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SECURITY FENCES IN THE CYPRUS ISLAND: POLITICAL SECURITY AND THE ANNAN PLAN

*Emete GÖZÜGÜZELLİ**

ABSTRACT

Cyprus imbroglio has always been on the agenda of UN, on and off, since 1968. Latest UN plan was offered in 2002 named *Comprehensive Settlement Plan* which separate simultaneous referenda were held on 24 April 2004. The plan was approved in the Turkish Cypriot referendum by 65% of the votes whereas 76% of the Greek Cypriot people rejected the plan. The only reason for the irreconcilability of Greek Cypriots is based on the ideology of Hellenism. Hellenism is not only the sole target but also the sole ideology of the Greek Cypriot people. As a matter of fact that the ideology to get the whole island as belonged to them come up during the Annan plan. All processes fail, due to the continued reluctance of Greek Cypriots to share equal sovereignty with the Turkish Cypriots of the island, because of, the speech act over protection of so called "Republic of Cyprus" successfully securitized in political security. This paper seeks to analyse the contribution of the Constructivist theory of International Relations with Copenhagen School's Securitization theory to analyse 2004's referenda results in the context of political security. The result is political security understanding of both sides deeply differ. In the event, this study does not evaluate the Annan plan's advantages or disadvantages, only focus the political perspective of both sides, but particularly Greek Cypriots. In sum, Greek Cypriots were not ready to the political equality and administrative partnership between the two nation. Although, functional federative system was not supportive by the Greek Cypriots because they afraid to loose their "sole sovereignty" in the name of "Cyprus Republic of 1960". This makes to think an idiom of the "good fences(borders) make good neighbour" as necessarily.

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STRUCTURED ABSTRACT

The Cyprus issue was first brought to the agenda of the United Nations Security Council in 1964. In 1968, inter-communal negotiations began between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leadership under the auspices of the United Nations. In 2002, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, presented the Comprehensive Solution plan to the Parties. The plan was revised five times, and at the end it was simultaneously submitted to a referendum on 24 April 2004 in the island. With the regard of the referenda, overwhelming majority of Greek Cypriots rejected the plan because of they dealing with continuation of "Republic of Cyprus"(ROC) and to "sovereignty and survival". So the sovereignty of Cyprus is not belonged one nation. But since the Greek Cypriots armed onslaught of 1963 and subsequent events, the shared sovereignty of the "ROC" has become split and the Turkish Cypriot share sovereignty over North Cyprus and the Greek Cypriots share of sovereignty is over south Cyprus. Annan plan referenda was the sign of this too differ authorities over sovereignty in the island. So that means that Greek Cypriots do not represent the Turkish Cypriots and of course, there is no single government.

The focus on the conflict between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots not only includes societal, military, environmental issues of security but also political. This article begins with a brief overview of the social constructivist thinking that what it is, how can be used, focusing the main lies of the Copenhagen School' securitization approach. It will than outline political security understanding during the Annan plan, followed by an explanation of the aspects of the threats and perceptions on the basis of the unification. The research questions are designed as Why Annan plan did not reach any consequences at the time? What are the main political security understanding of Greek Cypriot side? How can we read the result of referenda in the context of political security sector? Is it possible to understand the deadlock of Cyprus by the methodology of securitization in the context of political security? Why the security fences of UN plan was approved by the Turkish Cypriots and disagreed by the Greek Cypriots?

The international relations experts says securitization is defined as "a more extreme version of politicization"(Buzan,Weaver,Wilde,1998). "All issues of public interest are divided into three categories, from non-politicization (without the need for a state decision), to politicization (necessary the decision of the state), and by making it securitized (existential threats that require measures outside norms)" (Buzan,Weaver,Wilde,1998). Securitization defines security in a form called "a speech act". In this study, the concept of political security is discussed. Anything that threatens the stability of a state, perceived as an existential threat in the political sector and therefore requires extreme measures to respond to it. Political threats are also linked to social threats. "Identities and cultures - basically subjective and contextual structures - can easily lead to policies of discrimination and exclusion"(Stone,2009) in the Cyprus island.

The essence of this study is not to reflect the ideas of the Annan plan that create or do not create advantages. The study aims to assess the political security which impact of the Annan plan referenda results. The theory of securitization presents an approach that distinguishes us

and others in the concept of identity that social constructivism stands out. Moreover, by providing a security perspective that is different from the traditional security understanding that took place before 1989, it was put forward by the State elites how the foreign policy-making processes of states in political, social, economic, environmental and military security sectors were created as social construction. It is a theory that makes sense of public persuasion. When the Annan plan period is examined within the framework of this theory, firstly, it is seen that both peoples have different security concerns. The source of such threats linked to the social sector but affecting the political one has difficulty in identifying and responding to them (Buzan, Weaver, Wilde, 1998). So, the idea of a state, in particular the national identity and ideology of the organization, and the institutions that express it, are the normal target of political threats (Buzan, 2009). These threats may include pressures on the government to pursue a specific policy, measures taken to overthrow the current government, attempts to weaken the political party that manages the state to prepare for a military coup, or pressures to refuse to accept an agreement text, such as in the Annan plan.

Considering the political security view that the majority of Turkish Cypriots said “yes” to the Annan plan despite the perceptions of threats, it was seen that the Turkish Cypriots did not have any expectation for the continuation of the sovereign existence of the TRNC or their own State, but that they could take part in a new united Cyprus for that period. On the other hand, it was revealed that the Greek Cypriot administration, which was mainly processed, supported the discourse that emphasized the continuation of the “ROC”. It is correct to say that Greek Cypriots did not wish to share a sovereignty with the Turkish Cypriots. As a matter of fact, ensuring the continuation of the “ROC” was seen as a matter of political security by the Greek Cypriots.

In particular, the Greek Cypriots were cited as the main security reasons for the fact that the Treaty of Guarantee will continue for a certain period of time, that all immigrants cannot return (Adamides, 2012), that Turkish troops will be present on the island, that no unitary model is foreseen and that they do not accept the plan presented by the United Nations (Lordos, 2004, Fautsmann, 2004, Chadjipadelis and Andreadis, 2007, Coufoudakis, 2004).

Greek Cypriot side was against the plan because of perceived as it was a new state affairs which aimed to be established by the Annan plan to determine new order. This was perceived as threats which affect the ideology of the “ROC” and its institutions. Within the framework of threats to national security, marginalization took place. In the substance, Cyprus's guarantor power of Turkey and the Turkish state was the target by Greek Cypriots. The essence of the Cyprus issue was considered an “occupation” by Greek Cypriot. However, Buzan says “it is vital to understand the origin of threats to consolidate the origin of threats. Some threats are deliberate and others unintentional according to the scholar” (Buzan, 2009) Antoniou evaluates the securitization of Cyprus issue which states “how threats are constantly found in environments and that the viewer perceives a normal or existential threat with many leaflets around the Cyprus island” (2018).

Constantinas Adimidis evaluates the securitisation in the context of ethnic conflict (2012). Lordos and Webster states that “although the younger Greek Cypriot population is more likely to reject the Plan, it would be more meaningful and useful to argue that those who do not have a sense of partnership with the Turkish Cypriot community are more likely to reject it, and that such alienation from the other community is slightly more common among young people than among older people”(2006). This study is important to understand Greek Cypriots perspective which based on Hellenism which is internalized with “Republic of Cyprus”.

This research will be based on literature review and a qualitative research methods to explain the unsatisfactory solution of the Annan plan in the aspects of the security concerns. Finally, with the results of the referendum, the Turkish Cypriots excluded the protection of the sovereign existence of the TRNC from the understanding of political security. Contrary, the leader of the Greek Cypriot administration has successfully convinced its people to saying no the plan via seucitization of political sector. There are deeply different security concerns which provide to enhance two state solution.

In this context the protection of the Turkish Cypriot sovereign existence and political security should be emphasized as necessity rather than a glance.

Keywords: Cyprus, Securitization, Political Security, Threats, Annan Plan.

KIBRIS ADASINDA GÜVENLİK ÇİTLERİ: SİYASİ GÜVENLİK VE ANNAN PLANI

ÖZ

Kıbrıs meselesi 1968'den beri Birleşmiş Milletler'in gündemindedir. En son BM planı olarak bilinen *Kapsamlı Çözüm Planı* 2002'de adanın her iki tarafında sunulmuş ve beş kez revize edildikten sonra 24 Nisan 2004'te eşzamanlı referandumla sonuçlanmıştır. Kıbrıs Türkleri anılan planı % 65 evet oranında desteklerken, Kıbrıs Rumları % 76'ı oranında ezici çoğunluk ile planı ret etmiştir. Esasen Annan planı öncesi, dönemi ve sonrasında Rumlar ile bir anlaşmaya varılamamasının tek sebebi Helenizm ideolojilerine dayanmaktadır. Helenizm sadece tek hedef değil, aynı zamanda Kıbrıslı Rum halkının tek ideolojisidir. Nitekim bütün adanın kendilerine ait olduğu ideolojisi Annan planı döneminde görülmüştür. Kıbrıslı Rumlarının, adanın eşit ortağı Kıbrıs Türkleri ile eşit egemenlik paylaşımı üzerine isteksizliği devam emesinden ötürü, tüm süreçler başarısızlıkla sonuçlanmaktadır, çünkü sözde “Kıbrıs Cumhuriyetini koruma” söylemi başarılı bir şekilde siyasi güvenlik sektöründe güvenlikleştirilmiştir. Bu makale, Uluslararası İlişkilerde Konstruktivizm Teorisiyle, Kopenhag Okulu'nun Güvenlikleştirme Teorisi katkısında 2004 referandum sonuçlarını siyasi güvenlik bağlamında analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Sonuç, her iki tarafın politik güvenlik anlayışının derinden farklı olmasıdır. Bu çalışma Annan planının avantaj veya dezavantajlarını değerlendirmemektedir,

sadece iki tarafın, özellikle de Kıbrıs Rumlarının politik perspektifine odaklanmaktadır. Sonuçta, Kıbrıs Rumları iki ülke arasındaki siyasi eşitlik ve idari ortaklığa hazır değildir. Özetle, işlevsel federatif sistem Kıbrıs Rumları tarafından desteklenmemektedir, çünkü “1960 Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti” nin egemenliğini kaybetmekten korkmaktadırlar. Bu durum “iyi çitler(sınırlar), iyi komşuluk ilişkisi sağlar” deyimini artık düşünmeyi zorunlu kılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Annan Planı, Kıbrıs, Güvenlikleştirme, Siyasi Güvenlik, Tehditler.

Introduction

Cyprus island was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1571 to 1878. Since 1571 the population of Cyprus has been composed of two distinct nationalities, named muslim Turks and orthodox Greeks. A convention of Defensive Alliance was signed at Istanbul on 4 June 1878 between Ottoman and Great Britain which Cyprus to be temporarily occupied and administred by Great Britain. The legal sovereignty of the island was belonged to Turkey. By an Annex to this Convention of 1 July 1878 a provision was made that if Russia withdraw to Turkey, than the island of Cyprus would be evacuated by Great Britain and Convention would be at an end. In 1914 Cyprus island was annexed by Britain, because of the Ottomon Empire entered the First World War. Under the Treaty of Lauseanne of 1923, Turkey and Greece agreed that Cyprus should be under British sovereignty. Annexation of Cyprus to Greece, named ENOSIS campaign had launched in 1878 by the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus. Turkish nation in Cyprus retorted to Greek Enosis Campaigning by demanding that if the Island was to change hands again, it should be given back to Turkey.

In fact, the ideology of Enosis was based on Megali Idea which is irredantist policy of Greece nation. In this context Enosis campaign encouraged by the Greek Orthodox Church and revolted in 1931 against the British government and Turks in Cyprus. During the years 1931-1945 the friction between two nations was at lowest because of pressure and control of the British government in the island. With the end of the 1945 the campaign for Enosis was intensified once again. In 1950 the Greek Orthodox Church arranged an plebiscite for self determination. Turks in the island refused to recognize this plebiscite. When terrorist movement EOKA formally started on the 1st April 1955, it was openly proclaimed by the members of EOKA that their ultimate object was to unite Cyprus with Greece. Paralel to Greek Cypriot agitation on the island, Greece made several attempts during the years of 1954-58. At the end, Zurich and London Treaties accepted and 1960 Republic of Cyprus established on the basis of two nationals, resting on the political equality and administrative partnership of the Turks and Greeks in Cyprus. The settlement thus established was to be guaranteed by Turkey, Greece and Britain. Whereas 1960 Constititon did not satisfied the Greek Cypriot leadership. In accordance to this treaty, Archbishop Makarios was the President, and Dr. Fazıl Küçük was vice President of the 1960 Republic (Ertekün,1981). After the establishment of new Republic in Cyprus, Enosis was not non politicized but also main target for politicization. Makarios made a speech on 1.4.1960 and stressed that “The splendor of EOKA's liberation struggle laid the foundation for national freedom. It is our sacred duty to protect and complete freedom. National struggles never end....”(Reddaway,2001). This speech was one of the step by Makarios to increase puplic policy. 1960 Republic was offered as become part of Greek puplic policy in the desire of the national struggle, named Enosis. Aftermaths of the 1960 Agreement, Makarios started to offer some issues related to EOKA' struggle that he mentioned Greek Cypriots must continue to advance in order to complete the work initiated by EOKA heroes... The struggle continues in a new way and will continue until we reach our goal... dated,18.08.1962”(Reddaway,2001). This is important to stres the character of existential threat for the first step of securitization. Makarios offered the struggle of EOKA as alarms

to reaching the aim of the union of Cyprus with Greece. Makarios pointed out that it is impossible to put an end to this aspiration by establishing a Republic, dated 9.04.1963(Reddaway,2001). Starting the year of 1963, Makarios passed a way to adopt extraordinary measures by offering the constitutional amendments in December 1963. These amendments target was to diminish the Turkish Cypriots into minority which refused by Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey. Makarios convinced his people that their goal of struggle is to annex Cyprus to Greece (made another speech dated 5.9.1963)(Reddaway,2001). After the refusing the proposed amendments (known Thirteen Points) by Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots launched their attack in order to implement a well prepared scheme came to be known as the Akritas Plan (Ex President Denktas' letter of 4 August 1980 to the United Nations General Secretary).

An extreme steps were taken by Greek Cypriot leadership in 21 December of 1963, soon after the independence. Many civilian Turks in Cyprus killed, become refugees, their home and properties were destroyed, barred from taking part in the administration of the Republic and so on. All these attacks were governed by leadership Archbishop Makarios and their terrorist organization, named EOKA. The attack against Turkish Cypriots were accepted as normal policy. Makarios pursued its Enosis policy and made another speech that Cyprus is Greece on 27.10.1964. Makarios believed that Pan-Hellenic's struggle for unity with Cyprus will be crowned with success in a short time. This success will be the beginning of a new age of splendor and grandeur”(Reddaway,2001). The incidents which started in December 1963 went on until the end of 1967 in the form of armed conflicts. Turkish Cypriots who had to evacuate their villages in order to escape Greek Cypriot atrocities were not allowed by the Greek Cypriot administration to return to their former homes. United Nations Secretary General Report to the Security Council numbered S/5950 of 10.9.1964 states that in 109 villages, most of them was belonged to Turkish Cypriot or some villages who were mixed, totally 527 houses have been destroyed while 2,000 others have suffered damage from looting” (UNSG'Report to Security Council No.S/5950,10.09.1964) The aggression from 1963 to 1974 against Turkish Cypriots continued. Between 1964 and 1967, Cyprus was occupying Greece with its 20,000 soldiers and its officers in the Greek Cypriot Guard. As a result of the alert of Turkey which might intervene, withdrawal of the Greek forces from Cyprus happened. The intercommunal negotiations, which aimed at restructuring the Cyprus Constitution, began on 3 June 1968 between the representatives of both sides under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the Cyprus Special Representative (Ertekun,1981). After this negotiation process following speeches made by Makarios to securitize their national aspiration, Enosis, to annex the island with Greece;

“.....I shall never violate my oath , and I shall never deviate from my goal. I have desired Enosis...”(in a interview with Eleftheros Kosmo and Ta Simerina, Athens, 19 August 1970, Ertekun,1981)

“Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus was Greek since the dawn of its history, and will remain Greek” (in a speech at Yialousa on 14 March 1971, Ertekun,1981)

Enosis has always been for the Greek Cypriots a deep rooted national aspirations...”(Cyprus Mail, daily Greek Cypriot newspaper, dated 16 May 1974, Ertekun,1981)

The Cyprus State should be dissolved only in the event of Enosis(In a letter to General Gizikis, President of Greece, dated 2 July 1974, Ertekun,1981)

On 15 July 1974 Greek Junta made a coup de etat in Cyprus and proclaimed the island annexed to Greece by the Junta command, Nicos Sampson.

The target of Enosis by the Greek Cypriots based on Hellenism deprived from the Megali Idea. This political stance via speech acts by Makarios convinced and accepted by the Greek Cypriots.

Makarios was hypnotic effect on his people which finally triggered off such a chain of dramatic events. Following the coup, Makarios fled the island. In his statements made in London and UNSC in New York, he confirmed that coup was the attack direct against the independence of Cyprus. The Turkish intervention which took place on the 20 July 1974 was kick off in accordance with the right and obligations of Turkey under the Treaty of Guarantee. Aftermaths of the intervention, Voluntary Population Exchange Agreement was accepted and Turks from South moved to North, and Greeks from North moved to South under the UN auspices. This created bizonal and bicomunal framework in territory of Cyprus. Aftermaths of this events, many negotiation process, on and off, continued under the UN.

Cyprus issue has been rendered ineffective because of the negative attitude of its leadership resulted very bitter experiences on this issue. However, the Greek Cypriot administration refused many plans such as the 1985-86 Draft Framework Agreements, the Gali Plans of 1992, titled as Set of Ideas, Confidence Building Measures (CBM) in 1994 and more recently the Annan Plan in April 2004.

The focus on the conflict between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots not only includes societal, military, environmental issues of security but also political. This article begins with a brief overview of the social constructivist thinking that what it is, what can be done with it, focusing the main lies of the Copenhagen School's securitization approach. It will then outline the role of the securitization process during the Annan plan, followed by an explanation of the aspects of the threats and perceptions on the basis of the unification. Political security also will be discussed and linked by the evaluation of both sides leadership. In this context research design composed of these following questions: Why Annan plan did not reach any consequences at the time? Can we argue that it depends on the main security concerns regarding the Annan plan? What is the main security concerns of both sides? Is it possible to understand the deadlock of Cyprus by the methodology of securitization in the context of political security? Why the security fences of UN plan was approved by the Turkish Cypriots and disagreed by the Greek Cypriots?

This research will be based on literature review and a qualitative research methods to explain the unsatisfactory solution of the Annan plan in the aspects of the security concerns. To find the exact answer of the unsatisfactory solution of the UN plan, it will be asked that why? How? And which type of reasons explain the understanding of the security concerns of the both sides. The Comprehensive Settlement plan is used as an Sample Case study and Copenhagen School's securitization approach with constructivism. Political security concept and logic of threats are taken key theoretical approach to explain the issue.

Conceptual Framework: Social Constructivism and Copenhagen School

"Constructivism in International Relations basically focuses on the ideologies and identities which how it is existed and how it can become transformation which are the important factors to understand the state's behaviours" (Kaya,2008). "The political elite's speech acts also another subject to understand intersubjective relations with its states. Constructivist believe that state interests and identities can be transformed during the historical process. It depends on the time and conditions. Alexander Wendt saying that behaviours can change but identities and interests cannot be changed. McSweeney mentions that identities incomes before interests"(Kaya,2008).

"Speech-act by elites is necessary as a security act for a securitization which the issue offers as "existential threat," via this way calls for extraordinary measures beyond the routines and norms of everyday politics(Williams,2003). Language shapes or construct the issues which become security issues (McDonald,2008).

"Closely linked to this is the importance that Constructivism attaches to the notion of identity. Identities define the self and others, but they carry with them significant implications as regards

relationships and actions – hence, crucially, identities inform interests”(Malik,2015). One of the key contributions of constructivists was to emphasize the need to analyze the process leading to the formation of state policy”(Malik,2015). In particular, Barry Buzan defines the threats as stemming from five main sectors: political, social, economic, environmental and military. This means that the expansion of the concept of security includes not only military but also political, economic, social and environmental aspects. The structure also affects the level of analysis. Buzan, Weaver and Wilde explain five levels of analysis; international system, international sub-system, unit, subunit and individual (1998). These units are the main analytical instruments. “To show the interaction between these units which were explained by Buzan, Weaver and Wilde, as the military sector relates to power relations, political sector to authority relations, economic sector to economic relations, environmental to the man and the nature, and the societal to the relations between social groups”(O’Neill, 2006).

Securitization and Political Security

The concept of securitization was first proposed by Ole Waever in her famous article *Securitization and Desecuritization*, which was published in 1995 (Weaver,1995). According to Waever, security means the presence of a threat and a number of measures against it. Desecuritization refers to a situation where there is a security problem but no adequate measures are taken or no response is given(Weaver,1995). The theory of securitization, which has a constructivist basis, sees security as a speech act. According to the theory, security issues are constructed as a security threat through promises. In this way, it is legitimate to resort to extraordinary means against the security threats that have been built.

The rulers can choose the way to legitimize their sanctions by presenting the issues they want to take extraordinary measures as a security threat. “Buzan does, however, provide examples of the types of threats associated with each, with the state as the referent object in the case of the military sector and sovereignty experiencing threats in the case of the political sector. In the societal sector, on the other hand, the referent object is the large-scale collective identities that can function independently of the state, such as the nation or religions” (Malik,2015).

“Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde book titled as *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, which stated securitization which could take place with five political sectors named, Military, Political, Economic, Society, Environment (Buzan, Weaver, Wilde,1998). “The literature on security actually became more rich, especially in its own elements. Waever defined security as the outcome of a ‘speech act’ and Securitization as the linguistic process which led a particular issue to be seen as an existential threat”(Malik,2015). “For Waever, Securitization was dependent upon stages which included, first, a declaration by elites that an issue was a security problem, and second, *an acceptance by the audience that the issue is indeed an important one*. The audience must accept the existential nature of the threat, because it is only then that emergency procedures are put in place and the issue is removed from the boundaries of ‘normal politics’ and placed in a special, ‘separate’ area”(Malik,2015).

Political security is the one of the one sectors of the Copenhagen School. Buzan emphasize that political security is the “sub group of political threats that do not use massive military, identificational, economic or environmental means”(Buzan et all,1998). In the political sector, the reference object constitutes the state and state sovereignty. But in this case, non-military threats are also important. Moreover, non-state political organizations can also be a reference object in this sector. For example, supranational organizations such as the European Union, or non-state organizations can be given as examples. Although political and military sectors are concerned with national security, they do not focus on the identities of nations.

“For the Copenhagen School, the primary reference object within the political sphere is not the state itself, but its principles, ideas and institutions that provide the function of a state, and the

authority of the state elite. In order to manage these principles effectively both internally and externally, ideas and institutions are called political regimes” (Buzan, 1990, cited in McCharty, 2008). “Political security is now related to the survival of the unit that represents the state and / or the population constituting the state.” (Dolinec, 2010). Hence, securitization is a process (depending on the sector) that brings problems and problems (often politicized) to a position that makes it an existential threat for the reference object (state, sub-state, ideology, economy, environment, etc.). This change is called the securitization movement (Dolinec, 2010).

“A state in the political sector can be threatened by both internal and external state actions. Internal threats can arise as a result of government actions. Efforts to change or to overthrow the government's policies of resistance or movements towards autonomy or independence threaten state stability and ultimately increase state insecurity” (Stivachitis, 2008). “Threats from the outside may be from the ideology of another state such as nationalism, fundamentalism, communism. For this reason, states can be threatened by ideas represented by others” (Stivachitis, 2008).

Annan Plan

For reconstruction viable and comprehensive solution on the Cyprus imraglio, UN offered a plan, named Comprehensive Settlement Plan, for negotiating both sides of the Cyprus island in 2002. The plan was offered by the efforts of the General Secretary, Kofi Annan. That's why the plan called as Annan plan which was suggested to restructure the new Republic as a “United Republic of Cyprus”. In fact, the efforts of the Kofi Annan, which failed to reach an agreement, did not bring the solution on the island. “We've been at this for decades and I don't think we've ever been this close, Kofi Annan said in 21 April 2004” (Wright, 2004). But the results of the referenda, which was held on 24 April 2004 as simultaneously of both sides, did not provide the bridge on the gap of security concerns of both sides. In results, only 24% of Greek Cypriot and 65% Turkish Cypriots was supported the UN Plan. Greek Cypriots found the UN plan as it was not well balanced. Whereas UN Security Council resolution numbered 1475 (2003) gives its full support to the Secretary General's carefully balanced plan.

The Aspects of the Security of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots During the Annan Plan

The nature of the security and threats have been placed in the course of Grand debates of the international theories, but there were no found any agreement on the concept of the security. Especially the traditional security understanding was based on military conflicts between states which war and sovereignty had interlinked as always between them. Cyprus dispute has always been as securitizing issue which survival or units sovereignty are taken main referent object for their political security in both communities of the island. However, to understand the unsolution of the Cyprus dispute, and the unfailure success of the Annan plan referenda, the subject must examine under the concept of security understanding by focusing on the Copenhagen School's securitization approach and political security concept.

The famous question to both sides by UN Plan on 24 th April 2004. It was asked as follows;

“Do you approve the Foundation Agreement with all its Annexes, as well as the constitution of the Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot State and the provisions as to the law to be in force to bring a new state of affairs in which Cyprus joins the European United?”

Yes-----No

Clearly, in the results of the Annan plan reference, the last version of the Greek Cypriots' Annan plan was rejected as a result of not satisfying the political security interests. At the same time, the Turkish Cypriots voted "yes" with the overwhelming majority.

Undoubtedly the strong rejection of the V. Annan plan on the 24 April 2004 showed that Greek Cypriots were unwilling to the new partnership on the island or no longer support federation as well as the all international efforts since 1968 despite the various UN Security Council resolutions. To understand this stance of the Greek Cypriots there must be focus on the security concerns of the both sides which still provides the barriers for viable solution.

In particular, the main security problems on the Greek side are secured against the right to Turkish intervention on the basis of the division of the island, the existence of Turkish troops, disarmament and the Guarantee Agreement (Fautsmann, 1999).

Alexander Lordos made an evidence based study on the understanding the Greek Cypriot response to the UN Peace Plan for Cyprus that present the response data for the bizonal-bicommunal federation:

“ 14.7% of the sample consider federation to be an ideal solution to the Cyprus problem, regarding the unitary state solution %49.1% of the Greek Cypriots perceived unitary state model as the ideal solution. On the contrary of these arguments, the Greek Cypriot views concerning the prospect of two state solution, overwhelmingly of the Greek cypriots -69% approximately- are clearly opposed to the prospec of a two state solution” (Lordos, 2004).

Indeed, Greek Cypriots led by their president's speech against the plan and in general “no” campaign in political parties provided to understand main anxieties or fears or threat perceptions of the Greek Cypriots. There were some reasons on the security aspects of UN plan.

The Greek Cypriot Security Concerns and Political Security

How are these security needs can be understood? Greek Cypriot claimed that The UN Plan was not equitable.

The main security demands of the Greek Cypriots are following: (Fautsmann, 2004):

1. It should not be possible to leave the federal state.
2. In a future federal Cyprus, disarmament is indispensable.

Only a certain period of time should be envisaged for Turkish troops, not to remain in the island indefinitely. Turkish troops should shrink and a timetable should be prepared for the island to withdraw completely as soon as an agreement is reached.

3. The island, which is an international UN-led peacekeeping force and has a strengthened mandate, shall send police to the island for a limited period to ensure the security of all Cypriots.

4. Both Guarantee and Alliance Treaties may not remain in its present state and shall be amended. An international peacekeeping force should be established and the order of the agreement should be met. If only the international power cannot fulfill its duty, the right to intervene jointly or unilaterally should remain. United Nations Security Council should have the right to prevent the right of unilateral intervention of Turkey. (This request is completely changed in Crans Montana. Greek administration advocates totally disarmament of the island and end of the Guarantee Treaty and the elimination of the Alliance Treaty).

5. Property must be changed voluntarily. There should not be a forced property exchange, but those who want their property back should have the right to obtain it. Others should be compensated. For a limited period, a freeze in freedom of movement and reconciliation should occur.

6. Some regions which to be given back to the Greek Cypriots should be controlled under the UN administration until the transfer of the Greek Cypriots (Fautsmann, 2004, also cited Adamides, 2012, Antoniou, 2018, Klokkanis, 2009)

The Annan plan had a lot of deficit for many Greek Cypriots (Jennings,2005). The plan did not satisfied the security concerns of Greek Cypriots. Instead, it envisaged for Turkish troops to stay on the island for a while (Chadjipadelis and Andreadis,2007).

The Pre Greek Cypriot administration leader, Tassos Papadopoulos, “in a speech delivered on the 7th of April live on television called on Greek Cypriots to reject the plan with shed tears, declaring *I received a state; I will not deliver a community* and stressed that “if the sovereign people reject the Plan by their vote, the “Republic of Cyprus” will become a full and equal member of the European Union. We would have achieved the strategic goal we have jointly set, i.e. to upgrade and shield politically the Republic of Cyprus”(cited in Turkish Foreign Affairs web page on Cyprus issue). Papadopoulos was the securitizing actor who stated that the referent object is existentially threatened. Indeed Papadopoulos’s speech acts always refer the survival of “Cyprus Republic” which was being securitized as an existential threat and shifting the process of Annan plan referenda. This was the sign of political sector. However the functional actors also played an important role during the no campaign.

The Progressive Working Group first demanded that the referendums be postponed. The Progressive Party decided to reject the Annan Plan two days before the referendums because it did not guarantee sufficient security.

The movements of civil organizations were opposed to the Annan plan, such as the Movement for Social Democracy, the Ecology and Environment Movement, the New Horizons, the United Central Democratic Union, and the Movement to Fight the Democratic Movement. Finally, some members of the Democratic Rally left the party and formed a new party for Europe, which opposed the plan (Chadjipadelis and Andreadis,2007). Actually the majority of the Greek Cypriot political parties, civil societies, and churches were against the plan.

Most of the power of Papadopoulos comes from AKEL, DIKO and EDEK voters. More than 25% of Papadopoulos's power corresponds to DIKO voters (Chadjipadelis and Andreadis,2007). Leading players on the Greek side had also changed during the Annan plan. In February 2003 Papadopoulos came to the power. DISY MP Kathy Clerides, in an interview which was made to Kibris newspaper in North Cyprus, stated that Papadopoulos did not want to solve the Cyprus problem. Because he does not want to solution on the island. Also he vowed to fight for improvements the plan on the “more functional and so more viable” (Faustmann, 2004). The general belief of Greek Cypriots based on the fear of the lost their so called “sovereignty over Cyprus Republic” (Coufoudakis, 2004). In accordance to this view the fear was seen that the so called “Republic of Cyprus” which is accepted internationally will be abolished and established by a loose confederation of two major autonomous states. The new policy is qualitatively checked for lack of hierarchy laws and the fact that the powers of the central government stem from the constituent states.

The main security concerns of the Greek Cypriot regarding their national aspiration based on Hellenism which goes back to Megali Idea. Megali Idea is a Greek irredantist ideology, aiming to gather all Hellens. Tassos Papadopoulos on the occasion of the UN Day in Limasol on 23 October 1967 made a speech that “*freedom for us means only the integration of this southern outpost of Hellenism into the national identity*” (Ertekün, 1981) . Another speech by Sypris Kyprianou at Limassol on 24 March 1971 to commemorate Greek Independence Day points out that “*the struggle of Cyprus is the struggle of Hellenism*” (Ertekün,1981). All these speec acts by elites proved that Hellenism shown as existential threat and Greek Cypriot elites carried it from one generation to other as follow speech acts until now. For instance, in 2017, Greek foreign Minister Kotzias underlined that “*The Hellenic Republic and the Republic of Cyprus will continue united their titanic struggle for the rights of Hellenism, Cyprus and the Cypriot people ...*”(Greek Observer, July 2017. Or Archbishop Chrysostomos speaking on behalf of the Church, said, “*it is necessary to exclude any notion of veto powers. Under no circumstances the 82% should be equated with the 18% and remain a captive*

thereof”(Greek Observer, March 2017). Although the Greek Cypriot leader N. Anastasiades mentioned that “*majority could not be equitaded with minority*”(HRI News, February, 2017). Although on February 2017, ‘Enosis Day’ in schools announced by Greek Cypriot’ Representative Council which Turkish Cypriots protested the decision. “Anastasiades condemns Turkish Cypriot reaction to Enosis vote” (Cyprus Mail, February 2017). Enosis is an annexation the island to Greece which the ideology based on Hellenism. Of course today any annexation not possible but deepening relations to enhance the argument of “Cyprus is Greek” is supported in the context to protect survival of “Republic of Cyprus”.

An interesting explanation was made by Simitis, stated with the news of the Greek Cypriot newspaper, named "Mahi", Simitis commented on the Greek Cypriot side's accession to the EU and said that succeeded Enosis. According to the newspaper, Simitis, as the president of the EU Presidency awarded his error that later noticed “EU membership succeeded” to his words(Yeni Mesaj, 2003).

In fact all the speech acts in Greek Cypriot’ in unit level by elites regarding their political security because all things can actually be politicized. In sub unit level many NGO’s in Greek side also refused the plan because of the main concerns regarding the political security of Greek Cypriots. Protection of Hellenism is the protection of “Republic of Cyprus’ sovereignty” for Greek Cypriots. This has been accepted as necessary for political sector. From this point their “sovereignty and survival” should be protected at least to reach control the whole island as unique sovereign nation. In the matter of the Annan plan, rejecting the plan was necessary that’s why Papadopoulos used speech act to create awareness their national security concerns on pursuing their “legitimacy”.

The Turkish Cypriot Security Concerns and Political Security

The perspective of Turkish Cypriots for any solution can be summarized as follows (Fautsman, 2004):

1. The membership of EU in new federal union will bring the Turkish Cypriots back to the 1960 positions, which is not acceptable and should be lifted...
2. Each constituent state must have a separate sovereignty whereas thus was not offered in any Annan plan.
3. Security ties with Alliance and Guarantee Treaties with relevant homelands should be preserved.
4. The troops number could be increased in the context of the Alliance Treaty.
5. Regional privileges should also be restricted for security reasons, a safe land foundation is prominent to us for why we have a smaller population and our past pain should never be repeated...
6. The administration of internal security and justice must be in the hands of the federal states (Fautsmann, 2004).

During the referenda process the actors in TRNC were played an important role for getting yes to the plan. Turkish Cypriot people was fragmented into two sides. The division of the community into two line which one side was supporting “no” and other “yes”, putting the importance of the securitization role.

In fact there were some threat understanding of the Turkish side relate to the following issues; unification of the island with Greece, continuation of Guarantee Treaty and permanent presence of the Turkish troops in the island, protection of political equality of Turkish Cypriots, any chance on the return of Greek Cypriot refugees to north which can creates a threats arising from the economic and numerical superiority of the Greek Cypriots(Fautsmann,1999).

TRNC's President, Rauf Denktaş, related to the Annan plan made many speeches which stressing the *no* to the plan. On March 2004, Denktaş (securitizing actor) made an statement that "if Cyprus question(functional actor) would solve by the Annan plan(threat),this will provide the end of the Turkish dominancy on the island which it had roots depends on 400 year."In 4 April 2004 Denktaş made another speech that he will say to the plan "no"(Hurriyet News,2004). On the other side TRNC' government stance from 2003 by Talat's power, supported the plan. Main opposition party' stance was mixed.

Turkish Cypriots who favoured voted no to the plan, because of the security issues (Gözügüzelli,2007) . Denktaş after referanda said "I see Palestine, I see Kosovo and I say no again" (Sach,2004). Despite of these concerns Annan plan voted as yes by the Turkish Cypriots. When Turkish Cypriots overwhelmingly said yes to the plan despite of the Denktaş' no campaing that mean was TRNC' political security was not important during the Annan plan by its majority of elites and sub unit organizations such as their civil societies.

Conclusion

My research on security understanding on Cyprus imraglio has provided me with insight and access to security studies in Cyprus but more narrowly focused on academic security studies than this proposal. During the Annan plan majority of the Greek Cypriots afraid to power sharing with Turkish Cypriots. The friction was not eliminated by the Annan plan. The distinct perspectives on Cyprus issue proved that Greek Cypriots still lives in the past which they favour of Hellenism which still see themselves a unique owner of the island under the so called "Cyprus Republic".

Although, the Greek Cypriot community securitize the "Cyprus Republic" and not accept the federal shemes proposed by UN since 1968. The Greek Cypriots leadership tries to create *fait accompli* on the name of "Republic of Cyprus". Hence, the Greek Cypriot elites continued to assure their community that they were dedicated to Hellenism. It became appearent during Annan plan negotiations that the Greek side would not agree to a settlement that would to close the door of Hellenism. The usurped and so called "Republic of Cyprus" enhanced the sprit of "Hellenism" by the speech act over the protection of "Cyprus Republic". The Greek Cypriot leadership insisted on the settlement under which the Turkish Cypriots would be treated as a mere "minority group" deprived of all their partnership status and rights arising from Guarantee Treaty.

In sum getting to yes to the plan was the main securitizing steps in Turkish side, but saying no to the plan in Greek Cypriot side. Their political stance and understanding of the political security deepnly different. Greek Cypriots do not want to give up their pseudo "State". Hence, Hellenism has always been national aspirations for Greek Cypriots. In other words, they accept Annan plan as a threat to their sovereignty. In contrast with the above statements, Mr. Rauf Denktaş resistance was to protect Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as sovereing state and favour continuation of the Guarantee of Turkey. Whereas Greek Cypriots demand was firm: Turkey should withdraw whole its troops from Cyprus. Hence they want to return back and get whole properties of pre 1974. Whereas Turkish intervention was carried out in accordance to the rights and obligations of the Turkey under Treaty of Guarantee, because of the Greek Junta was happened in 15 July 1974. The Cyprus issue was not regarding to the Turkish troops in the island, the problem is related to power sharing with Turkish Cypriots as co founder status in the island.

Within the framework of Securitization theory, it was seen that the majority of Turkish Cypriots saying "yes" to the Annan plan which showed that TRNC, in terms of political security, was not important to their security. On the other hand, it was revealed that " Republic of Cyprus", was seen as a matter of political security by Greek Cypriots and that the establishment of a new State could not be accepted. In this context, within the framework of the ideology of Hellenism that the dream of "the

whole island is Greek” continue. Modern Hellenism is strictly supported with “survival of Cyprus Republic” under the unique control of Greek Cypriots.

In the end, the existence of the TRNC was not seen as a political security issue during the Annan plan. The reason why there was no agreement between the parties even in this structure was due to the continuation of belonging to the irreconcilable and old political ideologies of Southern Cyprus. The “Republic of Cyprus”, where the Greeks take shelter of the island as the only ruler Helen, has a reputation in the world to ensure the continuation of Hellenism. The Turkish troops and the Guarantee Treaty also are accepted as threat in front of the Hellenism.

Despite the threat perception, when the majority of Turkish Cypriots say “yes” to the Annan plan, it is seen that the Turkish Cypriots are not in the expectation of the continuation of the sovereign existence of TRNC, but rather that they can take part in a new unified Cyprus. On the other hand, the The continuation of the “Republic of Cyprus” for the Greek Cypriots was seen as a matter of political security and it was revealed that they did not intend to dissolve it with power sharing of Turkish Cypriots.

As a matter of fact, the leader of the Greek Cypriot administration has succeeded in convincing its people through the speech act which was that political sector was used for voting no to the plan. That was the successful securitization of Greek Cypriot leadership.

In this context, despite these differ policies, it is time to insist on two equal sovereign state with side by side would be realistic way. In view of the fact that the Cyprus issue could not be solved by attempting to restore the situation which existed before July 1974, but that a new solution had to be found side by side as two sovereign State.

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