proceeds with more and more internal orbits, till we reach the very core of the system, where the solar orbit is situated, at the the very centre of the structure, its pulsating heart. Let us see briefly but in some detail the structure of the work. The first darśana is named cārvākadarśana (134 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of the system of the materialists, those who deny the authority of the Vedas, the moral mechanism of karman, and the existence of ātman, and consequently the mechanism of rebirth (saṃsāra). They are completely beyond the pale of the Vedas, the more external worldview with respect to smārta tradition. The chapter is a precious doxographical source, because it contains a lot of quotations from lost works of the cārvākas, a school that has severely suffered from a sort of damnatio memoriae, so that most of its basic texts have not been preserved (Bhattacharya 2013). The general trend of the work is to use primary sources, only rarely does it represent a darśana using second-hand material: this fact is more and more evident in the course of time, particularly nowadays when new texts are available for scholars, texts being unknown to the previous generations of scholars that have studied the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha (Nakamura 1968).
The second darśana is named bauddhadarśana (375 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of the system of the followers of the Buddha, Siddhārtha Śakyamuni, those who deny the authority of the Vedas, and at least partially the existence of ātman, but admit someway the moral mechanism of karman, and consequently the mechanism of rebirth (saṃsāra). They are completely beyond the pale of the Vedas, but in a less radical way than the previous darśana. The positions being analyzed within this darśana are in fact four, corresponding to the schools mādhyamika (nichilism), vijñānavādin or yogācāra (subjective idealism), sautrāntika (representationism) and vaibhāṣika (presentationism). It must be noted that in this chapter there is a reference to a jaina doxographical source, the Vivekavilāsa by Jinadatta Sūri.
The third darśana is named ārhatadarśana (438 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of the system of the jaina, the followers of the Jina, Vardhamāna Mahāvīra, those who deny the authority of the Vedas, but admit the moral mechanism of karman, and consequently the mechanism of rebirth (saṃsāra). They are completely beyond the pale of the Vedas, but in a less radical way than the preceeding darśana. In part the chapter reflects Kumārila's arguments against jaina doctrine. The author shows a good familiarity with both well-known and lesser-known jaina sources (Prameyakamalamārtāṇḍa, Āptaniścayālaṅkāra, Paramāgamasāra, Tattvārthasūtra, Svarūpasambodhana, Syādvādamañjarī). It is not at all meaningless the fact that this darśana is put after the bauddhadarśana and before the rāmānujadarśana, so in a position immediately following the tenets of bauddha school(s) and preceding Rāmānuja's doctrine. In fact it is the doctrine of syādvāda, the multilaterality of points of view, that assigns to jaina doctrine this intermediate position. This remark will become possibly more evident infra, when we will refer to the notion of Inclusivism.
The fourth darśana is named rāmānujadarśana (387 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of the system of Rāmānuja, that is the qualified nondualism (viśiṣṭādvaita), the tradition of śrīsampradāya. It should be noted that within the structure of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha this school is situated in a conceptual position far remote from the school of Śaṅkara, not at all contiguous with it, immediately after the jainas that are still beyond the pale of the Vedas. This collocation sounds someway strange, due to the evident contiguity between viśiṣṭādvaita and kevalādvaitavāda within the pale of uttaramīmāṃsā. Perhaps this choice could reflect the attempt at building a block against the more direct rival of the Śaṅkarite kevalādvaitavāda within the vedānta front, a debate field much animated in Indian philosophical controversies (Comans 1989(Comans , 1990Lacombe 1937;Mumme 1992;Sawai 1991;Schmücker 2003;Veezhinathan 2003). Some important doctrinal points of the content of the chapter are a comparative analysis of the hermeneutics of a mahāvākya (great dictum), namely tat tvam asi (thou art that) (Chāndogyopaniṣad [Secret Teaching of the Singer in Metre] 6, 8, 7) 2 from the points of view of the rival schools of Śaṅkara and Rāmanuja; an ex-2 For a controversial interpretation of the passage see Brereton 1986.  Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of the system of Madhva (alias Pūrṇaprajña, alias Ānandatīrtha), that is the dualism (dvaita), the tradition variously known as brahmasampradāya, sadvaiṣṇava, atyantabheda (Ikebe 1997). Here the polemic attitude of the nondualism (advaitavāda) against the dualism (dvaitavāda) is much emphasized, in order to show the internal contradictions of the dvaita system. A lot of sources are employed, some of them being part of the itihāsa, the Sāṃkhyakārikā by Īśvarakṛṣṇa (Gauḍa 1988), the commentary Mahābhāratatātparyanirṇaya by Madhyamandira, the Śākalayasaṃhitā, the Taittirīyopaniṣad, the Agnipurāṇa, the Bhagavadgītā, the Bhāllaveyopaniṣad, the Viṣṇupurāṇa, the Tattvavādarahasya, the Mahopaniṣad, the Nyāyasūtra, the Tārkikarakṣā, the Brahmasūtra, the Garuḍapurāṇa, the Taittirīyabrāhmaṇa, the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, the Kūrmapurāṇa, the Skandapurāṇa, the Bṛhatsaṃhitā, the Ānandatīrthabhāṣyavyākhyāna. A reference is made to the well-known interpretation of the great dictum (mahāvākya) tat tvam asi (thou art that) (Chāndogyopaniṣad 6, 8, 7), that the dvaita school reads as atat tvam asi (thou are not that).
The sixth darśana is named nakulīśapāśupatadarśana (135 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of a śaiva school foreign to the tradition of the āgamas, inspired by the master Nakulīśa (alias Lakulīśa). The form of Śiva being object of veneration is Paśupati, the Lord (pati) of tied cattle (paśu). The main works of this tradition are the Pāśupatasūtra, 168 aphorisms commented by Kauṇḍinya (Pañcārthabhāṣya) and the Gaṇakārikā by Bhāsarvajña (tenth century CE, with comment Ratnaṭīkā) (Hara 2002). The doctrine is very systematic, comprehending inter alia a correlate structure of eight pentads (acquisition, impurity, expedient, locality, perseverance, purification, initiations, powers). The ritual antinomistic behaviour of the devotee in a certain grade of his spiritual career is examined in detail, with accurate references to the primary sources of the school.
The seventh darśana is named śaivadarśana (209 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of a śaiva school belonging to the tradition of the āgamas, a partly dualistic school, diffused mostly in Southern India (but having a strong tie with masters from Kaśmīr, and depending not only on Sanskrit but even on tamil sources), the śaivasiddhānta (definite conclusion of śaiva doctrine) (Torella 1980). Its main categories are the Lord, the bound soul and the bond, pati, paśu and pāśa. The sources of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha for this chapter can be divided into two groups: the first is formed by the āgamas, the second one by a number of individual works with historical or semi-historical authors. In the first group we may mention the Mṛgendrāgama (a minor āgama, upāgama, affiliated to the tradition of the Kāmikāgama), with the commentary thereupon (Mṛgendravṛtti by Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha), the Pauṣkarāgama, the Kiraṇāgama, the Kālottarāgama, the Saurabheyāgama. In the second group we may mention Bhojarāja (Tattvaprakāśa), Bṛhaspati (the mythical founder of the cārvāka system), and above all Sadyojyotiḥ, Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, Rāmakaṇṭha, Aghoraśiva, Somaśambhu: these last names are the most renowned masters of the śaivasiddhānta. It is to be noted that the chapter does not mention the tamil tradition of the school, whose main work is the Śivajñanabodham by Meykaṇḍa.
The eighth darśana is named pratyabhijñādarśana (149 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of a śaiva school belonging to the tradition of the āgamas, the renowned school of the nondualistic Kashmirian Śaivism, founded by Somānanda (Śivadṛṣṭi, ninth century CE) and developed by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, the pratyabhijñā, 'recognition' school. 3 A partially obsolete method of classification of the śaiva schools puts this current within the socalled 'nondualist Kashmirian Śaivism', together with such currents as kula, trika, spanda and krama. This historiographical label has recently been criticized for its supposed generality and imprecision (Sanderson 2007). A number of quotations from the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā, the Mnemonic stanzas of the recognition of the Lord by Utpaladeva, commented upon by the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī, the Examination of the recognition of the Lord by Abhinavagupta are the main source for this chapter. Apart from it we may mention a quotation from the Śāstraparāmarśa by Madhurāja Yogin. The texts quoted are practically the only source for the systems expounded in this chapter and in the previous one.
The ninth darśana is named raseśvaradarśana (135 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of the school of Indian alchemy (Mazars 1977), whose keyword is rasa, a complex term important in Indian aesthetics and music (where it means flavour, taste, the aesthetic feeling or sentiment), but indicating in this specific context mercury, quicksilver, regarded as a sort of quintessence of the human body, as the seminal fluid of the god Śiva, the virile semen and so on. Even here a number of primary sources are quoted, namely the Rasārṇava, the Rasahṛdaya, the Raseśvarasiddhānta, the Parameśvarī by Parameśvara, the Sākārasiddhi, and such authorities as Govindabhagavat, Sarvajñarāmeśvara, Viṣṇusvāmin, Śrīkāntamiśra.
The tenth darśana is named aulūkyadarśana (182 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of the school of Indian atom-istic physics, the vaiśeṣikadarśana, whose semi-mythical founder is the sage (muni) Ulūka (a name meaning 'owl', because according to the hagiographic tradition he had assumed the form of an owl in order to gratify Śiva), better known as Kaṇāda (atom-eater). The chapter contains a synopsis and a résumé of the root text of the school, the Vaiśeṣikasūtra. A specific interest is attributed to epistemology, particularly to the theory of the means of knowledge (pramāṇa); to the six categories (padārtha); to the twenty-four qualities (guṇa); to the process of perception (pratyakṣa); to the theory of numbers (apekṣābuddhi), particularly to the production of 'twoness' and duality (dvitva and dvitvatva); obviously to the atomic theory, with the two main concepts of atom and aggregate of two atoms (aṇu, dvyaṇuka); and finally to the category of non-existence (abhāva). Critics from both the currents of the pūrvamīmāṃsā, prābhākara and bhāṭṭa, from Śrīdharācārya (a commentator upon the Bhagavadgītā), and from the logicians, naiyāyika, are taken into consideration.
The eleventh darśana is named aksapādadarśana (216 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of the school of Indian logic, the nyāyadarśana, whose founder is Gautama, nicknamed Akṣapāda (probably 'having his eyes fixed [in intellectual rapture] on his feet'). The chapter contains a synopsis and a résumé of the root text of the school, the Nyāyasūtra by Gautama, commented for the first time by Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana (Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya). There is also a reference to the Nyāyakusumañjali by Udayana; and a quotation from Śvetāśvataropaniṣad (The Secret Teaching of Śvetāśvatara) 3, 2 (Abhyankar 1978) towards the end of the chapter. The section treats particularly of epistemological and logical categories such as the fourfold means of knowledge (pramāṇa): perception, inference, analogy, verbal testimony (pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, śabda); the doubt (saṃśaya); the definite conclusion (siddhānta); the hypothetical reasoning (tarka); the ascertainment (nirṇaya); the fallacy (hetvābhāsa); the futility ( jāti); but even ethic categories such as fault (doṣa) and the concept of self (ātman). A doxographical juxtaposition of naiyāyika doctrine with bauddha (sautrāntika and yogācāra) positions on point of detail is attempted; the same happens with cārvāka and sāṃkhya points of view. The theistic position of nyāya is debated, particularly with reference to the proofs in order to claim the existence of God. These proofs are defended, and possible defects in them are refuted, such as their hypothetical status as unproved, contradictory, too general, precluded, counterbalanced (asiddha, viruddha, anaikānta, bādhita, satpratipakṣita).
The twelfth darśana is named jaiminidarśana (291 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of the school of Indian ritual exegesis, the pūrvamīmāṃsā (breviter mīmāṃsā), whose founder is Jaimini, the author of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra (Aphorisms about Exegesis), a complex and deeply structured text containing 2745 aphorisms (sūtra). The key term of this section is obviously dharma, to be intended in all its main acceptations, such as duty, law, rule, norm and so on. Other significant key terms in this section are focussed on the link existing between the ritual act and its remote effect, expressed by such concepts as the semantic sphere of 'unseen' (apūrva); the distinctions of the sections of a text concerning ritual practice in different parts, such as 'injunction' (vidhi), 'explanatory passage' (arthavāda), 'formula' (mantra) and so on. After a detailed synopsis of the root text of the school taken into consideration, the author starts from the very beginning of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra (1, 1, 1), having as its object the intense desire to know duty (dharmajijñāsā), that must be examined through a fivefold hermeneutical path, including subject, doubt, prima facie argument, definite conclusion and connection (viṣaya, saṃśaya, pūrvapakṣa, siddhānta, saṅgati). The sources used comprehend, apart from the teachings of the very same pūrvamīmāṃsā school and of its two main currents, prābhākara and bhāṭṭa, the Manusmṛti, the Ṛgvedasaṃhitā, the Aṣṭādhyāyī by Pāṇini, the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa by Bhāsarvajña, the Nyāyakusumañjali by Udayana. A number of counterarguments from sāṃkhya and nyāya are taken into consideration and discussed. The particular position of the pūrvamīmāṃsā in the field of language philosophy is referred to, clearly distinguishing the two opposite positions inside the school about the mechanism of primary signification (abhidhā), namely the abhihitānvayavāda, or theory of the construction of the uttered (relating the meanings of words in a sentence after they are uttered, hold by the bhāṭṭa current), and the anvitābhidhānavāda, or theory of the expression of the construed (according to which the words convey their own meanings as well as the construed meaning of the sentence, hold by the prābhākara current). This section is very important, due to the strict and everlasting bound connecting the two mīmāṃsās, the first (pūrva) and the second one (uttara), both of them being interested in the preservation of the Vedic lore, the pūrvamīmāṃsā from the ritual point of view (karmakāṇḍa), the uttaramīmāṃsā from the point of view related to knowledge ( jñānakāṇḍa). In this perspective the two mīmāṃsās are perhaps to be considered more as mutually synergistic schools, rather than as openly rival schools (Bronkhorst 2007;Halbfass 1983).
The thirteenth darśana is named pāṇinidarśana (284 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of the school of Indian traditional grammar, the vyākaraṇa, whose founder (or at least the more ancient author whose work has arrived to us) is Dākṣīputra Pāṇini, the author of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, Eight Day Grammar (eight sections, each one of them divided in four 'feet', pāda, for a total sum of almost 4.000 aphorisms, sūtra), glossed by Kātyāyana (vārttika) and commented upon by Patañjali (bhāṣya). The term vyākaraṇa covers both the semantic spheres of grammar (and more generally of linguistics) and of philosophy of language, and it may etymologically be explained alternatively as 'formation of words' or as 'analysis', in the sense of 'separation, distinction' of words into their constituent parts (such as root, prefix, suffix, and so on) (Thieme 1935;Palsule 1961). In this section too, as in some of the previous ones, the author takes into consideration the incipit of the root text of the school under examination, Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī. In fact, the most celebrated example of the incipit (śāstrārambha, 'beginning of a treatise') of Sanskrit literature is the śāstrārambha of two works both attributed to Patañjali (and it is even deemed a sort of stylistic fingerprint of the author by those who consider these two authors being one and the same Patañjali, not two homonymous authors): the Yogasūtra begins with "atha yogānuśāsanam" (and now the teaching of yoga), and the Great Comment (Mahābhāṣya) to Pāṇini's Eight Day Grammar (Aṣṭādhyāyī) begins with "atha śabdānuśāsanam" (and now the teaching of word) (see Slaje 2008). In this case atha works as a sort of illocutionary act, being able to begin a teaching and to validate its content (Austin 1962). The author of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha then discusses the distinction between Vedic words and common language words (vaidika, laukika), in this following the "Introduction" to Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya, namely the Paspaśā. In fact, the Paspaśā is strictly followed in this section of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, and a famous Vedic passage quoted herein is discussed (Ṛgvedasaṃhitā 4, 58, 3 tic school founded upon the dialectics between the two main principles of reality (tattva), the male inactive and conscious principle (puruṣa), and the female active and unconscious principle (prakṛti). The root text of the school is the Sāṃkhyakārikā by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, commented upon by Gauḍapāda (bhāṣya) and by Vācaspati Miśra (Tattvakaumudī). The Sāṃkhyasūtra by Kapila, commented upon by Aniruddha (fifteenth-sixteenth century CE, Aniruddhavṛtti) and by Vijñānabhikṣu (sixteenth century CE, Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya), is a late artificial work, entirely different from the 'real' sūtras being at the root of other schools. In fact the Sāṃkhyakārikā (main passages quoted being 3-4, 9, 21-2, 24-7, 57, 59) is the main source for this chapter of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha; even the Tattvakaumudī by Vācaspati Miśra is used as a doxographical source. Two other important sources used by Mādhava are the Bhagavadgītā (The Song of the Supreme, 2, 16), and the Śvetāśvataropaniṣad (4, 5). The two famous metaphors of the system, the lame and the blind, and the actress on the stage (respectively Sāṃkhyakārikā [Aphorisms about the School of Enumeration] 21, 59), are reserved for the conclusion of the chapter. Evidently for the author of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, as for ourselves today, the literary sensitivity and a sort of theatrical attitude were an important feature of the sāṃkhya school.
The sixteenth darśana is named śāṃkaradarśana (918 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of the school of the absolute  (source Bhāmatī;. Then the subject matter of the Brahmasūtra is expounded (lines 64-83). Then the exegesis of the term brahmajijñāsā (Brahmasūtra 1, 1, 1) is expounded (source Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2, 4, 5; lines 84-9). The impossibility to doubt that the desire to know the ātman is impossible is the next theme (lines 90-114). The next theme regards the impossibility of desire to know the self (lines 115-26). Then follows the expounding of absence of contradiction between the true experience of self and the world of daily experience (different opinions of Prabhākara Miśra and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa are compared; lines 127-37). Then follows the syllogistic proof that brahman cannot be the object of study (lines 138-47). The syllogism according to which ātman and non-ātman cannot be not different is expounded (lines 148-57). Then follows the uttarapakṣa about the possibility of beginning of brahmajijñāsā (lines 158-63). Then are expounded examples of the six characteristics (upakrama and upasaṃhāra together, abhyāsa, apūrvatā, phala, arthavāda, upapatti) of definite knowledge in a text (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6, 2, 1; 6, 8, 6; lines 164-71). Then follows the superimposition of the objectiveness of self on the ego-experience according to vaiśeṣika point of view (lines 172-85). Then follows the use of the metaphorical expression 'Rāhu's head' to illustrate the real meaning of verbal cognitions such as 'my body' (source Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 1, 1, 4; lines 186-94). Then follows the proof of superimposition of ātman, and the refutation of difference (sources Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 1, 1, 1; Bhāmatī; lines 195-205). Then the refutation of the jaina point of view about jīva is expounded (lines 206-19). Then follows the refutation of the proposition of yogācāra according to which vijñāna is ātman (here a certain degree of doxographical distorsion is actually present; lines 220-36). Then a doubt about the status of ātman is examined (sources Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6, 8, 6; Brahmasūtra 1, 1, 2; lines 237-53). Then the proposition according to which āgama is the means to ascertain brahman is illustrated (source Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2, 4, 1; lines 254-66). Then follows the proposition according to which brahman cannot be the subject matter of authoritative teaching (lines 267-70). Then it is expounded a pūrvapakṣa according to which Veda cannot be a pramāṇa for obtaining definite knowledge (source Ślokavārttika, Autpattikasūtra, śabdapariccheda 4; lines 271-92). Then it is expounded an uttarapakṣa according to which meaning of words comes from es- cience through self-knowledge (parable of the prince) (sources Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6,8,7;Āpastambadharmasūtra 1,8,22,2;. Then it is expounded the conclusion of the first sūtra from the Brahmasūtra, and its connection with the rest of the work in the following sūtras (source Brahmasūtra 1, 1, 1; lines 898-902). Finally, the other sūtras of the portion of the Brahmasūtra known as catuḥsūtrī are dealt with, and the concepts of svarūpalakṣaṇa and taṭasthalakṣaṇa; this part ends with some concluding remarks (source Brahmasūtra 1, 1, 2-4; lines 903-18).

Hermeneutical Remarks in Relation to Both Western and Indian Theories
After the analysis of the content and nature of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, along with a short review of its main doxographical sources, a pair of observations are now necessary. First, it is to be noted that no relevant mention is made in the treatise of any śākta school (apart from a brief refutation of śākta tenets in the last chapter, lines 781-92), and this is something strange, not easily to be accounted for. It is unlikely that no theoretical position from the śākta point of view could be present in the mind of the author of the treatise. The possibility that śākta position could have been considered by him as almost contiguous with kevalādvaitavāda is strenghtened by the traditional attribution to Śaṅkara himself of such śākta works as the Saundaryalaharī. But it is obviously an argumentum e silentio, and it cannot resolve the problem definitively. The same kind of argumentum e silentio could be invoked for a possible solution to the problem of the contested authorship of the Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa ascribed to Śaṅkara; even this text is not alluded to in the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha. Second, even in absence of an overall study about the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, it is possible to conclude that its author uses frequently selected primary sources for the exposition of a single darśana, and that doxographical voluntary misrepresentation of rival schools is generally limited in the treatise. So we can confidently subscribe the conclusion by Nakamura about the third chapter of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, according to which sources employed in it are generally «authoritative and reliable» (Nakamura 1968, 514), and extend it to the entire work. A possible hermeneutic tool for the theoretical interpretation of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha could be the application to the doxographical method of this text of the category of Inclusivism (German Inklusivismus), introduced by Paul Hacker (1983) and discussed by Wilhelm Halbfass (1990aHalbfass ( , 1990b. In this perspective, Indian doxography could be hypothetically read as a good example of Inclusivism, that is of the peculiar Indian attitude to divide the subject matter into Apart from two wide-ranging works by David Smith (2003) and Jonardon Ganeri (2011), a useful trend of research has been carried out by more sectorial works (Black, Patton 2015;Fisher 2017;Galewicz 2010;Mills 2018).
Within the hermeneutic perspective supported by Paul Hacker (1983) and Wilhelm Halbfass (1990aHalbfass ( , 1990b, Inclusivism as described above stands in strong contrast with its opposite ideological position, namely Exclusivism, this last being a typical attitude for Middle East originary monotheisms (Hebraism, Christianity and Islam). Within this theological environment, Exclusivism means the fully aware will to exclude every possible alternative choice to one's own position, claiming that one's own concept of God is an absolute truth, irrespective of any serious confrontation with other possible options. Within Indian intellectual tradition this kind of trend is simply unconceivable, due to the importance of the vital need for each and every school to consider the opponents' positions, first of all in order to better confute them. This attitude is raised up to a hermeneutic and epistemological system within the horizon of jaina doctrine, with the concept of anekāntavāda, the doctrine according to which all phenomena and ideas are relatively manifold (Bhattacharya 2013;Mookerjee 1944). No proposition can be affirmed absolutely, all affirmations are at the same time true (and false, as says vedantic critique to this conception) under different conditions. So the nature of reality can be approached only through several steps: no single unilateral definition is adequate to describe things as they are, in their effective manifoldness and complexity.
According to jaina point of view, 6 due to the fact that qualities are innumerable and their modalities are infinite, because they encom-6 For a far deeper and more extensive treatment of jaina doctrine see Long (forthcoming). pass both beginningless past and endless future, for the common people, not endowed with omniscience, it is not possible to perceive the existing (sat) in its entirety: in every single moment it will be possible only to perceive either the uniqueness (ekatva) of substance, or alternatively the transient multiplicity (anekatva) of its modalities. Complexity of what is existing, 'being' (sat), a reality simultaneously unique and multiple, is the very core of the doctrine of multiplicity of points of view, anekāntavāda, the only model being able to cope with the complexity of reality according to jaina epistemology. Change (pariṇāma) is continuous, and in epistemology this means that it is impossible (rectius: useless) to express judgments apart from the irrevocable multiplicity of points of view: anekāntavāda will become the pivot of jaina philosophy. The continuous change in which substances are immersed determines the doctrine of multiplicity of points of view (syādvāda, anekāntavāda), a position resulting in a 'doctrine of modes of considering' (nayavāda), having as its main rule the 'sevenfold method' (saptabhaṅginaya), a sum of possible statements about a given argument, starting from specific points of view, being defined by four specific peculiar factors: substance (svadravya), occurrence (svakṣetra), time (svakāla), and condition (svabhāva). The seven 'modes of considering' are: 1) 'current mode' (naigamanaya), considering the object regardless of generic and specific qualities; 2) 'synthetic mode' (saṃgrahanaya), putting in evidence generic features to the detriment of specific ones; 3) 'empiric mode' (vyavahāranaya), putting in evidence specific features to the detriment of generic ones; 4) 'straight mode' (ṛjusūtranaya), considering only the actual present aspect of its object; 5) 'verbal mode' (śabdanaya), considering the conventional meaning of words regardless of etymology; 6) 'advanced mode' (samabhirūḍhanaya), considering words according to etymology; 7) 'basic mode' (evambhūtanaya), considering the object as possessing or not possessing the qualities attributable to it according to etymology, that is, according to the relation of etymology with effective reality. Truth about a specific object can originate only from the comparison of these seven points of view, and only jaina doctrine can reach this goal, because each and every different speculation is overly unilateral. For example, vedānta overestimates naya 2 to the detriment of the other ones; cārvāka point of view overestimates naya 3; Buddhist position oeverestimates naya 4 and so on. The favorite formulation of anekāntavāda is named 'doctrine of the may be' (syādvāda), and it too involves seven points, applicable to any possible object of research whatsoever. The term syāt 'it may be', means more properly 'from a particular point of view', and the indeclinable particle eva has a limitative value, meaning 'only', excluding all unspecific conditions of the situation under exam. According to this formulation, about the object under exam it is legitimate to say that: it is (syād asti eva); 2) it is not (syād nāsti eva); 3) both it is and it is not

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(syād asti nāsti ca eva); with reference to different observers, or in different times; 4) it is undetermined (syād avaktavyam eva); with reference to the impossibility to see in it opposite qualities in one and the same moment; 5) it is and it is undetermined (syād asti avaktavyaṃ ca eva); 6) it is not and it is undetermined (syād nāsti avaktavyaṃ ca eva); 7) it is, it is not and it is undetermined (syād asti nāsti ca avaktavyaṃ ca eva. For example, a certain piece of food may be available for subject A (1), but not for B (2), either it may be available or not for A or for B, or alternatively it may be available only for A in the course of time (3), it may be perceived as hot for A but not for B, or alternatively as hot for A in a moment and not hot in a subsequent moment, so resulting as undetermined (4), it may be available for A and undetermined (5), it may be not available for A and undetermined (6), and lastly, it may be available or not available, and undetermined for different subjects and under different circumstances (7). The continuous flux of becoming is channeled into a jail of judgments that try to preserve its fluidity: this is the only chance to offer an adequate description of a complex reality, opposing both perils: the declared impossibility of judgment, and the unilaterality of judgment. These two extremes must be avoided for jaina logic, insofar as they generate three wrong points of view, respectively illusionism (māyāvāda), determinism (niyativāda) and nihilism (ucchedavāda). According to jaina doctrine, the multiplicity or multilaterality of points of view allows for a coordinated method (samuccaya), a method capable of coordinating different methods, being able to find a single path towards liberation (mokṣamārga), mainly based upon intuition (darśana), critical knowledge ( jñāna), and behaviour (cāritra) (Bhattacharya 2013;Van den Bossche 1995). From a hermeneutical perspective, it is possible that the incentive to cope with logic may have infiltrated Jainism, surely from the above-mentioned syādvāda and anekāntavāda methods, but even from the continuous attribution of authority and prestige to the Veda being maintained by the followers of the brahmanical school of the first exegesis (pūrvamīmāṃsā). Along this apologetical and polemical line we may collocate such works as the Āptamīmāṃsā by Samantabhadra (fifth century CE). A great focus about the problem of how to confer authority to a source, this work is the basis of a vast commentarial work, always rich in controversy, including such works as the Aṣṭaśatī by Akalaṅka (eighth century CE) and the Aṣṭasahasrī by Vidyānanda (ninth century CE).
A method resembling anekāntavāda in the scope of its feasibility, but starting from very different theoretical premises, is the socalled tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi) ascribable to Nāgārjuna (secondo-third century CE). This dialectic method applies the fourfold negation to a thesis A in four steps (negating A, negating not-A, negating both A and not-A, negating neither A nor not-A), mainly applicable to be- ing (sat), as negating being, negating not-being, negating both being and not-being, negating neither being nor not-being. As such, this method denies each and every possible ontological presumption. It is the main dialectical tool of the mādhyamika school, able to dismantle any conceptual building with meticulous and ruthless elegance (Chakrabarti 1980;Ruegg 1977;Westerhoff 2006). Within Nāgārjuna's thought, the tetralemma is functional to the doctrine of voidness (śūnyatā), but in a different context it will be considered as a neutral dialectical tool. As such it will be used within an entirely different hermeneutical perspective, without involving its extreme consequences proper to its Buddhist context, and it will be considered fitting within Vedantic apologetics, in such works as the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya by Śrīharṣa (twelfth century CE) and the Tattvapradīpikā aka Citsukhī by Citsukha (thirteenth century CE).
Should we adopt, methodologically and provisionally, the point of view of nyāyadarśana about the core of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, that is the way in which the different darśanas are expounded, we could affirm that the author of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha adopts a style of debate in the use of its arguments, while exposing perspectives different from his own, that we may identify in naiyāyika terms as vāda, a term meaning first of all 'speech, discourse, talk, utterance, statement' and more specifically 'thesis, proposition, argument, doctrine', if the exposition of an argument is concerned; and 'discussion, controversy, dispute, contest' (but even 'demonstrated conclusion, result'), if the discussion of the argument within a formal environment is concerned.
The founding text of nyāya school, its root (mūla) teaching, is the Nyāyasūtra, ascribed to Gautama Akṣapāda (200 CE?), a collection of aphorisms that characterizes a philosophical system already well-structured, claiming to be a vādaśāstra, an ideal normative system dealing with the philosophical debate, with all its variants, starting with the ideal debate (vāda), the philosophical discussion perfectly regulated in every minute detail. This method of discussion is not a monopoly of the logicians of the nyāyadarśana. We may find substantial traces of vādaśāstra in the works of Buddhist logicians such as Maitreya, Asaṅga, Dignāga, and principles of scientific methodology of philosophical debate (tantrayukti), including norms for dialectics and eristic, both in the Arthaśāstra and in the Carakasaṃhitā. The main distinction at work distinguishes above all the means for valid knowledge (pramāṇa), and the objects of valid knowledge (prameya), that is to say, mainly the individual conscious principle, the self (ātman). The pramāṇas constitute the main interest for nyāya and are considered as mere tools, means to the end consisting in the correct knowledge of the prameya. The pramāṇas accepted by Akṣapāda are four: direct sensory perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), analogy (upamāna) and authoritative verbal testimony (śabda). parts are led by the aim to defeat the opponent, not of ascertaining a part of truth being possibly common to both of them. The arguments used are, in full consciousness of the debaters, possibly counterfactual and insincere. The trophy of the dialectic competition is the only real goal of this style of discussion, irrespective of any judgement about effective truth. The quibble (vitaṇḍā) is at play when, within a discussion, the goal is not to support a thesis (like was still the case in the eristic), but exclusively to defeat the opponent's point of view, using a merely destructive method. The method of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, using wherever possible original sources for the schools under examination, and limiting at the most the doxographical distortion of their doctrine, allows us to suppose that the type of debate that its author had in mind was a sincere debate (vāda), not eristic ( jalpa) and least of all a quibble (vitaṇḍā).

Conclusions
We have, inter alia, referred to two possible comparisons of Vedantic hermeneutical and doxographical tools from jaina and bauddha contexts, namely anekāntavāda and catuṣkoṭi, and to the methodological tools common to nyāya and scientific treatises (tantrayukti), these being partially shared by Vedantic exegesis. More than this, it is to be noted that the very same possibility of a multilateral point of view in the interpretation of other people's positions is not at all an exclusive privilege of jaina epistemology (with its doctrine of syādvāda and anekāntavāda, alluded to above) within India's intellectual history. Indeed, it has been explicitly considered within smārta sphere by Bhartṛhari (fifth century CE, in such passages such as Vākyapadīya 2, 489), and it has been proposed to call this theoretical position Perspectivism (Houben [1997] 2007; see also Passi 2000), the point of view according to which the validity of different perspectives is accepted, and eventually one's own intellectual position emerges as the result of a sort of integration with the contrasting views of one's own opponents. Seen in the light of this additional hermeneutic model originating from smārta environment, in fact the more coherent interpretation of the doxographic methodology of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha could result in considering it as inspired by the dialectical method of the succession of the three classical positions presented in the large majority of Indian philosophical treatises. Within this perspective, arguments are presented according to a conceptual stratigraphy, considering in the first position the exposition of an argument by a disciple (śiṣya, etymologically 'the one that must be instructed'), so a preliminary exposition. In the second position there is the argument expounded by a subject being nearly a master, but still not in the role of a real master (ācāryadeśīya, 'al- 268 most a master'), so an intermediate position, being radically unilateral (ekadeśin). The final position is expounded as the definite conclusion of a master (ācārya, 'authoritative master'), so it is the definite position of the school with regard to the debated argument. This hierarchical sequence takes the name of 'preliminar point of view' (pūrvapakṣa), 'further point of view' (uttarapakṣa) and 'definite conclusion' (siddhānta) (Tubb, Boose 2007, 239-42). Due to the fact that 1) our treatise uses a lot of original sources for the points of view under examination, and that 2) a doxographical distorsion of opponents' points of view for dialectical goals is reasonably limited, and in many cases a simple hypothesis sub iudice, the natural conclusion is that 3) the triadic dialectical model starting with pūrvapakṣa, going on with uttarapakṣa and concluding with siddhānta, is probably still the best and most appropriate way to consider the doxographical method of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha. This kind of interpretation offers the methodological convenience that it uses an 'emic' rather than an 'etic' point of view (Pike 1967;Swadesh 1934). The glasses we wear above our nose can sometimes heavily influence our vision of the world outside us, and to use Indian lenses in order to enquire into Indian world is perhaps still the best thing to do, at least under certain conditions.