Turkish Studies Social Sciences

Volume 14 Issue 4, 2019, p. 1321-1330

DOI: 10.29228/TurkishStudies.22719

ISSN: 2667-5617

Skopje/MACEDONIA-Ankara/TURKEY

INTERNATIONAL
BALKAN
UNIVERSITY

EXCELLENCE FOR THE FUTURE
IBU.EDU.MK

Research Article / Araştırma Makalesi

Article Info / Makale Bilgisi

✍ *Received/Geliş:* 01.01.2019

✓ *Accepted/Kabul:* 10.08.2019

📅 *Report Dates/Rapor Tarihleri:* Referee 1 (15.02.2019)-Referee 2 (15.02.2019)- Referee 3 (15.02.2019)

This article was checked by iThenticate.

UNDERSTANDING THE CLASS-BASED EXPLANATIONS OF THE DEMOCRATIZATION LITERATURE

*Alper Tolga BULUT**

ABSTRACT

Recent years have witnessed a renewed attention in the structuralist explanations of democratization that place elite action in the center of democratization process. Building on the social class literature, scholars of New Structuralism offer new insights to the democratization literature especially through their re-examination of class relations. In this essay, I will first review the major findings of the New Structuralists. This study argues that social class literature made great contributions to our understanding of democratization by bringing a simple yet powerful explanation to the process of democratization. Recent studies, have also contributed to the literature in various ways. First, they brought the concept of inequality to the center of the studies and explained how the level of inequality determines the nature of the class conflict as well as the possible political outcomes. Second, by making a distinction between income and landholding inequality and showing that these two types of inequalities might lead to different political outcomes, these studies showed that inequality is a complex concept and further research is needed on conceptualization. Third, this strand of the literature provided a coherent and plausible causal mechanism to the modernization theory thereby furthered our understanding regarding the relationship between economic development and democracy. In light of all these contributions, it can be argued that Social Class theory is one of the most important elements of the democratization literature.

STRUCTURED ABSTRACT

This study argues that social class literature made great contributions to our understanding of democratization by bringing a

* Dr. Öğr. Üyesi, Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, E-posta: atbulut@ktu.edu.tr

simple yet powerful explanation to the process of democratization. Recent studies, more specifically new structuralists, have also contributed to the literature in various ways. First, they brought the concept of inequality to the center of the studies and explained how the level of inequality determines the nature of the class conflict as well as the possible political outcomes. Second, by making a distinction between income and landholding inequality and showing that these two types of inequalities might lead to different political outcomes, these studies showed that inequality is a complex concept and further research is needed on conceptualization. Third, especially Boix (2003) provided a coherent and plausible causal mechanism to the modernization theory thereby furthered our understanding regarding the relationship between economic development and democracy.

Marx's class based explanation of political outcomes has been questioned and the demise of the Soviet Union brought about questions about the validity of his arguments. However, despite this set back, Marx made a crucial contribution to the political science and sociology literature by presenting the class-conflict to the analysis of political process. Although his assumptions were rigid and excluded any possibility of cross-class alliance and underemphasized the role of the state (or whatever political authority is in power), his work greatly influenced the structural school of thought. The structuralists who followed in the footprints of Marx situated the class at the center of analyzing political phenomena but offered different and more elaborated accounts. In addition to classic accounts of the social class approach, a new literature emerged with a different explanation to the relationship between class structure and democratization. These new structuralists, borrowing tools from the political economy literature, focused on the role of inequality in class struggles and democratization. According to Boix (2003) the two crucial variables that determined the democratization prospects of a country was income inequality and asset specificity. According to Boix as countries develop economically, income inequality will decrease and also the elites will rely less on fixed assets such as land (that can be easily taxed) and more on mobile assets such as stocks (that can be easily moved out of the country). Thereby, the redistribution fear of the elites will be decreased and democracy will become more likely.

Although social class explanations of have greatly contributed to our understanding of democratization process, there are certain issues that needs to be taken into account. First problem is that social class approaches treat classes as homogenous structures. This is especially problematic when elites are not homogenous and have different preferences. What will happen if the elites are divided and have different policy preferences? Ziblatt (2009) convincingly showed that inter-elite struggles played a key role in the suffrage extension process in Prussia. Is this finding peculiar to that period of German history or inter-elite struggles are a powerful explanation for democratization?

Same issue is valid for other social classes as well. Can we think of a homogenous middle class? What will happen if there are cross-cutting cleavages in a society? Will they act under the umbrella of "middle class" no matter what their differences are or will they form cross-class alliances based on other similarities (i.e religion). For example, in a country like Iraq, where Sunnis previously were in power, would the middle class

Sunnis act with middle class Shiites to overthrow the Sunni dictatorship and replace it with a representative (therefore Shiite) government? It is hard to know. It should be noted that, this does not mean that the class struggles do not take place as the scholars of social class argue rather; it means that the micro-foundations and historical background of a country should be carefully examined as well.

Another issue is the different findings regarding how inequality effect democratization. Some scholars argue that rising inequality helps democratization (Ansell and Samuels, 2010) some argue that inequality declines with economic development and declining inequality makes democratization more likely (Boix, 2003). Houle (2009: 559-600) shows there is a great variation in terms of measuring inequality. This variation might be causing the quite different findings. Therefore, a comprehensive account of the reliability of these measures should be provided and agreement on a fairly robust measure of inequality should be reached. This way, students of the field will be more convinced that variation in the results is not a function of the measure that has been used. With these caveats in mind, I believe the social class theories make a crucial contribution to the democratization literature not only because of their focus on the class conflict and co-operation, but also their focus on different types of inequality as an explanatory variable.

Keywords: Democratization, Social Class, New Structuralism

DEMOKRATİKLEŞME LİTERATÜRÜNÜN SINIF TEMELLİ AÇIKLAMALARINI ANLAMAK

ÖZ

Son yıllar demokratikleşme sürecinin temeline elitlerin eylemlerini koyan “yeni yapısalcılık” akımına artan bir ilgiye şahitlik etmiştir. Sosyal sınıf literatürünün üzerine inşa eden Yeni Yapısalcı akademisyenler, özellikle sınıf ilişkilerini tekrar ele alarak demokratikleşme literatürüne yeni bakış açıları kazandırmışlardır. Bu çalışmada öncelikli olarak yeni yapısalcıların ana bulguları ele alınarak incelenmektedir. Bu bağlamda bu çalışma, yeni yapısalcı akımın basit, fakat güçlü bir açıklama getirerek demokratikleşme konusunu kavrayışımıza büyük katkılar yaptığını öne sürmektedir. Bu alanda son yıllarda yayınlanan güncel çalışmalar, literatüre farklı şekillerde katkıda bulunmuştur. İlk olarak, “eşitsizlik” kavramını demokratikleşme çalışmalarının merkezine taşıyarak, toplumdaki eşitsizlik seviyesinin hem sınıf çatışmasının doğasını hem de olası siyasi çıktıları ne şekilde etkilediğini göstermiştir. İkinci olarak, gelir eşitsizliği ve taşınmaz varlık/toprak eşitsizliği arasındaki ayrımın altını çizerek ve bu iki farklı tür eşitsizliğin farklı siyasi sonuçlara yol açabileceğini açıkça göstermiştir. Böylelikle “eşitsizlik” kavramının ne kadar karmaşık bir konsept olduğunu ortaya koyarak kavramsallaştırma noktasında daha da fazla araştırmaya ve çalışmaya ihtiyaç duyulduğunu açıkça göstermiştir. Üçüncü olarak, literatürün bu kolu modernleşme teorisine bütüncül, mantıklı ve sebep-sonuç ilişkisini temel alan bir açıklama getirmiş ve böylelikle, ekonomik gelişme ve demokratikleşme süreci arasındaki ilişki konusundaki kavrayışımızı daha da ileri bir

seviyeye getirmiştir. Tüm bu katkılar ışığında, Sosyal Sınıf teorilerinin demokratikleşme literatürünün en önemli bileşenlerinden biri olduğu ifade edilebilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Demokratikleşme, Sosyal Sınıf, Yeni Yapısalcılık

Introduction

Why certain countries democratize while others remain autocracies? This is probably one of the most frequently asked question in the history of political science. Scholars from different traditions, offered various answers to this question. Some focused on the role of culture (Almond and Verba 1963; 1989; Inglehart 1977; 1990; 1997; Putnam 1993; Welzel and Inglehart 2007), while others underlined the importance of modernization (Bollen 1979; 1980; Diamond 1992; 1999; 2008; 2011; Lipset 1959; Epstein et al. 2006; Treisman 2011). This article aims to examine the class-based explanations in the democratization literature, and articulate their contributions to the literature. Ever since Marx, class based explanations of political phenomena has been widely used in the social science disciplines such as political science, sociology and economics. In this article, I will review some of the influential works in the social class literature and present their approaches to the class struggles and how they affect socio-political outcomes.

This study argues that social class literature made great contributions to our understanding of democratization by bringing a simple yet powerful explanation to the process of democratization. Recent studies, more specifically new structuralists, have also contributed to the literature in various ways. First, they brought the concept of inequality to the center of the studies and explained how the level of inequality determines the nature of the class conflict as well as the possible political outcomes. Second, by making a distinction between income and landholding inequality and showing that these two types of inequalities might lead to different political outcomes, these studies showed that inequality is a complex concept and further research is needed on conceptualization. Third, especially Boix (2003) provided a coherent and plausible causal mechanism to the modernization theory thereby furthered our understanding regarding the relationship between economic development and democracy.

“The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles”. This beginning sentence of the chapter of Bourgeois and Proletarians actually presents the fundamental understanding of the Marxian school regarding class struggles. According to Marx, there is a fault line between the two hostile camps. On the one side is the class created by the modern capitalism, the bourgeois. Who own the means of production and exploit wage-labor, on the other side is the class of wage-laborers, the proletariat, who lack their own production means.

According to Marx and Engels the main dilemma of the bourgeoisie is their need for constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production as well as the relations of production and whole relations of society. Due to this process the lower strata of the society who fail to adapt to the new technology (peasants, small merchandisers) will join the proletariat. Since the proletariat have nothing of their own to secure, their mission is to destroy all previous securities for individual property owned by the bourgeoisie. Therefore, the inevitable result is a revolution against the bourgeoisie which will result in its destruction.

Marx’s class based explanation of political outcomes has been questioned and the demise of the Soviet Union brought about questions about the validity of his arguments. However, despite this set back, Marx made a crucial contribution to the political science and sociology literature by presenting the class-conflict to the analysis of political process. Although his assumptions were rigid and excluded any possibility of cross-class alliance and underemphasized the role of the state (or whatever political

authority is in power), his work greatly influenced the structural school of thought. The structuralists who followed in the footprints of Marx situated the class at the center of analyzing political phenomena but offered different and more elaborated accounts.

In his book *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Barrington Moore (1993) defines three routes to modernization. These three routes are parliamentary democracy, fascism and communism. In order to achieve the outcome of parliamentary democracy coupled with capitalism, there must be a weak state/crown, the landed aristocracy had to be less independent with a market driven (not state driven) commercial agriculture in a non-labor intensive environment. This environment will lead to the coalition of the landed aristocracy and thereby parliamentary democracy.

Moore sees the democratic route to modern society as a balance of power between crown and landed aristocracy (p.430). His main argument is that the transition to industrial societies has been led by a middle-class revolution rather than a peasant revolution. His famous statement summarizes his thesis. “No bourgeois, no democracy” (p.418). He analyzes England, France and the United States as historical cases to support his thesis. He also argues that the countries where democracy has not occurred, the transition has been led by upper landed classes or peasants. The transition into the modern industrial society is the achievement of the alliances of social classes as upper classes and the working class. In the third path the peasant revolution leads the transition. In this case, the landed upper class was not able to control commercialized agriculture and government was not able to repress working groups, so the peasant revolution has occurred.

The conditions for a peasant revolution through which communism emerges are the existence of a weak bourgeoisie, a powerful agrarian elite, a highly centralized state as well as a strong peasantry which stems from increased exploitation in non-commercialized agriculture, strong peasantry communities and weak ties to landlords. The main condition for the development of fascism is the development of a coalition of upper landholders, the monarchy and a dependent bourgeoisie. In this scenario there must be a bourgeoisie of medium strength which must rely on the state to able to prosper. Moore’s analysis is more detailed and fine-grained account of modernization and class struggles. Moore’s analysis was similar to Marx’s account in that both placed bourgeoisie in the center of the class struggle and emergence of capitalist democracy. As Moore famously stated “no bourgeoisie no democracy” bourgeoisie is the key social class for democracy.

Moore’s analysis was very influential and it started a scholarly debate about the role of social class in modernization and democratization. Although his account was much more detailed and fine grained than Marx’s, it had been criticized from a number of aspects. More than two decades later John Stephens underlined the fact that although Moore’s book is considered to be a contemporary classic there had been few attempts to evaluate the validity of his arguments using a large number of comparable cases.

To fill this gap, Stephens (1989) published an article which covered all Western European countries that experienced democratic rule between 1870 and 1939. His aim was twofold: first, to explain what structural and historical features distinguished the breakdown cases from those that remained democratic and second, to trace the process of class coalition formation in the transition to democracy and subsequent breakdown. Stephens’ analysis presents only partial support for Moore’s thesis. That is all four breakdown cases (democratic breakdowns in 1920s and 30s) were characterized historically by an authoritarian coalition of three actors: the state, labor-repressive landlords and the bourgeoisie whereas in none of the democratic survivors this coalition emerged. However, against Moore’s account of the conservative authoritarian path, the ruling coalition did not modernize the country (except for Germany)

The most important weakness of Moore’s analysis is that it *underemphasizes the role of working class and attributes far too positive a role to the bourgeoisie* in terms of democratization (Stephens

1989). Stephens' analysis reveals that as contended by Therborn (1977), in most of the countries working class was an important force in the final push for universal male suffrage. However, Stephens also notes that this role should not be exaggerated since the working class needed to ally with the other social classes and was not the decisive class.

Another crucial finding revealed in Stephens' analysis was that contrary to the accounts of the orthodox Marxists and of Moore, the middle class was not the natural supporter of democracy. In fact, in most cases the bourgeoisie opposed to the extension of the suffrage to the working class. In other words, bourgeoisie helped in the establishment of parliamentary government but resisted further democratization. No doubt this finding was also a significant challenge to the modernization theory which argued that socio-economic development leads to democratization through intermediary variables one of which is a sizable middle class. To sum up in Stephens' words "the agrarian class relations and patterns of state-class alliances of the 19th and early 20th centuries were necessary though not sufficient causes of the breakdown of democracy in inter-war Europe".

Following in the footprints of Stephens, Reuschemeyer et. al. (1992) make a similar argument about the role of different social classes in the democratization process. According to the authors, democracy has been strongest in the capitalist Western countries since their societies have undergone massive industrialization after which a large and powerful working class emerged. It is this class' pressure and direct involvement that made democracy possible in the Western countries. Reuschemeyer and his colleagues' argument contradict with the Marxian school of thought which argues that democracy is the most useful regime type for the capitalists to advance their interests. On the contrary, the bourgeoisie has generally been opposed to further enfranchisement fearing the power it might grant to the working class.

Noting the strong and consistent significant positive correlation between development and democracy, Reuschemeyer et. al.(1992) admit the fact that there is no way to deny this fact as a spurious effect of flawed methods. However, they also note that this correlation alone does not offer an explanation and identify a causal mechanism. In this regard, to be able to open the black box of causality the authors use comparative historical studies since they see this method as indispensable for developing valid causal accounts. The basic assumption upon which which Reuschemeyer et al.'s analysis rests is that democracy is a matter of power. Since democracy is about increasing political equality it requires sharing the political power. Therefore it is power relations that determine whether democracy can emerge and maintain itself.

The most important factor in their analysis is the power balance between different social classes or class coalitions. The other two crucial power configurations are *the strength of the state apparatus and its relations with the civil society* and the effect of transnational power relations on *both the balance of class power and on state-society relations* (Reuschemeyer et al., 1992).

Within this framework the authors propose that based on their expectations regarding the gains and losses from democratization and their ability of organization/collective action, social classes will present certain political tendencies in the democratization process. The class who will suffer the most from democratization is the landed upper class; therefore they will be the strongest opponents of democratization process. This expectation is quite logical and is compatible with Moore's account. Working class will be the most supportive for democratization since they will gain the most from redistribution. Lastly, middle class will be supportive of the establishment of constitutional and representative government but they will not support further democratization since further redistribution will harm their interests.

The results of the historical evidence support the expectations of Reuschemeyer et. al and show that social classes act in a quite systematic fashion.. In most cases, landed upper class was the most anti-democratic force whereas the working class was the most supportive and pro-democratic one. The

bourgeoisie, on the other hand, played an ambivalent role in the democratization process. Although, they were the main force behind the establishment of constitutional and representative government, however, they were reluctant to support the inclusion of lower classes to the democratic process. They supported full democracy where they were not able to acquire their demands from a powerful elite and therefore needed to ally with the working class. But, if they felt threatened by the working class within a partial democratic system, they challenged the inclusion of them in the political process.

One last point that should be mentioned about Reuschemeyer et. al.'s framework is that they bring in an important variable: transnational power structures. Their analysis shows that economic dependence had negative impacts and influenced class struggles in a negative way in terms of democratization. Industrialization that relied on imported capital intensive technology caused the working class to be weak. Lastly, geo-political interests of core countries usually led to interventions in favor of repressors.

New Structuralists

In addition to classic accounts of the social class approach, a new literature emerged with a different explanation to the relationship between class structure and democratization. These new structuralists, borrowing tools from the political economy literature, focused on the role of inequality in class struggles and democratization. According to Boix (2003) the two crucial variables that determined the democratization prospects of a country was income inequality and asset specificity. According to Boix as countries develop economically, income inequality will decrease and also the elites will rely less on fixed assets such as land (that can be easily taxed) and more on mobile assets such as stocks (that can be easily moved out of the country). Thereby, the redistribution fear of the elites will be decreased and democracy will become more likely.

An important part of Boix's theoretical account is the role of middle class in democratization. According to Boix (2003) if the middle class becomes wealthier with economic development whereas the rich and the poor remain in relatively static positions, then the gap between the rich and the middle will decrease. Therefore, the costs of redistribution specifically targeted to the middle class declines compared to the cost of repressing the middle class. The result will be a cross-class alliance bringing a limited democracy. If the gap between the middle class and the poor decreases full suffrage may be possible.

Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) also adopted a similar but different approach in terms of the role of inequality in democratization. First, the authors underlined a dilemma, on the one hand, increasing economic inequality, associated with economic development, increases the demand for democracy. On the other hand, it makes the elites less willing to make democratic concessions. Then, how this mechanism work? According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) the relationship between income inequality and democracy is not linear but rather it is bell (or inverted U) shaped. In other words, masses will not revolt against a dictatorship if the level of inequality is low since there is less to gain from redistribution and this gain does not exceed the costs of revolting. In medium levels of inequality, the poor will have the incentive to pressure for democratization and elites will accept since the cost of redistribution is relatively low compared to the cost of repression. If, on the other hand, the level of inequality is very high the elites will be determined to suppress the masses and therefore democratization will be less likely. These two pieces made a great contribution by providing a sound theoretical explanation to how class struggles emerge and under what conditions these struggles lead to democracy.

Ansell and Samuels (2010) on the other hand challenge these two influential studies in terms of the role of inequality in democratization process. The authors note that both Boix and Acemoglu – Robinson assume democratization as a function of elite's fear of redistribution. Taking a contractarian, the authors argue that democratization is instead a function of demands by rising economic groups from

the state. Making a distinction between land and income inequality, the authors suggest that while land inequality hampers democratization, income inequality promotes it.

According to the authors as increasing land holding equality does not cause democratization because it alleviates the redistributive fears of elites, rather it because as the number of free land-holders increase so does their fear of taxation and expropriation of their land or money by the autocratic elites. This, in turn leads to an increased demand of a representative system which will protect their rights. Income inequality, on the other hand, works in a different way.

Ziblatt (2008) on the other hand, reaches a different conclusion in terms of the role of inequality. In his article where he investigates the reasons that pre 1914 Prussia's inegalitarian suffrage system endure throughout democracy's "first wave" despite the increased wealth associated with the rise of capitalism and repeated efforts at institutional reform. His findings show that land-holding inequality does indeed decrease the probability of a democratic transition. However, contrary to previous findings, income inequality does not have any effect on democratization. The novel part of Ziblatt's work is that he includes in his analysis an important yet omitted variable: the role of inter-elite dynamics of politics and shows that strategic expectations of parties regarding the gains from a more democratic system affected their choice of further democratization.

Houle (2009) also challenges the findings of Boix and Acemoglu-Robinson and argues that inequality harms consolidation but does not affect prospects of democratization. Reminding the findings of Przeworski and Limongi (1997), the author argues that the causal pathways that effect consolidation and democratization are different therefore inequality effects these two outcomes in different ways. More specifically there are various ways that inequality might affect democratization as mentioned above scholars disagree on how inequality effects democratization prospects however, there is but one mechanism it might affect consolidation. If inequality increases in a democracy so does the tension to resort to a military coup or revolt.

Conclusion

Although social class explanations of have greatly contributed to our understanding of democratization process, there are certain issues that needs to be taken into account. First problem is that social class approaches treat classes as homogenous structures. This is especially problematic when elites are not homogenous and have different preferences. What will happen if the elites are divided and have different policy preferences? Ziblatt (2009) convincingly showed that inter-elite struggles played a key role in the suffrage extension process in Prussia. Is this finding peculiar to that period of German history or inter-elite struggles are a powerful explanation for democratization?

Same issue is valid for other social classes as well. Can we think of a homogenous middle class? What will happen if there are cross-cutting cleavages in a society? Will they act under the umbrella of "middle class" no matter what their differences are or will they form cross-class alliances based on other similarities (i.e religion). For example, in a country like Iraq, where Sunnis previously were in power, would the middle class Sunnis act with middle class Shiites to overthrow the Sunni dictatorship and replace it with a representative (therefore Shiite) government? It is hard to know. It should be noted that, this does not mean that the class struggles do not take place as the scholars of social class argue rather; it means that the microfoundations and historical background of a country should be carefully examined as well.

Another issue is the different findings regarding how inequality effect democratization. Some scholars argue that rising inequality helps democratization (Ansell and Samuels, 2010) some argue that inequality declines with economic development and declining inequality makes democratization more likely (Boix, 2003). Houle (2009: 559-600) shows there is a great variation in terms of measuring inequality. This variation might be causing the quite different findings. Therefore, a comprehensive

account of the reliability of these measures should be provided and agreement on a fairly robust measure of inequality should be reached. This way, students of the field will be more convinced that variation in the results is not a function of the measure that has been used. With these caveats in mind, I believe the social class theories make a crucial contribution to the democratization literature not only because of their focus on the class conflict and co-operation, but also their focus on different types of inequality as an explanatory variable.

REFERENCES

- Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2006). *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Almond GA., & Verba S. (1963). *The Civic Culture*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
- Almond GA., & Verba S. (1989). *The Civic Culture Revisited*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Ansell, B., & Samuels, D. (2010). "Inequality and Democratization: A Contractarian Approach". *Comparative Political Studies*, 43(12), 1543-1574.
- Boix, C. (2003). *Democracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bollen, K. A. (1979). "Political Democracy and the Timing of Development". *American Sociological Review*, 572-587.
- Bollen, K. A. (1980). "Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy". *American Sociological Review*, 370-390.
- Diamond, L. (1992). "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered". *American Behavioral Scientist*, 35(4-5), 450-499.
- Diamond, L. (1999). *Developing democracy: Toward consolidation*. JHU Press.
- Diamond, L. (2011). "Why Democracies Survive," *Journal of Democracy*, 22, 1, pp.17-30.
- Diamond, L. (2008). *The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the World*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Epstein, D. L., Bates, R., Goldstone, J., Kristensen, I., & O'Halloran, S. (2006). "Democratic Transitions." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (July): 551-69.
- Houle, C. (2009). "Inequality and democracy: Why Inequality Harms Consolidation but Does not Affect Democratization". *World Politics*, 61(4), 589-622.
- Inglehart R. (1977). *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
- Inglehart R. (1990). *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart R. (1997). *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
- Lipset, S. M. (1959). "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy". *American Political Science Review*, 53(1), 69-105.
- Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1848). *Bourgeois and Proletarians*. Manifesto of the Communist Party.

-
- Moore, B. (1993). *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Vol. 268). Beacon Press.
- Przeworski, A., & Limongi, F. (1997). "Modernization: Theories and Facts". *World Politics*, 49(2), 155-183.
- Putnam R. (1993). *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
- Rueschemeyer, D., Stephens, E. H., & Stephens, J. D. (1992). *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Vol. 22). Polity: Cambridge.
- Stephens, J. D. (1989). "Democratic Transition and Breakdown in Western Europe, 1870-1939: a Test of the Moore Thesis". *American Journal of Sociology*, 94(5), 1019-1077.
- Therborn, G. (1977). *Science, Class and Society: On the Formation of Sociology and Historical Materialism*.
- Treisman, D. (2011). *Income, democracy, and the cunning of reason* (No. w17132). National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Welzel, C., & Inglehart, R. (2007). "Mass Beliefs and Democratic Institutions." In *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, eds. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes. New York: Oxford University Press, 297-316.
- Ziblatt, D. (2008). "Does Landholding Inequality Block Democratization?: A Test of the "Bread and Democracy Thesis and the Case of Prussia". *World Politics*, 60(4), 610-641.