SVETLANA V. Orekhova

Cand. Sc. (Econ.), Associate Prof. of Enterprises Economics Dept.

Ural State University of Economics

62/45 8 Marta/ Narodnoy Voly St., Yekaterinburg, Russia, 620144

Phone: 8 (343) 221-17-21

e-mail: bentarask@list.ru

Industrial Policy: Evolution of Scientific Approaches, Russian Specifics and the Impact on Enterprises' Competitiveness

The study aims at identifying types and specifics of Russia's industrial policy as well as its impact on competitiveness of the Russian enterprises. The paper presents the findings of terminological analysis and systematization of the types of the state industrial policy. The novelty of the study is that it attempts to reveal the effects of the industrial policy on the Russian enterprises. The author concludes that the state economic intervention increases competitiveness of businesses only if parameters of an enterprise correspond to objectives of an industrial policy. This statement directly contradicts the stereotype that industrial policy is always a kind of a protective shield for domestic business. Having analyzed the evolution of the scientific approaches to industrial policy the author arrives to the conclusion that currently the state's role in economic relations is strengthening significantly across the world. The policy of the state capitalism is also peculiar to the Russian economic system. Based on the comparison of the declared and the real industrial policy in Russia a number of discrepancies were discovered. Particularly, the declared proactive policy turns out to be the active one and is limited to the system of catch-up measures.

JEL classification: L50, D02, D04

Keywords: industrial policy; sustainable development; industrial policy tools; competitive advantages; reindustrialization.

Introduction

In recent decades, the world market has witnessed a re-design of sectoral structure, which resulted in redistribution of existing resources and expansion of the resource base to support innovations in industry [14. P. 2]. This fact is due to both changing macroeconomic situation and altering rules of the game in markets. At this, institutional (rather than market) mechanism of coordination tends to increasingly determine the development of individual sectors and territories.

In such context, the discussion about the role of the state in maintaining sustainable competitive advantages for enterprises and sustaining economic growth in general is becoming more and more intense. With global competition mechanisms and methods getting more complex, the methods and approaches to governing national sectoral markets are getting more sophisticated as well.

It seems that the problem of selecting an industrial policy toolkit and its influence on long-term competitiveness of businesses is a non-trivial scientific matter obviously requiring an effective solution

The main goal of the present study is to assess the state of the Russian industrial policy and elaborate on its impact on the competitiveness of domestic business. The goal implies fulfilling the four key tasks:

- 1) to detail the theoretical foundation and types of industrial policy;
- 2) to study possible effects of the industrial policy on the Russian enterprises;
- 3) to examine scientific approaches to industrial policy and their evolution in economic practice worldwide;
- 4) to systematize directions and find out the common vector of the industrial policy in Russia.

Determinants and evolution of the content of industrial policy

Contradictory understanding of the necessity and ways of carrying out industrial policy dictates the need to detail the theoretical foundation of this concept. Terminological analysis demonstrates that depending on the research objectives, semantic emphasis can shift substantially [3], and the concept “industrial policy” (or sectoral policy) may be regarded as:

- sustaining economic growth by the state [9];
- developing measures aimed at enhancing competitiveness and expanding opportunities for domestic companies and industries as well as stimulating changes in the structure of the national economy [4. P. 6];
- the state’s attempt to encourage the inflow of resources in particular sectors that it considers important for future economic growth [23];
- directing efforts to particular sectors, firms and improvement of business environment or improvement of the structure of economic activities by sectors, technologies to achieve such results that are considered by the state as efficient for economy as a whole [1; 19; 32; 38];
- a set of state measures on fostering or preventing certain structural shifts [33] and creation of unequal conditions for functioning of enterprises in different sectors (or for different enterprises in one sector) [5];
- a tool of ensuring political stability (balance and accountability of the main groups of interests) through redistribution of incomes in economy and control over the sources of rent [13].

Such dissimilar treatments of the concept “industrial policy” lead in practice to the differences in its content and tools. To understand the whole set of measures, which can be taken while adopting industrial policy, it is reasonable to explore all its possible classifications (table 1). Such typology will later allow determining the Russian specifics of industrial policy.

Adoption of industrial policy of this or that type anyway causes redistribution of production factors into priority economic sectors, what lessens chances for other sectors’ development. This is the reason why the examples of pursuing mixed types of industrial policy are so rare. For the same reason, in practice it is impossible to achieve Pareto efficiency¹ of industrial policy; instead, what can we speak about, is more likely to be target efficiency² or result orientation. Industrial policy can be assessed in the following three directions:

- 1) performance monitoring;
- 2) cost-benefit evaluations;
- 3) impact evaluations (the impact on a market generally and its participants).

At this, while analyzing the results of industrial policy at macro-level it is necessary to take into account the possibility of the next effects:

- 1) substitution effect, when improvement of the situation in some economic spheres leads to or is the result of worsening situation in others;
- 2) creaming effect, when strong companies react to government support, which is not crucial for them [31];

¹ A situation is Pareto efficient if it is not possible to make one better off without making another worse off.

² Target efficiency is an indicator reflecting a degree of reaching the goals set by the subject exerting impact (in this case – the state).

Table 1

Classification of the types of industrial policy

Criterion	Type of industrial policy	Characteristics of policy	Examples of the mechanisms for implementation of industrial policy
1. Target	Stimulating	Development of industries	- Easing tax burden. - Simplifying the procedures of starting and doing a business
	Constraining	Reduction of business activity in an industry	- Restructuring an industry. - Changing specialization of enterprises
	Passive	Solution of the problem of market failures and creation of competitive environment	- Antitrust regulation. - Control over mergers and acquisitions. - Improvement of national institutional environment
	Active	Change in the structure of an industry to stimulate/suppress its development	- Changing institutions in particular industries and complexes. - Changing the structure of property in particular industries and complexes. - Protectionism in particular industries (selected enterprises) in foreign trade
2. Methods applied	Proactive	Design of development strategies for industries and complexes, long-term rules of the game in markets	- Constructing programs and scenarios of development for individual industries. - Proactive modelling of scenarios for industries
	Total	Design of the mechanisms for improvement of the whole institutional environment	- Simplifying the procedures of starting and doing a business. - Easing overall tax burden. - Improving national institutional environment
	Selective	Concentration on individual, priority industries and markets	- Methods of antitrust policy. - Information differentiation. - Financing and subsidizing priority industries. - Designing development strategies for priority industries
	Regulatory	The state acts as a market regulator	- Determining subjects in a market (for instance, through licensing mechanisms). - Setting prices. - Using the instruments of budgetary, tax and credit policy. - Modifying legislation and standards of doing business.
4. Degree of the state interference into market processes	Policy of the state capitalism	The state is both a regulator and a market participant (like a businessman)	- Public-private partnership. - Management of the state-owned property. - Nationalization or privatization of property. - Construction of the system of public contracts. - "Micromanagement"

Table 1 (continued)

Criterion	Type of industrial policy	Characteristics of policy	Examples of the mechanisms for implementation of industrial policy
5. Level of competition in industry	Policy in relation to competing industries	Regulation of the activities of the companies operating in competitive environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Securing property rights. - Ensuring compliance with legal and financial requirements to corporate reporting. - Introducing competition and anti-trust regulation. - Eliminating market failures. - Guaranteeing safety of products and services for consumers [35]
	Policy in relation to non-competing industries	Regulation of the activities of natural monopolies and industries enjoying exclusive access to natural resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Special incentives and rules of competition. - Conditions for development of the state-owned companies
	Policy in relation to non-market industries	Regulation of the industries in the public sector	The state regulates the sector the most actively or directly operates in it [21]
6. Orientation	Internally oriented	Support of the domestic demand and import substitution due to the development of national production	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Protectionist policy. - Maintaining a low rate of national currency. - Stimulating the production of goods to substitute foreign analogues
	Export-oriented	Promotion of the development of export industries, the production of which is competitive in international market	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishing tax and customs privileges. - Providing loans on easy terms. - Keeping national currency weak. - Taking measures to create favourable conditions for the development of export-oriented and related industries. - Improving export infrastructure. - Simplifying customs regimes
	Innovation-oriented	Boost for innovation activities and introduction of new technologies, including resource-saving ones	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increasing the concentration of markets (in conditions of low concentration there are no incentives for innovations because of long payback period and risks)
7. Mechanism of influencing the market	Vertical (traditional)	Orientation towards particular (priority) sectors and complexes of industries and creation of redistributive, inclusive institutions (the term is from [17])	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Direct state subsidies or state investments into the development of priority sectors and industries. - Stimulating large businesses. - Creating mechanisms for redistributing rent in favour of the state
	Horizontal (new)	Creation of extractive institutions (the term is from [17]) targeted at general economic growth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Changing rules of the game in particular markets. - Creating "open access institutions" [8]. - Encouraging small and medium enterprise

Table 1 (concluded)

Criterion	Type of industrial policy	Characteristics of policy	Examples of the mechanisms for implementation of industrial policy
8. Type of interference into market mechanisms [11]	Authentic	Restricting of the use of the property by its owner	- Nationalization
	Bilateral	Forced sharing between the state and a market subject	- Taxation
	Trilateral	Permitting (prohibiting) exchange between subjects	- Licensing - Monopolistic privileges
9. Benefits (rent)	Process-focused	The effect of the policy emerges in the process of its formation and implementation	- Antitrust regulation. - Instruments of budgetary policy and disbursement of funds allocated from the budget. - Formation of the government procurement
	Result-focused	The effect is the immediate result of the policy	- Improvement of national institutional environment. - Maintenance of safety of goods and services for consumers

3) the effect of deadweight losses, when industrial policy corresponds to the natural vector of economic development, what makes government expenditure senseless [29].

The main problem of carrying out industrial policy is poorly predictable results, especially at micro-level, because in real economy there are always many uncontrolled factors. This fact conditions the dual nature of the impact of government regulation on competitiveness of individual enterprises (Fig.). Basically, the cumulative effect of industrial policy on an enterprise can be interpreted using the next formula (1):

$$E_{cum} = \left(\sum_n^1 E_p - \sum_m^1 E_n \right) \times K_c, \tag{1}$$

where E_{cum} is cumulative effect of industrial policy on an individual enterprise;

$\sum_n^1 E_p$ is a sum of positive effects resulting from industrial policy;

$\sum_m^1 E_n$ is a sum of negative effects resulting from industrial policy.

K_c is adjustment coefficient, determining the degree of correspondence of an enterprise to the vector of industrial policy. The coefficient depends on legal and economic characteristics of an enterprise K_1 , level of dynamic capabilities of an enterprise K_2 and possibilities of an enterprise to employ alternative strategies of development K_3 . K_c is determined applying the formula (2):

$$K_c = K_1 \times K_2 \times K_3. \tag{2}$$

Factors behind enterprise competitiveness as a result of industrial policy impact

Transformation of industrial policy: theoretical discussion and international practice

Adoption of industrial policy implies that the state interferes into functioning of economic system. However, economic theories in various periods suggested polar opposite viewpoints on the necessity of the state regulation of markets.

The ideas of A. Smith (1723–1790) about “invisible hand of the market” predetermined the formation of the classical economic theory. The basis and the subject field of this theory developed in the works of A. Marshall (1842–1924) and P. Samuelson (1915–2009), rest on the principles of free market trade and equilibrium between supply and demand. Industrial policy is considered to be unjustified interference of the state into economy that distorts market (price) mechanisms and hampers optimal distribution of resources. According to this viewpoint, the state through “artificial” management of the market is not able to identify real growth areas, that is why priorities assigned to sectors and industries by it will just decrease Pareto economic efficiency.

Yet such theoretical construction is rather abstract. Moreover, it is widely known that in practice there are no markets with perfect competition, whereas markets that formally should end in “fiasco” (the term is from [18]), keep on functioning. Economic reality periodically demonstrates market failures and long-term functioning of inefficient markets, what is impossible to explain within the frames of the classical economic analysis.

In the economic history, the Great Depression in the USA exemplifies one of the most notorious large-scale market “fiascoes”, as a response to which the Keynesian economics was developed. Being the founder of the system of the state regulation of the economy, J. M. Keynes (1883–1946) suggested and quite successfully applied in practice concrete financial, fiscal and other instruments of general economic and industrial policy.

In the 1970s, both Keynesian economics and socialism¹ faced fierce criticism from the representatives of the Austrian school, the most famous of whom were M. Rothbard (1926–1995) and F. Hayek (1899–1992). They regarded the state’s interference into market relations exclusively as “intervention” [11. P. 18; 16. P. 130]. In F. Hayek’s opinion, the market is a complex transfer mechanism, which allows making the best use of information. The state’s actions distort market information signals, and thus reduce its efficiency [16].

Further development of economic theories concerning state regulation of market was reflected in the works of neoinstitutionalists. Institutional approach to understanding the essence of market does not only allow fixing the presence or absence of connections (exchanges) between market participants, but also explaining the nature and reasons behind these exchanges. Strictly speaking, markets can be called such only conditionally, because they function due to institutional, rather than market mechanisms of coordination. Even prices, which, according to neoclassical economists, are the results of the “invisible hand of the market”, in many cases are regulated by formal and informal institutions [2]. Institutional regulation of markets is especially important for the transition economies [36].

Various authors are still expressing diverging views on the issue of market regulation (see, for instance [6. P. 104]). At the same time, economic history illustrates how important industrial policy is for developed [20] and developing [22] countries. For instance, a proactive industrial policy, which targeted priority industries and stimulated technology transfer, has significantly contributed to the rapid growth of the newly industrialized countries of the East Asia [38].

The new structural economics proposed by J. Lin [25–28] was how economic theory responded to the new reality. Within this approach based on the experience of the Asian countries, the state is believed to be capable of not only creating favourable basic conditions for business, but directly subsidizing individual sectors [37].

¹ Both to a certain degree may be qualified as planned economies.

Along with the long-standing debates on the role of the state, the instruments and methods of industrial policy remain a highly contentious issue as well. The conception of the new, or horizontal, industrial policy developed in the works of D. Rodrik [34], suggests that the drawbacks of industrial policy are connected not with the fact of the state's interference, but with the way it is effected. And here the emphasis is shifted to the "failures of the state" rather than market failures. Basically, the new horizontal policy differs from the conventional conception in two aspects:

first, it is oriented towards the creation of general institutional conditions for economic activities rather than the support of individual sectors and/or companies;

second, it relies on the country's competitive advantages.

The state may induce structural changes based on specific assets of the economy, which generate an advantage for some sectors competing in world markets. This is a fundamental distinction, because in the middle of the last century adherents of industrial policy often presumed that the state may build any needed structure of the economy through active stimulation of, for example, import substitution [5. P. 154–155].

Almost at once the new structural economics was confronted with opponents of the concept of state capitalism. A number of studies [24; 30; 39] point to a fact that in the BRICS markets the state assumes a more prominent role than in traditional market economy. Such active interference, frequently ending in micromanagement, as well as a dual role of the state as a market regulator and its participant, leads to that it stops guaranteeing compliance with the rules and becomes just another factor of instability. Moreover, excessive investment and relative abundance of resources created purposefully in state-backed companies reduces incentives for improving management efficiency in such companies and distorts the action of market mechanisms.

The table 2 summarizes the aforementioned and presents a systematization of the stages of industrial policy transformation in the world economic practice in the 20th and the early 21th centuries.

Table 2

Stages of development and content of industrial policy in the world economic practice in the 20th and the early 21th centuries

Characteristics of industrial policy	Period			
	1950s–1960s	1970s–1990s	2000–2009	2010 – present
Goals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Industrialization. - Import substitution. - Protection of emerging industries. - Management of the public sector 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Trade liberalization. - Privatization. - Attraction of foreign direct investment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reindustrialization. - Sustainable innovative development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Protection of the national sectors. - Providing employment. - Searching for new sources of sustainable growth
Theoretical principles	Keynesian economics	Austrian school, Washington Consensus ¹	New structural economics	New structural economics, policy of state capitalism
Reasons	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Destroyed post-war economy. - Changes in the global order 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - State failures. - Globalization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Market failures. - State failures. - Strengthened positions of BRICS countries. - The need to account for an ecological factor 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The need to specify the role of the state. - Searching for new models of growth

Table 2 (concluded)

Characteristics of industrial policy	Period			
	1950s–1960s	1970s–1990s	2000–2009	2010 – present
Policy type (according to classification from table 1)	- Vertical. - Active. - Selective	- Vertical. - Passive. - Total	- Horizontal. - Proactive. - Selective	- Horizontal. - Proactive. - Selective
Main instruments	- Monetary regulation. - Protectionism. - Support of the national champions	Creation of conditions for capital movement	- Creation of favourable institutional environment. - Ensuring benefits in dynamics	- Focus on technologies. - Active participation in creation of networks and clusters. - Fostering innovations

¹ Washington Consensus is a set of liberal economic strategies, which in the late 1980s became a conceptual platform for opponents of the state's direct interference into economy and was widely used as a theoretical basis for recommendations of international financial organizations involved into market reforms in most countries with transition economies [5. P. 155].

It can be noted that an obvious trend in developed countries' industrial policy is an increasing number of forms and methods of the state's interference into economy. Simultaneously, the emphasis is shifted from direct market regulation to "soft" stimulation measures of exerting impact and establishing favourable conditions based on extractive institutions.

Russian specifics of industrial policy

In Russia, as B. V. Kuznetsov and Yu. V. Simachev point to [5. P. 155], the debates about industrial policy have been traditionally fierce due to instability in both politics and economic policy, and predominantly rent-oriented behaviour of market participants.

It is important to understand (here we completely agree with Ya. P. Silin, Ye. G. Animitsa and N. V. Novikova [12. P. 17]) that Russia has always been characterized by the policy of catch-up modernization, when the state carries out an accelerated industrialization, relying on its own resources without large foreign investments.

According to Yu. Simachev [13], there can be identified five stages of the national industrial policy in Russia's recent economic history (table 3).

The relative failure of the liberal economic market reforms in Russia, which refused to pursue an active industrial policy in the late 21st century, phenomenal successes of the BRIC countries, first and foremost, of China, growing macroeconomic risks from Russia's dependence on raw materials, have all together triggered a wave of searching for efficient methods of state interference in the second half of the 2000s.

One of the principal tasks of industrial policy was to complete the formation of a full-fledged corporate sector in all segments of the economy and start establishing companies of a new type capable of competing with world leading producers [4. P. 7]. The main approach applied in this period was the creation of the state corporations and development institutions. State corporations were partly considered as a tool for consolidation of the state assets (and in some cases of renationalization of privately owned assets) in a spectrum of a strategically important sectors, and partly as a way to circumvent existing regulations limiting direct government participation in the financing of production activities of enterprises.

A new round of industrial policy was marked by the enactment of the Federal Law no. 488 "On industrial policy in the Russian Federation" on December 31, 2014. The articles 3 and 4 of the law set priorities, presented in table 4.

Table 3

Stages in Russia's industrial policy of the 2000s

Period	Priorities in the state policy	Characteristic features of industrial policy	Developmental character and budgetary resources	Model of interaction between the state and the business
2000–2003	Development of market institutions and structural reforms	Soft regulation policy (types of taxes, prices of natural monopolies, exchange rate)	Recovery growth, limited budgetary funds	Individual approach. Practice of meeting with the representatives of large business. Active attitude on the part of the business
2004–2008	Diversification, fostering innovations, accumulation of budget revenues	Vertical industrial policy, long-term design, creation of development institutions	Fast raw materials-based growth and abundant budgetary resources	Constructing “the vertical”. State control. Institutionalization of the access. Expanding the number of subjects forming industrial policy (development institutions)
2008–2009	Maintenance of social stability	Vertical compensation policy, support of large enterprises, micromanagement, preferences	Crisis, severe recession in processing industry. Considerable tightening of budgetary restrictions	Help to large business in exchange for its obligations to the state
2010–2011	Search of the new sources of growth (innovations, modernization, structural privatization)	Technology industrial policy	Post-crisis recovery. Period of budgetary moderation, high uncertainty	Expansion and competition for access. Appearance of new players, increased level of competition
2012 – present	Reindustrialization, improvement of investment climate, encouraging high-tech sectors	Industrial policy of creating new jobs	Strong slowdown. Tightening of budgetary restrictions	Development of new communications (Agency for Strategic Initiatives, Open Government), road maps

Source: [13].

The main tools suggested by the Federal Law no. 488 for implementation of industrial policy include:

- financial support in the form of loans, grants, equity contributions, leasing;
- subsidies on a competitive basis to fund research and development, engineering works, create and modernize industrial infrastructure with the use of the best available technologies as well as acquire new production capabilities;
- placement of tasks for various works within the government defence order;
- stimulation of innovation activities in economic entities with the state participation;
- boost for innovative products' demand through setting standards in government procurement.

The analysis of the correspondence between the goals of Russia's modern industrial policy and its particular types and tools shows that the vectors of its development are contradictory and divergent. Principally, the current stage of industrial policy is characterized by:

- 1) strengthening socioeconomic and political prerequisites and motives for its implementation;

Table 4

Types of industrial policy in Russia

Directions for industrial policy according to the Federal Law no. 488	Type of industrial policy (based on table 1)
1. Forming high-tech, competitive industry that will support the national economy transition from export-oriented, raw materials-based type of development to innovative type of development	- Stimulating; - proactive; - total; - innovation-oriented; - result-focused
2. Ensuring national defence and security	- Selective; - proactive
3. Ensuring employment	- Stimulating; - passive; - process-focused; - vertical
4. Creating competitive conditions for activities in industry compared to the conditions for the same activities existing in the territories of foreign countries	- Stimulating; - active; - total; - result-focused; - horizontal; - internally oriented
5. Increasing economic output with high added value and supporting export of such products	- Export-oriented; - selective; - active; - process-focused
6. Supporting modernization in industry, particularly, of fixed assets; ensuring technological independence of the national economy	- Innovation-oriented; - process-focused; - horizontal

2) latent character of its implementation, when declared priorities diverge from the real ones;

3) formal orientation towards introduction of proactive, preventive measures of regulation (design of the development strategies for industries and complexes of them) with the aim of a long-term benefit for the whole economy;

4) actual short-term orientation and inconsistency of the programs carried out accompanied by the absence of clear systems of control and efficiency assessment of the measures taken;

5) selectivity, which is expressed in prioritization and reallocation of resources, rights and control powers between sectors, presence of winners and losers;

6) principal orientation towards the support of the industries working for the domestic market through fueling domestic demand;

7) predominantly direct participation of the state in redistribution of rent, including through the tools of the state property consolidation, public-private partnership and renationalization;

8) individual approach during interaction and a considerable superiority of traditional groups in lobbying their interests;

9) strong orientation of groups of interests towards receiving rent from the process of the policy implementation rather than from its results;

10) unfavourable conditions for pursuing both vertical and horizontal industrial policies because of the low quality of institutional environment; parallel implementation of the measures on improvement of the framework and sectoral conditions of operation¹.

¹ In developed countries, there was a gradual construction of the general institutional environment, and after that – of the individual elements of industrial policy.

At the same time, the adoption of the Federal Law no. 488 has led to some structural shifts concerning the general vector of the Russian economy development. Prior to that, the strategic goal was considered to be the need to form a postindustrial economy in Russia [15. P. 13].

By contrast, the law "On industrial policy" provided a powerful impetus to the economy reindustrialization, or the new industrialization, which is understood as a synchronized process of creation of new high-tech sectors of economy, efficient innovative renewal of its traditional sectors with concurrent, aligned, qualitative, and consistent changes between economic-technological and socio-institutional spheres [10. P. 46]. In his paper, O. S. Sukharev stresses that reindustrialization is an economic policy representing a wider set of measures than standard alternatives of industrial policy, aiming at the planned restoration (creation, change) of industrial and technological base of economic system [14. P. 9].

Yet new industrialization is frequently treated as drastic changes of the technological and production base of society, creation of new enterprises and economic sectors. A significantly lesser portion of attention is paid to modernization of traditional industries that form the economic foundation of industrial regions [15. P. 15]. We believe that primarily, reindustrialization should concern old industrial regions, because they are "territories with high dependence on one or more specialized industries, inflexible institutional structure and often outdated production" [7. P. 8].

It seems reasonable that the greatest attention should be devoted to the policy affecting the state of traditional industries. This proposition can be justified by the following arguments:

1) such vector of development does not contradict the conception of the new structural economics, according to which while increasing an object's competitiveness it is necessary to improve strengths rather than minimize weaknesses;

2) exclusive focus on high-tech sector of economy will cause substantial regional differentiation in budget revenues;

3) high level of competition in traditional economic sectors opens up a possibility of inflow of capital into new, high-tech industries.

Conclusion

Terminological structuring of definitions, types, and mechanisms of industrial policy enables us to draw a number of important conclusions.

1. The state's interference into economy is a factor behind business competitiveness only if the field of activities, size, resources and a number of other parameters of an enterprise correspond to the objectives of industrial policy. This statement dissents from a stereotyped opinion that industrial policy is a kind of a protective shield for domestic business. Moreover, such approach does not aim to support the efficiency of market mechanisms, it is more likely to distort their action, what can result in failures of both the market and the state.

2. It can be stated that in Russia there is a dichotomy between the declared (proactive, horizontal, total) and the implemented (active, vertical, selective) industrial policies. This fact is explained by a spectrum of reasons, among which there are objective (for instance, the necessity of the parallel construction of general institutional environment and particular development institutions) and subjective ones (designing policy "from top down", which leads to inability to adequately assess the needs, and, what is more essential, the possibilities of businesses).

3. Selectivity of industrial policy was destined to produce a multiplicative effect, which should have sustained general economic growth. What happens de facto is the development of inclusive institutions that target redistribution of rent in favour of large players, including the state itself.

References

1. Abalkin L. I. Kontseptual'nye voprosy razrabotki promyshlennoy politiki v usloviyakh sovremennoy rossiyskoy ekonomiki [Conceptual issues of industrial policy in the conditions

of modern Russian economy]. In: *Promyshlennaya politika Rossii na poroge XXI veka* [Russia's industrial policy at the turn of the 21st century]. Moscow: IzdAT Publ., 1997, pp. 28–33.

2. Volchik V. V. Effektivnost' rynochnogo protsessa i evolyutsiya institutov [The efficiency of the market process and evolution of institutions]. *Izvestiya vuzov. Severo-Kavkazskiy region. Obshchestvennye nauki – University News. North-Caucasian Region. Social Sciences Series*, 2002, no. 4.

3. Gilmundinov V. M. Promyshlennaya politika Rossii: sostoyanie i problemy [Industrial Policy in Russia: state and problems]. *Region: ekonomika i sotsiologiya – Region: Economics and Sociology*, 2011, no. 1, pp. 104–117.

4. Kondratyev V. B. Otrastli i sektora global'noy ekonomiki: osobennosti i tendentsii razvitiya [Industries and sectors of the global economy: characteristics and development trends]. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya Publ., 2015.

5. Kuznetsov B. V., Simachev Yu. V. Evolyutsiya gosudarstvennoy promyshlennoy politiki v Rossii [Evolution of the state industrial policy in Russia]. *Zhurnal Novoy ekonomicheskoy assotsiatsii – The Journal of the New Economic Association*, 2014, no. 2 (22), pp. 152–178.

6. McConnell C. R., Brue S. L. *Ekonomiks: Printsipy, problemy i politiki* [Economics: Principles, problems, and policies]. Tashkent: Turan Publ., 1996, vol. 1.

7. Maltsev A. A., Mordvinova A. E. Restrukturizatsiya staropromyshlennykh regionov Evropy: opyt i problemy [The restructuring of old industrial regions in Europe: Experience and problems]. *Upravlenets – The Manager*, 2016, no. 3(31), pp. 8–13.

8. North D., Wallis J., Webb S., Weingast B. V teni nasiliya: uroki dlya obshchestv s ogranichenym dostupom k politicheskoy i ekonomicheskoy deyatel'nosti [In the shadow of violence: Lessons for societies with limited access to political and economic activities]. *Voprosy ekonomiki – The Issues of Economics*, 2012, no. 3, pp. 4–31.

9. Polterovich V. M., Popov V. V. Evolyutsionnaya teoriya ekonomicheskoy politiki. Chast I. Opyt bystrogo razvitiya [An evolutionary theory of economic policy. Part I. The experience of fast development]. *Voprosy ekonomiki – The Issues of Economics*, 2006, no. 7, pp. 4–23.

10. Romanova O. A. Strategicheskiy vektor ekonomicheskoy dinamiki industrial'nogo regiona [The strategic vector of the economic dynamics of the industrial region]. *Ekonomika regiona – Economy of Region*, 2014, no. 1, pp. 43–56.

11. Rothbard M. *Vlast i rynek: gosudarstvo i ekonomika* [Power and Market: Government and the Economy]. Chelyabinsk: Sotsium Publ., 2016.

12. Silin Ya. P., Animitsa Ye. G., Novikova N. V. Pered vyzovami tretyey volny industrializatsii: strana, region [Facing the challenges of the third wave of industrialization; country, region]. *Izvestiya Uralskogo gosudarstvennogo ekonomicheskogo universiteta – Journal of the Ural State University of Economics*, 2016, no. 3 (65), pp. 14–25.

13. Simachev Yu. *Promyshlennaya politika v Rossii: institutsional'nye osobennosti, gruppy interesov, uroki na budushchee* [Industrial policy in Russia: Institutional specifics, groups of interest, lessons for the future]. Available at: <http://www.econ.msu.ru/ext/lib/News/x20/x6e/8302/file/Simachev%20presentation%202014-01.pdf>.

14. Sukharev O. S. Reindustrializatsiya ekonomiki Rossii i tekhnologicheskoe razvitie [Russia's re-industrialization and technological development of the economy]. *Natsionalnye interesy: priority i bezopasnost – National Interests: Priorities and Security*, 2014, no. 10 (247), pp. 2–16.

15. Tatarkin A. I., Romanova O. A., Bukhvalov N. Yu. Novaya industrializatsiya ekonomiki Rossii [The new industrialization of Russia's Economy]. *Vestnik Uralskogo Federalnogo Universiteta. Seriya: Ekonomika i upravlenie – Bulletin of the Ural Federal University. Series: Economics and Management*, no. 3, 2014, pp. 13–21.

16. Hayek F. A. *Individualizm i ekonomicheskii poryadok* [Individualism and economic order]. Chelyabinsk: Sotsium Publ., 2011.

17. Acemoglu D., Robinson J. A. *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*. N. Y.: Crown Business, 2012.

18. Akerlof G. A. The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1970, Vol. 84, no. 3, pp. 488–500.
19. Chang H-J. *The Political Economy of Industrial Policy*. L.: Macmillan Press, 1994.
20. Chang H-J. *Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspectives: Policies and Institutions for Economic Development in Historical Perspectives*. L.: Anthem Press, 2002.
21. Danker T., Dohrmann T., Killefer N., Mendonca L. *How Can the American Government Meet its Productivity Challenge?* McKinsey and Company, 2006, July.
22. Gereffi G., Wyman D. *Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia*. Princeton, N. Y.: Princeton University Press, 1990.
23. Krugman P. *Geography and Trade*. Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, 1991.
24. Li X., Liu X., Wang Y. *A Model of China's State Capitalism* (August 2015). URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2061521>.
25. Lin J. Y. *New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking Development and Policy*. Washington: World Bank Publications, 2012.
26. Lin J. Y. *The Quest for Prosperity: How Developing Economies Can Take Off*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012.
27. Lin J. Y., Rosenblatt D. Shifting Patterns of Economic Growth and Rethinking Development. *Journal of Economic Policy Reform*, 2013, no. 15 (3), pp. 171–194.
28. Lin J. Y., Sun X., Jiang Y. Endowment, Industrial Structure, and Appropriate Financial Structure: A New Structural Economics Perspective. *Journal of Economic Policy Reform*, 2013. DOI:10.1080/17487870.2013.799035.
29. Mankiw N. G. *Principles of Microeconomics*. Worth, Texas: The Dryden Press, 1997.
30. Musacchio A., Lazzarini S. G. *Reinventing State Capitalism: Leviathan in Business, Brazil and Beyond*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014.
31. Newman J. The “Double Dynamics” of Activation: Institutions, Citizens and the Re-making of Welfare Governance. *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, 2007, no. 27 (9-10), pp. 364–375.
32. Pack H., Saggi K. *The Case for Industrial Policy: A Critical Survey*. Available at: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/8782/wps3839.pdf>.
33. Price V. *Industrial Policies in the European Community*. L.: Macmillan, 1981.
34. Rodrik D. *Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century*. Available at: <https://www.sss.ias.edu/files/pdfs/Rodrik/Research/industrial-policy-twenty-first-century.pdf>.
35. Beardsley S. C., Farrell D. Regulation that is Good for Competition. *McKinsey Quarterly*, 2005, no. 2.
36. Stiglitz J. *Whither Reform? Ten Years of the Transition*. Available at: https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/sites/jstiglitz/files/1999_4_Wither_Reform.pdf.
37. Wade R. *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and The Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization*. Princeton, N. Y.: Princeton University Press, 2003.
38. Warwick K. *Industrial Policy – Emerging Issues and New Trends*. The Babbage Industrial Policy Network, 2013 Lecture Series. Available at: <http://www.ifm.eng.cam.ac.uk/uploads/Research/Babbage/Warwick.pdf>.
39. Wooldridge A. The Visible Hand. *The Economist*, 2012, January 21. Available at: http://media.economist.com/sites/default/files/sponsorships/MM150/20120121_state_capitalism.pdf.

Промышленная политика: эволюция научных подходов, русская специфика и влияние на конкурентоспособность предприятий

С. В. Орехова

Исследование направлено на выявление типов и специфики российской промышленной политики, а также ее влияния на конкурентоспособность отечественных предприятий. Проведен терминологический анализ и предложена систематизация типов государственной промышленной политики. Новизна исследования заключается в том, что предпринята попытка выявления эффектов деятельности предприятия от результатов проведения промышленной политики. Сделан вывод, что вмешательство государства в экономику является фактором повышения конкурентоспособности бизнеса только в том случае, когда параметры предприятия соответствуют целям промышленной политики. Данное утверждение расходится со стереотипными представлениями о том, что промышленная политика всегда является своеобразным защитным барьером для отечественного бизнеса. В результате анализа эволюции подходов к проведению промышленной политики автор делает вывод: на мировой арене наблюдается существенное усиление роли государства в экономических отношениях. Политика государственного капитализма является также «визитной карточкой» российской экономической системы. Сопоставление декларируемой и реальной промышленной политики в России выявило целый ряд расхождений. Декларируемая проактивная (упреждающая) политика на практике является активной и сводится к системе «догоняющих» мер.

Ключевые слова: промышленная политика; устойчивое развитие; инструменты промышленной политики; конкурентные преимущества; реиндустриализация.

Источники:

1. Абалкин Л. И. Концептуальные вопросы разработки промышленной политики в условиях современной российской экономики // Промышленная политика России на пороге XXI века : материалы круглого стола (12 февраля 1997 г.). М. : ИздАТ, 1997. С. 28–33.
2. Вольчик В. В. Эффективность рыночного процесса и эволюция институтов // Известия высших учебных заведений. Северо-Кавказский регион. Сер.: Общественные науки. 2002. № 4. С. 43–50.
3. Гильмундинов В. М. Промышленная политика России: состояние и проблемы // Регион: экономика и социология. 2011. № 1. С. 104–117.
4. Кондратьев В. Б. Отрасли и сектора глобальной экономики: особенности и тенденции развития. М. : Международные отношения, 2015.
5. Кузнецов Б. В., Симачев Ю. В. Эволюция государственной промышленной политики в России // Журнал Новой экономической ассоциации. 2014. № 2 (22). С. 152–178.
6. Макконнелл К. Р., Брю С. Л. Экономикс: принципы, проблемы и политики : в 2 т. : пер с англ. Ташкент : Туран, 1996. Т. 1.
7. Мальцев А. А., Мордвинова А. Э. Реструктуризация старопромышленных регионов Европы: опыт и проблемы // Управленец. 2016. № 3 (61). С. 8–13.
8. Норт Д., Уоллис Дж., Уэбб С., Вайнгайт Б. В тени насилия: уроки для обществ с ограниченным доступом к политической и экономической деятельности // Вопросы экономики. 2012. № 3. С. 4–31.
9. Полтерович В. М., Попов В. В. Эволюционная теория экономической политики. Ч. 1. Опыт быстрого развития // Вопросы экономики. 2006. № 7. С. 4–23.
10. Романова О. А. Стратегический вектор экономической динамики индустриального региона // Экономика региона. 2014. № 1. С. 43–56.
11. Ротбард М. Власть и рынок: государство и экономика / пер. с англ. Б. С. Пинскера. Челябинск : Социум, 2016.
12. Силин Я. П., Анимица Е. Г., Новикова Н. В. Перед вызовами третьей волны индустриализации: страна, регион // Известия Уральского государственного экономического университета. 2016. № 3 (65). С. 14–25.
13. Симачев Ю. Промышленная политика в России: институциональные особенности, группы интересов, уроки на будущее // Узлы экономической политики: доклады диспут-клуба Ассоциации независимых центров экономического анализа (Москва, 16 января 2014 г.). URL: <http://www.econ.msu.ru/ext/lib/News/x20/x6e/8302/file/Simachev%20presentation%202014-01.pdf>.

14. Сухарев О. С. Реиндустриализация экономики России и технологическое развитие // Национальные интересы: приоритеты и безопасность. 2014. № 10 (247). С. 2–16.
15. Татаркин А. И., Романова О. А., Бухвалов Н. Ю. Новая индустриализация экономики России // Вестник УрФУ. Сер.: Экономика и управление. 2014. № 3. С. 13–21.
16. Хайек Ф. А. Индивидуализм и экономический порядок. Челябинск : Социум, 2011.
17. Acemoglu D., Robinson J. A. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. N. Y. : Crown Business, 2012.
18. Akerlof G. A. The Market for «Lemons»: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism // The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1970. Vol. 84. No. 3. P. 488–500.
19. Chang H.-J. The Political Economy of Industrial Policy. L. : Macmillan Press, 1994.
20. Chang H.-J. Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspectives: Policies and Institutions for Economic Development in Historical Perspectives. L. : Anthem Press, 2002.
21. Danker T., Dohrmann T., Killefer N., Mendonca L. How Can the American Government Meet its Productivity Challenge? // McKinsey and Company. 2006. July.
22. Gereffi G., Wyman D. Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia. N. Y. : Princeton University Press, 1990.
23. Krugman P. Geography and Trade. Cambridge, MA : MIT Press. 1991.
24. Li X., Liu X., Wang Y. A Model of China's State Capitalism (August 2015). URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2061521>.
25. Lin J. Y. New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking Development and Policy. Washington : World Bank Publications, 2012.
26. Lin J. Y. The Quest for Prosperity: How Developing Economies Can Take Off. Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2012.
27. Lin J. Y., Rosenblatt D. Shifting Patterns of Economic Growth and Rethinking Development // Journal of Economic Policy Reform. 2013. Vol. 15. No. 3. P. 171–194.
28. Lin J. Y., Sun X., Jiang Y. Endowment, Industrial Structure, and Appropriate Financial Structure: A New Structural Economics Perspective // Journal of Economic Policy Reform. 2013. Vol. 16. No. 2. P. 109–122.
29. Mankiw N. G. Principles of Microeconomics. Worth, Texas : The Dryden Press, 1997.
30. Musacchio A., Lazzarini S.G. Reinventing State Capitalism: Leviathan in Business, Brazil and Beyond. Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 2014.
31. Newman J. The “Double Dynamics” of Activation: Institutions, Citizens and the Remaking of Welfare Governance // International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy. 2007. Vol. 27. No. 9-10. P. 364–375.
32. Pack H., Saggi K., The Case for Industrial Policy: A Critical Survey. URL: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/8782/wps3839.pdf>.
33. Price V. Industrial Policies in the European Community. L. : Macmillan, 1981.
34. Rodrik D. Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century. URL: <https://www.sss.ias.edu/files/pdfs/Rodrik/Research/industrial-policy-twenty-first-century.pdf>.
35. Beardsley S. C., Farrell D. Regulation That is Good for Competition // McKinsey Quarterly. 2005. No. 2. P. 49–59.
36. Stiglitz J. Whither Reform? Ten Years of the Transition. URL: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTABCEWASHINGTON1999/Resources/stiglitz.pdf>.
37. Wade R. Governing the Market: Economic Theory and The Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization. N. Y. : Princeton University Press, 2003.
38. Warwick K. Industrial Policy – Emerging Issues and New Trends. URL: <http://www.ifm.eng.cam.ac.uk/uploads/Research/Babbage/Warwick.pdf>.
39. Wooldridge A. The Visible Hand // The Economist. 2012. January 21. URL: http://media.economist.com/sites/default/files/sponsorships/MM150/20120121_state_capitalism.pdf.

Сведения об авторе:

С. В. Орехова, канд. экон. наук, доцент
кафедры экономики предприятий
Контактный телефон: (343) 221-17-84
e-mail: bentarask@list.ru

Уральский государственный экономический
университет
620219, Екатеринбург, ул. 8 Марта/
Народной Воли, 62/45