The hidden hands of foreign interference and Ethiopia's security challenge, from post 2005 Election-2018

Authors. Yeheys Nardos Hawaz¹ and Ms. Chen Xi²

Affiliation, PhD candidate, Jilin University, School of International and public Affairs¹, and (PhD)lecturer in the School of International and Public Affairs of Jilin University. She holds her MA and PhD in major of Public Administration and Public Policy from the Administration College in Jilin University. She had been the research assistant of National Center of Digital Government in University of Massachusetts, Amherst in U.S for a year. Dr. Chen's research fields are International public relations, New media public diplomacy and Evaluation of the employees of International organizations. ²

Email, nardosha@gmail.com ^{*}freyafloat@163.com

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Abstracts

Post-2005 election had created great political awakening in Ethiopia. In this post-election period, another armed political group was established against Ethiopian government. However, this group was based at foreign destination. Political intervention is largely military. According to the history of countries where military intervention has been shown, the cause of the intervention may be serious human rights abuses, biological hazards, or serious civil conflicts that threaten the lives of citizens. Ethiopia did not have direct intervention because of there were no sign of any above stated

*processes. However, it is not possible to say that foreign hands were not involved in Ethiopia's political dynamics. From 2005-2018 which is the time of Melees Zenawi to Hailemariam Desalegn's power as prime minister, the government had been accusing the hands of foreign forces in the aftermath of violence. Even though outside forces did not directly intervene, these third parties were involving and interfering in Ethiopia's domestic politics and **exacerbated** unrest. By what means were they able to get involved in the politics of the country? With whom they collaborate? What was the position of the government? The content of the crisis that followed*

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these endorsements underscores the dilemma of the foreign regime and the security crisis that the Ethiopian government had faced. This article will address these questions by considering Ethiopia's security challenges during the period adoption of 2005 to 2018.

Keyword, Security, foreign interference, national interest, armed group.

1. Introduction

When Ethiopia was under the control of the transitional government, the transition government was busy completing several tasks. The corrupt practices of the previous government had to be corrected. Ethiopia's foreign relations had to be renewed. The transitional government was short-lived and had to be drafted by a constitution that would fix the fate of Ethiopia. It had to form a legal and permanent government. These transitional tasks were a major chore in terms of maintaining the stability of the country and maintaining peaceful activity.

All were successful, federalism is believed to reduce the Ethiopian public's security concerns. It became a government system. The constitution was approved. A constitutional recognized government was also established. Citizens have the right to govern themselves. Meles Zenawi was elected as the first Prime Minister. While the process has temporarily reduced security concerns in Ethiopia, violence, conflict and dissatisfaction have begun to occur for different reasons.

If federalism answers the question of the nation, the issue of how these conflicts might have happened was the challenge to the Meles administration and

began to carefully consider these issues. It began to indicate that there were indications that the risks associated with external interference were being migrated under the country after 2005 election. It was not immediately clear which of the foreign forces originated. However, slowly the outside hands rested on several issues.

Hailemariam Desalegn, who is in power after the death of Meles Zenawi, suffered a similar setback. In fact, it was a government that was under pressure. Ethiopia's governmental opposition has increased in number. Political strife, religious upheaval spread. Tolerance between nation has diminished, and conflicts between states have increased. Nation started to create an identity and hate-based campaign. The Hailemariam Administration has endured all these temptations but the problems have not gone away.

It is believed that the Ethiopian government had created a stable state in federalism. Nevertheless, Federalism itself has promoted ethnic nationalism in the country. However, citizens still have common values in national affairs. But in post-federalism, there was growing sense of humor that was given the opportunity to have political content. It was also late the long arm of outside forces to interfere. How can religious disputes suddenly arise in a country while religious equality has been heard with a constitutional mandate? And how these conflicts exacerbated with interference?

The interference by external forces in Ethiopia has been wide-ranging. The aid and support of opposition parties is one among the other. Organize armed struggle groups and support terrorist group are the also the other dimensions. Unlike the above, allowing the media is also one of the factors. The following

pages will explore in detail, on how these hidden hands became the challenges of Ethiopian Political dynamics at the given time.

2. Sources of security threat

Ethiopia's security threat stems from several factors. One of the problems internal political instability of the country. This is due to the rapidly growing nationalism associated issues. with the collapse of the Derg regime in Ethiopia, Ethiopia adopted federalism system. The system has created a sense of ethnic nationalism for the nations across the country. And those who live in the border and coastal areas have been drawn sense of belonging neighboring countries. Just as the federal system gave citizens the opportunity to govern themselves, it also gave the opportunity for national politics to flourish. This nationalism has continued to be a cause of conflict and has opened the door to foreign forces as it continues to struggle.

The other is the interest of external forces in the environment. Due to the geographical location of the area, it has frequently been shown that foreign forces have a unique influence on the environment. For example, one report suggests that the instability of Ethiopia's political dynamics does effect on the demand U.S. in the Horn of Africa.[1] Relaying on that factor, U.S. may be fully willing to help the Ethiopian political process be rectified. But if this is the case, it would require a study of whether the neighboring countries are happy. If the matter is of interest to Ethiopia, then the mutual aid can be made to other countries too at other time. The region is becoming a field of computation among powerful government.

The other threat is Ethiopia's geographical location, which will have a direct or indirect impact from the Horn of Africa, the east Africa and the Middle East. This geographical location is located in the northeastern part of Africa and covers the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. [2] There are a number of countries that intervene in the natural resources outside the region. The area is characterized by high levels of poverty and is a devastating conflict zone. However, the conflicts exacerbated to interfere with external forces.[3] Studies have shown that Ethiopia has a high level of security risk in different directions in relation to its geographical location. These geographical areas include Ogden, Afar, Oromia, and Gambella. The situation in these areas is an indication that there may be a complex security problem from neighboring country. In addition, Tigray has the same opportunity similar wise from Eritrea. [4] Beside these, there is a possibility that this geographical positioning may be an additional source of security threats. This has the potential to result in significant cultural interaction.

The other is the similarity of cultural interaction in the Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa people are indirectly following a similar social experience. It is a people who speak the same language and follow the same religion. Every time a politician tries to make this social content a different meaning, it followed by serious problem. The region faces similar challenges include weak government, ecological, environmental and health vulnerabilities, vulnerability to international terrorism, and criminal networks.[5] In terms of cultural and social interaction, the same happens in all areas of the region. In addition, Ethiopia's history of friendship and hostility with other countries in the region has created a lot of fear and suspicion toward one another rather than on its

trust. On the other hand, cross-border resources are also a long-term problem.

While Ethiopia has its own internal instability, it also poses serious risks through these regions. All countries from the region are not mentioned as a threat but few states. The country's policy made clear that in 2002, Horn of Africa is zoning a conflict, but it does emphasize certain countries.

3. Rivalry of powerful states in the Horn of Africa as a security concern

The role of foreign involvement in the Horn of Africa is not particularly new. This engagement changed the course of world politics as it was at the time. Most of the reason behind the engagement is the protection of the economy at the local and global levels and reducing security threats.[6]The strategic location of the Horn of Africa makes it attractive to the rest of the region, neighboring countries and powerful states. It has created the opportunity for these groups to flourish in the region's political parties. In this case, the area is considered to be source of a security threat, and combined with the aggressiveness of the region's state, the region has become unstable.

The United States has been active in the international anti-terrorism campaign in the area. Ethiopia is one of the allied countries in this counterterrorism campaign. From its base in Djibouti, U.S. military provide support to counter terrorism in Somalia and Yemen.

With only the threat of a horn in the Horn of Africa, the United States has made a number of hidden and explicit mission on terrorism. Somalia has been a major hub of counter-terrorism operations and US fights and has helped in the fight against al-Qaeda,

al-Shabaab and other terrorist activities. Ethiopia is one of the countries involved in this anti-Terrorism campaign.[7] Because Ethiopia is concerned about the threat of extremist propaganda and fears that this group may will support rebels operating in Ethiopia, Ethiopia military, intervene in Somalia with support from the U.S.

Ethiopia's military intervention is compatible with the collapse of the Islamic Courts;However, it does not answer whether Ethiopia's security threat is reduced. This is because the al-Shabaab terrorist group that emerged in 2006 has created a favorable atmosphere. Already, Ethiopian opposition groups have joined or affiliated with al-Shabaab. In 2008, the group reached the summit that could finally be declared terrorist by the U.S. Congress.[8]The Ethiopian government has been formally also identified Al-Shabaab as terrorist group as the threat to Al-Shabaab continues to increase.¹Ethiopia's intervention appears to be a further threat. It soon became a victim of anti-US and its ally's movement. Al-Shabaab had supposed that the one of its two-wing in horn and east Africa will create its movement to create chaos in Ethiopia. [9] All of this was Ethiopia's post intervention time. Though, Ethiopia has clearly left Somalia, the threat continued. Nevertheless, the United States continues its secret campaign in Somalia.[10]

The competition for superpowersin the Horn of Africa continues. In 2017, China established its first military base in Djibouti. Prior to China, it was known that the United States, France, Japan, and some of the EU member states had military bases.[6]

¹ See more at United States Department of State. (2012, July 31). *Country Reports on Terrorism 2011 - Ethiopia*, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/501fbc822a.html>

Following this, powerful countries that occupy the region's political balance have expanded. The United States is not particularly pleased with Russia's and China's expanding potential. To this end, she expressed a desire to be friendly with Eritrea in the name of terrorism.[11] These conditions clearly indicate that there was/is an ideal conflict in the region between powerful states.

Depending on the circumstances, it is worth noting that the role of the powerful states in the region can further increase the threat of the region itself. Despite Ethiopia's entry into Somalia to reduce its security threat, al-Shabaab's intervention, including Islamic extremism, has increased significantly. Ethiopia has repeatedly experienced domestic violence. The government described the opposition political forces and foreign forces were behind this violence. Understanding this chain can be seen as a reflection of al-Shabaab's attack and resentment on Ethiopian government.

In general, the involvement of foreign countries, particularly the superpowers in the Horn of Africa, has not been almost as successful as the story. The region is still under development. As terrorism, civil strife, poverty and helplessness continues, the engagement of foreign countries continued to be less valuable to the region unless for their interest. It rather creates hostility among each other following Alignments with one of the powers.

4. Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa: A threat Sensitive relation

Ethiopia's foreign policy of 2002 begins description of its relations with foreign countries in the Horn of Africa. As the policy began, it states change in Ethiopia has an impact on the Horn and the process

in the Horn also has an impact on Ethiopia. Therefore, Ethiopia has begun to maintain its relations with these countries in great deal of protection of own security and interests.[12] Besides, it also clearly stated that Ethiopia has a history of friendship and hostility with these countries, so that any activities in these countries need to be carefully observed. Ethiopia's fear is that democratic and developmental processes can be easily hindered by social interactions.

The Horn of Africa, like Ethiopia, is still in its early stages of democracy, so it is not yet strong enough to support Ethiopia's democratic path. This is due to the limitations and pressures they have, but not to despise or undermine the country. On the other hand, the Ethiopian government already thought that these countries can have a significant negative impact on Ethiopia. According to the policy definition, these countries can easily suppress Ethiopian democracy. This, by promoting religious extremism, will make the country vulnerable to the threat of religious intolerance.

Eritrea and Somalia, which have repeatedly been mentioned as the pathway to security threat from these countries. Even though Eritrea peacefully seceded from Ethiopia in 1993, it was engaged in a bloody war with Ethiopia a few years later. [13] However, as post-war, Ethiopia was a breeding ground for Eritrea in the north, it had great security concerns. In addition, the Eritrean government has shown increased co-operation with anti-Ethiopian forces [14] and also supported the establishment of opposition political parties and providing training. So, it was feared that the threat that appeared only in the north would be in every direction.

Ethiopia-Eritrea war has changed the political landscape of the Horn of Africa. It turned the most difficult part of the region's politics to more complex.[15]The Eritrean regime also assumed that its post-war Hegemonic project was failed. The war with Ethiopian government was largely responsible for this. Thus, Eritrea tried to change Ethiopian regime, even forcibly. Hence, studies suggested, Eritrea had been heavily armed, trained, and provided material and other support to the anti-Ethiopia regime in her realm, the governance had been involved in the violence in the region in order to disturb the stability of Ethiopia. [16]For example, the conflict with Djibouti is possible to mention. This was a project that was more than a wave of controversy of claiming border as it affects the economy of Ethiopia as Ethiopia is mainly deepened on Djibouti's port.

Somalia was also a major source of security threat in Ethiopia. Ethiopia's 2002 policy describes Somalia as an embodiment of involvement with Ethiopia's enemy. The friendship story goes far beyond social interaction and cultural elitism. The hostility story has been extensively told in connection with the agenda of the Great Somalia Project,[17] the influence of colonial politics,[18] and Islamic court. In affecting Ethiopia stability, whenever one of these issues fails, the other would work. Whenever, it could not get in touch with Ethiopia directly, it also made to interfere in search of related or affiliated bodies.

Even if only recent cases are considered, the rise of the Islamic court and Al-Shabaab has left Ethiopia in a state of disarray. It is well-known that the Ethiopian government had used military intervention to overthrow the Islamic court.[19]However, following the abolition of these group, many terrorist groups were created in Somalia. These groups have received

support from Eritrea and other countries for training. They organized and supported Ethiopia's opposition groups in Somalia. This has made it easier for them to find a way to trigger their target.

Broadly speaking, Ethiopia's security concerns were either Eritrea and Somalia, or were generated by that route. And because of its social interaction, it has created a climate of convenience. But groups from these countries are completely have no direct conflict in recent days; they rather support opposing a group especially those have been fighting the government for liberation.

5. Armed opposition political group (parties) and Ethiopia's security threats

Ethiopian politics are very volatile. This flexibility has greatly challenged the democratic construction of the country. This dynamic has been around since the transitional government. It is known that the two political parties that signed the transition charter were immediately opposed the charter. These parties are OLF and ONLF.

OLF had repeatedly complained that the EPRDF had violated the agreement after signing the transition. More often than not, while involving in government, it had mentioned that, the party had been already fighting with the Government forces. In the end, OLF left the transitional government.² Similar wise, after the Charter, the ONLF also began to govern the Somali region. However, it did not stop Ogaden's independence during the transition. Finally, the Ogaden was unable to agree on the agenda self-

² See more at *The Christian Science Monitor*. June 24, 1992 :

<http://www.csmonitor.com/1992/0624/24023.html>

determination of the Somali region. It is separated from the government. So is the administration of the region.[20]

The Ethiopian Transitional government would have allowed for the self-determination. However, the parade is not a international standard, but a national one. This means that it is an autonomous region that separates each region from the other, not sovereignty.[21]The anger of the OLF and the ONLF is also associated with EPLF, who has already been in power in Eritrea, has issued a referendum. Eritrea has succeeded from Ethiopia. This was in the era of the Charter. In this case, the OLF and ONLF, were also the organization that fought for the independence of Oromia and Ogaden respectively. Nevertheless, after separating from the Charter, the two organizations continued their armed struggle.

The Oromo Liberation Front was dispersed to the plains of Somalia and Kenya after separating with the government. Over time, various attacks have resulted in different occasions. OLF used to run the headquarters at times in Khartoum, and sometimes Asmara. At different times, it was considered a terrorist group, even in Ethiopia, Kenya and the Somali government, in the attacks on civilians. For this, the BBC report in 1998 indicated, the Kenyan government accused the Oromo Liberation Front of the conflict that erupted in the northeastern Kenyan border and killed 187 people.³The Ethiopian army had been also conducting military surveillance in Somalia since 1996 to attack Somali-based anti-Ethiopian forces. One of them was the Oromo

Liberation Front. The government Sayed, OLF stand by the side of Eritrea during the Ethio-Eritrean war and overtly showed its hostility to Ethiopian people and government.⁴

The Ethiopian government has committed to proclaim anti-terrorism proclamation. To this end, the OLF refers to repeated attacks. The group launched a bomb attack on a government institute in Dire Dawa in 2002. Again, in 2002, it injured civilian in an explosion in a private oil tanker. The OLF said it would be responsible for the bombing of the Delaware Railway Commission that same year. In 2004, it carried out the same bombing at the Government Educational Institute in Gedewo Zone. In the same year, it again attacked the Bishoftu Business District. After all of these repeated attacks, the OLF had declared as a terrorist group of Ethiopian origin to gather with other two.⁵

Though Ethiopian government declared OLF as terrorist, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and other powerful state did not designate it as a terrorist yet. [22]However, the OLF continues to operate through its command office in Asmara. He had the support of the Eritrean government.

In 1999, Patrick Gilkes wrote to The Independent that OLF had been training in Eritrea and took military assistance. According to Patrick, in February of that year, it deployed military equipment in southwestern Mogadishu, and transported hundreds of ONL troops who completed their training in May.[23]

⁴See more at BBC News. (1999, June 28). *Africa;Ethiopia 'captures' Somali town*. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/380472.stm>

⁵See more at MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base: <https://web.archive.org/web/20070314041711/http://www.tkb.org/Incident.jsp?inclID=11151>

³ See more at BBC News. (1999, June 23). *"Massacre 'involved Oromos'. says Kenya"*. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/376564.stm>

Conflicts in widespread Oromia were directed against the Master Plan, the mal administration of corruption. Of course, there is some truth here. The student protests, which were sparked in 2014 by New Abba City and Oromia's special interest, were due to the fact that it was illegally spread and was a distraction for Oromo farmers. Gradually it dropped out and grew into religious content. Opposition voices were claiming religious equality, as well as opposition to government intervention in Islamic Affair.

Since these incidents were repeated occurred, the OLF had a great opportunity to refine the agenda. In Oromia, it soon captured the attention of many youth. The mal administration, and the Master Plan issue were considered national pressure to separately from the management problem. In an effort to compensate for the embarrassment of the Ethio- Eritrean war, the OLF became its right hand. It would be folly to conclude that the violence in Oromia was not in the hands of or connected with the ONLF. Similarly, behind the OLF is not Eritrea, which is just a fad.

Like OLF, the ONLF had also signed the charter. It even reached administrating the state of Somali. However, he was excluded because he could not agree with the government's political motives. The ONLF, who is fighting for the independence of the people of Ogaden, has clearly set out its political goals. Among these is the proclamation of the independence of the Ogaden, and the establishment of an Islamic state is the underlined priority. These are some of the reasons that were not received by the Ethiopian government. However, the group maintains that the Ogaden is illegally controlled by Ethiopia. It

considers this to be the fall of the Ethiopian colony in various ways.⁶

The ONLF is one of the political parties threatened by the government as terrorist. The group has carried out a series of attacks in the Somali region of Ethiopia. The name is also mentioned in the frequent clashes between Somali and Oromia region. Since the Somali region is divided into clan groups, the clan had been divided and engaged in conflict between the Ogaden and government supportive groups. [24] ONLF also engaged in armed confrontation with government forces. However, it also made a surprise attack. In its struggle with the government forces in 2007, the group stated that counted seven cities. Like the OLF, the group trained in Eritrea. This situation was particularly strong in the post-Eritrea war. The ONLF had attacked the oil exploration companies, which seventy-five people died in the attack, nine were Chinese and several have been seriously injured. In the same year, students were killed in an attack by the city cultural gathering. Civilians were also injured. [25] In Korahe Zone and Shilavo town attack teachers were killed including civilians. There has also been a recurrent threat in the sub-region. By analyzing these attacks and scrutinizing the political lines and considering its links with al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab, the Ethiopian government has designated it as a terrorist group.

The ONLF simply fell out of favor of foreign influence because of its political advantage. It has become a tool for the spread of Islamic extremism. It took the path of Eritrea to organize the politics of

⁶ See more at ONLF. (n.d.). *Political Programme of Ogaden National Liberation Front*. Retrieved from http://onlf.org/?page_id=16

revenge. Islamist extremism in the Somali region is growing in other parts of Ethiopia. The politics of hating non-indigenous is also spreading. After all this, However, all this was not the ONLF's political purpose. The ONLF was a political group that concentrated entirely on the Ogaden. But all of a sudden, the it had joined forces with Eritrea, al-Shabaab and other opposition groups in order to gain its goal.

The other armed group which did not have any touch with the transitional government is Ginbot 7. Ginbot 7 is a party formed after the 2005 election. The group is formed by former members of the Coalition for Unity and Democrat Party, which opposed the government's claim that the electoral system was abolished. In the chaos that followed the election, youth people in Addis Ababa city had lost their lives and many were injured. Some have fled the country due to prosecution and conspiracy under the leadership of party leaders in trying to wreak havoc in the regime. After their release, the rest of the group also left the country.

The party was founded in 2008 in a foreign country and the founders are former members of the coalitionn for unity and democracy party. The organization works to foster Ethiopian nationalism by working with Ethiopians at home and abroad. More specifically, the group states that the struggle include arms even to change the regime forcefully and ensure citizens' equality. However, it is illegal to seek to change the government in such manner.[26]

The group even aimed more, to ensure that every Ethiopian has a country where democracy and human rights are respected, economic prosperity and social justice, citizens' lives, security and benefits are

respected.⁷ However, there is no good reason or only the group knew as to why it wants to achieve this, even in armed struggle.

The party was working to form alliances with the opposition political parties in Ethiopia in various ways. But it needed foreign aid to help coordinate the work. The group's leadership, once said that Ginbot 7 had a financial and technical support agreement with the Eritrean government. He also said the financial support will be used for further military training and Intelligence operations.[27]

Even though Ginbot 7 has no experience as the OLF and ONLF, it did not take long to be judged as a terrorist in its propaganda. When Ethiopian government signed the OLF and ONLF as a terrorist, Ginbot 7 was in the third. The organization had made its position in the United States and has been active in the Horn of Africa.

Once, Andargachew Tsige, who was the leader of the organization, was under arrestwhile traveling to Eritrea. The reason of his traveling was to provide training for opposition in Eritrea.[28] The training aimed at exacerbating the violent movement and the course material explored different ways of how to make explosives.

Like ONLF and OLF, Ginbot 7 do not have separationist agenda. However, it worked closely with those two organizations to achieve its goal. Similarly, all three of them have similar external support.

⁷ See more of. *Patriotic G7 Vision* from https://www.patriotg7.org/?page_id=124.

6. Media and conflict escalation

Private media institutions in Ethiopia are booming. Particularly since the election of 2005, opposition media has begun to flourish.[29] Of course, it is not objectionable that opposition parties can rely on their own means in this regard, since there is little air coverage available to them. However, the problem arises when the media is not licensed by national government.

Medias have been instrumental for Opposition parties in promoting conflict in Ethiopia, eroding the coexistence of communities. In the effort to discard the ideology, the relatively small and the negative aspects that they provide in their coverage of the issue are abundant. On the other hand, they have their seats overseas and their establishment is licensed by foreign countries to make them accountable.

For example, ESAT Media was established on April 24, 2010, a group of journalists who had fled, many of whom had suffered domestic abuse, imprisonment or exile, suffered domestic abuse. The institute's website reports that the studio, based in Amsterdam, Washington, and London, uses on-Broadcast, satellite TV and radio services. It is a satellite media project registered in the media and democracy advocacy in Ethiopia, in the Dutch Chamber of Commerce and a US-based charity.⁸ The organization believes that ESAT is a stronghold of exiled journalists, human rights activists, civic leaders and members of the Diaspora, who are firmly committed to democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The media is widely associated with the Patriots' Ginbot 7 party [30] and is often referred to as the language of the organization.

It has been tried to see Ginbot 7 had been an armed opposition group and had been supported by Eritrea and Somalia. Now when it comes to media, if ESAT is associated with the party, it is possible to see the Western hand. The concern for these is that licensing and registration of media led by a major struggling organization underscores the need for intervention in countries.

ESAT repeatedly stated that the Ethiopian government would have prevented the transmission from reaching Ethiopia. The main challenge, according to ESAT, is that, with the support of the Chinese government, Ethiopia has attempted to silence ESAT using jamming technology. It was abducted 24 times in this effort. However, this effort proved to be futile as it was a media that resisted their efforts to stay on the air despite financial difficulties. And here it is easily understood that there is a multiplicity of powerful governments. If ESAT is able to get license from Amsterdam and Washington while mention China to support Ethiopia in jamming process, there is a clear political need beyond the media.

OMN is a U.S.-based nonprofit organization licensed under the Federal Communications Commission. OMN is chaired by an independent board of trustees, executive council and professional journalists. OMN complain the question of the Oromo people has never come to the fore as the Ethiopian government controls all the newspapers, radio and TV stations in the country. Therefore, as it has stated the goal on the website, it will be able to work to unite the Oromo Diaspora and local one on to move the Oromo people

⁸ See more at official website,
<https://ethsat.com/about-us/>

movement to promote the language and culture of the Oromo people in the future.⁹

Like ESAT, the OMN is said to have contact with the opposition parties. It has been observed once that it extends to the Oromo nationalism. This is the core goal of Oromo Liberation Front. It has been noticed advocated for the release of Oromo Political prisoners, and thus, was viewed as a party affiliated rather than a professional. ESAT was originally intended to persuade the diaspora and the Ethiopians at home. In this, it differs from OMN. In short, ESAT preaches Ethiopian nationalism and OMN is an activist of Oromo nationalism. However, when the two media presented as an alternative to the nation that was confined to the state media, they created considerable political awakening within the community.

They Spread out social complaints. They continued to report on human rights violations, and the widespread lack of democracy, totalitarian rule, which had an impact on the entire population political view. They opened the way for the community to easily fall under the pressure of the diaspora. They provided air cover, indirectly looking for various governmental defects to get the ruling party out of power.[31]

The other, ENN media was established in 2016. The media offers a wide variety of unusual news. Private media was becoming more popular as the news media is completely transformed by the political media and changed the media's culture and approach in Ethiopia. While ENN covered Ethiopian nationalism, it was frequently complained that it

would exaggerate the masses in the Oromia. As a result, it did not have a good relationship with the Oromia regional government and Addis Ababa city administration.[32] Finally, it is closed in 2018 on charges of misrepresentation.

If these media are placed at founding sequences ESAT is the first, then OMN and finally ENN. The ENN is analogous to OMN. When the OMN reports the growing pressure on the Oromo people, ENN declares that human rights violations, and crime on non-indigenes in Oromia region, in live transmission. ESAT uses both as input. Many foreign radio stations have also performed similar activities. However, as the government media did not raise public concerns, it is true they played role in raising public question. However, they had also played a role in exacerbating the unrest and violence which was a main challenge of the regime.

7. Ethiopia's opposition political party Culture and security concern

The federal system of Ethiopia allows multi-party system. the federal system is indicative that there may be national and regional parties.

EPRDF was the ruling party in the federal system of Ethiopia. EPRDF was a coalition of four regional parties.¹⁰ However, the five regions are also a

¹⁰ The EPRDF was a coalition of four political parties formed in 1988. They are the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), Amhara Democratic Party (APP), the Oromo People's Democratic Party (OPD), and the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (SEPPDM). EPRDF has created parties in the region since the beginning of the election. Nationally, they are the four regional parties called by the EPRDF, but the five regions regional parties are also operating according to the EPRDF. The party's efforts to form a national party by combining these affiliated regional parties for years have only

⁹ See more at official website, OMN. :
<https://oromiamedia.com/about/>

subsidiary, though not part of the EPRDF. Therefore, they are funded by the EPRDF, and do not have their own political program.

Opposition parties exist at national and regional levels. They operate at the national level, competing for the formation of a central government like EPRDF. At the regional level, they are in the process of becoming a regional ruling party. EPRDF's ruling party-based indirectly affiliated with ethnic groups, thus, all parties in regions tend to favor ethnic nationalism.

In 2005, after the conflict between the ruling party and the opposition, the culture of Ethiopia's opposition parties changed. The rise of the opposition politics associated with nationalism has seen signs of linking with political activists. Organizations that follow the political activism discourse appear. Political activists have done their part to promote the social crisis in Ethiopia.[33]

While the government claims that have developed a multiparty system, it has been assumed that protesters have been losing power under a single party power domination for two decades. Protesters did not seem to be able to conquer the system peacefully. The government identified the parties responsible for the recurrent political crisis and political instability in Ethiopia during the post- 2005 elections and mention some as terrorist group. According to the Proclamation, any interaction with not just with these groups, but with members is considered an alliance or affiliated. Besides, Political activists from the Amhara region were clearly associated with Ginbot 7, while the Oromo activists seemed to have

recently ended. The EPDRF is now in collapse. Instead, the Prosperity Party has continued to lead ruling party.

affiliation OLF and other Oromo nationalist movement.

The role of these activists in the conflict in the Oromia and Amhara region has been prominent since 2015. Here, it's good to note that the conflict had exacerbated since then and followed by the resignation of the prime Minister. On the one hand, activists opened their own independent media. The media also have a foreign license. On the other hand, the activists do not pretend to be activists but rather as political opposition. The expression they use was/is largely illegal with the system. For example, while the government is led by the EPRDF party, yet, the parties and activists used/uses the term "weyane" which is associated with TPLF.

Another immense problematic was the party politics in Ethiopia. As their path is different, the two groups considered themselves as governors and opposition other than as the ruling party and oppositions party.

As a result, the culture to appreciate even the government's infrastructure development was declined and with conspiracy to commit a public offense is increased. In this case, both the ruling party and the opposition parties indirectly taught the Ethiopian people, especially the youth, a politics of blind support and wild opposition. This promotes even the wrong side of the political system, and denounces prejudice as well.

As a result, EPRDF's mistakes have been blindly overlooked and its good works has been blindly condemned. Opponents have similarly received the same fate from supporters of the ruling party. EPRDF has drawn up a program on youth since 2005 and has been officially known as the EPRDF youth league. In

the process, a group of *kero*¹¹-youth based formed in Oromia and *Fano*¹² in the Amhara region. These two youth league players lacked a legitimacy, and following a call from activists or opposition, they had played major role in exacerbating protest against government and performing wild judgments.

The anti-terror sentiment of the former is set to be recalled, as the government had repeatedly made public statements that the parties to the armed struggle are likely to cause violence in the country. Political organizations operating at the national and regional levels were mentioned as having direct links. For example, the Blue Party was often held to account for internal conflicts, even though it did not have armed struggle. The party meant to be associated with the Ginbot 7 rally, as the party is gearing up for nationalism.

OFC is a party operating in the Oromia region and has frequently been involved in conflicts in Oromia and Addis Ababa. The leader was arrested on suspicion that the party was working for the withdrawal of Oromia from the federal government. Like the blueparty, OFC was named/called as associated after the OLF. These connections are the result of a coincident of motives, which has led to widespread opposition within the country. However, they were not the same as in the political program.

The government repeatedly stated that oppositions parties hand was playing a major role in aggravating conflicts in Ethiopia. As a result, the political tensions in the country began to rise. Members of the

opposition Party were gradually fall under closed monitoring as they traveled to other country. For this, it is possible to see Dr. Merars's incarceration process.¹³

Even as the tensions between the governors and these institutions were tarnishing the country, the two groups did not seem to be on the verge of tolerance. Just as the government's actions cannot be completely justified, neither the opposition nor the activists were completely free from foreign influences. The question that remains unanswered is whether the party holed to play a foreign interest in the program.

8. Conclusion

Post-2005 election was a powerful stimulus to Ethiopian politics. The chaos that resulted from the disputes over the election has tragically killed many civilians. The leaders of the coalition party, the main rival in the retail sector, were arrested and held hostage. After some were released, they left the country and formed another party. Many parties were formed in post-2005 election. Although they were legally established, they were considered to be involved in conflict.

Privet media highlighting the concerns of the government, by focusing on the concerns of these political detainees by giving broader airspace as they broadcast broad coverage rather than the national political situation. The government has already made these media more complicated and linked these media to terrorist groups.

¹¹ *Kero* is a name of given group of Youth Oromo in Ethiopia in the name for political change.

¹² *Fano* is a name of given group of Youth Amhara in Ethiopia in the name for political change.

¹³ See more at ESAT News. (2016, November 30,). *Leading opposition leader arrested on arrival from Europe*. Retrieved from

In light of these political conflicts, the Meles administration had declared that religious extremism was taking place in Ethiopia. Religious extremism has been the source of conflict in Somalia, in Harar, and in parts of Oromia in connection with Islam. There were some signs that the ONLF was in the hands with al-Shabaab and others spreading this. Similar wise, there were some signs in Oromia that OMN Media was in the hands. As a result, the government claimed the Somalia and Eritrean support groups have been under siege through Somalia, stratifying the military intervention was to safeguard national security.

It is impossible to say that the private media, especially those licensed abroad, worked for the unity of Ethiopia. For example, ESAT which has been extensively airing about Ethiopian nationalism, has made its studio in three foreign countries and has been a tool for opposition parties. It does record the prejudice of government rather than good will of government institutions by any measure. The OMN had also been reported the allegations that it was made in Oromia. The youth by far was a follower of OMN.

While the Ethiopian government is facing these challenges, the news of the late Prime Minister Meles's death is heard. Prime Minister Hailemariam, who replaced Meles, faces an even greater challenge. The media pressure increased. The youth protested. Conflict escalated between regions. Earlier, the intervention by Eritrea and Somalia was beginning to assert that the government had stated the state is being disturbed by Egypt. The West has taken the warning that human rights abuse is at an unprecedented level in Ethiopia. One of them is the United States. How America, a friend and longtime

Somalia's intervention, suddenly turns head and reminds of Ethiopia's human rights treatment? The government of Ethiopia, while take its effort handling conflicts it also shows a sign that the situation goes beyond control.

The pattern of conflict has changed over time, and the refining of factories has resulted in the population displacement. Suddenly, the Prime Minister announced that he had resigned. Those media began to proclaim that they were leaders in the political change. It began to hear the news of reconciliation across the Horn region. Once again, America emerged as an ally of Ethiopia. However, all of these were interrelated and complex security threats that locked into one another. The pressure of the government at that time was multifaceted and was not really a matter of domestic politics.

9. References

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