Studii și Articole

The origins of postmodernism

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Abstract: *Postmodernism is the popular trend which is the key to success in philosophy, art and ethics nowadays. In order to present a philosophical legitimacy, postmodernist thinkers claim that they identify the philosophical origins of postmodernism in the thinking of Friedrich Nietzsche and of Martin Heidegger. This study aims at proving that this claim is unsubstantiated and that postmodernism is actually an imposture. Therefore, we call it the philosophy of making fun and making fun of philosophy.*

Keywords: *postmodernism, trend, success, morals, imposture.*

The overwhelming majority or the quasi-unanimity of researchers of the phenomenon, and postmodernists themselves consider that postmodernism represents the exhaustion and, at the same time the overtaking of modernism. One of the renowned representatives of postmodernism, Gianni Vattimo shows that, as “*modernity can indeed be characterised as being dominated by the idea of the history of thinking as a progressive «illumination»*”¹,

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¹ Gianni Vattimo, *Sfârșitul modernității (The End of Modernity)*, Constanța: Pontica Publishing House, 1993, p. 6

and “*the history of ideas has led ... to the emptying of the very notion of progress*”², “*at present we already live in post-histoire, that is in another time than the modern one, Arnold Gehlen argued*”³. In reference to the idea of postmodernism as exhaustion of modernity, Horia-Roman Patapievicci claims that the very idea of coming out of modernity is a misunderstanding of modernity, because “*modernity cannot be surpassed: it is the inevitable form of expression of all manifestations that admit a temporality ...*”⁴. In other words, in history one cannot go out of modernity, because one cannot go out of time. The pretence of exhaustion, closure of modernity, surpassing or going out of it, according to Patapievicci, cannot be endorsed. Since in the historical condition, in this world we cannot go out of time, any denial of modernity becomes its affirmation and the insistence upon it underlines it: “*the one who hopes to get out of modernity through postmodernity does nothing more than go deeper in it*”⁵. Hence, according to Horia-Roman Patapievicci, postmodernism is part of modernity and is nothing but another face, attempt or dimension of it: “*Postmodernism is just a radicalisation of modernity*”⁶. If postmodernity is part of modernity, Patapievicci describes it as being “*the way in which we, recent people ... feel modernity: a modernity reaching that stage of universalisation of its principle, because its forms of manifestation are no longer stemmed by the memory of any tradition*”⁷.

² *Ibid.*, p. 11.

³ See *Ibid.*

⁴ Horia-Roman Patapievicci, *Omul recent (The Recent Man)*, Bucharest: Humanitas Publishing House, 2001, p. 115.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

⁶ See also Yirmiahu Yovel, *Hegel, Nietzsche și evreii (Hegel, Nietzsche and the Jews)*, Bucharest: Humanitas Publishing House, 2000, p. 331: “*the postmodernist trend means only a pluralist correction in modernism*”.

⁷ Horia-Roman Patapievicci, *Omul recent (The Recent man)*, in quoted edition, p. 116.

Postmodernism would be part of modernism, but a diseased or alienated part of it, “*a post-traumatic phenomenon*” in which “*the modern is driven to despair by its own modernity*”⁸. We consider the idea that postmodernism is the post-traumatic, alienated or diseased modernity a well-argued idea, whether we consider postmodernism part of modernity or way out of it. What we find odd is the fact that Horia-Roman Patapieviçi considers that “*postmodernism ... represents the answer given against the desacralised world and against the triumphant science by the man whose religion was confiscated by history ...*”⁹. Analysing the content and the ideas of postmodernism, it seems to us that, far from being a protest against de-sacralisation, postmodernism is itself de-sacralisation. We will see that everything it affirms about the sacred is nothing but impropriety, denaturation, falsification and destruction of the sacred.

Horia-Roman Patapieviçi calls into question the well-established definition and understanding of postmodernism. He rests upon the idea that there is no way out of modernism, as it is not possible. He means that *tertium non datur*: either modernism or nothing! According to him, there is no post-modernism because there is no way out of time, out of history and out of life, except as death. We find his affirmation similar to André Malraux’s famous sentence, like a bet: “*The 21st century will be mystical or it will not be at all!*”. The meaning of the idea of Patapieviçi is the same: “*After modernism, either modernism or nothing!*”. However, we can see that Malraux was wrong: the 21st century is not mystical at all, and it still exists! On earth humanity still exists, there is still life, history, health and illness, faith and faithlessness, life and death, sense and nonsense. History, the being and humanity have not become mystical or nonbeing: *tertium datur*! Likewise, Horia-

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

⁹ *Ibid.*

Roman Patapievici is wrong, because although there is no way out of the being from the being, of mankind out of humanity, of time out of time and of history out of history, there is still a way out of modernity. Postmodernism is not one of the facets of modernity, nor is it a paint coat over modernity, but quite another reality. One cannot ignore the assertions of postmodernists themselves, or of the quasi-unanimity of researchers, who stated unquestionably the ideas and the specificity of postmodernism as being exactly the opposite of modernity. Postmodernism is neither “*a look in the mirror*”, nor a commentary upon modernity, but the contrary, the denial and the annihilation of modernity. The way out of modernity is not automatically a fall into death and nonbeing. Just like Malraux, Patapievici thinks that “*it cannot be worse!*”. However, we see that it can be worse! Postmodernism shows the exhaustion of modernity, a fall from being, truth, life and certainty, which does not automatically mean death and nonbeing. For this fall and distress is not sudden, but gradual: it is a progressive decay, insanity and death, in a multitude of stages and nuances. Postmodernism appears to be the announced death, which is slowly savoured or “*frying on low heat*”. The name of the man is the one that he says and that the people acknowledge: postmodernism is what postmodernists affirm and what everybody acknowledges, not what an individual says invertedly, against everybody else.

But in order to understand postmodernism it is imperative **to mention the origin, that is, the roots**. Ascertaining that it is refused, that it is not acknowledged a place in the history of thinking and of philosophy, that it is considered fraud and distorted thinking, postmodernism sought legitimation by claiming to issue from an acknowledged philosophy. In this sense, G. Vattimo affirms that postmodernism derives from nihilism, even from F. Nietzsche and M. Heidegger and that it would be the accomplishment of the thinking of these two. He admits expressly that the aim of relating to the two great

philosophers is to obtain legitimacy: “only by relating to the Nietzschean question of the eternal recurrence and to the Heideggerian question of overcoming metaphysics, can the theories of postmodernism ... acquire philosophical rigour and dignity”¹⁰. He sees the connection between the two German philosophers and postmodernism in general in that “Nietzsche and Heidegger attempted to construct it as concerns the heritage of European thinking, putting it forward radically, nevertheless, refusing themselves to suggest a critical «overcoming» of it”¹¹. Examining the issue closely, as concerns F. Nietzsche, postmodernism claims drawing from him, through the common affirmation of “God’s death” through “a devaluation of supreme values” (despite the fact that Nietzsche does not say “devaluation” - “Verwertung”, but “re-evaluation”- “Umwertung”!) and through the fact that the God that postmodernism rejects, “the violent God ... is, in this perspective, the God of metaphysics ... ipsum esse subsistens”¹². As concerns relating to M. Heidegger, postmodernists consider they can claim drawing from him through “the reduction of the being to exchange-value”, through the idea “the Ereignis of the being that flashes through the imposing structure of the Heideggerian Gestell is the very proclamation of an epoch of «lessening» of the being, in which «the appropriation» of entities is explicitated as transappropriation”¹³ and through the fact that “Heidegger ... is the one who refers to the necessity of leaving aside the being as

¹⁰ Gianni Vattimo, *Sfârșitul modernității (The End of Modernity)*, in quoted edition, p. 5.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹² Gianni Vattimo, *A crede că mai credem (To Believe We Still Believe)*, Constanța: Pontica Publishing House, 2005, p. 28.

¹³ Idem, *Sfârșitul modernității (The End of Modernity)*, in quoted edition, p. 30.

*foundation in order to «leap» into its «abyss»*¹⁴. The postmodernist G. Vattimo wants to make this connection credible through the declared claim that “*I understand Heidegger better than he understands himself!*”¹⁵. It is obvious that here he imitates M. Heidegger, who said that “*we must understand the Greek better than they understood themselves*”. But “*quod licet Jovi, non licet bovi!*” M. Heidegger has conquered a place in the citadel of philosophy and of thinking which is acknowledged by all the thinkers and philosophers, whereas G. Vattimo is a pathetic reproduction, acknowledged by a few in the citadel of philosophy who are full of velleity. The relation between M. Heidegger and G. Vattimo seems to be the following: if Sartre is a caricature of M. Heidegger, then G. Vattimo is a caricature of J. P. Sartre. But he persists in the idea of descending from the great German philosophers and declares serenely that through “*the notion of foundation and thinking ... radically put forward by Nietzsche and Heidegger ... in this they can rightfully consider themselves philosophers of postmodernity*”¹⁶.

If we have in mind the relation of F. Nietzsche and M. Heidegger to metaphysics and modernity, we consider that we must admit in their case, from the start, the idea of overcoming metaphysics. Only that this overcoming is not at all postmodern. As for F. Nietzsche, “*the dying God*” is in his case only the western, rationalist and philosophical God, not any God, and overcoming modernity does not mean annihilating any truth, foundation and certainty (as postmodernism wishes), but the revaluation (“*Umwertung*”), even as self-overcoming (“*Selbstüberwindung*”). And the criticism of metaphysics and its

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹⁵ René Girard, Gianni Vattimo, *Adevăr sau credință slabă (Truth or Weak Faith)*, Bucharest: Curtea Veche Publishing House, 2009, p. 91.

¹⁶ Gianni Vattimo, *Sfârșitul modernității (The End of Modernity)*, in quoted edition, p. 6.

overcoming in the case of Heidegger does not mean annihilating any Divinity and thinking, but the denial of the ontological God and the affirmation of the “*divine God*” (“*der göttliche Gott*”). Invoking M. Heidegger as precursor of modernism on account that he showed man’s alienation through technology is completely improper and truthless, as postmodernism indulges itself in the very denial of certainty and in alienation. Postmodernism can find roots in nihilism, but not in M. Heidegger, who was not a nihilist.

The origins of postmodernism are not to be found in Nietzsche and Heidegger, but in **the crisis of Western theology, philosophy, culture and society** in general, and in the distorted Christian ontology or theology in particular. The honest and rigorous researcher must acknowledge the accuracy of postmodernist observations regarding the Western crisis as crisis of modernity. Postmodernist observations are simple and incontestable, within everyone’s reach. Modernity has reached a crisis through “*the dissolution of authoritative political institutions; the dissolution of faith in the subjective conscience as ultimate foundation; the dissolution of any concept of reality, through multiplication and conflict between different ways of interpretation*”¹⁷. Starting from the acknowledgement according to which “*Western culture in general and Judeo-Christian tradition in particular had entered a profound «ideological crisis»*”¹⁸, some can draw the conclusion or can come to the idea that “*it no longer seems possible to regard history as something unilinear*”¹⁹.

Actually, postmodernism considers that the Western crisis has two causes: technology and the Christian faith. According to

¹⁷ René Girard, Gianni Vattimo, *Adevăr sau credință slabă (Truth or weak faith)*, in quoted edition, p. 101.

¹⁸ John Caputo, Gianni Vattimo, *După moartea lui Dumnezeu (After God's Death)*, Bucharest: Curtea Veche Publishing House, 2008, p. 10.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

it, “*the crisis of humanism is certainly related ... to the growth of the technical world*”²⁰, because, “*representing the accomplishment of metaphysics, it calls humanism to an overcoming, to a Verwindung ... (so that) man can make his farewell from his own subjectivity, understood as immortality of the soul and admit, instead, that the ego is rather a bunch of many mortal souls*”²¹. The fact that the progress of technology has led to alienation and that it is a threat to humanism was exceptionally signalled by M. Heidegger and has become something obvious for every researcher. But the idea that technology necessarily leads to alienation and anti-humanism, that it is, in itself, alienating and anti-human, is a pre-judgment. The thinker must see that technology cannot be irrational, since it is nothing but the development of reason. It cannot be “*reason against reason*”. Technology becomes irrational not because it is in itself irrational, but because reason is used irrationally. Reason is not irrational, but it can be used irrationally. Experience shows us that any technology is ambiguous, ambivalent or two-edged, just like the knife: human or antihuman. It is not good or bad in itself, but because of how it is directed. The human will establishes the sense, the direction and the quality, the humanism or the anti-humanism of technology. Just as it is not at all necessary to be used as a weapon, but it is possible for nuclear energy to be used forever only in a peaceful way, in the same way, it is possible for technology to live together with humanism. Technology in itself is not to blame for the alteration of humanism; it can be the occasion, but not the cause of man’s denaturation. To reckon that technical progress is responsible for alienation, irrationality and antihumanism is the same as

²⁰ Gianni Vattimo, *Sfârșitul modernității (The End of Modernity)*, in quoted edition, p. 37.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

considering that reason is irrational or that it would perish in the irrational. There is nothing more absurd than this.

In the same way, **a second cause** of postmodernism is considered to **be the crisis of faith in general and of Christianity in particular**. Postmodernists start from the acknowledgement that in the West Christianity is present as “*a faith weary of life, shocked and horrified by its own failure and by its own moral incapacity*”²², so that they conclude that “*the ideal of Western civilisation ... ends up turning against itself ... (and) Christendom proves to be «nothing more than a stage in the history of Christianity, representing just one of the many possible relations between Church and society»*”²³. Against these postmodernist assertions, the Christian theologian must have the minimum honesty and admit the authenticity of the proofs or what is evident. The symptoms and the pathology of Western Christianity are proved, but postmodernist conclusions are not. Because the crisis of Western Christianity does not automatically mean that this “*ends up turning against itself*”. Any organism can become ill, but the illness can never be confounded with the body itself and it does not prove that the body turned against itself. However serious, the illness is inappropriate to the body and many times it can eliminate and annihilate it. In order to prove the complete failure of Christianity, postmodernists make a radical distinction between *Christendom* and *Christianity*, where *Christendom* is the historical and deficient materialisation of the Christian faith, and *Christianity* is its ideal or authenticity. This distinction would justify and impose, according to postmodernists, a radical theology²⁴. But

²² John Caputo, Gianni Vattimo, *După moartea lui Dumnezeu (After God's Death)*, in quoted edition, p. 17.

²³ Hugh Mc. Leod, *Introduction. The Decline of Christendom*, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 2, *apud.* John Caputo, G. Vattimo, *După moartea lui Dumnezeu (After God's Death)*, in quoted edition, p. 17.

²⁴ See John Caputo, Gianni Vattimo, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

here, postmodernists themselves appear tributary to the schemes of Western modern logic. Because they, like Western thinking in general, fall into the Manichaean scheme, according to which, either Christian faith is authentic if it separates from the world and from history, or it is denatured in history. Or, Eastern Christian theology argues the fact that religion, faith and the Church are not a separation from history, but implementation and transformation of history, or *work done with the client's material*. Christian faith is not ahistorical, but profoundly historical and it is materialised necessarily as an institution, but institutionalisation – just like the world or history itself – does not automatically mean distortion, falsification or failure. Any experience can show that indeed, Christianity or the Christian faith does not identify completely (it is not accomplished in the perfect, ideal way) in Christendom, that is, in history and in people, neither it is separated or is something else than these. This refers to understanding that although the world and the history are never capable of the plenitude of faith, still, this non-plenitude is not inauthenticity. The history and the world are not just nonsense and non-being, but first of all sense and being, just as the sick body is not first of all illness and non-being, but deficient health and being. The history and the world are first of all chance, not mischance. The one who does not understand or who will not understand this ontological paradox of the world and of history will not be able to affirm a man or a faith. The world, the history, man and faith can be affirmed only by understanding and acknowledging this paradox. Thus, one cannot refer to the failure of Christianity, but to the failure of Christendom, of some historical Christian experiences.

Nevertheless, it is true that postmodernism proves correctly the historical failures of Christendom or of Christianity as an institution. Just as one can prove the contribution of the Christian faith and Church to the formation of European humanism, one can also prove its anti-human contributions, the political and social

domination of the Church, the humiliation and the denaturation of its own faithful. No one can dispute the postmodernist way of defining the domination of the Church as “*delusion of the devil that gave the leaders of the Church the necessary authority, not only to define the right faith, but also to impose its perspective on uniformity and homogeneity*”²⁵. Christian theology has expressed most often in an exclusivist and overbearing way. Even if it does not admit, it is obvious that “*the glory of the Church triumphed upon rejecting Christ, as the persecuted became persecutors, and the servant, the new Lord and master*”²⁶. The entire history of Europe bears witness to this. But, as usual, postmodernists take into consideration only what is minority or partial, making it absolute, disregarding what is majority and essential and relativising it. Out of the fact that the Christian Church has sometimes made abuse of power, postmodernism simply draws the conclusion that the idea of power itself is bad, “*that we have to accept the death of God in a limited sense ... in particular of the God of sovereignty, of power and of omnipotence*”²⁷. Although they prove to be incompetent, impostors and falsifiers in everything – in philosophy, art and theology – it appears that their imposture culminates in the relation to theology. Here they express only aberrations. In order to support the idea that God is weakness and not power, they invoke the Christian idea of self-emptying (*kenosis*), asserted in the Epistle to Philippians 2:7 by Saint Paul, who affirms that, through the incarnation, God “*made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant*”. The entire Christian theology of the first fifteen centuries showed that this “*emptying*” does not mean renouncing divinity (because it is impossible, as God cannot contradict Himself or commit suicide),

²⁵ John Caputo, Gianni Vattimo, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 198.

but renouncing the grandeur or glorious form of manifestation. Taking over old heresies – as they have a special appetency for imposture and malady – postmodernists want to teach theologians that “*God, through the act of kenosis, emptied his divinity ... often God is only a human projection*”²⁸. Indeed, this idea is not philosophy or theology; it is only a postmodernist projection. It does not allow God to exist the way He knows and wants, according to His absolute and immutable essence, but orders Him to contradict Himself and be postmodernist, just like a son who grows weary of having a good and strong father and wants to be helped by a weak father. Postmodernists, alien to logic, philosophy and theology, ignore the fact that the idea of kenosis means only the humble form of God’s love, in relation to its glorious form. Yet, their purpose is not theology or faith, but confuting religion. Hence, they want to antagonise and absolutise the difference between the Christian ideal and its historical measure and to envisage – in an absurd, impostor and impossible way – a “*Christianity without religion*”²⁹. Since this Christianity no longer has to be a religion, it is obvious that postmodernists decree that “*religion could still play a role, but only in the private sphere of personal morality*”³⁰. Any theological or religious faith is necessarily communitary and confessional, as the idea of privatization of religion is, as Heidegger puts it, “*a wooden metal*” or “*a square circle*”. However, modernism attempts in general to convince us that we must prefer non-being to being, illness to health, weakness to power, insanity to reason and death to life.

After having seen the definition and the elementary ideas or the programme of postmodernism, the most important is to

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

²⁹ According to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Widerstand und Ergebung (Endurance and Capitulation)*, Gütersloh, 1998, p. 445.

³⁰ John Caputo, Gianni Vattimo, *op. cit.*, p. 24, quoting Immanuel Kant, “*On Beauty and Good*”, “*What is «Illumination»*”.

identify **the content and the spirit of postmodernism**. What is it, what does it aim, how does it reason and where does it lead? Postmodernism is such a confusing mixture of impostures, distortions, falsifications and aberrations, that it is difficult to name its main component or characteristic. Nonetheless, we consider that firstly one notices **the relativisation of the being, of man and of knowledge**. We have seen that there are plenty of relativising and relativist conceptions and ideologies. The postmodernist relativisation appears to us specific through its hypocrisy or the indirect method, through the fact that, although it undermines essentially the being and knowledge, it claims that it provides even theology and humanism. There are commentators of postmodernism – even theologians – that imagine that philosophy, theology and humanism can take over something from or can be painted in its colour. In regard to this, we must memorise definitively the totally relativist affirmations of postmodernism, namely, “*the denial of some stable structures of the being ... dissolution of the being’s stability*”³¹, as well as “*the decomposition of absolutes, and thus, of the conviction that human nature can be known*”³² and, perhaps more clearly and more trenchantly, the affirmation that “*there is no objective truth given to someone once and for all, a truth around which to gather*”³³. These formulations are actually more serious than the nihilist or agnostic ones, because they do not deny the being or knowledge, but they relativise and denature them.

The relativisation of the being engages, assuredly, the relativisation of the sense, of time and of history: “*There is no*

³¹ Gianni Vattimo, *Sfârșitul modernității (The End of Modernity)*, in quoted edition, p. 7.

³² René Girard, Gianni Vattimo, *Adevăr sau credință slabă (Truth or Weak Faith)*, in quoted edition, p. 72.

³³ John Caputo, Gianni Vattimo, *După moartea lui Dumnezeu (After God’s Death)*, in quoted edition, p. 65.

unitary history, as a foundation, there are only ... ways of reconstructing the past in the conscience and in the collective imaginary ... it is difficult to see up to what extent the dissolution of history ... would not be a real end of history”³⁴; anyway, “*the idea of a history as a unitary process dissolves ... a sort of immobility, substantially non-historical*”³⁵. Here, we must remind that we have repeatedly underlined that no philosophy can undertake a definitive sense of history, that only theology can provide this, and without it, history remains just an abject cauldron in which the absurd, the malady, the suffering, death and the non-being boil. If nothing is absolute and everything is relative, it is certain that God – if we still affirm Him – is relative: “*God cannot be but relativist!*”³⁶. This idea is supported by postmodernists through the basic conception of the weakening of the being and through the opposition they establish between power and love. But we know that if the truth is complete, namely it is absolute, it follows that God is almighty and sovereign. Postmodernists believe that love can be asserted only through the denial of power. Thus, they come to affirm that “*God is not the content of a sentence, but a person ... who left us a model of love*”³⁷. Against these postmodernist ideas, we will only show here that - far from being opposed or exclusive – power and love are one in absolute, in God, that love exists for the very reason that it is the supreme and the absolute power, that weak or flabby love means distorted or false “*love*”. Affirming God as a model of love through Jesus Christ is not possible without the affirmation of Divinity, namely of His absolute being. God is not truth unless He is love, and love is true or proved through the person. Yet, love is not mere

³⁴ Gianni Vattimo, *Sfârșitul modernității (The End of Modernity)*, in quoted edition, p. 13.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

³⁶ René Girard, Gianni Vattimo, *Adevăr sau credință slabă (Truth or Weak Faith)*, in quoted edition, p. 55.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

sentimentality; it is true in the person exactly because it is ontology, because it shows the person as certain and definitive being and truth. A person with love, but without truth or being is an aberration and a fantasy; in the same way, a loving God but Who lacks the absolute of the being, of truth and of power is a mere fantasy, construction or whimsy. The content of love is not sentimentality or fantasy, but power and truth.

However, more than the being and God, relativisation regards Christian faith, more concrete and more forthcoming. Postmodernism wants to resuscitate the mawkish opposition between faith and religion. We have shown that although history marks an inevitable difference between faith and religion, still, the sense and achievement of faith is the denomination or the religion: an unreligious faith is phantasmagoria, a philosophical construction and a contradiction in terms. Notwithstanding, postmodernism imagines Christianity without a doctrine, without “*a patrimony of doctrines defined once and for all*”³⁸. It is clear that postmodernism does not know that the difference between the philosophical and the theological faith is this: the theological faith is first of all divine Revelation, that is, a truth and a precise and definitive doctrine, “once and for all”. But relativism and the postmodernist inconsistency are “*consistent*” for, despite the fact that they affirm that they accept a kenotic and secularised Christianity, at the same time they claim – in a conspicuous self-contradiction – that “*in the multicultural world I establish my own system of religious values*”³⁹. In other words: “*I agree that my mother should exist, but only what I want to adjust of her, not what she wants to be. I agree that God should exist, but not with*

³⁸ Gianni Vattimo, *A crede că mai credem (To Believe We Still Believe)*, Constanța: Pontica Publishing House, 2005, p. 58.

³⁹ John Caputo, Gianni Vattimo, *După moartea lui Dumnezeu (After God's Death)*, in quoted edition, p. 39.

what He wants, but what I want to remain of Him!”. Besides, the final conclusion or the ideal image of postmodernist Christianity is given in an apotheotic way in the enormous aberration that “*it is time for Christianity to accomplish its own destiny, the non-religious destiny*”⁴⁰. And obviously, if according to postmodernists, “*a non-religious Christianity*” is possible and desirable, then I can envisage a “*Church without Church*”, that means I no longer “*claim the authority of the Church, the dogmas*”, but another way than “*that of absolute certitudes*”⁴¹. In other words: “*The sense of God is a diluted God, the dissolution of the being, the incertitude of the truth, the faithlessness of faith and the inhumane of the humane!*”.

Indulging in relativism, postmodernism becomes a masterpiece of **confusion, inconsistency and contradiction**. It is known that postmodernism is a signally syncretist and eclectic phenomenon, a culture which expresses through “*the technique of collage*”. It mixes Indian karma to Christian love and the icon with the beer bottles, placing in the same space and sense incompatible and even exclusively opposed objects and realities, the only connection between them being the choice or the whim of the postmodernist writer. Postmodernism is an inconsistent consistency or “*the principle of non-principiality*”, that is, it constantly changes the ideas and affirmations according to the immediate interest, breaking any consistency and principiality: “*for those to whom it is convenient we will say that we are Christians, which does not prevent us from being Hindu*”⁴². The confusion and the maximum inconsistency might be the absolutisation of the relative or the absolutisation of man, of the

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁴¹ René Girard, Gianni Vattimo, *Adevăr sau credință slabă (Truth or Weak Faith)*, in quoted edition, p. 48.

⁴² Savatie Baștovoi, *Ortodoxia pentru postmoderniști (Orthodoxy for Postmodernists)*, Timișoara: Marineasa Publishing House, 2001, p. 29.

individual, according to which: *“I am the centre of the Universe, even because the Universe would be different without me”*⁴³. This idea is not new, but the confusion is new and the motivation that *“the Universe would be different without me”*, for it is clear that it is *“different”* in a non-essential way because here the reference is to a mere illusiveness and not to the irreducibility or the uniqueness of the person, that are possible only as *“imago Dei, through the almighty, sovereign, certain and immutable God, unacceptable for postmodernists”*.

Nevertheless, the most striking inconsistency is to be found in the splendour of the self-contradiction, in the stunning postmodernist affirmations of *“searching God by exploring evil”*⁴⁴ of the atheist J. Derrida, *“who affirms about himself that he is deservedly considered an atheist, but that he must be read as a religious thinker ... (as) here is the great paradox and the great value of postmodern philosophy”*⁴⁵, *“of desacralisation in order to have a better understanding of the spiritual meaning of the Scriptures, reading them spiritually”*⁴⁶ and at last that *“the philosophical and theoretical relevance of religion lies in its perpetual agony”*⁴⁷. As one can see, postmodernism counts on readers and auditors keen on gags, jests, buffoonery and frolics, who can live very well without logic, without consistency, without nourishment and without being. As postmodernism makes the apology of *“the industrial man”*, the biological mutation from man to myriapod might be possible (as Kafka indicates).

⁴³ The *“Orthodox”* poet and theoretician Alex. Muşina, according to Savatie Baştovoi, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁴⁴ According to *Ibid.*, p. 54.

⁴⁵ John Caputo, Gianni Vattimo, *După moartea lui Dumnezeu (After God's Death)*, in quoted edition, p. 32.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁴⁷ Hent de Vries, *Philosophy and the Turn of religion*, apud. John Caputo, Gianni Vattimo, *op. cit.*, in quoted edition, p. 9.

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