Things Are Not Enough Bond , Stiegler , and Technics

This article discusses Bond’s relationship with technology, arguing that it is not enough to focus on the various technological projects and technical objects/gadgets which surround the character – and which are made so much of in the paratexts and reception contexts of the films – but that it is essential to take into account Bond’s technical practice. Bond, then, is read as an embodiment of a form of Stieglerian prostheticism: a human being who produces the technological field and practises technics by way of being human.


TECHNOLOGY AS PROP AND FETISH
The objects employed by Bond or the villains have also been found to organise large parts of the texts themselves, especially when compared to the role of technology in the literary pretexts (152), structuring the plots, involving and attracting audiences, becoming "highly distinctive" (16) parts of the Bond formula.
Commentators veer between reading the devices as serious testimonies to the power of technology (especially for the 1960s flms) and according them a comic and ironic efect (especially for the 1970s and 80s flms), between seeing them as having a "logical narrative purpose" (Chapman 2007, 83) and regarding them as mere and fairly unmotivated spectacle. In addition to these various -and rather conflicting -functions, there is also the of-repeated claim of fetishisation: Bennett and Woollacott argue that "Bond's sexuality has become fetished [sic] on to machinery, cars, guns, motorcycles, and what have you" (203), and that this undermines his putative virility and power, while James Chapman more broadly suggests that Bond flms from Goldfnger (1964) onwards "contributed to the obsession with technology by fetishising it" (94). Clearly there is a lot that would need to be tied up with respect to these readings: how does fetishisation go together with the attested irony and self-parody of the flms? Does the spectacular 2 Of the many ofcial flm posters collected in Dougall (2012) and Museum Folkwang (2012) only a handful do not feature any technical objects; most show Bond and his gun, some add other technology that plays an important role in the flm at hand (harpoon, submarine, Little Nellie, cars etc.), some present their content through a gunbarrel frame. The few posters lacking technology are ofset by an equally small number of posters that show nothing else but Bond's weapon of choice. use of the gadgets push or undercut ideological identifcation with technological progress? How will the representation of technology manage to fetishise technology if the latter can be perceived to have weakened the main character's powers of attraction? The aim of this article, however, is to shif the focus of attention slightly, away from the objects (and their alleged functions) to the use of these objects by Bond and the way they (do not) function within the stories -not in order to complicate matters unnecessarily or evade the issue, but, on the contrary, to gain some crucial insight into the flms' construction of the technological. It will be argued that Bond's relations to technology are practical rather than object-centred, that the ideas of fetishisation and cyborgism do not hold, and that the texts in fact profer a completely diferent take on technology than their contexts and paratexts seem to suggest. Bond himself does not invest in technological objects: neither sexually, fnancially, emotionally, nor ideologically. Why should the audience (think he does)? And he is far from being part human, part machine, not made up of or relying on technical replacements (as implied by more conventional readings), but rather exhibiting a prostheticism that consists in technical practice and is thus constitutive of the technological feld outside of him.
A good academic example of such a more conventional reading of Bond's technicity, this time of one of the later flms, can be found in Jack Halberstam's Female Masculinity (1998). For Halberstam, Bond, in GoldenEye (1995), lacks "credible masculine power". While, for him, Bond's charms seem "as old and inefective as his gadgets", his masculinity is "primarily prosthetic and […] signifes [largely] as a technical special efect" (3). Halberstam reads Bond as being dependent on external technical objects as well as on those who provide him with these objects: M, read as a butch older woman representing female masculinity, and Q, read as a queer science nerd representing gay masculinity. Such dependency, the argument runs, undermines Bond's powers and position. Even as it is his technical relations, rather than biology, that defne his gender identity, "extend[ing] his masculinity" (4), Halberstam holds that it is the prosthetic nature of these relations that undermine his heterosexuality. Thus, the critic sees technicity, on the one hand, as a (contested) instrument of the character's identity performance, and on the other, as a means for a queer reading (for which performance per se is not the central problem) to call into question the workability of that performance. Halberstam's conceptualisation of Bond's technical prostheticism is informed by notions of lack, (over)compensation, dependency, and by a clear subject-object juxtaposition of human beings and technology, a contiguous relation-ship that can be prised open and exploited by a skilful queer reading. Bond needs objects to perform power, a performance to defne him, as he is essentially lacking competence and shape: "[w]hen you take his toys away, Bond has very little propping up his performance of masculinity" and remains "a hero without the action or the adventure" (4), as Halberstam puts it.
Halberstam's reading is stimulating and intriguing, if -for me -not fully convincing. It may well be that M's counter-performance of female masculinity in GoldenEye is on the whole much more credible than Bond's performance of heteronormative masculinity. Also, it seems justifed to comment on the pronounced role of technological hardware in Pierce Brosnan's Bond, as has been done by others too (Willis 2003). But it appears that Bond's powerlessness and dependency are massively overstated, that the text is not just read against its grain, but that the reading overlooks much contrary textual evidence: Bond laughs at Q, he bests M, he shrugs their criticism of, gets away with it, and ultimately is not dependent on technology, especially not more so than the other characters (who are supposedly more powerful than him by, mark, giving that technology to him in the frst place). How can M, depending on Bond and his use of technology, be more technologically independent than Bond himself? How can Q, whose job it is to develop technological objects and whose seriousness and impracticality about this is frequently ofered up to ridicule by Bond and flm alike, come across as less dependent or fxated on the world of gadgets and special efects than 007?

STIEGLER'S PROSTHETICISM
What, then, is Bond's exact relationship with technology? If it is prosthetic at all, we may think of it in terms of Stieglerian prostheticism. In Technics and Time: The Fault of Epimetheus (1998), Bernard Stiegler argues that technics, far from being surplus gadgetry, is "at the heart of what it is to be human" (Howells and Moore 2013, 2). For him, a prosthesis is not a mere extension of the human body, but the "constitution of this body qua 'human' […], not a 'means' for the human but its end" (Stiegler,153). Building on and going beyond Heideggerian conceptions of technology as delusive and constricting for human experience, and rereading the ancient Greek myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus, Stiegler develops the idea of humanity's constitution through technics: Epimetheus's fault to bestow a distinctive character trait on human beings in their creation is made good by his brother Prometheus's gif of fre to the species. Fire, as the frst technical prosthesis, thus defnes the human, but does not replace "what would have been there before it and would have been lost" (152). Not only in its mythological origins but also in its later cultural development, Stiegler sees the role of technology as constitutive of humanity: human consciousness "is always already technical" (Howells and Moore, 3), with techniques of externalisation (such as writing) only making personal thinking possible and externalised memory (such as in cultural traditions) only making human survival possible. If the external technical object, however, is important for the human self, it must be noted that the external is as such a product of human interiority projected outwards: ing is outside itself. The being of humankind is to be outside itself. (Stiegler,193) Technical interiority and exteriority thus are two terms and conditions not opposing each other but composing with each other a kind of simultaneous complex. Tools are made and used in anticipation of a result, the technical environment is constituted by human beings just as that environment constitutes the human, and human beings "are nothing but the internalisation of [their] prosthetic ek-sistence" (Howells and Moore, 5). One of Stiegler's main concerns, apart from the question of how humanity relates to technology in general, is to look into the ways in which technology has been written out of the history and selfunderstanding of philosophy in particular. According to Stiegler, modern philosophy is predicated on the very negation of its own technicity, starting from a separation of logos, philosophy's privileged concept of reason, from tekhnē, "which is linked to (implicitly inferior) practical skills" (6). This, for him, is a denial of the integral role played by external memory supports (drawing, writing and other cultural artefacts) for organised thinking to become possible in the frst place. Across the many felds of his interest, Stiegler thus identifes a complication of neat subject-object, interior-exterior and theory-practice positions in the relations between humans and technology: the sphere of the human and of the technological are mutually constitutive. For humans, there is to be no place outside of technology; technology cannot be taken away (as, for instance, implied by Halberstam's reading of Bond's technicity), and while a particular form of technological being may be inimical to human experience (as suggested by Heidegger), it is only through technology that social improvement can be achieved.
The suggestion here would be to see Bond as representing such a Stieglerian understanding of technology: Bond uses technical objects, but is not dominated by them. He does not renounce them, but keeps his distance, especially when they threaten to take his place or become an end in themselves (Nitins 2011, 459;Willis, 153). Bond resists technological intrusion from outside, remaining sceptical of big technology, preferring small technical solutions instead and showing a rather relaxed attitude about what, for instance, the gadgets can ultimately do for him. He may keep using a number of contraptions that are meant to surprise or amuse the audience, but these will eventually remain insignifcant for his defeating the villain: Bond is victorious because he keeps his nerve, has the better ideas and physical ftness, not because he is in possession of a super-weapon that helps him solve his problems. In fact, most of his fghts with the opposition involve muscle power, presence of mind, resourcefulness (especially in the fnal confrontations with the villains) as Bond fnds himself in face-to-face combat situations, kills his adversary with his hands or by skilful technical improvisation (more of which in a moment). Now, there is a sense in which technology frames and constitutes Bond's experience: usually he has to solve a problem that is also related to a technological threat (missile toppling, biological or nuclear contamination, solar weapon or Stinger missile attack, thef of submarine navigation system, global media manipulation, cyberterrorism). At the same time, the gadgets which he is given by Q -and which he dutifully and happily puts to use one afer another -seem to turn him into the object of a technological plan or narrative: how can he be in control while mechanically following all the cues provided? Usually nothing he is given in the Q scenes remains unused, while he hardly needs anything that has not been given to him.  (Stiegler,193), usually within split seconds, quite intuitively: through the quickest of externalisations. Bond clearly also does not care for technology as a substitution/com-pensation. Both his relations to substitutionary prostheticism -not the supplementary kind represented by him -and technical practice I now propose to look at in more detail.

BOND'S ANTI-CYBORGISM
Bond is far from being a cyborg as technologically "enhanced" characters and those that feature mechanical body parts quite obviously belong to the realm of the villain. Bond, it could be argued, is decidedly anti-cyborg. He is up against Dr No's metal hands, Tee Hee's steel pincers, Jaws's steel teeth, Klebb's poisontipped shoe, and Mr Hinx's metal thumbnails. Bond fghts Max Zorin, who is the product of prenatal steroid manipulations; Raoul Silva, who wears a dental prosthesis to hide his facial deformations; Zao and Colonel Moon, who undergo gene therapy to change their looks; and Renard, whose bullet in the brain makes him immune to pain and increases his stamina. Apart from featuring mechanical body parts, many of the criminal masterminds in the flms sufer from overidentifying with their big technological projects. They concentrate their wishes and desires on the technical solutions, which sometimes are means to an end for them, but quite frequently appear as a misdirected libidinal end in itself. Technology is elevated in the altar-like control rooms of their plants which ofen provide the scene for the flms' fnal battles. It is shown to be a highly problematic phallic investment, for instance, when Goldfnger points his laser beam at Bond's crotch; Scaramanga can only fnd pleasure in (using) his golden gun and solar weapon; Renard seeks to insert his fuel rod into the submarine reactor; and Elektra King fastens Bond to a torture chair and attempts to screw a piston through his neck. The majority of Bond villains are characterised by their sexual, ethnic and moral "deviance" (Black 2005, 171 and 175) as well as their failure to keep the right distance to technology.
Bond, on the other hand, is careful to avoid technological penetration of his body, although this has become a recurring problem for Daniel Craig's Bond. In Casino Royale (2006), M plants a tracking device in his arm, which he resents and which is removed -ironically -by the villain; in Spectre (2015), a GPS microchip is injected into his bloodstream, but not activated by Q, giving him relative freedom of movement. In general, it is important for Bond to be able to track people, but not be tracked by technological systems, or at least to stay in control over when to use the devices. The glove-compartment defbrillator he hooks up to in Casino Royale, together with the implanted chip, both helps and does not really help him stay alive by getting long-distance medical advice from HQ, as ulti-mately Vesper Lynd has to fnish the job manually and on the scene (in an interesting inversion of what commentators usually see as a much more physical and bodily autonomous Bond as performed by Craig). In Skyfall, he decides to use the retro-style radio transmitter provided by Q to capture Silva (with mixed results), just as in Goldfnger before, he uses similar devices to follow the villain through Switzerland and to try to point out his plans to the CIA when held captive in Kentucky (a plan that threatens to fail and is saved only by his technologyfree winning Pussy Galore over to his side). At the end of A View to a Kill (1985), he escapes MI6's prying eyes when in the shower with Stacey Sutton by throwing a towel over Q's radio-controlled dog robot; and at the end of For Your Eyes Only Even a recent flm like Spectre faithfully reworks these patterns: Franz Oberhauser's technological megalomania -of controlling information, establishing total surveillance, penetrating governments worldwide, rewriting history and colonising memory -is driven by a form of Oedipal complex, sexual aberration, and personal revenge. Oberhauser observes, acts, fghts, and kills by (technological) proxy (Bond calls him a "voyeur"; Oberhauser calls himself a "visionary"), his headquarters is a cathedral to big data processing, and his employees are soulless screen workers. With the help of his surveillance technology he has penetrated the British government to "kill of" the double-0 section and, in the torture chair scene, sets out to destroy important parts of Bond's brain, wishing to rob him of the gif of recognising people (and thus of parts of his memory), before ultimately killing him as well. Oberhauser operates the drills of the dentist's chair by typing orders into a computer, the drills penetrate Bond's head, but do not have the predicted efect. On the contrary, Bond feels the pain, but makes important connections about the past and the future while sufering the treatment. In a scene also hotly debated in online fan circles (in threads like "how does Bond survive the brain operation without adverse efects?") Bond shows that his anticyborg humanism is so strong that he resists the efects of technical interference even afer such interference has taken place. Oberhauser needs cameras, computers, and digital storage space to master and manipulate psychology, and even then fails to come to terms with his childhood "trauma" -Bond ignores trauma inflicted by technical instruments and can rely on being himself for keeping his memories, values, and afections. Bond brings Oberhauser down by using rather small technical instruments (compared to the villain's bigger ones), his technical and physical skills and his superior willpower, and by being helped by friends. It is Madeleine Swann who throws the exploding watch in Oberhauser's direction; it is Bond, with some support from Madeleine, who chases and shoots down a helicopter with a hand gun. It is rather unusual for Bond not to engage in a physical fght with his adversary, but Oberhauser himself remains physically passive throughout, turning the confrontation of the two alter-ego characters into primarily a mental battle, which Bond wins when he walks away from Oberhauser deciding not to kill him and become like him. Their confrontation is, among other things, one between a humanist and a technological understanding of the workings of the brain and the possibilities of human thought.
Oberhauser's technological attempt to revenge his trauma and untangle his relationship with Bond is also shown to be self-defeating in another way. Pointing the drills to Bond's head, he tells Bond "I'm going to penetrate to where you are" and, a moment later, goes on to reveal that he is "the man inside [Bond's] head, Ernst Stavro Blofeld". If we accept this, Oberhauser is virtually drilling into his own memory and identity. He will destroy Bond's ability to recognise people from the past, even as it is essentially important to him to be recognised by Bond. Oberhauser is shown to fail because he fails to make his technical instruments work the way he wants them to work and because his technological plan, from the outset, has been a doomed enterprise, a bad investment. Bond acts as the guarantor of the notion that the human mind cannot be colonised by technology.
How do earlier Bonds react to the villains' attempt at technological penetration of their body, country, and culture? Bond scufes with Goldfnger, who accidentally shoots out a cabin window and is sucked out of a plane (like penetration reversed), and he usually manages to turn the technical objects against their owners afer tooth-and-nail fghts: Renard is staked by his nuclear rod; Elliot Carver is bored by his sea drill; Alec Trevelyan is most probably staked by the feed horn of his satellite dish (Willis,158); Scaramanga is shot dead in his hall of mirrors while his island is destroyed by his own solar weapon; and Hugo Drax is simply pushed into space, which he himself has endeavoured to colonise before.
The villains fail at the hands of Bond, who uses "their own technologies" (158) against them, and because they can no longer control the technology they have devised and blown up to monstrous proportions. And it is important to note that Bond's "counter-penetrations" of his opponents are accompanied, if not fully framed, by countless other pleasurable and painful experiences and practices (driving, drinking, gambling, sensing danger, enduring hardship) as well as numerous instances of sexual penetration, which in turn come to appear as examples of "a 'natural' act of human interaction in opposition to the previously 'unnatural' acts of technological intervention" (158) practised mainly by the villains.
Bond's technological exploits are thus always additions, not substitutions.

TECHNICAL PRACTICE VS TECHNOLOGICAL OBJECTS
If the villains thus basically embody Heidegger's critique of the modern individual's technical being in the world -man seeking domination over nature, people being perceived "as raw material for technical operations" (Blitz 2014, 63) -and serve as a warning against the technological excesses of modernity, Bond's tekhnē (i.e. his practical orientation towards technics) also comes to the fore in his relations with Q. Whereas the villains represent the demonic, mad-professor side of technological progress (and the disadvantages of a fxation on planning; Black, 173), MI6 headquarters, Q, and diverse government ofcials still represent a (too) bureaucratic and theoretical approach to technology. Q is closer to Bond in preferring small practical technology, but again and again fails to make the grade as a practitioner. Martin Willis has pointed out that, in each of the Q scenes, "Bond is a chameleon fgure who moves indiscriminately from amateur to expert to hubristic scientist" (155). Like a child, Bond is ofen told of by Q for not taking the briefng situation and the objects presented seriously. Yet, afer a short introduction (and sometimes none at all), the agent manages to operate the devices more skilfully than their inventor, knows all about their scientifc background, and goes on to put them to his own irreverent uses (adding mocking comments like "nice Christmas present", "new pet, Q?" or "it's not exactly Christmas, is it?" 3 ). In these encounters, Q comes across as "schoolmasterly and patronising", a lab-theoretician representing the "hierarchical approach to scientifc power" (155). His professional seriousness and practical uselessness are played of against each other, and both sent up, not least by the ridiculous and quixotic experiments ofen unfolding in the background.
The scenes suggest that "the application of Q's inventions should be lef to the expert, Bond. Science, even applied science, is portrayed as comic, pompous and self-inflated, and its value shifs to use and application" (156).
Willis suggests that, in the Q scenes, Bond's expertise -application -is positively contrasted to the work of the scientist, who privileges "creation and invention" (156). I would hold, though, that Bond's regular technical mode is applica-tion with a diference, one that integrally includes creation and invention. It is one of Bond's distinguishing characteristics that strikingly ofen he does not use technical objects in the way intended by their producers. It is the very point of the character that he improvises and creates his own uses for objects, that in "misusing" them he adapts them to his wishes and improves their function.
Sticking to instruction manuals is for the villains, Ms, and Qs of the series. Bonds are the attractions that, in part, come with the general anarchic potential of a secret agent fgure (Palmer 1973;Merry 1977, 222-224). It should be remarked that the usual focus on the gadgets and their funny and "spectacular use" distracts commentators from the possibility to identify the moments when Bond spontaneously devises his own tools and practices as the much more spectacular and attractive points in the flms: there certainly is audience pleasure when objects are used in accordance with the audience's "foreknowledge of the gadgets" (Bennett and Woollacott,152), yet what makes Bond special from audience and other characters in the flm (such as the villains, who sometimes also possess spectacular tools) is that, in addition to having and using these objects, he frequently redefnes their purpose and creates new technical constellations with them. These are ad hoc uses, irreversible singularities (with nothing objectifed or commodifed about them), that come as a total surprise, and prove his superior technological skills.
Taking a closer look at Bond's technical solutions in A View to a Kill, arguably an extreme example in this respect, we will fnd Bond's gun -so important for paratexts and contexts -having no signifcance whatsoever. He only uses it once when chasing May Day up the Eifel Tower, and misses her. Later in the flm, in a slapstick scene, he uses a rifle loaded with harmless rock salt. In the ensuing fght, he has to go back to using his fsts. In all other encounters with the enemy in this flm, too, he either has to rely on his physical strength and skills or turns objects that come his way into weapons. He uses a climbing rope to pull an opponent from a snowmobile, he uses the ski of a broken snowmobile as a snowboard, and then uses this to knock out two more opponents; he uses a signal rocket to blow up a helicopter; he has a fstfght with two of Zorin's men and uses a conveyor belt to pack them of in crates; he uses air from a car tyre to stay underwater and escape May Day and Zorin; he uses his balancing skills to escape from a lif and a fre hose to save Stacey; he uses the back part of a fre engine to fend of his pursuers, and the movement of a drawbridge to lose them; he uses a chair to smash a window and deflect bullets shot at him; and he uses an axe lying about to cut loose Zorin's airship and thus avoid being killed by Mortner's dynamite. Techni-cal objects for all kinds of purposes (locomotion, spying, communications, safety) are appropriated by Bond and turned into tools for fghting. But creative appropriation also works across these and for other uses: Bond uses diving gear to jam and escape a turbine, he travels on top of a lif rather than in it for spying purposes, he uses the speed controls of his submarine for bedding his fellow agent, he uses a stethoscope (for the treatment of horses?) to open a safe, he uses a mining trolley for hiding and spying, and hangs from the rope of an airship rather than travelling the normal way.
Bond's Stieglerian prostheticism, his distinguishing mark, can be observed even in a flm like GoldenEye, which presents a "new Bond that was to be technological rather than physical" (Willis,151) and which started a series of flms that increased the character's reliance on technical objects, be they standard issue or of the gadget variety. Brosnan's Bond uses standard weapons much more ofen than Roger Moore's, shooting his way out of tight situations with automatic rifles or throwing explosive devices. Improvisation is almost exclusively used in confrontations with the enemy, though it remains a recurring element. Bond uses a car door to pressurise a CIA agent into uttering his password; he uses a sauna stove to escape Onatopp's deadly squeeze; he uses his head to activate an ejector seat; he topples a row of book shelves to close a door; he uses a tank to chase Ourumov through the streets of St Petersburg; and he uses a combination of gun, rope, and helicopter to break Onatopp's back, and then downs the helicopter. As in the flms before, all these quick and creative technical solutions come efortlessly to Bond and, as in them, run the whole gamut of modes and moods, from serious and suspenseful to tongue-in-cheek and self-parodying. In creating these solutions, Bond collapses the distinction between theory and practice, as most of his improvisations are not simply trial and error responses but are well calculated for efect; also, Bond's creative presence in the process of repurposing objects undermines a simple subject-object conception of the technological in the flms: the scenes construct the technological as an interactional process between diferent human beings and diferent objects going on at a particular time for a particular end, with Bond acting as an "agent" in a diferent sense of the word (i.e. a person or thing that produces a particular efect or change).

CROSSING BRIDGES WITHOUT BRIDGES: BECOMING TECHNICS
Bond's technical skilfulness is such that he is able to drive across a bridge that is no longer there. In The Man with the Golden Gun (1974), Bond performs a corkscrew jump over a broken wooden bridge. An amazing feat, though heavily ironised by Sherif Pepper's antics and a silly slide-whistle sound efect, Bond's technical practice produces the bridge for the audience to see in the trajectory of his car. Bond performs a similar technical transformation in Diamonds Are Forever (1971), when he makes his car pass through a narrow alley on only two wheels, effectively turning it into a kind of bicycle. We can read this as something more than just using a technical object for a new purpose. Bond enters into a relation with an object to temporarily create a new technical object out of this relation.
At the danger of mixing theories (and basically humanist and basically antihumanist approaches to boot) I would propose to draw on Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's fgure of thought of the "machine" (2007,4) to elucidate the connection that takes place in these moments. Thinking of all life, as Deleuze and Guattari propose, as "literally a machine" (Colebrook 2002, xxii), an endless process of connection and interaction, we may conceive of Bond as what they call a "desiring-machine" (i.e. "the outcome of any series of connections"), the site where new relations are produced, diference multiplies, and life forces are actuated (xxii; 98-100). Desire, for Deleuze and Guattari, is not grounded in lack or the need to overcome separation or loss, but it is a flow that creates and destroys, connects and dissolves structures. When Bond, behind its wheel, turns a car into a bicycle to turn it into a rubbish heap or submarine in the next instant he plays a part in a series of such connections and disconnections. Bond enters into temporary "machinic assemblages" (Deleuze and Guattari, 4 and 73) with things and flows surrounding him, constellations that make and unmake him in the process, turning him into a fgure or site of becoming rather than being, as privileged by the two French thinkers: a good example of this may be found in the sequence in The World Is Not Enough (1999) in which Bond moves from helicopter to pipeline pig, then acts as a human coupling and bufer when his pig engages with another one, and then jumps of before the device explodes and destroys the pipeline. Other examples are not hard to fnd: in GoldenEye, Bond takes a motorbike over a clif to go afer a plane, in mid-air disengages from the bike to turn into a kind of plane or projectile himself, to make a connection with the real plane and turn its pilot; in a similar scene from Moonraker (1979), Bond is pushed from a plane to skydive afer a parachutist, to engage with the latter, to become a parachutist himself afer connecting with Jaws and disconnecting with him again by pulling the cord of his parachute ( just in time before being bitten by the steel teeth). In these instances, Bond, in the terminology of Deleuze and Guattari, is becoming-plane, becoming-parachute, becoming-bridge, becoming-coupling.
The Deleuzian aspect of the character goes beyond the sphere of literal technical constellations to include other machinic activities. Bond does not really care for objects and possessions, but is more interested in experiencing intensities like speed, taste, and danger; he is not seriously hampered by lack, but lives in profusion, enjoying making and breaking connections (with women, agents, information), smoothing space, going from water to air to earth and back again.
As represented by their central character, Bond flms thus primarily suggest that technics and technology do not exist in opposition to or substitution of the human, but that they are supplementary and controllable. Bond, as has been repeatedly argued, acts to alleviate fears of an increasing advance of technology and its colonisation of human beings, its becoming abused by sinister powers or its becoming fully autonomous (Nitins,459;Willis,153). It may be part of the character's conservative side that he does so in the interests of the Western nation-state and traditional gender hierarchies -yet it is part of Bond's potentially progressive side that the character suspends the notion that there is a clear difference and opposition between the human and the technical, a thought that traditionally sees technics and technological culture grounded in the need to overcome some essential human lack (and a thought that both Stiegler, proposing the concept of prostheticism, and Deleuze and Guattari, proposing the concept of the machine, have argued against). Bond feels no lack, does not fetishise objects.
He has possibilities. This is why his character may point the path to a way of thinking that can overcome what Erich Hörl, following Stiegler, has called the limitations of "the industrialisation of our wishes" and the current "spirit of industry", which are both geared towards the correction of a fundamental human defect (2009, 20 and 21; my translation). This potential, I think, is contained in the machinic parts of Bond's character, and can be linked up with, even if it is all but hidden behind the commodifcations, fetishisations, and industrialisations that frame and contextualise the flms.