CONTENTS

VOL. XV
March 1987

News Stories
Chronology ........................................... 3
Articles ................................................. 11
Events .................................................. 1
Najib's Speech ......................................... 12
Tehran Round Table ................................... 18
Abstracts ............................................... 31
New Voice of America Program ..................... 34
Recent Publications ................................ 35
Nat'l Reconciliation Decree ......................... 40
Items from Bakhtar .................................. 41
Who's New in Kabul .................................. 42

AFGHANISTAN FORUM, INC.
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ABBREVIATIONS USED

AICMB - Afghan Information Center Monthly Bulletin
AWSJ - Asian Wall Street Journal
BIA - Bakhtar Information Agency
CC - Central Committee
CSM - Christian Science Monitor
DRA - Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
DYOA - Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan
FEER - Far Eastern Economic Review
FRG - Federal Republic of Germany
IHT - International Herald Tribune
KNT - Kabul New Times
NFF - National Fatherland Front
NWFP - Northwest Frontier Province
NYT - New York Times
NYCT - New York City Tribune
PDPA - People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PSFO - Peace, Solidarity & Friendship Organization
PT - Pakistan Times
RC - Revolutionary Council
RTV - Refugee Tent Village
SCMP - South China Morning Post
UNGA - United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR - United Nations High Commission for Refugees
WDOA - Women's Democratic Organization of Afghanistan
WSJ - Wall Street Journal

Line drawing from the 1982 Afghanistan Calendar of the Chicago Afghanistan Relief Committee.

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From the Editor:

After all our complaints about no news on Afghanistan, events of the past two months have brought a plethora of coverage. Like a bad musical in the out-of-town tryout stages, everyone is waiting for the music, choreography & script doctors to fly in with a bang-up third act which will save the investors' faces and funds, offer employment to the whole cast and crew for the months to come, and allow the producers to move on to other projects. New choruses wait in the wings on the off chance...

Cartoonists and politicians, however, have been inspired. A representative selection appears in the following pages.

In case you missed it, Najib's speech is presented in its entirety with comments from many sources along side.

For those who ordered it, the almost complete Directory of Organizations Interested in Afghanistan is enclosed. Subscribers who didn't order it but now want one may order it for $3. The non-subscriber rate is $5. Add an additional $2 for overseas airmail.

Again, our gratitude goes to those who sent us information. We can be informative only if you keep us posted. If you don't see the item you sent in this issue, it may appear in the next one. The deadline for that issue is 4/20.

The Geneva talks took place as we were going to press. We shall report on their progress, or lack of same, in the next issue.

EVENTS

Singer Ahmad Wali will give 3 performances in the US with Abdullah Atemadi on the tabla, and others. On 3/20 the performers will appear at the Golden Center at Queens College, Kissena Blvd., Flushing, NY. Tickets for the concert, which starts at 8:30, are from $30 to $15. Proceeds will go to the Int'l Rescue Committee for food & clothing for Afghan refugees. For information & tickets call the Golden Center box office, 718-793-8050 or World Music 212-206-1050. Tickets are also available at Speenghar Halal Meat & Apna Bazaar in Flushing.

The group will perform at the Wadsworth Theater at UCLA in Los Angeles on March 27 at 8:30. The box office phone number is 213-825-4261.

On April 4 they will perform at 8:30 at the T.C. Williams High School, 3330 King St., Alexandria, Virginia. Tickets will be available at the door or in advance from the Afghan Market, Five Star, India Bazaar, Bombay Store, Khyber Bazaar & the Committee for a Free Afghanistan (202-546-7577 - ask for Moriah).

Ahmad Wali, a former favorite on Kabul Radio, now lives in West Germany. His tour is sponsored by the World Music Institute.

Friends of Afghanistan is sponsoring the visit of Wakil Akberzai, Director Gen'l of the Refugee Relief Committee of the Islamic Alliance, Dr. Azam Dadfar, founder of the Psychiatric Center for Afghans, Moh'd Es'haq, Political Advisor for Jamaat-Islami, & Moh'd Gailani, Deputy Chief of NIFA. They will be meeting with the press, university groups & civic organizations from 2/27 - 3/20 to discuss issues pertaining to Afghanistan. For information call Laili Helms at (212) 787-0509.

"The Crisis of Migration from Afghanistan: Domestic & Foreign Implications" is the topic of a conference to be held in Oxford, England from 3/29-4/2. The meeting is co-sponsored by the UK Refugee Council Studies Program & the Dept. of Ethnology & Prehistory of Oxford University.
AN AFGHAN BATTLE WITH A DIFFERENCE

KABUL: After eight years of civil war, many Afghans say they are tired of fighting each other — but watching dogs fight is another matter. This traditional event is as popular as ever.

The time is Friday morning, on the Moslem day of rest. The place is a dusty plane on the northern outskirts of Kabul, where new construction projects are beginning to rise.

Several thousand men and boys — there is not a female in sight — are gathered in a large circle dressed mainly in khaki robes and wearing turbans or Astrakhan hats.

Inside the circle about 20 dogs — not the famed Afghan hounds but powerfully-built mongrels, most requiring two men to hold them on a leash — are waiting for battle to commence.

Dog-fighting, which takes place only during the winter months, is free entertainment in a country where not much else is on offer. Soccer is played in the summer, but stadia are few.

Many of the spectators at the dog-fight will go to Friday prayers afterwards. Otherwise, there is the cinema. One central Kabul picture house is offering an American science fiction film, *Infra-Man,* and an Indian drama.

In northern Afghanistan, a popular traditional sport is Buzkashi, something like a cross between polo and rugby football, in which any number of horse riders attempt to seize possession of a decapitated calf or goat.

But in the absence of horse racing, dog-fighting offers an easily available form of gambling.

A dog owner and half a dozen friends will jointly put up 10,000 or 20,000 Afghans which, if they lose the fight, they forfeit to the winning syndicate, explains Zalmay, one of the owners.

The crowd can also bet among themselves, while some pass the time playing "goat," a sort of roulette employing a map and dice instead of cards.

The hubbub of spectators and barking of dogs grows more intense. Then two dogs are paired off, and at a signal from the referee are unleashed to spring at each other's throats and roll over, grappling and snarling in the dust.

It sounds cruel, but little serious damage seems to take place. The contest is declared over when one dog runs away or its owner calls a halt — usually after a few minutes.

Zalmay claims that his dog, Sher (Lion), has won all of his 10 contests.

Staggering slightly as Sher tugs at the leash, he unexpectedly reveals that he is a former guerilla who was fighting the government until a few weeks ago when Kabul declared its "national reconciliation" policy and a unilateral cease-fire. — Reuter

ROUGH GOING ON THE KABUL GOLF COURSE

KHARGAH, Afghanistan—Long before the Government called on the rebels recently to join in a cease-fire, the war in Afghanistan always paused on Friday mornings in the hills outside this village just beyond the Kabul city limits.

The weekly tussle was arranged informally by the Government and the guerrillas so Western diplomats in the capital could go there to play golf.

On a recent morning, as a bright sun climbed in the sky, a visitor could not help wondering if he had wandered into the pages of an Evelyn Waugh novel as he walked the Khargah golf course with Michael Regan, a first secretary at the British Embassy, and Ragnar Gudmundsson, a United Nations development officer from Iceland who is stationed in Kabul.

The course has 9 greens and 9 fairways but 18 tees, so it can be played backward and forward for a total of 18 holes. It also has challenges and hazards Arnold Palmer and Jack Nicklaus could hardly imagine.

Some come with the terrain, a parched valley of undulating hills that could hardly support a herd of goats, much less a finely groomed golf course.

The fairways, expanses of hard-packed earth, are littered with stones, predatory thistles, open wells and Broodingian ant-hills. Instead of grass, the greens are made of sand, which an aged Afghan caretaker sweeps smooth with a doormat attached to a stick.

Needless to say, there are no man-made sand traps.

"I haven't a clue where the ball is, do you?" Mr. Regan asked at one point after his drive disappeared into a ditch.

A few moments later, Mr. Gudmundsson, hitting out of some particularly wild rough, drilled his ball into a boulder and ducked as it ricocheted into the air.

Then there are peculiarities associated with the war. An errant shot may wind up resting in a hole gouged out by a tank, or the ball can carom off an unforeseen hazard like the Soviet automatic rifle shell a young Afghan caddy found on the fourth fairway.

The clubhouse, a two-story white building, has seen better days. A Soviet tank, returning from combat in the mountains last year, backed into the building, topping part of the balcony.

Not easily deterred, the 16 members of the Khargah Golf Club, as the course is formally known, schedule annual tournaments, maintain scoring records, pay $75 annual dues and have a club board. "We hope to take our handicap back to our home clubs," Mr. Regan said.

That could be a problem, since no one seemed to know the exact length of the course or par. A good guess seemed to be about 6,500 yards and par 72.

Given the various hazards, a good score appeared to be anything under 90, not counting unavoidable penalty strokes for extricating the ball from hopeless positions.

TORONTO STAR

1/20

Rare find: Waterloo import Mushtaq Barakzai, an Afghan immigrant himself, found this unsigned handwoven rug while searching through a pot-luck shipment for his firm, Baluch Oriental Rugs. The traditional geometric patterns, which symbolize life and hope, have been replaced by tanks, machine guns and bloody crosses.
12/1 - BIA - The 520th Infantry Regiment, Hazara volunteers, was inaugurated.


Mujahideen of the Farkhar subdivision of Takhar.

12/6 - AICMB #70 - Mujahideen shot down two helicopters near the Salang Tunnel.

12/8 - BIA - Residential blocks in Mirkoray will now be built with 6 stories instead of 5 reducing building costs to Afs. 7m/ block.

12/14 - BIA - The DRA & the USSR signed a 5m ruble contract for equipment to finish the reconstruction of the Kabul-Hairatan highway.
- Rafiq Sadiq, a radio, tv & theater personality died of a heart attack at 57.

12/15 - BIA - The 1985 DRA GNP was Afs. 177.9b. The private sector accounted for 74%.

12/16 - BIA - Bakhtar says that according to former US Nat'l Security Adviser John Poindexter, one of the objectives of US arms deliveries to Iran was to establish additional channels for supplying arms to the Afghan rebels.

12/18 - BIA - The DRA says it has 2.5m nomads who are represented in "hundreds of tribal & consultative jirgahs."

12/19 - Report from Kunduz trans. by Jamil Ranzoor - Mujahideen commanded by Ali Moh'd Khan attacked a convoy on the Kunduz-Takhar road. The fighting went on for 3 hours. A Soviet tank & 2 armored vehicles were destroyed.

12/20 - LA Times - Lt. Gen. Mikhail Sotskov said in a Moscow press conference that a Soviet Mi-8 troop-carrying helicopter was shot down in Afghanistan with a Stinger at the end of November.

12/22 - BIA - The DRA expects the coming summit of the Organization of Islamic Conference to "correct its stand in regard to the DRA & renew the membership of the country in the Conference." (See 2/6/7)

12/23 - BIA - The RC Presidium elected Najib chairman of the constitution drafting committee. The former chairman was Babrak.

12/25 - AICMB #70 - The DRA sent a force by air to Khost. Led by Gen. Shah Nawaz Tani, the DRA army chief of staff, the force reached the areas of Shinkai & Utman. The force recaptured the areas in Tanni which it set up in early December & lost to the mujahideen on 12/19.

12/28 - BIA - Trade volume between the DRA & the USSR reached $960m this year, an increase of 6.7% over 1985. DRA imports were $600m; exports were $260m. [On 12/23, Bakhtar gave the 2nd figure as $360m.]
- Santa Monica Daily Breeze - In Isalmabad over 10,000 Afghans demonstrated against the Soviet invasion. Other demonstrations took place in Iran, the US & Europe.
- Fighting which began 12/21 in the Tora Bora mountain range south of Jalalabad continues. Soviet & DRA troops moved in with 500 tanks & encountered the mujahideen of Yunis Khalis.
12/28 - LA Times - On the 7th anniversary of the Soviet invasion, Pres. Reagan pledged the United States will continue its multimillion-dollar aid to its fight, saying, "The Soviets must be made to understand that they will continue to pay a higher and higher price until they accept the necessity for a political solution."

"If the Soviets truly want peace, let them present at Geneva a realistic timetable for the withdrawal of their troops from Afghanistan." Reagan said in a written statement released here Saturday. "The United States, which has always supported a negotiated political solution to the war in Afghanistan, will place no barriers in the Soviets' way should they decide to negotiate seriously."

12/29 - BIA - During the current year border tribesmen have received Afs. 650m in economic assistance. Over 21,000 of them have been mobilized into groups to defend the border. "Jirgah Magazine" & "Fraternal Nationality" (published in "7 native tongues" with a circulation of 5,000) are geared to tribesmen.

12/31 - LA Times - Several DRA military officers were reportedly arrested for "poor performance" in battles in Kandahar from 12/14-16. On 12/8, Soviet bombs killed 450 civilians in Kandahar.

1/1 - LA Times - US officials said that the 1985 poppy crop in Pakistan's NWFP was triple that of 1984. The US plans to modify helicopters & train pilots to spray the poppy fields in the Gadoon area of the NWFP.

1/2 - NYT - Najib announced a ceasefire beginning 1/15 (see p. 14):

The cease-fire would be followed, he said, by a discussion with the opposition groups, including exiled leaders of the former monarchy. "We don't want to exclude different political groups, moderates, monarchists and heads of armed anti-Government bands active abroad, from national reconciliation," Mr. Najibullah said. "I have spoken before about the creation of a coalition government of national unity."

- PT - According to 5 Afghan doctors who recently defected to Pakistan, Babrak is living "almost a life of house arrest in a remote corner of Kabul." He gets a pension of Afs. 3,000/month.

1/4 - LA Times - James Adams writes that there are over 4,000 Soviet Spetsnaz troops in Afghanistan:

Little distinguishes Spetsnaz from the regular Soviet forces except the right to wear a prized blue-and-white-striped T-shirt and parachute while in their uniforms. They are entitled to wear a blue beret, but this is not often seen in Afghanistan. The Spetsnaz appear to prefer a more raffish bush hat.

Their equipment is quite different from that of regular forces, however. In addition to silencers on their AK-47s, they use subsonic rounds that have an effective range of 50 meters, a spring-loaded knife that can fire a blade more than 15 feet, thermal-imaging for night vision, infrared detection devices and portable radios with high-speed transmission. In recent months, they have made increasing use of a new type of acoustic mine for ambushes. These mines, planted along known guerilla supply routes, go off only when numerous vehicles or animals pass along the trail at the same time.

Spetsnaz troops have infiltrated guerilla groups dressed as mujahedeen and they're believed to have carried out pursuit operations into Pakistan. They also specialize in night operations, both for reconnaissance and setting ambushes.

- PT - Fujahideen destroyed the transformers at the Sarobi & Naghlob Power stations near Kabul. Cdr. Abdul Haq reports that only 1 power station remains intact around Kabul.

1/6 - NYT - Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze & Anatoly Dobrynin flew to Kabul yesterday for talks. Tass reported that they were on a "working visit" at the request of the DRA. (See 1/7)

1/7 - LA Times - Shevardnadze, at a dinner in Kabul said "a ceasefire is an indispensable prerequisite condition for the rumble of guns to give way to the voice of reason and for the warring sides to get together at a common threshold of accord and be able to discuss a peaceful future of their country without interference."

"Success," Tass quoted him as saying, "will mean peace in a country that is our neighbor, and hence peace for us, too. It will also mean an early return to their homeland by the Soviet troops, by all our lads who are being awaited back home so eagerly, anxiously and hopefully by their mothers, fathers, wives, brides and work mates."

1/7 - NYT - The Islamic Alliance, headed by Moh'd Nabi, rejected Najib's proposal but offered to negotiate directly with Moscow for a truce. (See p. 17)

- AICMB #70 - In a Soviet-proposed trade, a captured Russian was exchanged for 11 mujahideen in Kunduz.

- PT - Najib stated that the new DRA constitution would be based on Islam.

- Soviet forces are using new long-range parachute guns in Afghanistan. They are more destructive than the BM-13, 21 & 41 guns.
1/8 - NYT - Shevardnadze told an Afghan press agency that a Soviet troop withdrawal was "not far off." The LA Times, citing the same interview, reported that he "as much as acknowledged that the cease-fire proposal will fail." The PT reported that the USSR was prepared to set a timetable for its troop withdrawal within the framework of the UN-sponsored talks. A spokesman for the Pakistan Foreign Office said that Pakistan is not concerned with conditions inside Afghanistan. The cease-fire was addressed to the Afghan resistance forces & was thus to be discussed between the Afghan parties.

1/8 BIA - The DRA will import 547,000 tons of petrol, diesel oil & kerosene from the USSR in 1987 - 10% more than last year.

- A recent census in Kabul shows the number of households in the city's 11 precincts to be 195,873. The population is 1,287,000 - up 39% since 1979 (see p. 42)

- CSM - In an editorial:

  "The US, China, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, chief suppliers of the Afghan guerrillas, should continue to do what they can to persuade Moscow to pull out. The best route is to continue aiding the rebels and consistently to raise the Afghan issue in bilateral meetings with the Soviets and in global forums."

1/10 - BIA - The DRA Investment Committee approved the establishment of 26 new projects in Kabul, Balkh & Baglan with a capital of AFS. 174m. Projects include "candy-making, aluminum dishes, poultry, soft drinks & construction material" worth Afs. 1260m annually.

- Commissions for National Reconciliation have been set up in 10 provinces.

1/11 - BIA - The 1st atmospheric pollution measuring station was installed in Kabul.

- Hot off the PDPA presses are "The History of SE Asia & the Far East" (1500 copies), "Dialectical Materialism in Layman's Language" (4,000) & "Youth & Revolutionary Education" (2,000).

1/15 - BIA - Najib declared a cease-fire from 12:00 local time Jan. 14/15. He said the cease-fire was "not a sign of weakness" but "only to end bloodshed in the country." Curfew will begin at midnight rather than 10 p.m.  

- The NFF at its 2nd Congress resolved that ensuring peace, security & nat'l reconciliation are the main duties of its members.

- LA Times - Najib said that over 400 rebel leaders, with 37,000 troops, have agreed to negotiate with the DRA.

- AICMB #70 - The Herat resistance launched a series of attacks on DRA-Soviet military installations in the city & along the Herat-Islamqala highway. Mujahideen also attacked a garrison at Kandahar, the Jalalabad airport, a convoy in Mazar & shot down a plane near Kabul.

1/16 - NYT - Najib offered draft dodgers a 6-month exemption from military service & a waiver of overdue taxes if they returned from Pakistan.

As part of a general amnesty he declared last month, Mr. Najib promised today to free prisoners who have served four or more years of a seven-year sentence, all prisoners sentenced to five years or less, all women in prison and any prisoners more than 60 years old. Prisoners convicted of terrorism acts or espionage would not be covered, he said.

- PT - Diplomatic sources in London said that the USSR may propose a withdrawal of its forces from the DRA within 2 years with an initial withdrawal of 50,000 in 3 months.

- NYT - Guerrilla commanders said their forces were conducting military operations as usual to demonstrate their contempt for the DRA cease-fire proposal. They reported fighting near Jalalabad, Torkham, Khost & Kandahar.
1/17 - NY & LA Times - Soviet tanks & armored personnel carriers were out in force in Kabul the day after the cease-fire announcement. The road to the Salang Tunnel was heavily guarded.
- Afghan News III, 3 - Over 100,000 Afghan refugees & mujahideen gathered in Peshawar to hear the decision of the Islamic Alliance to reject the DRA national reconciliation proposals. (See p. 12.)
1/17 - Report from Kunduz trans. by Jamil Ranzoor - Mujahideen in Alchin attacked Soviet electricians who were installing cables from the USSR to Kunduz city. 3 electricians & a "Russian military general" were killed & 2 tanks were destroyed.
1/17 - BIA - To welcome home those Afghans who are returning to Herat, Ghor, & Badghis, the USSR sent a "caravan" of 27,000 tons of wheat, ghee, sugar, tea, soap & clothes for distribution to the returnees.
1/18 - NYT - The Islamic Alliance in Peshawar announced yesterday:
"Upon the withdrawal of the Russian forces from our country, the overthrow of the non-Islamic puppet government and the establishment of an Islamic state, the war and bloodshed will be terminated once and for all and complete peace and security will return to our country," they said in a statement.
The guerrilla leaders said a commission would be appointed to pave the way for the formation of an interim Islamic government. The commission would issue a report by March, the statement said, but gave no indication as to when a provisional government might be declared.
- BIA - The DRA NFF & the Cuban Revolution Defense Committee signed a cooperation agreement in Kabul.
1/19 - LA Times - Najib warned that the rebel chiefs' rejection of his cease-fire offer will keep Soviet troops in Afghanistan indefinitely. In an interview with foreign correspondents invited to Kabul for the festivities, the Soviet writers had the text of some of his replies, translated into Russian, before he began to speak. He said that the PDPA would continue to provide the main "political guidance" for the regime even if other groups do participate in the gov't. He said Babrak was living in Kabul on a pen-sion, attending to his personal affairs.
Asked why Soviet armored vehicles were unexpectedly stationed at key government buildings and major intersections on Friday night, Najib said that the cease-fire does not mean a halt to all military activity.
- NYT - Soviet 1st Dep. Foreign Sec'y Anatoly Kovalev arrived in Islamabad on 1/17 for talks with Pakistani leaders on, among other things, Afghanistan. He will not meet with US Under Sec'y of State Michael Armacost who arrived in Pakistan today for similar talks. (See 1/23)
- BIA - In the DRA friendship protocols were signed with organizations in Yemen & North Korea.
1/20 - Afghan News III, 3 - Prof. Sayyaf, leader of the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan, was elected spokesman of the Islamic Alliance of Afghan Mujahideen for the next 3 months. He led a 7-member delegation to the OIC summit in Kuwait.
- BIA - DRA armed forces "have strictly observed the cease-fire" but some "opponent groups" particularly in Khost & Parwan have not.
1/21 - PT - Pakistani Air Marshal (ret) Asghar Khan said Pakistan should avail itself of the DRA offer to airlift Afghan refugees back home (see 1/29).
- LA Times - The Afghan charge d'affaires in Washington, Ruhollah Erfaqi, said that the DRA would reserve the right to ask for the return of Soviet troops even if an agreement on withdrawal was reached in Geneva later this month.
- Stingers reportedly are taking a heavy toll of Soviet & DRA planes in Afghanistan. The flares dropped by aircraft to divert heat-seeking missiles are not effective against them.
1/22 - BIA - So far over 850 Afghan families living abroad have returned home. Najib met with "opposed armed groups" from Char-Asiab, Paghman, Mirbachakot, Shakardara & Qarabagh.
1/23 - UN Press Release - Shah Moh'd Dost presented his credentials to UN Sec'y Gen'l de Cuellar as the new permanent representative of the DRA to the UN. (See p.42 for bio data.)
- PT - Joint winter operations by the mujahideen in Khost began on 1/15. They launched missile & rocket attacks on Jaji, Chamkani, Jaji Maidan, Ali Sher, Yaqubi & Tora Taraky.
- NYT - Pakistan & the USSR will step up their discussions on how to solve the Afghan problem. The Pakistani foreign minister will soon go to Moscow & because of this, the next round of Geneva talks will be put off to the end of February.

1/24 - LA Times - The DRA Ambassador to India, Abdul Samad Azhar, said that the PDPA would relinquish its power if it was rejected in national elections; he did not say when elections would be held (see 1/26).

1/26 - PT - The DRA Ambassador to India said that the process of completing the new DRA constitution was delayed because the DRA wanted to give the opposition a chance to express its views. He also said that there continued to be division within the PDPA & that a number of former PDPA leaders who "have committed crimes against the people" are in jail. He added that since Najib took over no party leader has been imprisoned.
- The DRA sent the UN Human Rights Commission official information on recent developments. However, the DRA has not yet responded to a renewed request from Special Investigator Felix Ermacora to visit Afghanistan.

1/27 - BIA - Czechoslovakia will assist the DRA in building a 2nd Pul i Khumri cement plant which will produce 1,000 tons of cement/ 24 hours. The project will take 3 years.
- NYT - Arnold Raphel, the US Ambassador designate to Pakistan, rejected an approach from the Soviet Embassy for direct talks on a solution to the Afghan problem. The US remains firm on its stand that indirect talks between the DRA & Pakistan are the proper forum for such negotiations.
- Mujahideen leaders toured refugee camps making speeches & handing out leaflets urging Afghans not to take seriously the DRA peace proposals. The leaders also declared that any Afghan who accepted Najib's offer would be considered a traitor & a Khad agent.

Afghan leaders in Kabul asserted that some local commanders of insurgent groups had already surrendered and agreed to work with the Government. The Kabul radio said recently that 417 "armed opposition groups" representing 37,000 people were "engaged in negotiations" on sharing power.

But these claims were vehemently disputed here. Rebel spokesmen said they knew of only one insurgent commander who had defected recently near the city of Herat. Kabul said he brought 1,500 men with him, but guerrilla leaders said today that there were at most 150.

1/28 - PT - An OIC resolution reaffirmed that Islamic organization's support for the people of Afghanistan in their valiant struggle for the liberation of their homeland from the occupation of foreign forces. It acknowledges the role of the mujahideen in restoration of the country to normalcy, welcomes the objective of promoting national reconciliation but says that it should be achieved in conjunction with the pullout of foreign forces within a short time frame.
- An Iranian foreign ministry spokesman said Iran had never encouraged Afghan refugees to stay in Iran nor had it ever stopped them from leaving (see 1/29).
- BIA - "An authoritative commission has been set up to look for ways & means in order to develop & flourish art, playwrite (sic) & to nourish the talents of youth."
- In the current 5-year plan (1986-91) 130 projects will be built with 445 rubles worth of Soviet assistance. Industrial production grew 10.8% this
The brave people of Afghanistan are showing that resolve. The Soviet Union says it wants a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan, yet it continues a brutal war and props up a regime whose days are clearly numbered. We are ready to support a political solution that guarantees the rapid withdrawal of all Soviet troops and genuine self-determination for the Afghan people.

1/29 - BIA - The DRA has asked Iran & Pakistan to arrange charter flights to return Afghan refugees to the DRA & requested the UN Sec'y Gen'l to exert pressure on those countries to respond positively. So far no results. The DRA claims that Pakistani & Iranian authorities are restricting the Afghan's return.

1/31 - LA Times - Abdul Ahad Arzbigi, a senior member of the DRA's cease-fire & reconciliation committee, was assassinated on 1/29.

1/31 - BIA - Thousands of "armed persons who were earlier engaged in anti-state activities have now returned home & are observing the cease-fire" in Herat.
- The number of schools in the frontier provinces is 1,226 of which 477 are "at the disposal of children of the frontier provinces."
- The charge d'affaires of the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul was called to the DRA Foreign Ministry where DRA officials accused Pakistan of deterring Afghans from returning home.

2/1 - BIA - A car bomb exploded near the Indian Embassy in Kabul, killing 4, injuring a number of others & damaging the Embassy & adjacent buildings.
- Sayed Jamal Hussain (see Forum XIV, 6, p. 4) & Zia Nassry (see Forum XIV, 5, p. 17) held a press conference in New Delhi after paying a visit to Kabul. Nassry said, "The state of the DRA has proposed a wise & feasible way of achieving nat'l reconciliation, but on the contrary, some other countries instead of rendering humanistic aids, are delivering bullets to the people of Afghanistan... We shall take a plane to the US today... At meetings with Congressmen we shall try to convince them of the need to stop military aid to the adversaries of the Afghan Gov't." [Both men are American citizens. Ed.] (See 2/25)

2/2 - BIA - In a letter to the UN Sec'y Gen'l the DRA said it still had not received a response to its requests to Pakistan & Iran "to provide the necessary facilities for the return of Afghan citizens living in those countries."

2/3 - BIA - The Islamic Conference (see 1/28) meeting in Kuwait "expressed its unshakeable solidarity with the DRA & supported the principled & peaceful policy for the political solution of the situation around Afghanistan."
- The Kabul press has covered the release of a number of prisoners from Pul-e Charkhi Central Prison. The KNT reported that 10 new Stingers were delivered to the "armed Afghan groups."

2/4 - HK Standard - Two rockets hit the Soviet Cultural Center in Kabul on 1/25 & 6 were killed in a rocket attack on the Khair Khana area on 1/26. Heavy fighting was reported in Parwan & near Charikar for the past 2 weeks.

2/5 - PT - DRA & Soviet aircraft continue to bomb mujahideen positions in Khost. Several thousand DRA & Soviet troops are involved in the action about 4 miles from Zhawar.
- LA Times - DRA & Soviet troops launched a major offensive on mujahideen in Eastern Afghanistan. About 12,000 troops attacked Zhawar & Jaji in Paktia. Another large force was reportedly massing in Nangarhar preparing to attack mujahideen supply routes.
- Zhawar, a sprawling underground guerrilla base, was captured by Soviet forces after heavy fighting last April. The Soviet troops later pulled back, and the guerrillas have since attempted to reconstruct the facility.

- NYT - WBZ-TV in Boston won an Alfred I. DuPont-Columbia University Award for its program "Afghanistan: The Untold Story" which focused on child victims of the Afghan war. The awards are given for excellence in broadcast journalism.
2/6 - PT - In a conference in Tehran, the "leader of the Islamic movement of Afghanistan, Moulvi Ghulam Rasool," stressed the need for unity of the Afghan people. Also participating in the meeting were Hujatul Islam Zahidi of Pasdaran Tanzeem of the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan & Hujatul Islam Hussaini of the Muslim Organization of Afghanistan. (See 2/7)
- The Voice of Germany reported that ex-King Zahir Shah welcomed the mujahideen decision to reject the DRA cease-fire proposal.
- A DRA delegation, led by the Dep. Min. of Communications, to talk with mujahideen ended up with 13 members captured & the Dep. Min. sent back to Kabul with the message that no talks will be held with the "puppets" unless the Soviets withdraw.

2/7 - PT - Int'l Red Cross representatives will be allowed to visit Pule Charki Prison. In an agreement with the DRA Red Crescent, the Int'l Red Cross will participate in a 2-year project to help develop an orthopedic center for war victims & surgeons will be allowed to visit hospitals when necessary.
- BIA - The DRA protested to Iran over a meeting held by Sayed Ali Khamenei with members of "Afghan opposition groups." (See 2/6.)
- Under the general amnesty a number of prisoners were released from Pule Charkhi Central Prison.

2/8 - PT - Travelers coming from Afghanistan report large-scale Soviet troop movements near the Pakistani border - ca. 20,000 troops at the Soviet base at Kandahar airport; some of them are going to Darabi, 25 km from the Pakistani city of Chaman, where a big base is reportedly under construction. New bases are also reportedly underway at Ziarat Shah in Helmand & Dasht Imran in Nimroz.
- Iran claims to have 2.8m Afghan refugees of whom 2.3m live in 14 gvt't-run camps. The December issue of Refugees, the UNHCR publication, says:

In the Islamic Republic of Iran, Afghan refugees are dispersed throughout the country, although half are living in the border provinces of Khorasan and Sistan-Baluchistan. New arrivals are temporarily placed in one of 14 reception and quarantine centres for registration and health-screening purposes prior to local settlement wherever employment might be secured.

- NYT - Soviet & DRA troops recaptured Sinakl Pass in Paktia. The mujahideen, who have ca. 2,500 men in Paktia, seized the pass last month.
- HK Standard - A contingent of UN observers will monitor the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan & uphold strict policies of non-interference once an agreement is signed. Its composition will be determined at a later date.
- LA Times - Tass reported that the DRA freed 1,300 political prisoners at a rally in Kabul.

2/9 - BIA - The Italian & Afghan Friendship organizations have signed a protocol of cooperation for 1987-90. - The Executive Committee of the DRA Council of Ministers approved private sector industrial projects with a working capital of Afs. 97m.
- A plane taking off from Khost was downed killing 30 "elderlies, women & children" plus 6 crew members. (See 2/10)
- Soviet customs officials prevented the smuggling of over 3½ tons of DRA antiques to Western Europe.
- DRA Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil, on an official & friendly visit to India, met with Rajiv Gandhi. Matters of mutual interest were discussed, including Indian support of the DRA's steps toward national reconciliation.

2/10 - LA Times - An Antonov 26 transport plane was shot down by mujahideen in Khost. Mujahideen claimed that the plane carried 15 Afghan officers, 22 soldiers & 6 crew & that all were killed.

The Kabul radio report that it was a civilian airliner seemed unlikely to observers here. Khost is under attack by guerrillas much of the time, and most of the civilian population was evacuated or fled years ago to Pakistan.
2/10 - BIA - Jouzjan defeated Balkh in a buzkashi tournament organized to celebrate the release of prisoners in those provinces.

- BIA - Sultan Ali Keshtmand told reporters that "we have undertaken preparations for the next round of Geneva talks with full optimism towards gaining positive results.

- According to Acting DRA President Said Haji Moh'd Samkanai, over 20,000 exiled Afghans have returned to join the "party & state of the DRA."

2/11 - LA Times -
A spate of bombings has shaken the Afghan capital of Kabul for a second week and may have been caused by fighting within the ruling Communist Party. Western diplomats in New Delhi said they said two bombs exploded in Kabul last week, including one Friday that killed three Afghans. One of the diplomats said that 13 people died in a Feb. 1 car bomb explosion outside the Indian Embassy. He reported that the explosives were hidden in a Soviet-made car used by Afghan officials. (See 2/1)

2/12 - LA Times - UN mediator Cordovez & Soviet For. Min. Shevardnadze reported "definite progress" in the Afghan peace talks. Shevardnadze told Cordovez that the new DRA policies offered a real chance of settling the conflict.

2/12 - BIA - The DRA protested to the UN Sec'y Gen'ly about the shooting down of the plane at Khos (see 2/9 & 10)
- The work of Zia Kosha, "a new star glittered in the sky of the Afghans art work," was displayed in Kabul. He uses "chopped straw," a technique new to Afghanistan but "very common in Japan, China, Pakistan & India." [Sounds pretty bourgeois to us. Ed.]

2/14 - BIA - The DRA & the USSR signed a 5-year joint-venture plan for the 400 km Kabul-Khulm electric network, a power station in Kunduz & projects in Mazar, Shiberghan, Jerqduq, Andkhoy & Sarobi.
- Rockets hit Kabul's 9th district killing 1 & damaging houses.
- Over Afs. 26m was distributed to 50,000 returning families in Herat.

2/15 - LA Times - Radio Moscow reported that a rebel missile attack on a Kabul bus depot wounded 1 & damaged several buses.
- BIA - During this 5-year plan (1986-91) Afs. 5229m will be invested in agricultural production & irrigation projects.
- Bulgaria will give the DRA electrical equipment for the frontier provinces.

2/16 - BIA- Bulgaria will deliver tools, vehicles & spare parts to the DRA. It will also build a tannery & "fur cloak" plant at a cost of over $5m.

2/18 - NYT - Bernard Trainor writes that Soviet strategy seems to be to secure the major cities, connected by the so-called Ring Road.

Control of these cities and the surrounding territory would put much of the population under Government domination. To do this, informed sources say semiautonomous commands have been established in zones around the country.

The zone commander is a local Afghan of proven ability who is assisted by Russian advisers. Each zone commander is in a population center and has at his disposal a variety of Afghan units to include the army, the secret police, tribal militias and special light units of Pushtoon warriors called Sarandoy.

In addition, the zones contain Soviet light battalions made up of airborne troops trained for motorized or helicopter operations. Each zone commander is responsible for the pacification of his region with the units assigned and can call upon Kabul for additional help.

The rest of the Soviet and Afghan forces remain under the control of higher headquarters, available for other operations like the reinforcement of zones and the protection of supply lines, airfields and convoys.

2/20 - LA Times - A truck bomb exploded outside Jamiat headquarters in Peshawar killing 10 & injuring 62. (See p. 21)

2/23 - AP Wire Service - A group of Afghans were in Geneva to observe the UN-sponsored peace talks. The group, headed by Zia Nasrasy, plans to talk with the Soviet-backed Kabul Gov't delegation. Calling itself the

Nassry & Hussain
Afghan Nationalist Leaders, the group wants to see an end to the 7-year-old war. "We started the war & we want to end it," Nassry said. Nassry envisions an India-style democracy; Sayed Jamal Houssain expects it to be a tribal democracy patterned perhaps after the Swiss confederation. Nake Kamrany is also with the group as are Abdul Majid Zabuly, Farooq Turbaz & A.W. Kariem.

2/26 - NYT - Afghanistan & Pakistan resumed indirect negotiations at Geneva. According to Diego Cordovez, the UN mediator, both sides are entering the talks with a "clean slate."

Rising Russian war losses
in men and material

LONDON, Jan. 14: The Soviet troops operating in the homeland of Afghan Muslims suffered more casualties last year as compared to 1985, while the Kabul troops had lesser casualties but the ratio of their defection was three times more than the preceding year.

Despite the renewed war strategy adopted by the Soviet-Kabul troops in Afghanistan during the regime of the former Khad chief, a decrease has been registered in the loss of life on the side of Afghan Mujahideen and the civilians.

A survey conducted by the Ageny Afghan Press with utmost caution and research says that the reports received from all 29 provinces of the war-torn country reveal that 8,321 Soviet-Kabul troops were killed last year, while the death toll in 1985 was 7,920. The number of Soviets who were killed in 1985 was 1,182 and those of Kabul troops was 1,536, while those who could not be identified whether they were Soviets or puppet troops were 5,829. Last year out of 8,321 Soviet-Kabul troops casualties, 3,040 were Soviets and 1,602 Kabul troops while 3,679 could not be identified. Most probably the large number was of Soviets. This is the first year since the beginning of the war that Soviet casualties were more than those of Kabul troops. It makes very clear that the burden of war on the Soviet troops has increased.

Another portion of the report confirms the view that now the major burden of the war is borne by the Soviets. In 1985 the defections of Kabul troops numbered 1,000 which increased to 3,541 last year. Most of the defections in 1986 took place in the months of February, March, April, August and September. The defectors joined the Mujahideen during the war or after the clashes were over. Most of the defections took place in the urban areas or the places where major military actions were undertaken against Mujahideen. The troops defecting brought arms with them in most of the cases.

In 1985, 2,859 Afghan soldiers were captured by Mujahideen, while the number of arrests last year has significantly come down to 281. It reveals that a large number of Afghan troops preferred defecting to Mujahideen and joining their ranks than to confront them and be captured by them.

The observers maintain that the situation brings to light, the state of day-today dissolving Afghan troops which have shrunk from 80,000 to 35,000 despite all campaigns for conscription.

Last year the estimated number of the Mujahideen martyred was 1,762, while in 1985 the number was 2,132. In this way the number of casualties on the side of freedom fighters have come to the level of 5,477 while 1,673 Mujahideen were martyred. In the provinces of Ninkhar, Kunar, Pakhta and Paktika located along Pakistan borders, the number of those martyred last year despite frequent bombings was lesser than in 1985. It is argued that a larger part of the population in the rural areas of Afghanistan, particularly those located along Pakistan and Iran borders, have either shifted to the big cities or to the safe mountainous areas. During the last year, 2,145 civilians were reported martyred, while the number in 1985 was 5,829. During 1984 the number of casualties was 42,000 while in 1985 the casualties were much more even than last year.

Last year, 2,729 houses were destroyed, while the estimated number of houses destroyed in 1985 was 2,727. The destroyed houses include mosques. The houses were mostly destroyed in the rural areas which had been the target of bombing. The bombing is a part of Soviet strategy through which they try to terrorise the local population for providing shelter to the urban Mujahideen and forcing them migrate to other places. Some of the rural areas had been the target of campaigns for conscription or search for Mujahideen where the tank-borne forces ransacked the villages.

The Mujahideen sources said that last year the number of Mujajideen and gunship helicopters destroyed during the war was much more than in 1985. According to the sources, in 1988, 167 Soviet planes and helicopters were destroyed and—in the last two and a half months alone 60 aircraft and helicopters were destroyed. However, the Agency Afghan Press Peshawar and Quetta offices reported that 49 planes and 73 helicopters were destroyed during the year, while in 1985 the number was 42 and 64 respectively. Out of these eight fighter planes were destroyed in the month of August.

Three planes were destroyed at the time when an Afghan pilot dashed his plane into the two MIG fighters stationed at the Kunduz airport.

Most of the helicopters were destroyed in the months of March, April, October and November. It is estimated that a number incidents of destruction of planes and helicopters by Mujahideen's machine-gun fire, anti-aircraft shelling and missiles occurring in the interior of Afghanistan or the provinces located along Soviet borders could not be reported.

In 1985, 452 tanks were destroyed, while the number last year was 447.

In 1985, 375 armoured personal carriers were destroyed the number was the same last year. In 1985, 224 trucks were destroyed with the same number last year.

Last year the freedom-fighter captured 5,538 rifles double the number seized in 1985. Differen heavy weapons were also captured by the Mujahideen during the last year which numbered 188 and included heavy guns, cannons an anti-air-craft guns; 145 machine guns were captured last year compared to 83 in 1985. —AAP.

"Excuse me, sir. It's Moscow. They want to know how goes the battle?"

TORONTO STAR JAN.27/87
Najib’s speech at extraordinary plenum of PDPA CC

1/3

KNT

Distinguished comrades.

The Politburo has convened today’s plenum of the PDPA Central Committee for discussing the outstanding problems of the life of the party our country and for working out and finding ways to their total solution.

The aim of the plenum is to work out the fundamental issues concerning the party and state composition and normalisation of the situation in the Communist Party and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The most important and vital issues dealing with the political line and way of the party have been included in today’s agenda.

VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION

As you know, we paid a visit to the Soviet Union from December 11 to 14 on the invitation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The Politburo endorsed the Afghan delegation consisting of Comrades Najib, Keshtmand, Zeray, Noor, Rafie, Yaqubi, Gulabzoy and Wakil. A grant was accorded to our delegation. Attending the talks from the Soviet side were Comrades Gorbachyov, Ryzhkov, Chebrikov, Shevardnadze, Sokolov, Talyzin and Dobyryn.

We gave information to the Soviet side on the political and political situation in the country and the struggle of the people against international imperialism and the reaction in the region as well as about the programme for achieving peace in the country of Afghanistan and national reconciliation to the benefit of vast circles of political forces, all social strata. We also recorded the firm determination of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the government of the DRA in carrying forward the constructive talks with the political forces who are inside and outside the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in preserving and expanding the contacts with all neighboring countries. Our delegation expressed the leading Soviet comrades of the current efforts for the immediate achievement of political settlement of issues around Afghanistan.

The Soviet leadership extended support to the struggle of the Afghan people for the realisation of the April Revolution, the fulfilment of the tasks of building an independent, free and non-aligned Afghanistan.

As per the Soviet tradition, we laid wreaths at the mausoleum of Lenin and the monument to the unknown soldier. A banquet was given in Kremli in honour of our delegation. It was an official banquet and a grand function held with the participation of all leaders of the Soviet Union, most of the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and our old friends. Speeches were delivered during the banquet.

Next day, that is, December 13, we left Moscow. During the visit, our delegation was accompanied by Comrade Demchik, alternate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and First Vice-President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. We were received in Moscow and Uzbekistan as brothers and closest ones.

A meeting was held in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan with the members of the Bureau of the CC of the Uzbekistan Communist Party. Comrade Usmanojaev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan talked on the work of the party’s reconstruction in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic and on the reconstruction of all spheres of social life.

We visited the Tashkent tractor factory during the night shift; got acquainted with the assembly and automatic technical services sections and attended a meeting of workers of the factory. On December 14, I and Comrade Rafie had a meeting with the Afghan students in Tashkent State University, Comrades Keshtmand and Yaqubi with Afghan students studying in the courses of the Ministry of State Security, Comrades Noor and Gulabzoy with the students of the Ministry of Interior and Comrades Zeray and Wakil with the Afghan students in the party and Romsumol of Tashkent visited Samarqand for around two hours and saw the ancient relics and buildings there. And, we returned to Kabul on that same day.

The dailies, television and radio of the Soviet Union covered our visit in detail. Streets, institutions and documents which we visited were decked with the flags of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

We met our countrymen, the people of the Soviet Union as well as those who had returned to their birth places after discharging their internationalist mission in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

An assessment was made of the visit in the Politburo session held on December 15. Representing the entire party, the Politburo of the PDPA CC expressed gratitude to Comrade Gorbachyov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for the warm and brotherly welcome accorded to the Afghan delegation. This visit proved the unshakability of the friendly Afghan-Soviet relations which were founded by V. I. Lenin and King Amarnah.

The Politburo underlined the constructiveness, the high meaningfulness and vivid character of the talks which took place in a spirit of honest mutual understanding, revolutionary solidarity, friendship and evaluated as positive the fruitful activity of our delegation. Satisfaction was expressed in the talks over the dynamism growth of the historic relations, good-neighbourliness between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. The existence of appropriate possibilities was mentioned in the talks for the further deepening of the cooperation between our countries in accordance with the principles of complete equality, mutual respect of national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other.

The Politburo of the PDPA CC attached great importance to this issue, that bona fide ways do exist at present to the immediate and final solution of the situation around Afghanistan. They lay the ground for the return to their homeland of the limited military contingent of the Soviet Union stationed in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on the request of our country.

I declare, with a sense of full satisfaction that the talks proved the full conformity of views of the two sides on all issues under discussion, and above all, national reconciliation.

The members of the Central Committee are well aware that our visit to the Soviet Union took place at a turning point in the history of new Afghanistan, at a time when the principle of the national democratic revolution had been enriched with new content, at a time when the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan has proclaimed the policy of national reconciliation.

The visit to the country of great Lenin was a great event for revolutionaries. One year has not yet passed since the convening of the 27th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. However, the country of Soviets astonished the world, for instance, in the acceleration of the growth of all fields of social life. The spirit of renovation and reconstruction, winning the wisdom and hearts of millions of people, is charging into a material fact. It is worth remembering that the Soviet communists, creating, history, approach it as ordinary and routine work. This is the nature of true revolutionaries who astonish the world.

continued on next page
the Pakistani border, Mr. Najib is a member of the important Parcham tribe. He grew up largely in Kabul, where his father was a banker, according to American intelligence sources.

At the prestigious Habibia High School in Kabul in which he graduated in 1964, Mr. Najib was known by his classmates as a devout Moslem who never missed his prayers, even if he was on school outings. But as a medical student at Kabul University, he abandoned his belief in God and became a Communist organizer.

He joined the Communist Party in 1965, and in 1967 aligned himself with the party's urban elite faction, known as the Parcham wing. Bigger than many of his fellow students, he earned the nickname "the bull" in the frequent, and sometimes violent, clashes that pitted the party's urban elite faction, known as the Parcham wing, against the party's rural faction, known as the Khalq, the two party formations.

In the frequent, and sometimes violent, clashes that pitted the party's urban elite faction, known as the Parcham wing, against the party's rural faction, known as the Khalq, the two party formations, Mr. Najib participated in solving the political crisis.

He was appointed a member of the Central Committee of the feudal bureaucratic regime," for his participation in solving the political crisis.

The principle of reconciliation is a simple concept common to every war. Avoidance of armed struggle and bloodshed in solving the problems of today and tomorrow of Afghanistan, ensuring of justice in representation in the political structure and economic life, no surveillance because of one's previous political activities, general amnesty, preservation and strengthening of traditional, national and cultural traditions, respect and observance of sacred Islam.

What are the objectives of the reconciliation? Most basic ones are: peace and security. Subsequent development of achievements should make possible the programme of action of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, ensuring of the independent, democratic and progressive development of Afghanistan, establishment of a stable situation in Afghanistan, establishment of a regime loyal to the friendship with the Soviet Union. The political solution of these questions through national reconciliation, being in a complex form, is carried out simultaneously inside and outside the country.

IN THE SPHERE OF DOMESTIC POLICY

We should courageously and openly forge ahead in establishing contacts with the armed opponent groups and neutral elements. We have rich experience in this sphere. At present, 417 opposing armed groups are negotiating with the organs of people's power. In the course of current year, 8,000 persons have joined sides with the state of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Under present conditions this direction of struggle is a particularly effective character. It would be necessary to pay daily increasing heed to this end. I want to recall for those who have not yet realized the need for the dialogue with us and who avoid it a proverb that says, "You must not reject the hand extended to you". Besides, attention ought to be paid to attracting the tribal chieftains, influential figures in tribal areas, as well as in Nooristan and Hazarajat to cooperate with the people's power.

Attention should also be paid to the passive and neutral armed groups, opposing groups and to the utilization of organisational measures to the extent of creating local administrative organs by themselves for maintaining contacts with state organisations.

Contact must be established with the opponents, who have got exhausted and for whom yesterday's slogans of the counter-revolutionary opposition organisations, appealing to the Khalq, and who have realised the futility of the war.

It is necessary to resolutely deal with the political forces who are in opposition and are ready for compromise with people's power.

It is also necessary to establish active contacts with the resilient personalities of the past regime and with the Islamic parties who intend to follow an independent line.

At the present stage, the establishment of a government of national unity is possible with the participation of the above groups. We should accomplish reconciliation with other political organisations who agree with us in this process.

Our party and revolutionary power are distressed that still thousands of Afghans are living in emigration and deprivation. Many of them have deserted the homeland, through theLegacy of War, and the Khalq, the two party formations. We reiterate our readiness for forgiveness in order to prevent new mischiefs. We deem it possible to respond to the numerous demands and wants of the Afghan people, as broad amnesty to prisoners who are in the passivity and who are in opposition and are ready for compromise with people's power.

In this case, it will be possible to elect the most outstanding personalities of the opposition, who agree to people's power to the composition of the high organs of state power.

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national reconciliation.

The main task of the young working class of Afghanistan in the conditions of national reconciliation is to elevate the efficiency of industrial production. The peaceful situation will help growth of the productive sector, including industries, oil refinery plant, the refinery complex of Aynak copper mine and, first and foremost, establishment of Kushk-Herat railway.

An event took place recently. The power transmission line from the border of Soviet Union to Kunduz was commissioned. 320 pylons bring the light of friendship to homes, factories and institutions. Thank you, employees of power energy. All these collective of working people will stage work drives on the occasion of 10th anniversary of the April Revolution. The plenum can support this patriotic initiative.

Today, the peasants are determinants of the political spirit in localities. The peasants even bring a vital force to normal functioning of the economy, and in the final analysis it depends on the peasants whether tomorrow's peace and tranquility shall be achieved or not? What should be done to attract the peasants towards the state power?

New necessary approach should be made regarding the agrarian, peasant question and democratic land and water reform. We should not forget all land reform are the cause of the occupation of state and social entities. It is necessary that joint venture companies be courageously set up in localities and the handicraft institutions and traditional occupations extensively developed.

It would be necessary that leasing of land and hiring of labour be allowed under the control of state and trade unions. The result in any case is the same. The village is the centre of future work and compromise should start from there.

The private entrepreneurs enjoy tremendous influence in our country. They are objectively interested in compromise. Because, if there is peace, tens of projects and natural resources which are inactive now will function.

Some of the private projects are inactive due to different reasons. This is a political error in the conditions of compromise. The rehabilitation of these projects should be helped and the representatives of their owners though outside the country, invited. As a result, the profit will solely be in favour of our economy and people.

The private owner has legal right to be full owner of his project. If the representatives of the project interfere in substantive matters in the affairs of private entrepreneurs, no encouragement and concession will be brought about a sound atmosphere. Creating any kind of nuisance of private entrepreneurs by the state representatives should be uprooted. This fact also relates to arrangement of passport for travel abroad. Now the passport is valid for one year, and for its owners to go through all formalities such as getting visa, making necessary documents, validity expire.

If the national capitalists are not attracted to active creative activity and guarantee and safety are not given to private investments the process of realization of the policy of national compromise will forge ahead with slackness. It is necessary that popular power creates real and tangible possibilities for them. Can't we proclaim that state, private and national ownership can all exist together?

This question can be reiterated by relying on normative documents which would form and guarantee the economic and legal foundations of the relations of private entrepreneurs with the state, and are themselves fruitful for the national economy. They should have more mixed institutions so that the capital of private entrepreneurs in different fields of national economy are still more attracted towards the revolution.

We have to back up the feasible efforts of private entrepreneurs and endorse credible documents in this respect in January in the Politburo and Council of Ministers.

It would be necessary that a nationwide conference of private entrepreneurs and traders is held. We are in favour of growth and flourishing of trade. Trade is messenger of peace. Under the conditions of war, he accepts risk in many cases. Compromise is the way to reduce the risk. It is through this that the prices of foodstuffs which have gone up during the years can be decreased. Those who support the trade relations with the Soviet Union and socialist countries should be encouraged.

Trade is the objective path of compromise. Because, now despite the war, the people bring products, and their labour from the villages under the dominance of the state, and tell them in cities controlled by us. They buy in these cities the essential goods i.e. salt, matches, sugar, kerosene etc.

Trade is alive, inspite of continuation of the war. We should not make the state of trade even more hard. Let us trade, not fight. It would be correct if the Ministry of Commerce organised consultative sessions and traders discuss their problems in a free atmosphere and point out what factors obstruct their way and how the state can help them.

An important role in compromise belongs to tribes and ethnic groups and that the tribes and ethnic groups contribute to shielding the borders of the country.

Afganistan, real conditions for fraternal dialogue home, without alien interference, will be prolonged.

The popular power does a great deal for tribes and ethnic groups. It considers in the other too to carry out further work for them. We know that the tribes and ethnic groups reconcile get together in their new cultural centre in Jalabad city and declare their most important war that is, war against war. Then, first one or two and following them all tribes and ethnic groups will declare their regions as areas of peace and security.

Two factors have special importance in the policy vis-a-vis tribes:

Firstly, the customs and traditions of tribes should not be violated. The tribes should not be assessed separate from the Afgan society. If we pay attention to growth of other Afghan nationalities and ignore the tribes, that would be an incorrect approach. We should work in a complex manner. As regards the national question, what the experience of fraternal territories teaches, above all, is that the economic, political and social rights of all nationalities must be ensured.

The practical forms of solution of this question depend on how much we do not keep in mind the history and traditions of the country.

We separately speak about the nomads. They can undertake dozens of measures for the cause of peace in the country. If they become peace messengers, close their pastures and settlements against the provocateurs and do not help transfer of weapons and ammunition, that will be in favour of nomads themselves and all our people. Today, compromise is a public necessity because it is an objective truth.

Now, we talk about craftsmen:

In the conditions of peace, the scope of offering their products will widen. The circle of orders will narrow. New orders and ground for control will be provided for them. The organization of their
work will be improved. It is important today that the artisans get united in a union and a fund for their assistance is established.

Supplying artisans with raw material and the sale of their products should be arranged. The time has come to talk about the intelligentsia. The intelligentsia should, above all, realize their role in the cause of national reconciliation. The Central Committee and the Council of Ministers have noticeably increased their attention to teachers, doctors and scholars. The teachers salary has been increased and the first academicians and candidate academicians have been introduced. All these measures have taken place in the conditions of war. Joining their efforts, the intelligentsia should help so that the masses of people are drawn out of fratricidal war.

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF RECONCILIATION

In the course of human history, this is a wholly new, unusual and unique fact that we are going to start. The entire world now watches the development of events in Afghanistan and their growth and their solution. It is necessary for us to engage precisely and actively in the issues of international policy and utilise this proper chance in our own favor. Attention should be focused on the non-aligned movement, Islamic conference and the United Nations.

Dear comrades,

Our cause is hard but extremely noble. Our suffering and war-striken people should rightly show to the world the definite example of life, which is the only possible one in our century, full of hazards and disputes.

Twenty years back, our country, was one of the founders of the non-aligned movement. At that time, our people turned into creators of a novel movement of non-alignment.

Today, pursuing and developing it in the policy of national reconciliation, we step forward. Today's plenum will be registered as an extraordinary one in the history of our party. This plenum sets out a number of extraordinary measures for cessation of war and achieving reconciliation. The extraordinary situation requires extraordinary measures.

Firm unity and oneness of our ranks and patience occupy the first place. We should not lose the spirit of optimism. Discipline and devotion are utmost necessary for us. It is from here that the great demand for extraordinary wisdom, foresight, flexibility, activity, decisiveness and independence come into being.

It can also happen that we may face unexpected conditions during the realization of the process of national reconciliation. Prediction of all warranties is difficult. These issues require extraordinary responsibly, demands strict control. We have been and are ready to work under such an extraordinary state so as to discharge our historic mission, that is, loyalty to peace for the sake of our suffering people.

T

HE withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan is not far off, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard A. Shevardnadze, announced last week. "This event," he predicted, "is not behind the mountains."

Western analysts doubt that the Soviet Union will remove its forces until the internal situation stabilizes. "If the Soviets withdraw under present conditions, their friends will be slaughtered," a Western diplomat said last week.

Shultz Urges Withdrawal

In Washington, Secretary of State George P. Shultz said no Afghan solution is possible until the Soviet Union begins to withdraw its troops.

"The essential ingredient is getting those Soviet troops out and doing it in a short period of time," Shultz told reporters at the State Department.

He said talks among Afghan factions over a new government cannot be held with the Soviet army still in the country, because the troops would "intimidate" the process.

But he said the Reagan Administration remains hopeful that Moscow will offer a timetable for troop withdrawal soon, and said he takes signs of Soviet flexibility seriously.

"There seems to be an awful lot of motion around, and so I think we ought to be ready to respond if there is something to respond to," he said. LA Times 1/17

SAID Mohammed Nabi Mohammed, spokesman for the Islamic Alliance of Afghan Mujahedeen: "We should have direct negotiations with the Soviets, and they should stop hiding behind the puppets in Kabul."
TIME JANUARY 19, 1987

In formally rejecting the cease-fire declared by the Soviet-backed Government, the guerrilla leaders denounced the truce and the Government's offer of reconciliation as ploys to legitimise Soviet control of Afghanistan.

One guerrilla leader, Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, not only demanded a Soviet troop withdrawal, but called on Moscow to surrender its predominantly Moslem Central Asian republics. Soviet Central Asia is made up of four of the nation's 15 constituent republics - Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenia and Uzbekistan. LA Times 1/16

but Pakistan's Deputy Foreign Minister, Zain Noorani, in an interview in Pakistan, said he was optimistic about prospects for a settlement, asserting that Pakistan was ready to explore all new Soviet and Afghan Government proposals.

LA Times 1/18

The cease-fire is only a part of the reconciliation program, Najib said, adding that the goal of national unity is like a distant mountain peak.

"Sometimes you go directly, sometimes you zig zag, and sometimes you go backward to get around obstacles in the path," Najib said. LA Times 1/19

The Miami Herald

NYT 1/25

Seuen Returning

Jim Morin

NYT 1/11

First We must negotiate a cease fire with the Afghan rebels.

Yes! Cease Fire.

NYT 1/11

And there must be no interference by any bellicose outside super powers!!

Yes! No Interference.

NYT 1/11

We the Soviet Union, have decided the time has come to withdraw from Afghanistan!!

Yes! Time has come.

NYT 1/11

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NYT 1/25
Najib’s reconciliation program & unilateral ceasefire has generated some optimism about finding a political solution to the problem of Afghanistan... Some of the Pakistani opposition parties are putting pressure on the Pakistan Gov’t to respond in a positive way & make use of this golden(!) opportunity to get rid of the Afghan issue.

The question is: Are the Soviets honest in finding a political solution for the problem of Afghanistan? If so, what are the indications of their change in policy? A close study of the Soviet leaders’ & their puppet statements shows that they have not offered something new... They want the authority of the Soviet-dominated regime to have a foothold in Afghanistan... Under the so-called reconciliation program dictated by the Soviets the regime remains & Soviet domination is legalized.

The Soviets knew very well that Mujahideen would not accept anything less than total freedom for Afghanistan. By offering a ceasefire & formation of a broad-based gov’t under the control of the communists, they wanted to adopt a peaceful outlook & give the impression that the Mujahideen are responsible for the continuation of the war. The time they have chosen for this propaganda campaign is of vital importance to the Soviet leadership. It is just before the Islamic summit in Kuwait. The campaign is directed to minimize the pressure on the Soviets on the question of withdrawal from Afghanistan. Mujahideen had decided to raise the question of recognition of the resistance by the OIC... The Soviets want to do everything to prevent the Mujahideen from gaining such a victory. The Geneva talks will open on 2/11. The Soviets wanted to send their puppet leaders to the talks with a new propaganda tool. The real intention of the Soviets will surface when the time table for the withdrawal of their forces will be discussed...

Putting pressure on the Pakistan Gov’t from within is another purpose of the present propaganda offensive. Some leftist opposition groups are trying to say that everything in Afghanistan has become normal & refugees can return. It was not surprising that Mujahideen leaders rejected the so-called reconciliation program & ceasefire & called it a ploy. However, the way they did it at the beginning was not a proper one. They spoke individually, not through the current spokesman of the Alliance. Individual stands can create differences & that is what the Soviets are waiting to exploit.

It should be emphasized that the mujahideen are eager to see the end of conflict in Afghanistan. Nobody on the face of the earth can destroy more than the people of Afghanistan themselves. But peace only returns when the cause of the conflict is not there. The cause of the conflict was the imposition of a puppet regime through military intervention by the Soviets. If the Soviets still insist on maintaining that regime which the people of Afghanistan have rejected, it means that they do not want to solve the problem but to deceive public opinion through political maneuver. The Soviets are playing a clever game. They know if Mujahideen accept what they give them it will lead to their total destruction; if they do not accept they can be branded as war-mongers... It is also possible that KHAD will direct some of its “sleepers” in the small resistance groups to make use of the “reconciliation program” to join the regime...

The resistance should strengthen its unity to cope with the new situation. This is only possible if the resistance leaders meet regularly, agree on a political program & speak through their elected spokesman. To be able to confront the enemy political offensives, the resistance should offer alternatives in which the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the right of the people of Afghanistan for self-determination & the restoration of the non-aligned & Islamic status of Afghanistan be included. The resolutions passed by the OIC & the UN General Assembly are the ones which the resistance can insist upon...

If the colonial wishes of the Soviets & their desire for the expansion of their empire at the expense of freedom is put aside, we do not have any other quarrel with the Soviets... While we totally reject the present campaign... as a propaganda offensive with no real intention to solve the problem, we welcome any honest step taken by the Soviets to end the occupation of Afghanistan & result in total freedom of the people of that country to choose their own destiny free from outside interference of any kind. Total freedom or holy war is our way.

AICNB #70 1/87

mediate withdrawal of Soviet troops & the replacement of the Kabul Marxist regime by an Islamic Gov’t acceptable to the people & the mujahideen. The common resolution also announced the formation of a commission which will begin working 2/11 & will have a month to prepare a joint program for an interim Gov’t & future free elections in Afghanistan... A judiciary committee will be set up to solve conflicts between resistance groups...
Discussion Re: Afghanistan Problem

Continued from the last issue. The following articles appeared in Kayhan International on December 13, 20 & 27.

(PART III)

* On the Soviet's Future Plans after the Geneva Conference

Mr. Khamoush: "In the name of God. The Soviet's plan after the Geneva conference will depend on the will of the combatant Muslim nation. Whatever scheme the Soviets devise and whatever joint decision they make may with the world-devouring U.S. and other covetous countries, they won't be able to cause any rift in the decisive will of our combatant nation to gain the final victory for the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan.

"Our nation will continue Jihad (holy war) until the final victory. So whatever decisions they may make and whatever plans they may have after the Geneva conference will have no effect on us. As the head of the Islamic Association of Afghanistan Ostad Rabbani has said, the main aim is Jihad and its continuation until the final victory of the Islamic revolution in Afghanistan and the rule of Islam on earth. We will achieve victory with the aid of the Exalted God. This is God's promise, that the believers will ultimately rule the earth and He will help them."

Mr. Khalili (from Nast Organization): "In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. The Soviet Union occupied the Islamic country of Afghanistan for specific motives and has been trying to realize them for a long time. The occupation of Afghanistan took place after the two hands ruling the country, namely the "Khaligh" (people's) and "Parcham" (flag) parties, failed to advance their ends. After this fiasco, the Soviets embarked on occupying Afghanistan to suppress the Islamic revolution of Afghanistan. They imagined that the uprising of the Muslim people of Afghanistan would be vanquished and the "Khaligh" and "Parcham" parties which were on the brink of annihilation would be strengthened. They thought their goal would be achieved through the coup of "Thr 7th". Fortunately these predictions turned out to be false and their strategy ended in vain. Despite their sophisticated arms and fierce attacks, the soldiers of the Russian Army could not do a damn thing and failed. They have suffered defeats in the battlefields and even the ringleaders at Kremlin have confessed to this reality.

"Because of the Muslim people of Afghanistan's victories in their struggle, the enemies decided to halt the Islamic revolution and this popular uprising through the Geneva talks.

"During several rounds of talks held in Geneva, the Soviet's general belief was that they could gain positive results through negotiations. However, with the clear stances taken by the independent Muslim forces of Afghanistan, each round of the talks ended in failure and the negotiation has been shelved as a result of the intensified attacks of the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviets. Thus, the Soviets understood that they could not and were not in a position to destroy this revolution through the Geneva talks and other political maneuvers. At the present time, the propaganda they made during the Geneva conference has been diminished. There are two ways available for the Soviet Union to still destroy the revolution: through military attacks and ruthless repression of the Muslim people of Afghanistan which has proven futile or to hold up the Geneva talks and diplomatic initiatives. The first has been set aside because Russia has not been able to succeed and even the leaders of the regime in Kabul believe that they have suffered defeat vis-a-vis Mujahideen's attacks. Therefore, the only alternative left is through diplomatic talks. We believe that this alternative will be carried out by the Soviets through collusion with the U.S. and other Western states. It is the Soviet's plan to avoid direct clashes with the brave combatants forces of Afghanistan on the one hand, and to secure the access for the preservation of their selfish interests by any means possible.

"The aims that the Soviets have in their minds should never be forgotten. Because their motives play a major role in the realization of their colonialist plans, the Russians will seek their ends through diplomatic venues. However, the position of the Muslim people and independent strugglers of Afghanistan is clear. So, this way will also end in naught; and ultimately, there will remain only one way for the Soviets: the disgraceful defeat and the unconditional expulsion of the Soviet Army from Afghanistan."

(PART IV)

Mr. Hashemi (from the United Front of Islamic Revolution in Afghanistan): "As the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. In question regarding the fate of Afghanistan after the Geneva conference should be divided into two parts: one part relates to the evaluation of the superpowers' future plans, and the other part concerns the Muslim people and crusaders of Afghanistan.

"As to the first part of the question, it seems that all international issues are decided upon by four individuals, namely: Gorbachev, Reagan, the head of CIA, and the head of KGB.

"Our evaluation of the superpowers plan is that Russia does not want the communist regime to rule Afghanistan for the time being, because it has realized that a communist government can no longer secure its survival in Afghanistan. At present, it only seeks to have the Communist Party recognized in Afghanistan. This party has sent thousands of children and youth to Russia to undergo brainwashing there and to be moulded into individuals more dangerous than Lenin, Babrak, and Najib. The mission of the Geneva conference is to guarantee the survival of the Communist Party in Afghanistan. We should let Pakistan be about to recognize the Kabul regime, and it is a reality. The agreement that Pakistan is going to sign with the Kabul regime will in fact, be tantamount to recognition of that regime. Those groups whose are dependent on Zahir shah will certainly submit to this plan sooner or later. Anyhow, if we continue to Kabul for a "national reconciliation" that may be followed by so-called "free elections." They may prepare grounds for "free elections" in Afghanistan to bring a "religious" or non-communist and "nationalist" person to power and then tell the world through propaganda that freedom has been established in Afghanistan while communism has failed.

"In such a case, a non-communist government which will act as a disguise for the communists while preserving the interests of the East and West under the cover of "Islam". This mock government will gain power in Afghanistan while the Communist Party will be trudging with it. So it is very important for the Soviets for the present time that the Communist Party be recognized, so that it will continue to rule Afghanistan under a new disguise, only with the difference that the U.S. will also have a share.

"This is not an issue to be dealt with only in words. We should evaluate a series of things realistically to see what they are doing and how much they have advanced.

"As to the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the Geneva conference may put an obligatory end to Russia's aggression by acceding to the retention of a certain number of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, for example 20,000 of them. Through this agreement, it will grant legitimacy to the Soviet administration in Afghanistan as well as allow them to preserve their own interests and that of the Communist Party in Afghanistan. In such a case, Russia will have no right to enter the territory of Afghanistan this time with two hundred thousand troops using the stipulation of this agreement under the least pretext, detection of a Muslim gunman in the moun-
tains, for instance. If it happens, the Soviet’s aggression will no more be questioned, their new invasion will seem lawful. The government will have an Islamic disguise, and the Communist party will reorganize itself with the Soviet’s support and the experience that it has learned in the course of years.”

QUESTION: There is not much information at least outside of Afghanistan, on the women’s role in the Islamic revolution in Afghanistan. I raise this question because we know that women have played a very significant role in the Islamic Revolution in Iran; and of course, women have had a remarkable role in many of the world’s revolutions. But since the role of women in the Islamic Revolution in Iran has been completely Islamic and positive, especially in its victory, and on the other hand we know that the Jihad in Afghanistan is Islamic, I think women must have played a great role in this Jihad (holy war). We think we better allocate this part of our discussion to women’s role. I hope they will brighten our minds about what women have done so far, what they are doing now, and what you think they can do in the future. Let us begin with Mr. Mowlavi Abdul-Jabir from the “Ansar Al-Mahdi” movement.

“Mr. Mowlavi Abdul-Jabir from “Ansar Al-Mahdi”:

“Seek refuge in Allah from the accursed Satan. In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. Praise be to Allah, the Lord of creation, the future will belong to the pious; and peace and greeting be upon our master, Muhammad (SAWA) and his family and companions.

“There are many points that can be discussed with reference to Muslim women. In Afghanistan, I can say that women have taken charge of keeping the houses of the Mujahideen safe. In addition, women prepare and take food for the Mujahideen through tough roads and under the hardest circumstances. In spite of all the difficulties, they do this service for the sake of Islam especially in places where the Mujahideen are unable to pass. They have also performed the duty of encouraging the Muslim Afghan children to fight against the polytheists very well. They also boost the morale of their husbands to combat against Russia and join their brothers in the trenches.

“It is the mothers of the martyrs who give inspiration to the Afghan youths not to despair in their Jihad (holy war) against the Russians.

“Besides these women also play a very outstanding role in Afghanistan by teaching, encouraging and preparing their children for Jihad. The role in this field is even greater than that of men. One can say that half the tasks of the Islamic revolution in Afghanistan is being carried out by women.

“Praise be given to Allah, in the Islamic Republic of Iran women have also extended much help to the war fronts although the government itself is strongly standing on its own feet. Women in Afghanistan have almost the same role as that of their sisters in Iran. Preparing food, taking water, and medicine to the wounded Mujahideen, giving shelter to and taking care of the wounded Mujahideen in places hidden to the enemy and its spies; these are among the remarkable activities of the Muslim women in Afghanistan.”

“Mr. Kalli, from the Nast Organization of Afghanistan:

“In connection with the role of women in the Islamic revolution in Afghanistan, I should first mention the point that women have been deprived in all the Muslim countries, especially in Afghanistan, and they are not on the same level as well as the rest of the Afghan people. Having been persecuted for long, women played a major role in the people’s movement and uprising. In Kabul and other towns of Afghanistan that are under the control of the Russians and their agents, women have even made use of highly sophisticated guerrilla tactics to establish coordination between the Mujahideen in the liberated regions and their combatant brothers in the towns.

“Apart from this, women had actively participated in the demonstrations that were staged against the Russians in Kabul and other towns on the third of Hut (February 22), a few months after the occupation of Afghanistan, and at the beginning of the academic year in protest to the foreign aggression. (In Afghanistan, schools open in the spring). In those marches which lasted a week, several hundred sisters were martyred in Kabul.

“So much for the activities of the Afghan women in towns. Our Muslim sisters have played an even greater role in giving help to the fronts. In northern Afghanistan when the people were attacked by the Red Army and the hirelings of Russia, they sought shelter in the mountains. There, the women also took up arms along with their Muslim brothers and fought against the aggressor enemy until martyrdom. Some of these sisters have been martyred in trenches in the Islamic revolution in Afghanistan.”

“Mr. Mowlavi Abdul-Wajed:

“I seek refuge in Allah from the accursed Satan. In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful.

“With respect to the role of women in the Islamic Jihad, I should say that the women of Afghanistan are generally from two groups. One group consists of the tribeswomen and villagers. The other one comprises the educated women. The role of both of these two groups in the Islamic Jihad in Afghanistan is very astonishing and commendable. As our brother mentioned, although the women of Afghanistan have suffered many deprivations, nevertheless, they have performed their role very effectively. For example, those women who are students and teachers in Kabul have carried out various activities.

They are very well organized and united. On the third of Hut (Feb. 22) a huge demonstration was staged in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. In that demonstration “Sister Nahid” was martyred. She had led an uprising from the high schools of “Zarghunabad” and “Ayesh Darani” and continued her struggle until she sacrificed her life for the sake of God. She urged the people and students to march and demonstrate against the Russians and their agents and was finally martyred by the executioners of the Red Army. This was an example of the women’s struggle and combat in the capital.

“Besides these activities, Muslim women have done a great job in inviting other women to Islam and teaching guerrilla warfare tactics to them in the towns. Under the present hard conditions they have even been able to secure a special place wherein they reproduce the news bulletins or leaflets of the Mujahideen and distribute them in schools and universities. These activities of educated women who are students at the schools and colleges of Afghanistan are praiseworthy.

“The other group of women is made up of tribeswomen and villagers who have done a really great service by smuggling food for the Mujahideen. Besides this, in many parts of Afghanistan these women have taken up arms in trenches so that their combatant brothers may be able take to a rest or call at their homes. In many cases it has happened that while the trenches were being guarded by these sisters, the enemy launched an attack. This happened in the region of “Lugar” and as a result two communist mercenaries were killed by a Muslim sister.

“Another strange tactic was employed by the Muslim women in the region of “Kesari”. A number of Mujahideen and Muslim brothers had been surrounded by the Russian forces and the lackeys of communism during the night. The Mujahideen were con-
The Afghan resistance and the problem of unity

ABDUL RASHID

In his inaugural address in May 1986, the new Secretary General of the communist regime in Afghanistan declared that the party was determined to continue with the war against the Mujahideen. He claimed that the war had been going well and that the Mujahideen were on the defensive. However, the Mujahideen had not been defeated and were still fighting. The war had been going on for many years and there was no end in sight.

The war has brought great suffering to the Afghan people. Many have died and others have been injured. The economy has been disrupted and there is little food and fuel available. The war has also led to the displacement of many people who have fled to neighboring countries.

The Mujahideen have been fighting for a better life for the Afghan people. They believe that the communist government is oppressive and that the people should have more freedom and democracy. The Mujahideen have been supported by other countries, including the United States, which has provided them with military aid.

The war has also had a negative impact on the economy. The war has disrupted the economy and there is little industrial activity. The war has also led to the displacement of many people who have fled to neighboring countries.

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Pakistan in Two Minds

Pakistan Foreign Minister Yakub Khan’s reported rejection of the Afghan plan for national reconciliation is as bizarre as it is unfortunate and must be seen as a setback. It is intriguing because Mr Yakub Khan is saying in effect that a national reconciliation in Afghanistan cannot come about without Pakistan’s consent. If he is saying so, can there be a more blatant admission that Pakistan is taking interest in the internal affairs of Afghanistan? Islamabad’s involvement in the Afghan situation can be understood and, even, appreciated. No Government could remain indifferent if millions of refugees were to pour in from a neighbouring country. It is even possible to argue that there would be a strong urge—as much political as humanitarian—to support and stand by the Afghan refugees. But what is beyond logic is for Pakistan to sniff at peace offers by Afghanistan, especially after Islamabad certified that Moscow looks genuine about reaching a political settlement of the Afghan question. Also because there is a large body of public opinion in Pakistan—after demonstrated connection between Afghan refugees and the Karachi underworld and drug traffickers who contributed so much to the recent orgy of violence in the city—that wants the Afghan problem sorted out at the earliest.

If Mr Yakub Khan’s stance after a visit to Moscow looks inconsistent with the recent Pakistani sentiments, it may have something to do with Islamabad’s fear that difficulties might crop up about the $4.2 billion military-economic aid package from the US in view of an Afghan settlement not agreed to by Washington. It looks as though Pakistan is under strong US pressure not to agree to any Afghan settlement which does not ensure quick withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and which may permit enough time for Moscow to stamp out anti-communist opposition before pulling out its troops. A circumstantial evidence of a US desire to torpedo an Afghan solution is the downing of an AN-26 aircraft near Kabul by US-supplied Stinger missiles which killed 36 persons. This happened around the same time when Mr Yakub Khan was in Moscow and the Pak-Afghan proximity talks were under way in Geneva. The reports from Washington suggest that the State Department is taken up by the Iran gate affairs that it has left with a large body of public opinion in Pakistan—after demonstrated connection between Afghan refugees and the Karachi underworld and drug traffickers who contributed so much to the recent orgy of violence in the city—that wants the Afghan problem sorted out at the earliest.

From the same issue, a story on the riots in Peshawar:

PESHAWAR, February 19 (UNI): Riots broke out in this capital city of Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province following a bomb explosion which resulted in more than 80 casualties including 16 dead.

While 12 persons, including five schoolchildren, were killed in the explosion, four people were killed during disturbances after the bombing.

AP, quoting reports, said angry Pakistanis poured into the streets after the blast. The explosion was placed in a truck standing outside the office of an Afghan Mujahideen group and went off about 4.00 p.m.

Some began yelling anti-Afghan slogans and hurling rocks at the Afghan office, local reporters and other eyewitnesses said.

Gunfire erupted and four persons were killed but bodies were spirited away when the police intervened.

The police confirmed there had been firing, but declined to give any details.

Several slum dwellings in the vicinity and a government primary school situated a few yards away were damaged in the explosion.

At least a dozen vehicles, suspected to belong to Afghan refugees, were burned down. Several shops were also set ablaze.

The police used teargas to disperse the crowd and later resorted to firing.

Several persons reportedly sustained bullet injuries.

All shops and business establishments were closed as violence spread to other parts of the city. Several contingents of frontier constabulary and troops were deployed.

Anti-communist opposition before pulling out its troops. A circumstantial evidence of a US desire to torpedo an Afghan solution is the downing of an AN-26 aircraft near Kabul by US-supplied Stinger missiles which killed 36 persons. This happened around the same time when Mr Yakub Khan was in Moscow and the Pak-Afghan proximity talks were under way in Geneva. The reports from Washington suggest that the State Department is taken up by the Iran gate affairs that it has left with a large body of public opinion in Pakistan—after demonstrated connection between Afghan refugees and the Karachi underworld and drug traffickers who contributed so much to the recent orgy of violence in the city—that wants the Afghan problem sorted out at the earliest.

Apart from the desirability of an early political solution in Afghanistan before Moscow discovered enough excuse for a reversal of its current reasonableness, pressure is building up within Pakistan for peace. This may explode to the discomfiture of Islamabad and Washington if the two continue to look responsible for stalling a settlement with Kabul.
Q: After eight and a half years, the Soviet military situation appears to have reached a stage of «victory-reductio». What is that? And do you see any signs of a decline? 

GOLBAGH HIKMATYAR: We do not quarrel with the perception of the military situation by our observers or their commentators. They have so much facility to publish and broadcast in their own countries. There are no words that they have no problem in understanding the military situation themselves over and over again. 

When the Afghans were in the Soviet Union in December 1979, the Russians were able to fire 700 SAC missiles and 8,500 tanks and armoured vehicles into Afghanistan. They are spending millions of dollars a day to support their military in Afghanistan. Their casualties rate is 20 Soviet soldiers killed per day. 

On the Afghan side, five million Afghans were killed, forced to take refuge in Pakistan and India. One million Afghans, including women and children, were killed in Afghanistan. The Russian soldiers destroyed 400 villages, farms, orchards and thousands of businesses. The third of our population is entirely wiped out. They have been forced to flee to Pakistan and India. 

The Russians have been forced to flee their own country, from 15,000 to 200,000. They have left their families to be left behind. They have recently assured an accurated announcement that by now, the anti-air, anti-tank and anti-personnel regiments, the Russians did not mean to abandon the Russian command. He said the number of Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan was only less than 250,000. Yet any news that reached Afghanistan from their comrades who had joined the Salvation Affair. 

Q: But do not that static equilibrium that we earlier mentioned mean that the war will be over in the near future? We hear that the expenses you mention are not being spent in the same way as in the Gulf war. 

A: In any case, they are far too valuable to the Russian people. They have been forced to fight in the Afghan war, to lose their blood and to fight against the Afghans. The Russians might have decided to stay put and take time to bring about a new equilibrium in the political and economic changes. 

G.H.: In fact, it is the equilibrium. It is not a situation of controlled war. The situation of the Rusians is getting better every day. It is better in the level of organisation, it is bigger in the number of their operations and in the ever-growing resources. 

The war has intensified the Warsaw Pact's capacity. The Russians, who are not ported by tanks and guns, are not ported by air power and security rifles are not safe even in the villages. They have to come and go and operate in and around Kabul. Only the other side there are no more than 10,000. They are against the Bangkok Russian embassy. It was said that the Russians are afraid that the Taliban will attack the embassy but the Taliban did not want to attack it. The Taliban did not want to attack the embassy and they went out of Kabul. 

Today the Russians do not feel secure in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the Moslemad group and its formations more virtually thanks from one end of the country to another. The Russians are not able to stop them. This is not the situation they would have liked to see. The war could be happy about. Otherwise they would be able to withdraw six regiments. 

Q: You have rejected the war as a legitimate exercise, to create a false impression of Soviet designs for a peaceful solution. 

A: We have rejected the war as a peaceful exercise, but at the same time it was also an effort to bring the people that are contained within the Kremlin's own boundaries. The Afghans are fighting in their own country. It is certainly very difficult and vast policies towards Islam and the Middle East. 

Q: But would it not be more reasonable for the Afghan people to live in peace and in practice at this stage, because the objective situation is闵with the risk of China and Iran has already been concluded? 

A: There could be a change in Iran, back to the Soviet Union again. It may be there will be a change in the Soviet Union. If there is a change in the Soviet Union, the war will go on escalating until victory. 

Q: What is your appraisal of the present situation in the Middle East? 

A: The morale of the Soviet army is very poor. Naturally the whole command and bureaucracy do not know any functions. Americans and Pakistanis were sent to the Soviet Union to work in a factory. Their situation is very difficult. There are about 45,000 to 50,000 people in the Soviet Union who joined the Afghan war. They have been killed, wounded or captured. Many of them are fighting alongside the Afghan resistance. 

Q: Are there any Central Asian soldiers? 

A: No, they are not Russians and other non-Muslim nationalities. 

Q: Confused, dispirited and not knowing what to do. The so-called ruling party (PPD) and the Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PA) has become more fractionalised. Previously it was split into two parts. The faction of the PPA, who are the Chalics and the PPA are further split. The ideological bonds were already tense. In the present situation, which is the frontman for the Russians to appear against internal opposition, the Afghan population do not have the calibre to be the general secretary of the party. I know him well. We were together in the Afghan news, we want Babak, but also dawn with Russia. Russia is an home.
AFGHAN VISIT SHOWS
DAMAGE OF A
CONTINUING WAR  NYT 1/22

BY PHILIP TAUBMAN
Special to The New York Times

JALALABAD, Afghanistan, Jan. 17 — The wind-swept graves that punctuate the barren hills outside this provincial capital, as well as the helicopters roaming overhead and the tanks that share the dusty highway with camels and oxen, belie the Government's contention that this area has been pacified.

Signs of the seven-year-old war that has torn Afghanistan abound in Jalalabad and the surrounding countryside: a huge expanse of arid plain and snow-capped mountains along the border with Pakistan.

A brief, tightly controlled visit to the region arranged by the Afghan leader, Najib, has given some hint of the dislocation and damage that includes the capital, as well as the helicopters parked by one isolated outpost that seemed a relic from the zenith of the British Empire.

One point the buses slowed down to pass an army patrol that had stopped on the road. Soldiers were standing over a man, apparently suspected of being a guerrilla, who was lying on the road with his hands pinned behind his head.

$1 Million Damage From War

The director of the state farm — actually an amalgamation of four farms founded with Soviet assistance in 1965 — said it employed more than 5,000 people. He said 700 of them were armed and members of the local defense force.

The director said the sprawling farm had been spared rebel attacks for several years but had sustained more than $1 million in damage over the course of the war.

An aged Afghan defender carrying a pre-World War I bolt action rifle later reported that guerrillas had engaged the local militia in combat during the previous nights despite the cease-fire. Bullet holes and artillery damage was visible in some of the farm buildings.

On the return drive to Jalalabad, the buses slowed to a crawl to remain a safe distance behind a convoy of at least seven Soviet tanks that were apparently headed back to base.

Afgan aides assigned to accompany the visiting reporters tried to prevent the correspondents from photographing the convoy and the Soviet troops, in some cases blinding camera lenses with their hands.

Before flying back to Kabul, the reporters were allowed to walk around the Jalalabad bazaar, a congested, noisy grid of narrow lanes and small shops. Those who wandered from the main group were followed by Afghan security agents.

The streets were filled with an incongruous mixture of vehicles, including mud-drawn carriages, hand-held carts pulled high with bags of grain and fruit, three-wheel mini-vans used as taxis, large multi-colored trailer trucks and European and Soviet cars.
The air rang with the bells on hundreds of bicycles that competed for space on the crowded streets. Periodically, the traffic would suddenly part as an Afghan or Soviet Army truck or armored personnel carrier rumbled through the city, churning clouds of dust into the air.

**City Swollen With Refugees**

Residents said the city's population was swelled with refugees from the countryside seeking improved security in Jalalabad. Several million Afghan refugees have fled the war to move to Pakistan. Tens of thousands have settled in spawling refugee camps on the outskirts of Peshawar, where they live in stone and mud dwellings and tents. One Jalalabad shopkeeper, a Sikh, said that the city was relatively peaceful during the day, but that small-arms and artillery fire could be heard all around at night.

He said he had been many helicopter sorties in recent weeks, apparently directed against guerrilla units in the hills and mountains outside Jalalabad. The shopkeeper, who sold pharmaceutical goods, said a local hospital was kept busy caring for wounded Afghan and Soviet soldiers.

At a nearby corner, three Soviet soldiers watched warily as an officer haggled with a shopkeeper over the price of a shirt. Apparently surprised to encounter an American reporter, the officer paused to inquire in Russian how an American reporter, the officer paused to inquire in Russian how.

"We have good relations with the people," he said, reporting that he arrived in Afghanistan three months ago and would remain for a year.

In a waiting jeep, several other Soviet officers pulled their collars up to cover their faces as a reporter pointed his camera in their direction.

**A parade of speakers from friendly Communist and Socialist parties offered their greetings and support, invariably denouncing imperialism and the United States as they raised a clenched fist over their heads.**

The audience was composed mostly of wizened Afghan men with long white beards, flowing robes called chapanas, elaborate turbans called longy and airy silk pants known as perohan watonban. Many of the men fell asleep during parts of the meetings.

The audience was sprinkled with Soviet officials, who often consulted with Afghan Government aides in Russia.

Western reporters were barred from leaving the meeting hall, a long, narrow chamber with a vaulted wooden ceiling, until the session ended.

David Shipner in the NYT of 1/21:

WASHINGTON, Jan. 20 — Despite growing signs of interest by the Soviet Union in getting its troop out of Afghanistan, American officials and foreign diplomats said today that an early withdrawal seems unlikely unless the Afghan insurgents moderate their opposition to forming a coalition government acceptable to Moscow.

A flurry of diplomatic activity has taken place in recent days among senior American and Soviet officials in Pakistan, which provides the main sanctuary and supply route for the insurgents. Under Secretary of State Michael H. Armacost was scheduled to return to Washington late tonight after talks in Pakistan, where a Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, Anatoly G. Kovalyev, was also holding meetings.

The Afghan leader, Najib, has said that his Government and the Soviet Union have agreed on a timetable for the withdrawal of the estimated 115,000 Soviet soldiers. The timetable has not been made public, although it is expected to be submitted at the next round of indirect talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is scheduled to convene in Geneva next month under United Nations auspices.

Informally, Moscow is reported to have spoken of a withdrawal period of years, during which Pakistan would cut off the flow of insurgent manpower and weapons. Pakistan has suggested four months, an American official said, and Secretary of State George Shultz has also spoken of "months," calling for a "short and decisive Soviet troop withdrawal."

Beyond the question of timing, however, lies the more fundamental problem of what kind of government is left behind in Kabul, officials and diplomats believe. They see Soviet officials requiring at least a face-saving political solution to accompany their pullout, a "decent interval" officials have called it, during which a regime friendly to Moscow could preside.

The United States has already agreed to be a guarantor of the United Nations-sponsored agreements when and if they are completed, a commitment that implies ending all but a small number of American weapons to the insurgents. Pakistan and Afghanistan have agreed to abstain from interfering in each other's internal affairs, which would mean closing the Pakistani routes of supply.

But neither the United States nor Pakistan appears ready to press the insurgents, known as the mujaheddin, to accept a coalition government that would include some Afghan figures who have served in pro-Soviet regimes.

"We can't force them to accept anything," a Pakistani diplomat said.

A State Department official said: "Our position is that it's up to the mujaheddin to determine what a future regime would be like. We're not looking for a puppet state for the West, but we won't accept a puppet state for the East. The U.S. is leaving it to the mujaheddin."

The mujaheddin ended a three-day conference last Saturday in Pakistan with a toughly worded declaration that a government composed of the seven insurgent factions based in Peshawar, Pakistan, would take over after a Soviet withdrawal, a Pakistani diplomat noted. Any Afghan who serves in a government under Soviet domination would be considered a Soviet agent, he said.

Diplomats speculated that the uncompromising stance of the Afghan insurgents could be a negotiating position masking some flexibility, but they said they were not sure.

One complication is that the United Nations negotiations, in which Pakistan and Afghanistan do not talk directly with each other but through officials of the world organization, do not deal with internal Afghan political affairs. If they are to be resolved, they must be negotiated informally by Pakistan, the United States, Afghanistan, the Soviet Union and the insurgents.

Given Afghanistan's history of a weak central government and tribal autonomy, diplomats and officials doubt that the insurgent groups will easily agree to a coalition acceptable to Moscow. And without the presence of Soviet troops, the officials predict, the Soviet-backed Government would not last long.

So far, the negotiations have produced agreement on three of the four issues on the agenda: future relations in the internal affairs of Pakistan and Afghanistan, international guarantees of Afghanistan's neutrality and the return of the three million Afghan refugees who have fled to Pakistan. The withdrawal timetable is the final piece of the puzzle, United Nations officials say.

Pakistan is said to be anxious for a resolution to the conflict. An American official said that during the last year at least 500 sorties have been made by Afghan aircraft, some possibly flown by Soviet pilots, against Afghan refugee camps inside Pakistan. In addition, some restiveness has been detected among Pakistanis about the Afghans in their midst.
FOR SOVIET CIVILIANS, A 'NERVOUS' LIFE

NYT 1/24

By PHILIP TAUBMAN
Special to The New York Times

KABUL, Afghanistan, Jan. 18 — In the last seven years, a small city of concrete apartment buildings and shops has risen on the outskirts of Kabul, not far from the airport.

It is the Soviet district, a miniature Moscow that is the center of a separate and reclusive world occupied by the thousands of Soviet citizens who live and work here.

Although Russians posted anywhere overseas as diplomats, advisers and journalists have a tendency to keep to themselves, partly by instinct and partly by instruction from Moscow, the practice has been reinforced in Afghanistan because of security concerns.

"They're exceedingly nervous," a Western diplomat said. "The Afghans don't like Russians, czarist or Soviet."

See Themselves as Unwelcome

Although other diplomats quarreled with the generalization, it was clarified during a five-day visit to Afghanistan, most of which was spent in Kabul, that the Soviet contingent, military and civilian, considers itself unwelcome among the Afghans.

Western analysts said there were about 120,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, a number that has varied little since the Soviet intervention against the Afghan guerrillas began in 1979. Afghan and Soviet officials refer to the military presence as the "Soviet limited contingent," and some Soviet press dispatches carry the dateline, "With the Soviet Limited Contingent in Afghanistan."

Western diplomats said that in addition to the troops, who are spread around bases throughout the country, there are about 9,000 Soviet civilian advisers in Kabul.

The threat, according to Kabul residents and Western diplomats, comes from both guerrilla fighters and Afghans who are unassociated with the guerrillas but resent the Soviet presence.

Russians Killed in Kabul

They said many Soviet soldiers and civilians had been killed in Kabul in stabbings and other attacks, particularly in the noisy, crowded bazaars.

There have also been several terrorist bombings in or near Soviet installations, including an explosion that destroyed part of the heavily fortified Soviet Embassy last year.

Because of these incidents, Soviet troops, when not engaged in combat or on patrol, stick to their bases, Kabul residents and Western diplomats said.

Soviet civilians have been warned not to visit the bazaar. Westerners in Kabul who go there make a practice of talking loudly in English, French or German to avoid being mistaken for Russians.

Russians who shop on Chicken Street, another shopping district where Western goods and electronic equipment are plentiful, carry concealed sidearms and two-way radios, Western diplomats said.

Soviet troops armed with automatic rifles often patrol the street.

Shopper With Bodyguards

A Soviet diplomat shopping along Chicken Street on a recent afternoon was accompanied by several Soviet bodyguards and followed at a discreet distance by a heavily armed Soviet patrol.

Narcotics, easily obtained in Afghanistan, are another problem, according to Western diplomats, who said many Soviet soldiers serving in the country had developed drug problems.

One Kabul resident said there was a special drug rehabilitation clinic in the capital for Russians, but this could not be verified.

To ease the strain and isolation, Russians in Kabul can watch Soviet television. Two of the three main Soviet channels are transmitted by land line to Kabul.

An Afghan official said there were several private screening rooms where Soviet movies were shown.

Soviet Shops Well Stocked

Shops in the Soviet district, which is known as Mikrorayon, a Russian word meaning "city housing project," are stocked with familiar products, including jam, cookies, canned goods, vodka and mineral water.

The Russians also drive Soviet cars and their apartments are outfitted with refrigerators and other appliances imported from home, Afghan officials said.

The apartment complexes are smaller versions of the prefabricated high-rise buildings that ring Moscow and other Soviet cities.

A Soviet armored personnel carrier patrolling the Soviet district on the outskirts of Kabul, Afghanistan. The district is known as Mikrorayon, a Russian word meaning "city housing project."

Because there are not enough apartments in the Soviet district, several new communities are rising on the outskirts of Kabul.

Western diplomats said top Afghan Communist Party members and senior Government officials were also housed in the Soviet district.

When large numbers of Soviet troops and armor were deployed in Kabul two days ago, apparently because of intelligence reports of possible terrorist attacks, a Soviet tank or armored personnel carrier was stationed at almost every intersection in Mikrorayon.

Social Life Circumscribed

The social life of Russians is circumscribed, involving contact almost exclusively with Eastern bloc diplomats and the Afghan authorities, according to Afghans and Western diplomats.

"They are under orders not to have anything to do with the Western diplomatic community here," a Western diplomat said.

There is a Soviet hospital in Kabul, a compound of two-story yellow buildings protected by a high concrete wall and several units of Soviet troops.

A group of six patients, young men with crewcuts who appeared to be soldiers, could be seen resting in the yard on a recent afternoon. A few yards away, a Soviet soldier scanned the area from a tank turret.

Philip Taubman continues his reports from Kabul in the 1/26 NYT:

KABUL, Afghanistan, Jan. 18 — The rug merchants speak Russian, but gladly accept personal checks for dollars that they deposit in New York bank accounts.

The stores stock Russian jams, cookies and vodka, but also sell Colgate toothpaste and Heineken beer.

The Russians, following their custom, installed elevated traffic booths at major intersections here to help maintain order, but the Afghan police rarely use them and the streets are never orderly.
A Country Between Cultures

After seven years of the Soviet military presence, Afghanistan seems to be a country caught between cultures and political allegiances. To a visitor familiar with the Soviet Union, it seemed a country with a Soviet system but not a Soviet soul.

The topography alone — towering mountain ranges and isolated valleys, huge areas of uninhabited desert — seems to form a natural barrier to the centralized ethos of Marxism-Leninism.

During a carefully controlled five-day visit by foreign reporters the authorities portrayed Afghanistan differently. They described it as a country living harmoniously under Communism with a party, Government and people dedicated to building a new Socialist order.

The Soviet Union, described by the Afghan leader, Najib, as “our great northern neighbor,” was depicted as a generous guarantor of security against foreign aggression and a source of political inspiration.

Travel and meetings were arranged by the authorities to support these images, and independent reporting was discouraged. Apart from a brief trip to the provincial city of Jalalabad and the surrounding countryside near the Pakistan border, the reporters were confined to Kabul, the capital.

But even with the constraints, it was apparent that the reality of Afghanistan was a good deal more intricate, involving a volatile political and social chemistry in which Soviet influence is strong but not completely dominant.

Under the ostensibly cohesive Socialist surface, there were clearly powerful opposing forces. These included longstanding tribal tensions and distrust of central authority, the growing appeal of Islamic fundamentalism and bitter divisions within the Afghan Communist movement itself.

Combined with a long history of opposition to foreign intervention, these forces seem likely to impede a political settlement of the seven-year war, the formation of a credible coalition government and the withdrawal of the estimated 120,000 Soviet troops here.

“Afghanistan has never been one nation, and it is not under Communism,” one Western diplomat said. “Historically, it is a land of many peoples and cultures that respected central authority. Afghanistan in its natural state is an unruly patchwork of autonomous valleys and villages.”

“Moscow cannot Sovietize Afghanistan unless it colonizes it, and that would require an act of conquest, which is not in the cards,” the diplomat added. “Afghanistan is a Soviet satellite but not the 16th Soviet republic.”

An Afghan Politburo

Some in the West have compared Afghanistan, which before the beginning of the war had a population of 15.4 million, to Soviet Central Asia, contending that it was rapidly becoming indistinguishable from the Uzbek and Tadzhik republics just across the Soviet border.

The Afghan political system is unmistakably patterned on the Soviet Union’s, with power held by the Communist Party, known officially as the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan. The party apparatus includes a Central Committee, Politburo and Secretariat, with Mr. Najib serving as General Secretary of the Central Committee.

The Government bureaucracy is filled with Soviet advisers who, one diplomat said, “sit at the elbow of every important Afghan official.” Diplomats said there were about 9,000 Soviet civilian advisers in Kabul.

The director of a state farm near the Pakistan border proudly told visiting reporters that 500 farm workers were loyal party members, some serving on local party committees. “Everyone from the director to field workers lives in the same kind of housing,” he said.

Such equality appeared not to be the rule in Kabul, where residents and Western diplomats said senior party activists and leaders enjoy special privileges. In controversial last apartments and special clinics — privileges common for party members in the Soviet Union.

Afghan television mirrored Soviet programming with an emphasis on ideologically safe themes. The evening news program offered a mix of pro-Government and anti-American reports.

The Government-controlled information outlets, mimicking Pravda and Izvestia, published texts of party declarations and speeches by Mr. Najib, who only uses one name, on the front page under flattering headlines. • • •

Black Volgas, tan Zhigulis and other Soviet-made cars cruised the streets of Kabul. As in Moscow, access to official cars seemed to carry a license to drive three times the speed limit and to ignore traffic lights.

Russian rules English, and may have surpassed it, as the preferred foreign language. Nearly all Afghan civil and military officials speak Russian and use it to converse with representatives from Moscow, according to Afghan aides who accompanied Western diplomats said these divi-

sive factors would make it extremely difficult to bring about the kind of national reconciliation outlined by Mr. Najib.

Mailbox Labeled in Russian

Most shopkeepers in Kabul and Jalalabad started conversations with foreigners in Russian, and were surprised to find some visitors were Americans.

Afghan children roamed the bazaar in Jalalabad, thinking they were approaching a group of Russians, told Western reporters in Russian that they could arrange female companion-ship for the right price. One Afghan urchin reeled off a series of Russian expletives that would have made an adult Muscovite blush.

At the Spinghar Hotel in Jalalabad, the mailbox nailed to the wall was labeled “with the Russian word for ‘post.’ Western diplomats said that Afghan cultural traditions had survived the Soviet military intervention, but that nonconformist writing and art had been discouraged and the intellectual life of Kabul had moved underground, • • •

The variety of goods available in shops in Kabul and Jalalabad were remarkable by Soviet standards. Electronics stores were crammed with Japanese tape decks and stereos. Grocery stores carried a dizzying array of Soviet, American, British, French, Italian and Chinese goods.

Money changers in the Kabul bazaar handed foreigners bags full of Afghan money at triple the Government exchange rate. Americans were welcomed like gold, rubles dismissed with a flick of the hand as almost worthless.

Almost anything that could be sold was, including gallon cans of vegetable oil sent to many countries by Washing-ton as a part of American assistance. The cans were marked: “Furnished by the people of the United States of America. Not to be sold.”

One Kabul shopkeeper, glancing up from another transaction, said the cans were priced at $10 apiece.

Political diversity, while limited by Western standards, appeared to exceed the Soviet norm. Western diplomats reported that May of Babrak Karmal as party chief initiated several anti-Government demonstrations. The diplomats speculated that he was removed because he had been identified with the Soviet intervention since 1979. The Parachitans, Persian-speaking Communists allied with Moscow, have held sway within the party since the Soviet intervention in 1979. The Khalqs, who generally speak Pushtoon, are considered less elitist and not enthusiastic about the Soviet presence.

Tribal antagonisms remain strong, not only between those allied with the Government and those who constitute the bulk of the guerrilla fighters, called mujahedeen, but also between the refugee camps, diplomats said. • • •

Western diplomats said these divisive factors would make it extremely difficult to bring about the kind of national reconciliation outlined by Mr. Najib.

“Even if the rebels lay down their arms, the millions of refugees return home and the Soviets leave, there can’t be a unified Afghanistan,” one diplomat said. “The mujahedeen goes against the grain of these people.”

Recently, as Afghan tribal leaders assembled here for a meeting, a nearby bookseller was hawking Russian periodicals.

The Afghan patriarchs approached the merchant’s table one after another, sitting momentarily as a hand-written sign advertising “Books and magazines from the U.S.S.R.,” then handed the man a coin and picked up a copy of the local Persian-language newspaper. Over the next few hours, as the tribesmen were harangued by a parade of foreign and Afghan speakers, including Mr. Najib, some of them surreptitiously read Islamic texts hidden in the folds of their robes.
MUNDA CAMP, Pakistan—His name, Janat Gur, means "Heaven’s Flower" in the Pushtu language of his native Afghanistan. Like many Afghans, he has a fair complexion and freckles and turquoise-green eyes. Place him in Hannibal, Mo., instead of this desolate, mud-walled refugee camp in the North-West Frontier province of Pakistan, and he is Tom Sawyer.

Heaven’s Flower is 10 years old. His fondest dream is of the day when he has grown big enough, like his brother before him, to pick up a Kalashnikov rifle and kill Russians.

The young Afghan and the several hundred thousand others like him in the 300 Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan are key factors in the refugees’ rejection of peace initiatives offered by the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul, the Afghan capital.

Janat Gur says that all he can recall of his family farm near Kabul are the sweet grapes and mulberries there.

His new life is dominated by war and weaponry and hatred of a foreign enemy. Even the textbooks in his school preach a bellicose message.

"The books," he said, "tell me about my country and how the Russians sometimes kill the child in the lap of the mother. With the older ones like me, they tie them to a cannon and blow them up."

A week after Najib, the leader of the Afghan Marxist government, began a six-month unilateral cease-fire and asked the 3 million Afghan refugees living in Pakistan to come home, very few appear to have taken him up on the offer. Pakistani officials posted on the border report only a trickle of crossers, no more than the normal movement in this seasonally migratory and nomadic desert country.

There are several obvious reasons for the refugees’ refusal to go home, despite the Afghan government’s promise of a peaceful passage.

For one thing, after several years of bitter fighting in which several hundred thousand people have been killed, Afghanistan is no longer the country the refugees left after the Soviet invasion of 1979.

All of the country is more or less destroyed," said Abdul Haq, a leader of the Afghan rebels—the mujahedeen forces—who command guerrilla units that operate around Kabul. "There is no road left, no school left. There is nothing much left."

Also, in the same seven-year period, the refugee camps that began as squalid tent settlements along the Afghan-Pakistan border, have evolved into semi-permanent, adobe brick villages. They have their own governments and markets, even some light industries such as flour mills. With the help of massive aid projects from sympathetic governments, including more than $800 million from the United States, the refugees are provided health care and more food than many were able to acquire in Afghanistan before the war.

A Pakistani official observing the distribution said: "These people are poor people. Most come from farms. In Afghanistan, their life is very hard, was very hard, even before the war. Here they just come with their donkeys and pick up food without even working for it. I am sure that many are happier here than they were back home."

Because of the extraordinary aid program, the people in the refugee camps is one of a people who are in no way desperate to return home. Although the Marxist Afghan government went so far as to install loudspeakers at some key border crossings to welcome refugees back home and promised them safety, observers in the border areas say that only a handful have crossed, no more than the usual number for the winter season.

Iramaullah Jan, director of the Pakistani government press information office in Peshawar, said he had received unofficial reports that no more than 30,000 Afghan refugees had responded to the call from home. Other officials said even that number may be high.

However, a Soviet diplomat in Islamabad said in an interview this week that there was an initial "two- or three-day rush" of Afghan refugees to return. The refugee flow stopped, he said, because of intervention by the Pakistani government.

"We know that some Pakistan authorities put some obstacles in the way," the Soviet diplomat said. "The authorities held top-level meetings in Peshawar, and security around the refugee camps increased. Checkpoints were added..."

If anything, however, the morale of the Afghan refugees in the Peshawar area appeared to be higher than before the peace initiative. The seven main Afghan mujahedeen groups based in Peshawar appear to be more unified than at any previous time. A rally called last Saturday by the seven-group alliance, the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahedeen, drew more than 150,000 Afghans into Peshawar. At the rally, rebel leaders announced, to the cheers of the assembled refugees, a total rejection of the cease-fire.

PESHAWAR, Pakistan—One of his men, the Afghan rebel commander said, is so fond of his new Stinger missile launcher that he spends most of his waking time polishing it and sleeps with it next to him.

"When it rains," the commander said, "he takes the shawl off his back and covers the Stinger."

He said the man has fired his weapon only seven times but has brought down five Soviet aircraft in Afghanistan—two helicopters and three transport planes.

Like other anti-aircraft missiles, including the U.S.-made Redeye and the Soviet SAM-7, known as the Grail, the Stinger operates on a passive infrared homing system. But unlike the other weapons, the Stinger can avoid being "distracted" by other sources of heat near the target aircraft.

This is particularly important in Afghanistan, where Soviet and Afghan flight crews customarily drop heat-generating flares as they enter a combat zone. Also, the most effective and feared Soviet helicopter, the MI-24 Hind, is equipped with engine exhaust suppressors to confuse heat-seeking missiles.

Early last fall, the Washington Post reported that some Stingers had been allowed into Afghanistan but then ordered withdrawn by Pakistani authorities after minor technical failures.

The Stingers were reassigned to rebel units that had proved their ability with SAM-7s supplied through the CIA pipeline. The main recipients of the Stinger were the Hezbi-i-Islami Khalis organization, headed by Younis Khalis, and the Hezbi-i-Islami Hekmatyar, headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan

... Even unusually skeptical U.S. officials admitted that the Soviet-Afghan peace initiative has potential, although they cautioned against premature acceptance of it.

"It's sort of like the dance of the seven veils," one senior official said. "What is behind the seventh veil, a lovely young lady of peace without the Soviets in Afghanistan? Or is it something else?"

The American position is that a peace plan that leaves Najib's Communist government in place is no solution. "If the government is in place is no solution, therefore receptive mood.

The mood in Pakistan's capital provides a striking contrast to the time when refugees began arriving here after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. At that time, they were welcomed as "Islamic brothers." Pakistan became a hero to the Muslim world. Sensitive Muslims from the Persian Gulf region arrived in the frontier regional capital of Peshawar with suitcases full of money for the jihad—the holy war against the Soviet infidels.

U.S. aid to Pakistan had been cut off by the Carter Administration in 1978 because of Pakistan's continued development of a nuclear weapon, but Pakistan quickly parlayed its support of the Afghan cause into a new $3.2-billion aid package from Washington. Included in this multi-year package of military and economic assistance were 40 advanced F-16 jets that became the pride of the Pakistani air force.

There are few Pakistanis who do not see American aid as a direct trade-off for allowing Pakistan to be used as a conduit for CIA-supplied weapons to the Afghan rebels and as a haven for Afghan refugees. But now all 40 of the F-16s have been delivered, and pressure in the new, Democratic Congress is mounting against Pakistan on the nuclear-weapons issue, as well as on the drug question, for the Afghan-Pakistan corridor has become one of the major sources of heroin for the United States and Europe.

Meanwhile, the refugees in Pakistan have turned into a political liability for the Zia government. Intrigue between Afghan political parties in Peshawar and terrorism blamed on the notorious Klhad or secret police, of the Kabul regime, has resulted in dozens of bombings in Pakistan's North-West Frontier province.

"Every little thing is being blamed on the Afghans these days," Mushtahid Hussain, editor of the daily newspaper, The Muslim in Islamabad, said recently.

Every opposition party in Pakistan except the large Pakistan People's Party headed by Benazir Bhutto has come out for accepting the Soviet-Afghan peace proposal. The politicians have sensed a weariness among the people of Pakistan about continuing to carry the main load in the Afghan war, which they see increasingly as a modern extension of the Victorian Age "Great Game" between the British and Russian empires.

Immediately after Najib, the Afghan leader, offered his peace proposal, the government dispatched emissaries to key allies, including China, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Foreign Secretary Abdul Sattar went to Moscow and returned buoyed by the prospect for peace.

He met afterward with U.S. Ambassador Deane Hinton, who said, "I urged him to probe the offer with prudence and patience." Ironically, all these developments have created an atmosphere in which the Soviet Union, widely condemned as the aggressor in Afghanistan, is being portrayed in some circles as a peacemaker. By opposing Soviet overtures of urging caution, Pakistan and the United States run the risk of being cast as warmongers.

Then, at a press conference Nov. 29 with Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in New Delhi, Gorbachev declared: "It is up to the Afghan people to decide what system to have... We stand for a nonaligned, independent, sovereign Afghanistan which would be the master of its resources and everything that belongs to it, for a neutral Afghanistan. What kind of regime will be there [after the Soviet withdrawal] is up to the Afghan people."... An Afghan rebel interviewed in Peshawar appeared to be particularly bitter about the positive reaction to the peace proposal in Pakistan and in some segments of the Western press.

Abdul Haq, commander of guerrilla elements operating around Kabul, said, "the Soviet program is not to make peace with the mujahedeen but to make peace with the Western press."

Asked about the possibility of Pakistan making a separate peace with the Soviets, Abdul Haq said the war will continue, with or without Pakistan or American support, and he added:

"I don't think Pakistan is going to do anything with blind eyes. But if they do, we will not have lost our country. It is not like Palestine. We still have our land and our people. We will continue."
MOSCOW DEALS FROM STRENGTH IN AFGHANISTAN
Jerry Hough - LA Times 1/16

In recent months the Soviet Union has launched a very active diplomatic offensive on the Afghanistan front, leaving some to conclude that a real possibility exists for a negotiated settlement. It is a forlorn hope at best.

Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev no doubt would like to withdraw Moscow’s troops from Afghanistan. The war has lasted two years longer than World War II. At last year’s 27th Communist Party Congress, Gorbachev called it “a running sore.”

The Soviet Union has appealed for a negotiated settlement, and in one sense it is sincere. Unfortunately, the phrase negotiated settlement has become a polite synonym for negotiated surrender. And that is the way it is being used in Afghanistan today. Thus the Afghan rebels are willing to negotiate only with Moscow—a demand that implies that the Kabul government is illegitimate or non-existent and that Moscow is the ruling force in the country. Soviet agreement to such negotiations would destroy the Afghan regime, and the rebels have made it clear that the communists would have no role in a new government.

Gorbachev, like his predecessors, treats the rebels as terrorists who live in Pakistan, are financed by the United States and limit themselves to darting across the border periodically to commit hostile acts against Soviet troops and Afghan civilians. The implication is that there is no indigenous revolution—only “outside agitators.”

Hence Gorbachev essentially wants negotiations between the Afghan government and those who harbor the rebels. Since the only rebellion that he recognizes is foreign-financed, the continuation of any revolutionary action is “proof” that foreign intervention is continuing and that Soviet troops are needed to defend against this intervention.

Similarly, when the Soviet Union or Afghanistan calls for a truce, it means that all rebels would stay in Pakistan and that all revolutionary activity inside the country would come to an end. A truce means a consolidation of the communist regime.

There are a great many indications that Gorbachev, despite all the talk of flexibility and of a coalition government, will not accept anything less than a “coalition” that is dominated by the communists and a recognition of their rule in Afghanistan.

Gorbachev has many reasons for his policy. First, Afghanistan is very important to the Soviets in their geopolitical calculations concerning Asia. Some think that the Soviet Union went into Afghanistan because of fear of Islamic fundamentalism inside Soviet borders. But in its domestic propaganda Moscow has failed to capitalize

on criticism of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s Iranian regime, indicating that it considers the Muslim threat small.

Instead, the Soviet Union has been involved in a complex geopolitical game in Asia in which it has been allied with India (and Vietnam) against China and Pakistan. Well before the communist revolution in 1978, Afghanistan was already becoming a Soviet satellite. But the mujahedeen rebellion threatened to take Afghanistan into the Pakistani-Chinese camp. The Soviet Union would never willingly tolerate such a thing.

Second, Gorbachev has a winning hand in Afghanistan. He has pressured the government into following a moderate domestic policy and co-opting mullahs, tribal leaders, peasants and anyone else who can be courted. The Soviet Union is training a new young Afghan elite in Soviet schools, and their fate—indeed, their personal survival—will be tied to the communist regime. And Pakistan knows that it must keep the rebels on a relatively short leash or risk a major blow from the Soviets.

When Gorbachev begins reducing the number of Soviet troops, it is a sign not of retreat but of victory. Total pacification will take decades, but over the long run the Soviet Union’s problem is no more intolerable than the one that the British have in Northern Ireland.

In the long run America should not be totally discouraged by the failure of the anti-communist revolution in Afghanistan. Communist regimes seem to be abandoning traditional collectivization. I, so, the moderate industrializing regime that is being established in Kabul is closer, in human rights terms, to American values than are the Islamic fundamentalist rebels, who often are worse than Khomeini on such questions as women’s rights and education for children.

Our crucial foreign-policy interest in Afghanistan was to warn Moscow to stay out of neighboring Iran during the turmoil of the Khomeini takeover there in 1980. Our secondary interests were to score a propaganda victory over the Soviet Union, to allow Pakistan’s military regime to neutralize Islamic fundamentalism at home by identifying with the rebels, and to make gestures to our Chinese friends when they were in a more anti-Soviet phase. The establishment of an Islamic fundamentalist regime in Afghanistan was the last thing that we needed.

Essentially all our objectives have been successfully achieved. It would have been better to have a non-fundamentalist, anti-Soviet regime in Afghanistan, but that hope was utopian.
Najibullah’s Futile Endeavors

The regime ruling Afghanistan has recently started a new scheme. It is just a copy of what was done in Russia in Stalin’s time — population re-settlement program, or to put it correctly forced migration. By carrying out this plan the regime aims at weakening the Islamic movement in Afghanistan. About three hundred thousand Afghan citizens will be affected by this scheme. These people, mostly from the thickly populated eastern provinces including Lughman, Pakta, Neem-rouz, Farah and Helmand would have to migrate to the south western parts of the country — hundreds of miles away.

The program was approved by the government last July and the chief of staff of the Afghan armed forces had declared that it was primarily aimed at giving relief to people in the crowded regions of the east and to help them to settle down in other parts of the country and get land for cultivation. He also promised to award cash prizes and provide all necessary facilities to get agricultural tools and equipment for those who volunteered to migrate.

Such a program was also executed in Ethiopia. scheme carried out in Ethiopia and the present one implemented in Afghanistan by the Marxist regime was primarily aimed at weakening local resistance movements and to alienate the freedom fighters from the masses. Secondary aims are to deprive the Mujahideen of the supplies and other necessary backing provided by their countrymen, as well as preventing the tribes to move from one place to another.

Though, during the past six years eastern Afghanistan was the scene of bloody battles and was regularly bombed by the Soviet bombers, the control of all provinces in that region is still in the hands of people and not the government. Soviet forces, every year in spring and end of fall, attack the area particularly the routes used for transporting provisions to the Mujahideen. Having failed in such regularly repeated attacks, the Marxist regime has started to implement the forced migration scheme. There are signs which clearly show that the scheme, even at its preliminary stage, is considered to be a failure because the linking routes made use of by the Mujahideens for transporting arms and ammunition as well as provisions, as to date, remain open and are being utilized.

Najibullah hopes that by forcefully removing more than 300,000 people from the said region and bringing some of his own people in their place, he would be able to provide a reliable line of defense around Kabul and save the capital from the destructive attacks of Mujahideen. Experts believe that if attacks on Kabul could be stopped or at least diminished as regards their force and frequency, the present regime could be in a position to claim that it has regained substantial control over the events in Afghanistan. This was exactly the point which Karmal failed to achieve. He was even unable to initiate it. The plan was for the Mujahideen who are established in Nangarhar Province to be sieged to cut their approach to Kabul.

Notwithstanding the political goals behind the scheme and the other aims such as propagating Marxist ideology in the region and establishing the social systems as desired by the regime, it could be said that the plan has brought nothing but destruction and ruin to the region where it was carried out. More than 70% of the dwellings in the region and vast rural areas have been demolished and ruined.

Kayhan Int’l 12/27

Afghans Show Missiles, Say Rebels Got Stingers and British Blowpipes

KABUL, Afghanistan — The Afghan Defense Ministry on Thursday displayed what it said were a captured American-built Stinger anti-aircraft missile and its British counterpart, the Blowpipe.

Defense Minister Mohammed Rafie said the United States and Britain have been supplying the advanced, shoulder-fired weapons to the anti-Communist guerrillas.

The Reagan Administration decided last year to provide Stingers to the rebels, and a Soviet general reported in December that a Stinger struck one of his troop helicopters. However, there have been no previous reports that Britain was also sending such weapons to the guerrillas.

The missiles, along with their launching tubes and containers, were carried into a news conference by military officers who placed them on a blood-red Afghan carpet at the Foreign Ministry.

The display came at the end of answers to written questions on the Afghan government’s cease-fire offer before several hundred reporters and spectators.

Markings on the missile identified as a Stinger indicated it was made by Atlantic Research Corp., a Virginia defense contractor.

Since they reportedly began using the heat-seeking Stingers in late 1986, the Afghan rebels have claimed success in shooting down Afghan and Soviet planes with it.

Rafie said the weapons on display were captured from a rebel band in Afghanistan within the last 10 days.

The Stinger carried this warning on a small sticker: “Confidential: National security information. Unauthorized disclosure subject to criminal sanctions.”
The following are abstracts of papers presented at the 14th Annual Conference on South Asia, held Nov. 1-3 at the University of Wisconsin:

"Involuntary Migrants: When & Why They Leave, Urban Afghan Refugees in Peshawar" by Kerry M. Connor, Univ. of Nebraska.

Research based on interviews with 976 heads of Afghan refugee families in Peshawar indicates only a slight trend toward associative spatial behavior based on time of departure from the homeland, time of arrival in Pakistan & the specific reasons for leaving Afghanistan. The data suggest the strong impact of other attributes such as geographical origin inside Afghanistan, ethnicity, educational levels, employment in Afghanistan & resistance party membership. Time of departure, arrival & reasons for leaving, however, often correlate with these other attributes. The paper suggests that a better understanding of the "push" factors involved in involuntary migration will aid in the understanding of refugee movements.

"Afghanistan from Queen Victoria to Mikhail Gorbachev: A Struggle for National Liberation" by Hafizullah Emadi, Univ. of Hawaii.

The paper analyzes external interferences in Afghanistan's internal affairs since the last British attempt in 1919 to the Soviet invasion in December 1979 & its aftermath. The paper looks at Soviet foreign policy in the pre- & post-occupation periods & the development of the Afghan resistance. The paper also examines Western aid policies & the political scope of the "Afghan national liberation war."

"The Afghan New Middle Class as Refugees & Mujahidin" by Grant Farr, Portland State University.

The emergence of a new middle class in Afghanistan has had profound consequences on the country's development. The paper examines the development of this class, traces its role in the political struggles of the 70s & 80s, discusses its condition as refugees including why & how they leave, & examines its position in the present fighting. The paper concludes that while the present position of the new middle class is somewhat marginal, it has the potential to be an important force in the struggle for the freedom of Afghanistan.

"Sovietization of Afghan Schools" by Wayne Glidden & Moqim Rahmanzai, Univ. of Nebraska.

Since the December 1979 invasion, Soviet officials, with the acquiescence of the DRA gov't, have pursued the systematic & expanding Sovietization of Afghan life & social institutions. A critical element in this process is the educational system. Sovietization of Afghan schools has progressed to the point that a new system of schools now exists in Afghanistan. While this system is confined to the areas controlled by the Soviets, it provides a nucleus for later imposition.

The Implication of the Durand Line on Afghan-Pakistan Foreign Policy Relations" by Sultan A. Gulzad, University of WI - Madison.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the foreign policy relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan from the turn of the century until 1979. One tends to categorize inter-state relations in conflictual, cooperative, or competitive terms, yet usually relationships between nation-states vary from time to time as a result of particular conditions. Afghanistan's and Pakistan's case is quite different; one could generally describe their relations as one of constant cold war. The reason for this continuity can be traced back to the drawing of the Durand Line in 1893 by the British and the reigning King of Afghanistan, who drew the boundary between British India and Afghanistan. This boundary cut through the center of major Pushtun tribal areas, dividing the peoples of the the area. This issue continued as a long-standing dispute, which was inherited by the Pakistani government in 1947. In order to understand the precise nature of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, a basic understanding is needed of: their historical relationships; their foreign policy objectives and perspectives; their perceptions of each other; and also their ideologies. This paper analyzes the phases of interactions between the two countries from 1947 to 1979 underscoring the observation that their relationships have been ones of constant strain.
The Roles of Agnatic Rivalry and Islam in the Political Processes of Afghanistan, 1919-present

This paper discusses the national state political processes of Afghanistan from 1919 to the present. The thesis of this paper is that agnatic rivalry has played a large part in the structure of the Afghan government since 1919. There has been constant brother-brother, cousin-cousin, nephew-uncle, Durran-Ghilzai, and Pashtun-non-Pashtun competition for power. This paper provides an understanding of the relationships which certain Afghan tribes and families have to one another, clarifying the dynamics of attempted power usurpations and the more pronounced structural changes that have occurred in the Afghan government. There has been constant jockeying for power between agnatic rivals, which, in combination with the influence of theological Islam, has had a retarding role in the consolidation and development of the governmental processes of Afghanistan. Having identified the above characteristics of the Afghan national political process, this paper will purpose a model for more efficient opposition to today's Barbrak Karmal regime. An ideology emphasizing folk Islam in combination with regional autonomy under the "blanket" of Afghan nationality is suggested as an alternative to the numerous, competitive resistance groups of which the Mojadidi family is part.

A Peace Plan for Afghanistan" by Leon Poullada.

The UN proximity talks between the Kabul regime & the Pakistan gov't have little chance of success because they do not include the principal parties - The USSR & the Afghan people. A more promising approach would be for the UN to sponsor the convening of a Loya Jirgah, the traditional grand assembly of Afghanistan. This could be accomplished by a UN neutral commission backed by a temporary UN peacekeeping force. The Loya Jirgah would appoint a provisional gov't to negotiate directly with the USSR for withdrawal & cessation of hostilities. As the Soviets withdraw, external aid to the mujahideen would be scaled back under UN supervision, backed by guarantees from the permanent members of the Security Council & the neighboring countries in the region. Following complete withdrawal, the Provisional Gov't would arrange for national elections & the formation of a permanent gov't, which would draft a constitution & negotiate a permanent settlement with the USSR. The purpose would be to restore Afghanistan to its status as a non-aligned, neutral country with self-determination for its people & to provide the return of the Afghan refugees with peace & honor. The UN would sponsor an int'l consortium led by the World Bank to finance a reconstruction program for war-torn Afghanistan. Such a plan would restore Afghan freedom, return it to economic viability & give the USSR a face-saving device to withdraw its troops & its support from the unpopular Afghan Communist gov't.

The following are abstracts of papers presented at the 1986 Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Assn. held in Boston from Nov. 20-23:

"Iran & the Afghan War" by Grant Farr

Given its potential, Iran's participation in the Afghan conflict is still limited largely because it has other internal & foreign issues that are of greater importance to it & because of its relationship, albeit constantly changing, with the USSR. However, Iran has given some support to Shi'ah groups in Afghanistan. The paper describes some of the groups, their methods of operation & suggests reasons for their waxing and/or waning influence.
"The Wild Bunch: The Revolt of Habibollah 1929," a paper delivered by Jan-Heeren Grevemeyer, University of Berlin

The paper examines contemporary accounts of the revolt of Habibollah in 1929 and shows how time has led to a reinterpretation of the event. The new interpretations mirror political developments since 1978-79 characterized by a country-wide resistance movement against a communist regime and since 1979-80 against the Soviet invading forces - a resistance movement at least in part comparable to Habibollah's movement in 1929. In both cases the state's main aims were the transformation of the economy and society in general; the resistance aims were the restoration of an ancient way of life, the abolition of a regime which wanted to interfere with tradition in its reform plans, and the expulsion of arrogant modernizers.

The 1929 revolt brought an able soldier & social bandit into power. However, he was lacking a political program & unable to resist against better legitimized rivals. In 1979 a nearly successful resistance movement led to the Soviet invasion which in turn forced the resistance to transform itself from a peasant revolt to guerrilla warfare, to create new elites & to transform religious slogans to ideologies.

"Private Voluntary Organization Assistance to the Afghan Resistance" by John Lorentz, American Aid for Afghans, Inc.

Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a number of Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) have come into existence to provide nonlethal humanitarian aid to the Afghan resistance. All of these organizations have operated through Pakistan. Although some assistance has flowed through Iran, no foreign aid organization has been permitted to operate there.

The Pakistani Gov't has its own agenda concerning Afghanistan & has provided assistance to one Afghan group or another according to that agenda. Individual commanders have increasingly become not only military men, but governors of large areas of Afghanistan & independent of Afghan politics in Pakistan. However, they are tied to the officially recognized Afghan parties because it is only through these parties that official aid flows. And it is by means of this aid that the parties keep commanders associated with the party.

A US Congressional appropriation of $15m for cross border humanitarian aid was set up for fiscal year 1986. The funds were allocated to US Aid which set up an office in Islamabad. Another factor entered into US Gov't participation - the Denton & McCollum Amendments. The first allowed the opening of Defense Dept stocks to be released to disaster areas for humanitarian relief, & Afghanistan qualified. The 2nd added $10m to the Defense Dept. budget for transportation of relief supplies.

The available aid monies were divided into 3 categories - commodities, medicine & education. The American Manufacturers Export Group (a Houston group made up primarily of retired USAID personnel) was selected as the commodities contractor ($5m); the University of Nebraska at Omaha was selected as the education contractor ($1m). The remaining $9m was for the medical area. The paper discusses the pros & cons of private vs. gov't assistance for the Afghans & the effectiveness of the aid programs.

"War & Peace in Afghanistan: The Economic Issues" by M.S. Noorzoy

This paper argues that the Soviets have shifted the brunt of the war in Afghanistan more & more to the economic area. It points out that Soviet aggression had two broad economic aspects, both of which had direct military effects. First, while the world speculated that the Soviets would send many more troops than the estimated 126,000 soldiers (1986), the Soviet strategy was simply to depopulate rural Afghanistan & destroy its infrastructure to suppress resistance. The second aspect has been to shift the cost of the war to the Afghan economy largely by selling military hardware to Afghanistan. For example, $486m worth of aircraft during 1979-84 & $233m worth of "trucks" over the same period. In return the Soviets have obtained Afghan
gas at Soviet-fixed prices resulting in a loss of revenue of at least $336m for 1979-81 alone. The author estimates that Afghanistan has accumulated additional debts to the Soviet Union amounting to $899.2m for the 1979-84 period. The paper finds that based on the available information the human & material costs of the war to the Soviets have thus far been acceptable enough for them to continue their aggression.

"A Model for Refugee Resettlement & Reconstruction in Post-Soviet-Withdrawal Afghanistan" by M.S. Noorzoy at the Allied Social Sciences Meetings in New Orleans, 12/28-30. The paper, part of a larger study, constructs an economic model for the current value of income & asset holdings that an adult Afghan refugee expected to have before he was made homeless by the Soviet invasion. Assumptions are made about the refugee's annual income & total assets. Estimates of the losses for the "representative" single refugee are based on UNHCR documents & information from other Afghan refugee sources. A distinction is made between refugees in Pakistan & Iran as the approaches to refugee problems differ in each of those countries. The general Pakistani approach has been one of temporary solutions with the expectation that the Afghans will return to their homes under a peace settlement. The Iranian approach has been one of long-term stay & integration of the refugees into Iranian society. These approaches will make a difference as to the eventual return of Afghan refugees & the issue of resettlement compensation.

"Sodur-Ghas-i-Afghanistan ba Shurawi," (in Dari), KULTUR, Vp1.5, #2, April 1986, pp. 45-51, Afghanisches Kulturzentrum, Bonn. West Germany, by M.S. Noorzoy.

Exports of natural gas from Afghanistan to the USSR began in 1967. Although detailed statistics are not available on an annual basis, it is clear that gas exports gradually replaced live stock products & agricultural (fruit, cotton, wool) exports in terms of total value before the 1979 invasion & by 1981/82 the value of gas exports was 57% of total Afghan exports to the USSR. Since most gas produced in Afghanistan is exported to the USSR & production & export take place under Soviet control, the question of pricing becomes critical. This article shows that in 1972-73 Afghanistan suffered significant losses in revenue from gas prices compared with the prices Iran received from the Soviets. This gap has substantially enlarged in the post-invasion period leading to potential revenue losses for Afghanistan in comparison with international or Soviet prices for gas - $178m in 1979/80 & $158m in 1980/81 - from this trade.
RECENT PUBLICATIONS


AFGHANISTAN, L’ETERNITE EN GUERRE, text by Olivier Roy, photographs by Philippe Guerillot, Paris, Nef.


"New Hazards Make It Harder for Journalists to Report a Curtained-off War" by Christina Dameyer in the COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW, March/April.

REFUGEE CHILDREN AROUND THE WORLD. COULD THIS BE YOU? Information Services, UNHCR, Palais des Nations, CH 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland. 40 pp. English only. Designed to introduce the plight of refugees to children ages 10-14. Contains a story about an Afghan refugee child (one of 6 stories); suggests activities for children individually or in groups.


AFGHANISTAN PASSATO E PRESENTE, Vol. 4, #s 1/2/3 (Feb./Apr./June 1986) carries an article on the European Parliament’s resolution on Afghanistan & on recognition of the Afghan resistance. The publication, in Italian, is available from c/c postale n. 21602503, via Maragliano, 33/a, 50144 Firenze, Italy.

THE FRONTIER REVIEW, announced in the November 1986 Forum, has appeared. Vol. 1, #1 is devoted to articles about refugees in the Peshawar area. Subscriptions are $35/year from P.O. Box 434, Palo Alto, CA 94302 (415-948-6456) & 15 Adamson Road, London NW3 in the U.K.

Books on Afghanistan by C.J. Charpentier (in Swedish), Vaesterlanggatan 21 A, S-241 Esloeu, Sweden:


VAGEN TILL MANDELRUMMET (1985) (The Road to the Almond Room, a novel set in Afghanistan)

AFGHANISTAN – VALDTAGET LAND (1986 – see review on p. 39)


BAZAAR-E TASHQURGHAN (1972)

AFGHANISTAN: THE GREAT GAME REVISITED is the title of a handbook on Afghanistan edited by Rosanne Klass, to be published by Freedom House.

E.J. Brill's FIRST ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 1913-1936 is being reprinted in an edition of 4 "limp bound" volumes. An introductory price of $570 (plus postage & handling) is in effect until September 1, 1987. For further information contact E.J. Brill, P.O.B. 9000, 2300 PA Leiden, Netherlands. Their ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM. NEW EDITION, begun in 1960, is halfway complete but will not be finished for many years.


A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY AFGHANISTAN by Ludwig Adamic, Academische Druck-u. Verlag., Neufeldweg 75, A-8010 Graz, Austria. 280 pp., illus., cloth $50, paper $34. 1987
This study is the first full biography of one of the major early contributors toward an understanding in the West of the realities of ancient and contemporary Afghanistan. The subtitle indicates the three aspects of Masson's activity - as traveller, antiquarian and agent; and the author, a former British ambassador to Kabul, recounts this activity against the background of 19th-century British travel and of the development of Anglo-Indian policy toward the disaster of the First Anglo-Afghan War. Given the sparse personal documentation (so far known) of Masson, the book must draw heavily on the subject's four volumes of Narrative; and this dependency leaves him a somewhat elusive character.

But Mr. Whitteridge reduces our uncertainties in two respects. He verifies (pp. 1-2) Masson's original name (James Lewis) and family. Even if little can be said of his life before India, we at least achieve a starting point. Clearly Masson was adept at playing roles, and his assumed name and cover as a travelling American sowed lasting confusion. (See p. 39: the attempt to explain him to the Anglo Indian public in The Asiatic Journal at the time of his arrest in Quetta in 1840.) The first pages of the current book well depict Masson's ambiguity and the final sentence ("there is no known portrait of Charles Masson," p. 165) symbolizes it. New and basic facts of his life are therefore doubly welcome.

Secondly, Mr. Whitteridge draws on the India Office records to better delineate Masson's work as a supplier of information to the British government in India. It is this aspect of his life which has rendered him controversial and aroused debate over his character. The additional documentation aids us in a fair evaluation.

So, too, does mindfulness of his other two roles. As a traveller, Masson is not unique in the 19th century for courage and confidence. And the contemporary American adventurer, Josiah Harlan, also reached the Kabul of Dost Moh'd Khan and beyond and had a good eye for topography, plant and animal life, and Afghan politics. But Masson stands out in his liking for, and ready adaptation to, the Afghan people and their way of life. Content to travel without wealth or authority, he established rapport and evoked affection wherever he went. Probably adept at languages (see Whitteridge, p. 2), he set out with no particular knowledge of Persian or Pashto (Narrative 1, p. 244) but using effectively the Hindi he had picked up (e.g., III, p. 277). He occasionally favors the reader with a Pashto phrase (I, p. 258; II, p. 198; III, pp. 223, 396); after several years residence in Afghanistan, he seems at home with its principal languages (III, p. 244). His Legends of the Afghan Countries (London 1848, not seen by this reviewer) presumably offers additional witness to his linguistic skill.

Masson says of his first ventures toward Charikar and the site of Bagram that "my intention in these trips was ... to feel my way, and to become acquainted" (III, p. 98). This sentence well sums up the manner and spirit of his travel narratives. He deals with whatever dangers, disappointments, or losses occur, recovers his equanimity, and continues his quest for knowledge. He can let his deeper feelings take flight, as in his paean to springtime in Kabul (III, pp. 5ff.) or his tribute to Kabul social life (II, p. 242). Relatively seldom does he distance himself (or his reader) with a studied contrast of eastern and western manners. Harlan's Memoir, on the other hand, maintains the attitude of an outsider looking in; it more or less assumes that the reader's basis for attempting to understand the Orient is an interest in Christian proselytizing. In style, Harlan can be straightforward enough in his journal (Central Asia), but his Memoir favors the inflated newspaper writing of his day. Masson, more objective and less flamboyant, writes with clean economy; and his prose is complemented by the clean line and clear detail of his unpretentious drawings.
Masson's interest in Afghanistan's past matched his engagement with the contemporary environment; and his identification of sites and his accumulation of coins provided a significant mass of detail for the quest to recover the Indo-Greek, Kushan, Sasanian and Hephthalite periods of history. Acute and curious, he attempted to evaluate any ruins he encountered on his travels (he was not only schooled in Greek and Latin historical literature but had read Muslim historical works then available in English, such as Firishta's history and Babur's memoirs). His abilities led him, of course, to such obviously important sites as Hadda (and the Jalalabad area generally) but also to unknown and less accessible remains, especially Bagram. Mr. Whitteridge (p. 164) defends his record as researcher. No mere site plunderer, Masson was aware of the importance of the provenance and context of artifacts and he appreciated the challenge of the humblest object, however deteriorated. Having discovered, Masson sought, in his articles in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, to explain; and he did what he could with the knowledge of his day. His awareness of Zoroastrianism and expectation of finding traces of pre-Islamic Buddhist culture, coupled with lack of knowledge of the flow of Buddhism across Central Asia, misled his interpretation of some sites, such as Bamyan (III, p. 316). In fact he was abetted by his good judgement—for instance, when he places Zoroaster in Khorasan and rejects the Azerbaijani tradition (ibid.). Still, he was judicious, recognizing the Buddhist affinities of Bamyan. Because he is not belligerent in advancing opinions, the reader does not feel excessive glee when Masson follow a blind alley, as in his disposition on the affinities of the names Pali, Palestine, Palatine and 'Pali' (he means Pahlavi, III, p. 199).

Through volumes I and II of the Narrative, Masson attends to the fluctuations of Barakzai and Sikh politics and to the adventures of the amir Dost Muhammad Khan, as he does to all aspects of Afghan life around him. Volume III and the year 1832 start on an ominous note ("I was surprised by a visit from a person announcing himself as Saiyad Keramat Ali, agent of the Supreme Government of India," p. 1), but his activities continue as before. Then on p. 321, as if a bolt from the blue, comes his appointment in 1835 as "agent for communicating intelligence" by Claude M. Wade, political agent on the northwest frontier of British India facing the Sikh Panjab, Sind and Afghanistan. The remaining 180 pages turn into a defensive documentation of his dutiful but involuntary involvement with the events leading to the First Anglo-Afghan War. His follow-up volume would chronicle his even unhappier entrapment in the war itself.

From 1835 until his departure from Afghanistan in 1838, Masson found that his previous free life of travel and inquiry was no longer possible. Required to support the fumbling efforts of Alexander Burnes' mission to Kabul, he necessarily shared in its failure. Frustrated by officials' misuse of the information he supplied (III, pp. 356, 407; Whetteridge, p. 133), he had the added humiliation of serving as a prime recipient of Afghan wrath against the British (III, p. 423). Little wonder that he does not always control his anger. He denounces his enemies in general terms (III, p. 149), gloats furtively at William Macnaghten's murder in Kabul (p. 491) and hurls his notorious aspersion on Lord Auckland (p. 495). He returned to England having lost his cherished way of life and, in his view, without proper compensation or recognition for his service, losses and suffering. This biography documents his lasting bitterness (pp. 161-62). Ironically, although Masson did not like Harlan (Whitteridge, p. 103) and presumably did not associate with him in Kabul, the two voice a sort of madrigal on the subject of the Burnes mission, Macnaghten, the war and Dost Muhammad Khan.

The Narrative, given its defensive purpose, lacks candor on the subject of his contact with Wade (he finally says something about how this started on III, pp. 366-67) and the sensitive matter of a pardon for his desertion from the army in India in 1827.
How far, then, can Masson be trusted when he affects to be surprised by the use of British troops to achieve the accepted goal of establishing Shah Shuja-al-Mulk in power (III, p. 489)? The harshest view of him is presented by J.A. Norris in his effort to reclaim the reputations of Burnes, Macnaghten and Lord Auckland: Masson, though ambitious and unruly, was well thought of by the politicos (Norris, p. 188), who tried to accommodate him (p.200). Displaced in Kabul by Burnes and resentful (p. xv), he expressed his vindictiveness by turning on the politicos in print; he thus fueled the political debate in England and provided the basis for our negative view of the leading figures in the war policy (pp. 170-71, 196). Norris is inclined to minimize Masson's contribution to the policymakers, and in so doing he weakens the suggested motivation for Masson's alleged treachery (he barely accepts Burnes' tribute to Masson, p. 125; cf. Wade's testimonials in Masson, III, pp. 357, 418). And he overpursues: Far from giving "no convincing reason for his anger" (Norris, p. 70) at his appointment by Wade, Masson shows how his standing with the Afghans suffered immediate impact (III, pp. 321ff.). One can agree with Norris's suggestion (ibid.; Whitteridge, p. 104) that the pardon was an important inducement. But the futility of declining a role which now was universally attributed to him seems evident.

To this murky area Mr. Whitteridge brings, in addition to a chronological narrative, India Office records which correspond to or supplement the documentation in the Narrative. The key subjects he touches on are the arrangements for support of Masson's research, the importance of the pardon, the difficulty of dealing with the manipulative Wade and the value of Masson's information. We become able to stand away a little from the Narrative and see not a villain but an unrealist. He wished to have his cake and eat it, to be both financed and free at a time and place where such consideration and disinterestedness could not and should not have been expected, to receive appreciation from those who could not profit from giving it. Pending actual documentation, one can give some weight to Masson's judiciousness (only compare, on Dost Muhammad Khan, I, pp. 252-53 and III, passim, and the hapless Burnes, quoted with approval in Norris, p. 184). His rejection of the use of British troops carries conviction, as does his claim that "I never once alluded to Persian and Russian intrigues; I hold them now ridiculous; I held them so then" (III, pp. 448-49).

Somewhere other writings of Masson may await discovery. An attractive find would be the policy paper he wrote "of the conflicting interests in Afghanistan, and the mode in which, in my opinion, they were to be approached and reconciled" (III, p. 447, followed by a summary). This biography, pointing out the attention due this important figure in the western effort to understand Afghanistan, shows that the search for they would be worthwhile.

References


Christopher Brunner
Cold Spring, New York
Mr. Masson.

Mr. Charles Masson, the antiquary and Indo-Bactrian collector, has been arrested at Quetta by Capt. Bean, under orders from Sir Wm. Macnaghten, our envoy at Cabul. It appears that some suspicion was excited at the circumstance of Mr. Masson's being at Khelat, when attacked by Nuseer Khan. Before its capture, he lost all his MSS., and accumulated stock of literary materials. He says he could have retired from the place, but a generous feeling led him to associate himself with Lieut. Loveday, the political agent. Whilst at Khelat, an official letter from Capt. Bean, political agent at Quetta, to Lieut. Loveday, stated that the mystery of Mr. Masson's appearance at Khelat, at the period of the recent outbreak, with the circumstance of his clandestine residence there, had created suspicions in his mind which he (Capt. Bean) has communicated to government. When Mr. Masson escaped from the Brahooes at Musooong, and reached Quetta, he found himself under detention. Capt. Bean, by letter, inquired "the circumstances under which he appeared at Khelat, the route by which he came to that place, and after having once quitted it, his reasons for having returned there." Mr. Masson answered the inquiries,—how he does not say, except that "my mysterious and clandestine residence," and his "quitting Khelat and returning to it," were false. In an interview with Capt. Bean, that officer stated that Mr. Masson had originated a communication received a long time since from Major Outram, informing him that he had heard that a Russian agent with 200 men was marching through Kej, intending to place the son of the late Mehrab Khan on the musnad of Khelat, and that he waited instructions from the government. "Mr. Masson complained of his being detained on the unfounded suspicion of being a Russian spy, and states that he is determined to prove the affair to the bottom.

Mr. Masson, it appears, is a native of Kentucky, in the United States. After having resided in England, France, and Russia, about 1821-3, he went from St. Petersburg to Tiflis, thence to Persia, and proceeded toCabul; and having roamed in his way to Scinde, he begged his way through that country as a fugitive. From Scinde he proceeded to Peshawar, crossed the Indus, and visited Lahore, Hyderabad, Tatta, Karachi, and Muscat; having cast off his Mahomedan disguise at Lahore, and appearing as a European. He again visited Persia; and by means of Colonel Wilson, resident at Bushire, Lord Clare and Sir A. Bumey, his extensive travels and researches became known to the public. It then came to light that he had gone to India as a private in the artillery, and had left the service without permission. A free pardon was obtained, an allowance of money made to him, and which was repaid by his making over to government his gold and silver coins. Misunderstandings now arose, and for some years Mr. Masson pursued his researches unaided. In February, 1839, he was occupying a miserable hovel, living in the manner of the natives, at Karachi; in May or June he was in Khelat.


Mr. Masson.

A writer professing to be well acquainted with Mr. Masson, represents the account of that individual's history and adventures, published in the Bombay Times (and from whence our extract, in p. 24, was taken), as abounding with errors, particularly in dates, and in the matter of his country, for Mr. M., he says, is an Englishman, and not a Kentuckian. "In that respect, perhaps in some other particulars also, I think it likely that he has been confounded with Dr. Harlan, an American gentleman, who was at one period in the army, at this presidency, as an officiating assistant surgeon. He was discharged, with many others of that class, in 1826, and was latterly in the service of Dost Mohomed the Bengal Horse artillery, commanded by Capt. Hyde, now of the retired list. Having received a good education, and having mixed in better society than that which is ordinarily to be found in a barrack-room, he soon became disgusted with the service, and having, by the assistance of some old schoolfellows, obtained the means of procuring a respectable livelihood out of his regiment, he applied for, but was refused, permission to abandon a way of life which his previous habits and education had rendered extremely distasteful to him. Nevertheless, when his troop was ordered on active service, he determined on fulfilling his duties as a soldier in front of the enemy, and, this done, of leaving the service for ever. He did not desert during, but after, the siege of Bhurtpore, when his troop was on the way back to cantonments (Muttra). His case was considered a very hard one at the time, and, in consideration of this hardship, he was pardoned, mainly through the instrumentality of Sir Claude M. Wale.* Another writer states that Mr. Masson's Gravesend name was Lewis.

2. Ibid., March 1841, n. 194.


Carl Charpentier first went to Afghanistan to work on his dissertation, Tashqurghan Bazaar: Ethnological Studies in an Afghan Traditional Bazaar, which was published in 1972. A European socialist, he was very critical of the Afghan government, the tribal dictatorship & conservative establishment. Not surprisingly he was at first encouraged by the Taraki coup and had high hopes for a more modern society. He revisited Kabul in 1979, but after the Soviet invasion his hopes were dashed.

In the spring of 1986 he managed to get a visa for Kabul. He was there for the Chernobyl disaster and the replacement of Babrak by Najibullah. He had several weeks of freedom before being ordered to move to the Kabul Hotel and being restricted to going out only with an assigned escort. He did go to Khost with a tour for foreign journalists just after the fall of Zhawar.

This book is a lively, vivid, often ironic description of his experiences and reactions. Whether one agrees with his interpretations of past events or not, the story is fascinating and evocative. His street scenes and encounters ring true and they arouse a strong interest in the present predicament of the Afghans.

Charpentier has already published one novel in Swedish and a second is to come out in March. Charpentier is looking for an English-language publisher and he deserves one.

Leila Poullada
St. Paul, Minnesota
THE RC DECREE ON NAT'L RECONCILIATION

KNT 1/4

In the name of Almighty God, the merciful and compassionate.

1. In fact, believers are brothers binding peace among others. (The Holy Koran).

2. From the historic moment, we appeal to the people of Afghanistan: Do not allow the bounty of the homeland to be plundered. As you Pakistanis, the besieged Afghans, the refugees, the displaced persons in neighboring countries and ethnic groups of Afghanistan, the victims of the fraternal war and the plots and conspiracies of the counterrevolution against the revolutionary people of Afghanistan; the full extent of the blacks in the country, the enemy's saving of the people and the progress and prosperity of the country, we believe in the Revolutionary Council of the DRA as a representative of the countrywide national reconciliation. The Revolutionary Council of the DRA declares in a clear voice:

1. From this very moment the concerned authorities of the DRA are duty-bound to:

- Prepare military operations beginning from 15th of January 1979 and to cease fire and the exchange of captured weapons that have remained up to now between the two sides. Despite the military desertsig systems, the permanent training schools, schools and military camps, and fire and the exchange of captured weapons that have remained up to now between the two sides.

2. End all kinds of armed forces and put an end to military units to their permanent training schools, schools and military camps, and fire and the exchange of captured weapons that have remained up to now between the two sides.

3. To halt military operations and to establish a cease-fire for a period of six months. The duration of the cease-fire can be extended if observed by both sides.

4. We expect the following in response to our peaceful measures:

- To halt the use of fire by any kind of weapons, the security of convoys and ammunition in the territory of Afghanistan.
- To halt the use of fire by any kind of weapons, the security of convoys and ammunition in the territory of Afghanistan. The residents of villages, sub-districts and districts who cease active struggle against the popular power, can freely receive the benefits of the cease-fire to widen their participation in the popula.
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5. The Revolutionary Council of the DRA clearly declares:

- The sacred religion of Islam is the religion of Afghanistan and this will be approved. In Article 2 of the new constitution of the country.
- The popular power will endeavour to attract vast political forces in order to form the government of national unity to the extent of giving a coalition character.
- The popular power will assist in creating favourable conditions for the return of the limited Soviet military contingent to their country provided the absence of intervention into the internal affairs of Afghanistan and their non-interference is guaranteed.

6. For all those who want centers for the distribution of primary goods, health centers and centers for medical consultation will be established in the centers of all provinces.

7. As a sign of its honest endeavours towards peace and country-wide accord, the Revolutionary Council of the DRA declares that within a special decree the release of those prisoners who honestly give up their hostile deeds against revolutionary power will be confirmed.

8. The Revolutionary Council of the DRA officially reiterates that the entire residents of Afghanistan, including those of their destiny joined the ranks of the enemy but upon the realization of their patriotic obligation laid down their weapons, will be permitted by the homestead and people. The people forgive them. They will enjoy understanding, sympathy and the support of the entire state power organs of the DRA. We are ready to forgive the deceived, repentant, condemn the malcontents and to warmly embrace them. We render assistance to those with empty hands, and warm to those who are cold. We are ready to hold brotherly talks with all those in our common home, i.e., free Afghanistan.

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KNT 12/10/86

Cartoonist: H. Shinwari
ITEMS FROM BAKHTAR

The National Gallery (12/2 & 12/27)

"During the past 2 years the State Committee for Culture has purchased dozens of paintings & enriched the collection of the National Gallery." The Committee "has plans to further enrich the National Gallery by purchasing new collections & canvases of both old & contemporary Afghans...." In its initial stage over 170 canvases, tapestries & foreign painters were on display...." It was set up in HS Ibd as a permanent place to "preserve outstanding works of art.... Among the artistic pieces in the building, one may face up with the most exquisite masterpiece of Gulam Moh'd Maimanagi...which has been painted in a time coincided with the age of the building. It depicts the culture & the social life of the people in those old days. The valuable artistic masterpieces kept in the building have been collected from the palaces & corridors of the castles of the Afghan kings which they had decorated for a long time." The 95-year-old building "which has been designed in a contemporary style, at 1st glance makes man to set on drawing or painting the building, was once the private residential house of the foreign minister of King Amanulah. Besides the works of Maimanagi, who died in 1933, Ustad Breshna, who died in 1947, other Afghan artists whose work is featured are Ustad Khair Moh'd Yari, Ustad Abdul Aziz, Yusuf Kohzad, Ustad Nasrullah & Nabi Hurnam.

Academicians (12/8)

The PDPA CC Politburo & the Council of Ministers approved the appointment of 9 "academicians & 32 candidates for the post of academicians" to the general assembly of the Academy of Sciences. The assembly will "mobilize the knowledge of intellectuals & intelligentsia for the realization of revolutionary transformations in the country." Academicians will receive Afs. 5,000 over their already salaries & candidates 3,000 extra. "Such a financial privilege has been offered...to enable the representatives of the intellectuals & literary people to devote their time & talents more than ever before for the creative & initiative work in the interest of the people & the country."

Film news (12/9 & 12/21)

"Siege" is a film under production at Afghan Film. "The film deals with the hard life of Pashtoons in a village of a border province.... Wood is the main product of the village but counter-revolutionaries hamper the supply of a saw-machine to the village. Finally the youth of the village defeat the bandits & the village gets the machine. The b & w film by Faiz Nabi & is based on a story by Bashar Roygar. It will be released "on the threshold of the 9th anniversary celebrations of the April Revolution." Another film, "The Last Wish," directed by Waliq Nazari, will depict in full color the "heroic struggles of the masses & the defenders of the April Revolution against the savage counter-revolutionaries."

Hero (12/12 & 12/15)

"The brave services of Capt. Moh'd Rehim Orva, a journalist of...Hagirat-e-Sarbaz," (the paper of the DRA Defense Ministry) "who has lost 2 of his legs & 1 of his eyes on the battlefield in the suburbs of Kandahar.... is a good example for other journalists...

Weather Report (12/22)

"The winter season has begun today with a relatively heavy snowfall in Afghanistan.... It was already forecasted that this winter will be colder than the previous one. People, particularly the peasants, are thinking about their yields every winter. Snow is considered as the yeast of the land by the peasants because sound cultivation both in spring & autumn sowing campaigns is closely dependent on snow fall.... The Hindukush mountains, especially the Pamir.... have always been covered with snow.... Suffice it to mention that an area of 1,100,600 hectares of agricultural land will be brought under cultivation during the fall sowing campaign which is about throughout Afghanistan.... Snow rarely can be seen in the eastern provinces whereas the north is more colder in winter.... None of the new generation in...Laghman has yet seen a snowfall in that province. It is rainy & wet. It is a custom in Afghanistan to make snowly with other when snow flakes cover the ground.... Different kinds of games are being played with snow - making snow men, snow puppets, hitting each other with snow balls.... Snow layers on the Hindukush mountains reach...occasionally 21 meters. This year the peasants...are happy for the new prospects they have seen for their cultivation. Although some feelings of fear were created last year by the Western propaganda machine, as if the country will be affected by drought, the people had witnessed last year that the last snow came down in late March...."

Terms of Return (1/13)

In his amnesty speech to the NFF, Sayid answered questions that "many of the refugees...will be reinstated to their homeland where they will be able to live in peace & security. In response to them we can announce the following:" Youth of draft age get a 6-month exemption as do reservists; pardons for army & sarawak officers & soldiers who deserted; pardon of land & small business taxes, income taxes, vehicular fines, rent, agricultural loans. The government will provide school & university education; facilities, re-employment of officials, teachers & doctors "taking into consideration the ranks they had before leaving their jobs." Pension rights, valid from the date of return, would be reinstated. The convicts, who have completed at least half of their sentences, will have their sentences reduced. "The espionage branches are assigned to arrest those who talk about the national reconciliation in the camps of refugees. Many people have been interrogated for this act."
The earlier population census of Kabul city was conducted in 1938 (June, 1939). Since then, more than seven years have passed and tremendous changes have taken place in size, composition, structure and characteristics of the city population making the previous data obsolete and unreliable for the effective planning of development of the fast growing city.

Hence the work of new census of Kabul city was undertaken by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) as per the decision of the Council of Ministers and successfully completed in time between November 22 and December 11, 1986.

The preliminary results of the census have yielded very interesting data which will be of great value to demographers and planners. The census disclosed that the population of Kabul city, enumerated under 1986 census, comprised of 265,000 households in 11 districts, amounting to 1,271,000 males and 632,000 females. The average number of members of a household came to 6.6 and the sex ratio worked out to 726 males against 100 females. The total population by sex and districts wise according to the census is given in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District No. of households</th>
<th>Population in thousands</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>16640</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>12997</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>17797</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>16664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>22180</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>27131</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>14255</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>13762</td>
</tr>
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<td>10</td>
<td>13713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>30548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>195,873</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The population figures refer to the resident population and are calculated according to the regulations of the Council of Ministers. In the above total population figures of Kabul city, foreigners and military personnel who are living in dormitories and military barracks are not included.

On the basis of population census of HR, 1986 the population of Kabul city then came to 655,000 persons compared to 560,000 persons according to the preliminary results of the current population census of the city showing a growth of 165,000 or 36 per cent growth over a period of more than 14 years i.e. the interval of two censuses. The average annual growth rate of population of Kabul city this comes to 5.6 per cent which is mainly due to natural population growth and immigrants to the city. If the growth of population of Kabul city continues at this rate, it will be doubled in the next 14 years reaching the figure of 2,574,000 in the year 2000.

The census data collected has been delivered to the computer services enterprises (CSE) for further process and compilation. The final reports of the census will include detailed analyses and tabulations of demographic, economic and social characteristics of the population.

Due to the workload and complexity of census operation as also due to lack of awareness of the respondents errors cannot be ruled out but every effort has been made to reduce substantially such errors.

Besides, in order to determine the coefficient of errors, a post enumeration survey of 0.5 per cent of households in Kabul city was conducted according to scientific statistical fundamentals and by using the results of this survey the errors in the above data will be taken into account and corrections be made in the final data of population census.