INTRODUCTION: NOT WASTING RESOURCES, JUST WEIGHTS AND MEASURES, THE 70 LANGUAGES, COURTS OF JUSTICE, SYNTHESIS

A. PUBLIC & PRIVATE TRANSPORTATION & THE SHAPE OF CITIES
   Or: HOW TO MAKE AN HONEST TRILLION DOLLARS
   "Dollar Vans" versus Monopolies in Local Bus Service
   Special Study of "Dollar Vans" on the Upper East Side, NYC
   Special Study of Wheelchair Accessible Transit in NYC
   Auto Rapid Transit
   Intra-city Highway Travel
   Commuter Railroads vs. Open Market

B. ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION, SOLAR POWER AND THE CREATION OF A NEW ZERO POLLUTION VEHICLE INDUSTRY

C. THE EDUCATIONAL IMPERATIVE: PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND LIVING SCHOOLS
   [A new program for Torah education is outlined in Appendix C.1, p 55-57. Teaching human anatomy to doctors, health professionals and others in a manner consistent with Torah is covered in Appendix C.2, page 57]

D. CRIME AND POLICE:
   SHOMRIM AND OTHER APPROACHES TO PUBLIC SAFETY

E. HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

F. FREE SPEECH: COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY AND TORAH ANTECEDENTS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT
   [A new type of censorship resistant reading system is described on p 58-63.]

G. TORAH AND THE TALIBAN
   [For maps of opium growing in Afghanistan, an explanatory letter, and an interview with Mullah Omar, see append. G1-2, and G4 p 64-71]

H. THE GLOBAL SOCIETY, ISRAEL AND WORLD PEACE
   SOME FOOTNOTES FOLLOW SECTION H [p48-50], APPENDICES FOLLOW FOOTNOTES. IN EXPANDED VERSIONS, 15 PAGES OF ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENTS ARE ON PAGES 72-86
INTRODUCTION

There is a mitzvah -- a religious commandment -- incumbent upon Jews and of practical value to everyone, that we should not waste resources (0.1a). Its application seems obvious enough. In modern societies, however, the true value of the things that we use every day is often so obscured by the circuitous way that they are paid for, that we mistake the cheap for dear and waste the latter all but unaware (0.1b).

We are also enjoined to have "just" weights and measures (0.1c). This again seems obvious enough. Again, the complexity of modern life leads us to violate this rule on a regular basis with hardly any consciousness of what we are doing.

This work will show how more careful attention to these and other similarly neglected "common sense" mitzvahs can lead to major improvement in the quality of life -- spiritual and physical -- of people everywhere.

The first section focuses on public and private transportation, a subject that nearly all of us have direct experience with. It demonstrates how application of these precepts can lead to the creation of over a trillion dollars in real wealth in the USA. The next four sections, on electric power generation, education, public safety and housing are still within the range of knowledge and experience of the general reader. Like the first section, they are based mostly on the application of "bal tashchis" -- not wasting -- and the requirement that we have "just weights and measures". They also show the possibility of creating real wealth at the trillion dollar level. The sixth section -- on free speech -- is based on Torah allusions to the "seventy languages" of the world and the destructive effects of anti-Torah monoculture. The seventh section -- Torah and the Taliban -- will show how a surprisingly clear understanding of a very different and distant society can be obtained by more careful attention to the "Seven Laws of Noah" and other Torah concepts. The last section, The Global Society, Israel and World Peace, will be based on a synthesis of the insights of the first seven parts.

0.1a. The mitzvah is known as "Bal Tashchis" (with the ch pronounced like the ch in Chanuka). It means "Don't destroy." and is derived from Deuteronomy 20:19-20, where there is a prohibition on the destruction of fruit trees. It may be one of the most ancient continuously operative laws of environmental protection in the world.

0.1b. Though the violation of a commandment when unaware is not the same as violating a commandment deliberately, we are nonetheless still responsible even for such acts. [provide reference to concepts of b'maizid and b'shogaig in Torah Law]

0.1c. Leviticus 19:35-36

This work was carried out on public and private access computers located at public, university and other libraries in NYC and Jerusalem. It involved a total out-of-pocket cost of under $1000.00.
Our concepts of free speech, concern for our fellow human beings and even just weights and measures are particularly challenged when we are dealing with people who speak a very different language, live a very different life and are so far away by almost any measure that it is difficult to communicate with them at all. The challenge becomes that much greater when these people are accused of heinous crimes by others who are usually looked upon as our social leaders. When these leaders actually launch an attack on these supposed criminals and begin to kill them by the thousands (G.1), the challenge for most of us could easily become too great to bear. This has been the situation with our relationship to the Taliban for the last several years -- and particularly since the kamikaze attacks of 9/11/01.

Here too, the Torah requires us to act according to its precepts. All people are enjoined to set up courts of justice (G.2). In what court were the Taliban, individually or collectively, accused? In what court was the evidence presented? In what court did they make their defense? Where were the usual voices who call out for human rights -- including the right to a fair trial -- in the case of the accused Taliban? In Torah Law, the court of public opinion -- the only court that has been operating here -- is not sufficient to allow the systematic annihilation of thousands of people and the destruction of a way of life. But shouldn't this be obvious -- like the other Torah precepts discussed thus far?

It is in cases like this -- where the people and their ostensible leaders cry for blood -- where there is seemingly no need or time for the niceties of courts and trials -- where lynching is in the air -- that those who live by a higher law must step forward and cry, "Wait! These too are human beings -- in the image of God! They too deserve the treatment we would want for ourselves if the tables were turned. Stop the killing and let them defend themselves against their accusers."

Here we will try to discern what the Taliban are about and what our response should be to them. It may seem a nearly impossible task for a single individual with limited resources to penetrate the fog of war and propaganda to see the underlying truth. It turns out that it is not so difficult. As with our other investigations, the key to success is asking the right questions.

(Discuss objective measures of the Taliban regime and contrast with OBL: statement concerning Jews and Israel from Feb. '98; ADL and Wiesenthal Center sources, behavior toward Jews in Kabul; Judicial punishments as reported by Amnesty International; education of women -- including medical schools; first woman executed in Kabul; eradication of opium growing by consensus through the mosques and contrast with Northern Alliance; the statements of their leader when interviewed by Voice Of America; the statement about "a truck full of gold"; the Swedish Committee; the internet; Bne Noach; attitude toward conversion, etc.; the mistake of calling Taliban controlled Afghanistan a "failed state"; no one in the state dept who was a religious Moslem -- who could meet with and understand Mullah Omar [statistics on punishments for adultery and sodomy by year may show response to international concern.][What can be done?]

Shortly after the events of 9/11/01, the author noticed several things about the Taliban that did not appear to be consistent with the generally negative view of them given in the US media. It looked as though the Taliban might be just what they claimed to be -- genuine religious Moslems of very high integrity with no significant interest in attacking Jews, Israel or the USA.

Three things in particular stood out:

1. An article that appeared in the secular media about the last two Jews of Kabul.

The article was published before the attacks and was primarily a human interest story. (G.3) The last two Jews were living in an old but sturdy synagogue and were not talking to each other as a result of some personal disagreements. They reportedly went to the local Taliban officials with their complaints about each other. The Taliban reportedly did not bother them and the local children addressed the older of the two Jews -- a man in his 60's with a white beard -- as Mullah Issak. The problem with this story was that the Taliban were being portrayed in the media as "extremists" and similar to the attackers in their orientation toward Jews. In this story, however, there was no apparent negative feeling between the Taliban and the Jews.
This was even more compelling because it was well known that the people in general in Kabul were in great difficulties, with tens of thousands desperate to have a roof over their head.

It would have been an easy matter for the Taliban to, God forbid, throw the Jews out on the street (or worse), and use the sturdy synagogue building and courtyard for their own purposes -- to house Moslems, for example. That they did not do such a thing suggested that they might not only be lawful, traditional Moslems, who would recognize that the synagogue belonged to the Jews, but that they also did not look for a loophole in Moslem law that might still allow them to take the Jews' property under an assumption of some special circumstances. This suggested that they were trying to be genuinely and visibly just and kind and that they recognized that traditional Jews are not a threat to traditional Moslems. (G.4)

2. There were stories in the media that the Taliban had been successful in eradicating opium growing in the parts of Afghanistan that they controlled.

If this were true, it indicated that the Taliban might be qualitatively different from the political leadership in almost every other country -- that they had an exceptionally high level of integrity and were far more resistant to the usual temptations that prevail in the opium business. This was also consistent with the view that the Taliban were traditional Moslems -- who are well known to be against the use of intoxicating drinks. It was easy to imagine that Moslem law extended the ban on such drinks to a ban on the use of opium as an intoxicant. (G.5)

3. There was an intense campaign in the media against the "madrasses" where the Taliban studied -- to the effect that nothing but antisocial brainwashing (God forbid) could come from such educational settings.

These madrasses, however, looked like traditional Moslem schools. They also resembled the traditional Jewish Bes Midrash -- House of Searching Study -- where religious Jews learn our classic religious texts and commentaries, much as we have studied and learned for thousands of years.

It is very common for people who are not familiar with the culture of the Bes Midrash to ridicule it. Those who know the culture of the Bes Midrash from the inside have a very different impression. They see that it is a source of active kindness, of clear and precise thinking -- a wellspring of God's Peace in the World. It was not difficult for a religious Jew to imagine that the much maligned madrasses of the Taliban might also be wellsprings of Godliness in a world that often looks like it is running in the opposite direction.

A quick way to check on the Taliban -- to see if they were just traditional Moslems -- would be to see what they had to say for themselves on their websites. However, the Taliban websites listed in a current bibliography obtained from the reference desk of Yeshiva University were all down... Perhaps the work of overzealous hackers upset over the attacks? No! According to Harun Amin, then first secretary of the "Northern Alliance" mission to the United Nations, the US State Department took down the Taliban websites in April of 2001 -- almost half a year before the attacks. (G.6)

Though confirmed by two other sources, (G.7), no mention of this has yet been found in any publication or on the internet. The State Department would not answer questions about this when asked (G.8) (G.8a).

There are two major Jewish organizations that are famous for monitoring the world for anti-Jewish and anti-Israel sentiments: The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and the Wiesenthal Center. Their websites at the time showed nothing from the Taliban against Jews or against Israel. When contacted by phone, their research departments confirmed what had been found from their websites -- that they had nothing at all on the Taliban against Jews or against Israel -- though both had large files on the activities of Osama Ben Laden (OBL). (G.9)

OBL had put out a "Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders" in February of '98. Though it was cosigned by several people, and Bin Laden was in Afghanistan at the time, none of the known leaders of the Taliban had signed it. (G.10). This, again, strongly suggested that the Taliban were traditional Afghan Moslems -- long on good terms with traditional Afghan Jews -- and not the puppets of foreign hate mongers like OBL.

The opium question was checked using both US and UN official websites. With independent study teams and two different methodologies -- aerial reconnaissance and on the ground surveys -- both confirmed that the Taliban had almost completely
eradicated opium growing in the areas that they controlled. At the same time, opium growing in the home province of President Rabbani of the "Northern Alliance" -- the group with the seat in the UN -- tripled. (G.11, see also Appendix G1, which includes maps of opium growing in Afghanistan by district, for the years 2000-2003)

The Amnesty International (AI) website was then checked -- to see if there was any mention of large numbers of executions or other severe punishments associated with the opium eradication program. The AI publications for the last full year for which such data were available -- the year 2000 (by the common reckoning -- the corresponding Jewish Year is 5760) -- did not mention any severe punishments associated with eradicating opium. The actual number of judicial executions for that year -- given by AI as 15+, was only about 1/3 of the rate of judicial executions per capita in Texas under then Governor, George W. Bush and about 1/10 of the rate in Saudi Arabia. (G.12)

This is particularly remarkable considering the situations in these three areas: In Afghanistan there had been nearly two decades of social turmoil, two years of terrible drought, widespread hunger, war on several fronts and the condemnation of the community of nations. In Texas and Saudi Arabia the people were relatively well off -- at least as far as money is concerned. The Texas Governor became President of the United States and the majority of the attackers came from Saudi Arabia -- none of them were Taliban.

The US had sent a small team to Afghanistan in the early months of '01 -- when it was already known by both aerial reconnaissance and a preliminary on the ground survey that the Taliban had achieved a tremendous success in eradicating opium growing. The team was to determine how the Taliban had accomplished this remarkable -- almost miraculous -- transformation. One of them, Mr. James Callahan, reported back that they did it by consensus of the elders connected with the mosques in almost every town and village. (G.13. See also Appendix G2, which includes a letter from Mr. Callahan to the author, outlining his observations, and communications with the US DEA on the same subject.) It was a sign visible from Heaven.-- and the Taliban knew it. (G.14)

So why didn’t the Taliban turn over Ben Laden -- either in connection with the embassy bombings in '98 or the attacks of '01?

If much of their strength --- in reality and in the eyes of the people -- came from their careful adherence to Moslem traditional law, they could not turn over popular (and well armed) people like OBL and his close associates without a public judicial proceeding that satisfied both the letter and spirit of the law that they lived by. The situation was even more difficult: OBL and his associates had been a real help to the people of Afghanistan in their years of struggle against the Russians and their associates.

It may be that the US had no evidence against OBL that would stand up in a court -- Moslem or American. Witnesses might be afraid to testify, etc. This is a situation that sometimes occurs in the US in the case of organized criminals where it is well known that certain leading criminals are responsible for ordering murders but nobody is available to testify against them. In these cases, the government looks for some other type of crime -- such as tax evasion -- where the case can be proven with a less stringent standard of evidence. Many leading organized criminals have been jailed on such relatively light charges where the heavier charges -- such as murder -- could not be proven in court. (G.15) (G.16)

Perhaps, if the US leadership had been more patient in this case -- and more respectful of traditional Moslem Law and the special situation of the Taliban -- they could have come up with an effective way of preventing OBL and his crew from doing more harm...

What about the oppression of women under the Taliban? -- Isn’t it true that they deprived women and girls of education and health care, that they deprived women of the opportunity to work and that they forced women to wear a burka in the street?

If you ask almost anyone in the USA what they think the first woman executed in Kabul after the Taliban came to power was executed for, they would probably answer "blasphemy or adultery".

If you ask how long the judicial procedure was -- from the time of the apprehension for the crime to the time of the execution, they would probably answer "a few hours to a few weeks".

If you asked how long after the Taliban came to power in Kabul was the woman executed, they would probably answer "a few days to a few months"
And what is the reality - as reported by the wire services -- ?

The women was executed for "beating her husband to death with a hammer as he slept.\(\text{G.17}\)\(^{1}\) (The anti-Taliban group, RAWA, that cited this story, did not bother to ask if there was any exculpatory evidence. They claimed the Taliban were at fault for not heeding the plea of a relative of the husband who called for financial compensation in lieu of the death penalty -- as the woman was about to be executed.) (\G.18\) (\G.19\) (\G.19a\)

- The woman was executed after a judicial procedure that took over a year -- from the time of the murder to the time of the execution.
- The execution took place more than two years after the Taliban came to power in Kabul.

The discrepancy between the reality and the media generated expectation in this case is suggestive of what one might actually find if one were in a position to investigate the other points in detail.

Would anyone imagine from what they "knew" about the Taliban that they opened several centers to train women to be doctors? They did!! (\G.20\)

As for the burkas, it appears to be the case that outside of areas like Kabul, where a substantial percentage of women had gotten used to dressing in western fashions, women went on dressing the way they had dressed for decades, if not centuries -- with their bodies, hair and faces more or less covered depending on where they were. In and around the home in the countryside, they wore a simple headscarf. In towns, they were more covered up. (\G.21\)

The English speaking, college educated women in Kabul -- who were mostly not only anti-Taliban but anti-religious -- were the people who were most adversely effected by the Taliban and were the most able to communicate their troubles to the Western Media. These women and their Russian speaking counterparts were not, for the most part, innocent beleaguered secularists caught in a web of religious oppression. They were, in so many cases, the very people who had been doing their best for over a decade to undermine the cultural foundations of Islam in Afghanistan. It would have been remarkable, in this light, if the Taliban had just left them alone.

While the educated women -- including so many who had been Russian collaborators -- were very adept at manipulating the media, the very traditional women -- who constitute the overwhelming majority of the women of Afghanistan -- were almost completely ignored.

While we are considering media distortions, it is interesting that the full text of the post 9/11 interview between the veteran VOA Pashtun language journalist, Spozhmai Malwandi, and the head of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, is still not in the public domain. Several edited versions are available -- published by the Guardian and the Washington Post, for example. For some reason, all the most complete published versions of the text leave out the clause "and if God is not with us...", among other things. (\G.21a, G.21b, see refs on page 71\)

**EXECUTIONS FOR SODOMY**

Up to this point the author's efforts here had been very informal -- just following up on some of the more notable apparent contradictions in the media without any effort to do a thorough research job. Still, the results were brought to the attention of one of the leaders of a local Ethical Culture Group. This had been suggested by two active members of the group who were sure that their Leader would be very interested in these unusual findings.

As soon as this Leader heard "Taliban", however, he didn't want to hear anymore. He said that they had executed people for sodomy -- something that the author's informal research -- not going back in detail to much before the mid 2000 opium ban -- had missed. (\G.21.1a\)

The author then checked the Amnesty International Reports -- their annual books covering the human rights situations in nearly every country in the world -- going back to the Report covering 1996. A.I. reported that 5 men had been executed by the Taliban for sodomy in 1998. (\G.21.1b\) No executions for sodomy were mentioned by A.I for other years.

When these five cases were examined in detail, it revealed that the A.I. Report had omitted a very important fact in describing the first three to be...
executed: A.I.'s own detailed case report stated that they had been accused of sodomy "with young boys" (G.21.1c). A more careful investigation using the LexisNexis database for wire service reports showed that, beginning with these first three, a total of ten people were executed after having been convicted by the Taliban of sodomy. All ten were subjected to the same form of execution — having a wall toppled on top of them. At least two -- including one from the first trio— were reported to have survived their executions long enough to give statements proclaiming that their survival showed their innocence. All of these reports of executions took place within a seventeen month period — from February of '98 to June of '99. There were no reports of executions or other punishments being meted out by the Taliban for sodomy after the June '99 case.

What was particularly disconcerting about these reports was the way three of the four wire service reports on the execution of the first trio treated the story. UPI, AFP and AP all left out any mention of "young boys". Only the Australian Associated Press, citing Reuters, mentioned this detail. The texts of the AAP and AFP stories are given in footnote G.21.1d & e.

With the exception of a single source AFP story for an execution in remote Jauzjan province in June '99, the only story of a Taliban punishment for sodomy that clearly involved relations between consenting adults, reported that the convicts had been beaten and embarrassed in public, with no reported maiming or execution. (G.21.1f, G.21.1fa)

This is consistent with an earlier report on how the Taliban would deal with sodomy. In a '97 interview with veteran foreign correspondent Jonathan Steele, the Governor of Kandahar stated that there were three types of punishment for sodomy under Sharia law and the Taliban preferred the most lenient which involved blackening the convicts face with no execution or maiming. (G.21.1g) It is also consistent with the situation in Saudi Arabia, where a LexisNexis search failed to turn up any executions for sodomy between consenting adults in a period from 1995 to 2004. Of 33 cases of execution for sodomy found during this period, all involved sodomy with boys or predatory sodomy of some kind. [LexisNexis wire service reports have been found by the author to be incomplete in this field. 8/22/05]

A possible explanation of the 17-month period of executions is that it centered upon a story of Mullah Omar, the head of the Taliban, trying to rid the Taliban army of young boys being used for sodomy. (G.21.1h)

THE 9/11 COMMISSION

On Tuesday AM 3/23/04, the staff of the 9/11 Commission presented a paper for the world to hear that included a statement that Mullah Omar of the Taliban is "an illiterate leader who was unconcerned about commerce with the outside world." (G.23) The author checked by phone with a leading US government expert on the languages and cultures of Afghanistan -- the same Spozhmai Maiwandi mentioned above--- who has been on the job for over two decades and who has had more than one interview with Mullah Omar. She made it clear that, as far as she understood, the Taliban leader was certainly not illiterate in his native language and that he had a very clear, brief and direct writing style.

The same sentence of that above mentioned 9/11 Commission staff document also states that Mullah Omar was "unconcerned about commerce with the outside world." Are we to suppose then that the well known efforts of the Taliban to get Unocal to build a pipeline were done without the approval of Mullah Omar? Are we also to suppose that former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, was mistaken when she stated in her presentation "the only thing the Taliban desperately wanted [was] international recognition" (G.24) They wanted the international recognition so that, among other things, the pipeline contractor could get insurance. Without such insurance, the contractor -- whoever it was -- would not build.

At this writing, August 4. '04, the 9/11 Commission's Final Report, (G.25) does not appear to contain any suggestion that Mullah Omar is an illiterate. He is described as being "reclusive" — though the only evidence of this is that he refused to meet with some non-Moslems. There were apparently no Moslems in the US diplomatic service who could meet with him. On page 251 of the Report, he and the Taliban leadership are described as being opposed to attacking the US. Despite 288 mentions of the Taliban in the report, there is also apparently no mention of their success in eradicating opium growing, let alone how they did it. This might have made it clear that Afghanistan under their governance was certainly not a "failed state".

On pdf page 267 of the Report, the Commission shows the clear link in the mind of the OBL between Ariel Sharon going on the Temple Mount and the
timing of the attack. Ultimately it came almost exactly one year on the Moslem and Jewish calendars from the day Sharon went on the Temple Mount with about 1,000 policemen – ignoring the standing warnings of our leading rabbis that going on the Temple Mount without ritual purification is a violation of its sanctity.

God willing, we will discuss the relationship between the sanctity of the Temple Mount, the Jewish People and World Peace, in the next section.

[ include material on punishments for sodomy, Moslem law on this the Swedish committee for Afghanistan’s educational program; the statues question; The case of the ambassador of the Taliban to Pakistan, Abdus Salaam Zaeef, imprisoned without charge in Guantanamo Bay: Article by Zaeef in Nov 19, 2001 Frontier Post, Peshawar Pakistan http://www.robert-fisk.com/mullah_abdussalaam_zaeef_nov2001.htm; comparison of this article with Mullah Omar –VOA telephone conversation –anti-Israel reference and failure to refer to God or mercy in Zaeef piece; the Bridas-Unocal conflict and the Bridas bid to start building the pipeline without international recognition ( G26 ); New “Reconstructed Taliban web site from August, 2001” by “Afghan Historical Society”


APPENDIX G1:

TALIBAN AFGHANISTAN: FAILED STATE?

TOP LEFT: OPIUM GROWING IN AFGHANISTAN IN SPRING OF 2000.
See footnote G.11a for page and source. PAGE 48 IN THIS DOCUMENT)

BOTTOM LEFT: OPIUM GROWING IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER TALIBAN BAN: note: opium growing increases substantially in Badakhshan province, the home province of the president of the Northern alliance. (See footnote G.11b for page and source.)

TOP AND BOTTOM, RIGHT: OPIUM GROWING IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER THE OUST OF THE TALIBAN, IN 2003 AND 2002, RESPECTIVELY.
(See footnotes G.11c and G.11d, respectively for pages and sources.)

NOTE: THE SCALES FOR OPIUM GROWING DIFFER FROM MAP TO MAP. The real difference between 2000 and 2001 is about as shown. The difference between 2002 and 2003 is less than it appears.
According to these UN sources, total opium produced in Afghanistan in 2000=2003 was 3,276,185, 3,400 and 3,600 metric tons. (See also page 65)

APPENDIX G2: COMMUNICATIONS WITH: 1. JAMES CALLAHAN, LEADING EXPERT ON OPIUM IN AFGHANISTAN DURING THE LAST YEAR OF THE TALIBAN, FORMERLY WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT, AND, 2. BARRY ZULAUF, CURRENTLY OF THE US DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION.

Re: Torah and the Taliban/ opium in Afghanistan

To:  
"s adler"<vantran613@yahoo.com>

CC:  
aric@brain.net.pk,  
bcrossette@aol.com, "Barry Zulauf" <bzulauf@leo.gov>,  
info@acbar.org,  
james.carroll@globe.com,  
jason.steinbaum@mail.house.gov,  
Mabidn@yahoo.com,  

Dear Mr. Adler,

I regret that I could not reply to you before.

When I visited Afghanistan it was as an official of the US State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. I would have written a trip report after the mission but do not recall writing any other reports on the mission. I was one of several officials from the US (State and DEA), UK, Germany, Belgium and the UN who took part in the mission.

In regard to what I observed and learned during the 8-day UNODC mission to Afghanistan in 2001 to access the Taliban poppy ban, I can say that the ban was highly successful. We conducted numerous meetings with farmers, opium dealers, Taliban officials, etc. All our meetings with farmers were done out of earshot of the Taliban security detail and I am confident that they were telling the truth. They universally said that - were it not for the ban - they would return to poppy cultivation because they could not support themselves and their families with wheat cultivation. Although the Taliban had previously announced bans to placate the international community, until 2001 they made little or no effort to convince the farmers not to cultivate or to enforce the bans. In 2000, according to the reports we received, the Taliban decided to announce and enforce a new ban. They sent leaders to all the villages and meet with village councils, leaders, etc, to explain the ban in religious terms and to indicate that they meant to enforce it. It appears that most farmers took this to heart and did not cultivate. In some cases, when farmers violated the ban, the Taliban plowed the fields, or made the farmers themselves pull up the plants, and jailed the offending farmers for a few days. I did not hear reports of serious physical coercion, torture, executions, etc, although I did hear that the Taliban had to employ heavy shows of force - including tanks - in some of the northeastern tribal areas where affinity for the Taliban was not high and where there was the strongest resistance to the ban, including killings of Taliban officials.

The Taliban, as you know, had taxed farmers at 10% of the value of the crop, and usually received the tax in opium. While they gave up this source of income, they continued to tax refiners and dealers, a point that our group debated with Taliban officials. They also, at least as of the time we were in Afghanistan, did not ban traffic in opium. We visited opium markets in the northeast and in Helmand province where sales were continuing although stocks were low. We constantly heard that there were large stockpiles of opium from the bumper crops of prior years but it was not clear if these stockpiles were held inside or outside Afghanistan or who held them. As you know, the price of opium skyrocketed during the ban which would imply that if there were stockpiles they were being withheld from the market to drive prices up.

My impression was that some of the Taliban officials genuinely believed in the ban and supported it for religious reasons, and possibly as an olive branch to the international community. I think others, however, continued to profit from the sales of stocks. It is not at all clear to me if the Taliban (except on an individual, ad hoc basis) engaged in direct trafficking to support their military activities or if they relied on taxation and contributions from the major, mostly Pakistani trafficking families that had moved their operations from Pakistan into Afghanistan to take advantage of the heavy cultivation. Whether or not the Taliban used the ban to drive up prices is a major point of contention. 9/11 meant that there would be no opportunity to test the Taliban for a second year and even then the Taliban had an excuse if they wanted to allow the farmers to resume, since food and development aid to Afghanistan from the international community was far from sufficient to fill the gap in incomes left by the ban.

However, the ban did demonstrate what could be done through religious appeals and careful work with the communities. The fact that the Taliban had established their authority and provided security in much of the country also gave them the ability to enforce a ban - with a minimum of physical coercion - which was highly unpopular.
I hope this information is helpful to your research and feel free to quote from the above. Please note, however, that while I have ambassadorial status in Uzbekistan as head of the UNODC mission here, I do not have the title of ambassador.

Best regards,

James Callahan
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Regional Representative for Central Asia
30a Abdulla Kahhor St.,
700100 Tashkent, Uzbekistan
Time zone: GMT + 5 hours
Tel. (+ 998 71) 120 80 50
Fax (+ 998 71) 120 62 90
Mobile (+ 998 93) 181 45 88
E-mail: james.callahan@unodc.org

s adler |<vantran613@yahoo.com>

Thu, 19 August 2004 04:08

To: Barry Zulauf
<bzulauf@leo.gov> james.callahan@unodc.org,
Thomas A.Schrettner@usdoj.gov,bcrossette@aol.com,
james.carroll@globe.com, Mabidn@yahoo.com,
aric@brain.net.pk, info@acbar.org,
jason.steinbaum@mail.house.gov,
ruleoflaw@usip.org
cc: mv2038@columbia.edu
Subject: Re: Torah and the Taliban/opium in Afghanistan

B'H

8/18/04

To: Ambassador James P. Callahan, UNODC, Vienna

From: A. S. (Steve) Adler, author, researcher, inventor,
NYC, 718-295-3510
cc: Dr. Barry A. Zulauf, Acting Special Assistant,
Intelligence Division, Drug Enforcement Administration
cc:Thomas A. Schrettner, Special Agent, US DEA
cc Barbara Crossette, author
cc: James Carroll, author

Re: Your investigation of the Taliban ban on opium in 2001

Dear Ambassador Callahan and Associates,

As I hope you will see from the attached draft, I am writing a book entitled "Applying Torah in Public Life" in which I plan to include a substantial chapter entitled "Torah and the Taliban". Part of this chapter has already been written or outlined and is included in the attachment I think that you will find it worth reading, even in its present incomplete form.

I would like to include a statement from you and or your associates from the US and other countries who visited Afghanistan in the early months of 2001 on how you understand the Taliban to have accomplished their remarkable ban on opium growing.

You are quoted by Barbara Crossette in the New York Times and other papers to the effect that farmers had told you that the ban was brought about by consensus—presumably of the elders connected with the mosques in the communities where the ban took effect.

I would like to quote you directly on this rather than quoting the reports of what you had said. Is there a report on this that you and/or others prepared on the subject that I may quote? If I were given a document number, title and number of pages, I might be able to obtain a redacted version of it under the Freedom of Information Act. A direct quote from you and your colleagues on that trip would also be of great value -- particularly considering subsequent events in the region.

Nearly all the pundits continue to refer to Taliban Afghanistan as a "Failed State", yet it is obvious that a government that can succeed in wiping out opium growing on the basis of some kind of consensus -- without the executions and chemical spraying so often associated with drug eradication programs -- has
achieved a success most ordinary governments would be hard pressed to duplicate.

I believe that your report would also be of special value to Harold D. Wankel, the US DEA’s new intelligence chief, who is expected to leave for Afghanistan this coming Friday. The new people at the Afghanistan Desk of the State department, such as Tim Wilder (202-647-5267) would also probably like to see it — or to hear from you in person.

I am sure there are many others — including my local Representative, Congressman Engel — who would do well to be more familiar with your observations and thoughts on that remarkable event.

I hope to hear from you soon.

A. S. (Steve) Adler

Below is a relevant message that I sent to DEA recently that some of those on the present list did not yet receive.

I do not have such convenient access to a computer and did not have a chance to read the references that you sent to me before sending you and special agent Thomas Schrettner my questions and a copy of the latest draft of my book.

The UNODC has, in the meantime, sent me James Callahan’s direct email address, and I expect to be contacting him directly after sending you these comments.

The Afghanistan country brief, excerpted below, was among the very first things that I found — not long after 9/11/01 — when I did a search on opium and the Taliban. It confirmed that there had been an extremely sharp drop in opium growing as a result of the Taliban ban. It also led me to the UN documents on the subject, which by that time, were also available on the web.

The UN documents led me to see, district by district, how the ban had affected opium growing from one year to the next. It showed opium growing in Taliban controlled areas and in the areas controlled by the people who still retained their seat in the UN. The most remarkable thing was that in the areas controlled most strongly by the Taliban — like Kandahar province — opium growing dropped to zero form a high level the previous year.

In areas most under the control of the President of Afghanistan — Mr. Rabbani’s home province of Badakhshan — opium growing increased by a factor of three in the same time frame.

It was very interesting to see how this truly remarkable situation was described in DEA documents — such as the ones you were kind enough to refer me to. A 98% drop is referred to as “substantial” and “significant” which intuitively might better apply to drops of 20-40% in the case of “substantial” and “10-25%, in the case of significant. It is then immediately suggested that this was a ploy to raise the price rather than an effort to bring their actions more in line with both Islamic Law and International Law. Does one completely eliminate the growing of a crop in one’s home territory in order to raise the price of inventories held mostly by others? Did Rabbani and his associates increase growing in order to do an act of kindness?

As I understand it, the Taliban taxed opium as a regular agricultural crop. Once they banned it, it was no longer taxed. If it was found growing, they made the farmers destroy their own crops.

If you look at the behavior of the Taliban when it came to alcoholic beverages and grape vines, you can get a better idea of whether they banned opium merely as a ploy to raise the price of inventories or whether they were trying to bring the behavior of the Islamic Society they were attempting to create — a society that was to be an example for Moslems everywhere — more in line with the tenets of Islam.

I suspect that there were not very many people at either DEA or State who were prepared to think of the Taliban as what they claimed to be — and almost certainly were — genuine religious Moslems trying to fashion a society consistent with normative Afghan/Deobandi Moslem beliefs.

As I understand it, they were not only not a threat to the US, but were probably more inclined to appreciate the US — for the aid they had received in their fight against the Russians and for the humanitarian aid they
had received in more recent years - than almost any other Moslem country in the world.

At the same time, as genuine religious Moslems, they were not likely to succumb to the usual carrot and stick approach that may characterize most US relations with such countries.

I see that I am almost out of time on this computer, so I will leave off here.

I look forward to your assistance in tracking down James Callahan's report and hope you find my chapter on Torah and the Taliban of value.

Sincerely,

A.S. (Steve) Adler

Barry Zulauf <bzulauf@leo.gov> wrote:


Taliban Profits from Drugs

Hutchinson

In 2001, Afghanistan produced approximately 74 metric tons of opium, a substantial reduction from the 3,656 metric tons produced in 2000.

Despite this significant decrease and the Taliban's claims of lab destructions, DEA has seen no decrease in availability, and no increase in the price of Southwest Asian Heroin in the United States and European consumer countries. This indicates that significant amounts of opiates still remain available. According to the United Nations, up to 60% of Afghanistan's opium crop is stored for future sales. Since the Taliban's opium ban of July 2000, the kilogram price of opium has skyrocketed from US $44 to over US $400. This price increase, which was limited to the immediate region and did not resonate to international markets, appeared to be a means for the Taliban to capitalize on a rise in the price of a commodity over which they exercise nearly total control.


Narco-terrorism: A Dangerous Mix. Casteel

Afghanistan is a major source country for the cultivation, processing, and trafficking of opiates, producing 59 percent of the world's supply of illicit opium in 2002. Because of the country's decimation by decades of warfare, illicit drugs had become a major source of income. Through the taxation of illicit opium production, the Taliban were able to fund an infrastructure capable of supporting and protecting Usama bin Laden and the Al-Qaida organization. Accordingly, drugs and terrorism frequently share a common ground of geography, money, and violence.

Illicit opium production increased each year in Afghanistan during the 1990's, surpassing Burma as the world's leading producer of illicit opium in 1998. By 2000, Afghanistan produced more than 70% of the world's supply of illicit opium, with more than 3,656 metric tons produced. This equaled a potential heroin production of 365 metric tons. An estimate conducted by INTERPOL suggested that ninety percent of the heroin consumed in Europe originates in Southwest Asia, particularly Afghanistan. Afghanistan's neighbors in the Central Asian States may also be candidates for exploitation by traffickers. Drug trafficking groups could potentially utilize their existing smuggling networks within the region to move product to markets and precursor chemicals to the clandestine laboratories.

Presently, the situation is fluid and constantly changing. Until the situation in Afghanistan stabilizes, the future of drug cultivation and production within that country or within the region itself will remain uncertain. However, the ingenuity and tenacity of drug traffickers in Southwest Asia will continue to present substantial challenges to western law enforcement.


Afghanistan Country Report, note that the ban was enforced by eradication program.
AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY BRIEF

Drug Situation Report September 2001

over 90 percent of Afghanistan, while a loose coalition of opposition forces (referred to as the Northern Alliance) maintains control of portions of northern Afghanistan.

STATUS IN INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING

The Islamic State of Afghanistan is a major source country for the cultivation, processing and trafficking of opiate and cannabis products. Afghanistan produced over 70 percent of the world's supply of illicit opium in 2000. Morphine base, heroin and hashish produced in Afghanistan are trafficked worldwide. Narcotics are the largest source of income in Afghanistan due to the decimation of the country's economic infrastructure caused by years of warfare. Afghanistan was invaded by the Soviet Union in 1979. Following the withdrawal of the Soviets ten years later, civil strife ensued in Afghanistan. There is no recognized national government in Afghanistan and opposing factions continue to battle for control of the country. The Taliban, a fundamentalist Islamic group, now controls northern Afghanistan.

DRUG CULTIVATION AND PROCESSING

Opium: According to the official U.S. Government estimate for 2001, Afghanistan produced an estimated 74 metric tons of opium from 1,685 hectares of land under opium poppy cultivation. This is a significant decrease from the 3,656 metric tons of opium produced from 64,510 hectares of land under opium poppy cultivation in 2000.

The United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) also estimates opium production in Afghanistan. The UNDCP estimated a reduction in 2000 opium production from 1999, pointing to a 10 percent reduction in land under opium poppy cultivation and the impact of a protracted drought in the area as the causes for the smaller opium production. Estimates for 2001 have not been released.

AFGHAN OPIUM PRODUCTION:

METRIC TONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>3,656</td>
<td>2,861</td>
<td>2,340</td>
<td>2,184</td>
<td>2,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDCP</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3,276</td>
<td>4,581</td>
<td>2,102</td>
<td>2,804</td>
<td>2,248</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I do not see anything about consensus. I will try to find traces of the Callahan report.

Barry A. Zulauf, Acting Special Assistant, Intelligence Division, Drug Enforcement Administration

August, 2004 by James CALLAHAN

For comparison, here is the UN data on area under cultivation, (not tonnage) from 1994 to 2003.

Afghanistan Opium Poppy Cultivation from 1994 to 2003 (ha, rounded)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>71,000</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td>57,000</td>
<td>58,000</td>
<td>64,000</td>
<td>91,000</td>
<td>82,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>74,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX G4

http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0,3604,558076,00.html

Mullah Omar - in his own words

Wednesday September 26, 2001
The Guardian

This 12-minute interview with Mullah Omar Mohammad, the Taliban leader, was conducted in Pashtu for the publicly-funded radio channel Voice of America. The broadcast was pulled last Friday, following objections from the US deputy secretary of state and senior officials of the National Security Council.

[8/03/05 A different version was obtained from VOA, purporting to be the complete text of the interview. However, it contains no introductory or concluding salutations, the name/s of the interviewer/s or any official document number. Words that appear in the Guardian but not in the "complete" text from VOA are shown in underscored italics. This includes differences in capitalization, spelling and punctuation. Words that appear in the VOA "complete" text but not in the Guardian, are in boldface reddish type.

A facsimile of the VOA "complete" text will be provided as an attachment, available upon request, or printed as pages 84-86 of this document.


Voice of America interviewer: Why don’t you expel Osama bin Laden? America and the international community want him. Why do you protect him?

Omar: This is not just an issue of Osama bin Laden. If this is an issue of Islam. Islam throughout the world. Islam’s prestige is at stake.

So; so is Afghanistan’s tradition. Whether Afghans uphold their tradition and protect their honor is another issue.

VOA: Do you know that the US has announced a war on terrorism?

Omar: I am considering two promises. One is the promise of God; the other is that of Bush. The promise of God is that my "My land is vast. If you start a journey on God’s path, you can reside anywhere on this earth and will be protected." That is the promise of God. The promise of Bush is that there."There is no place on earth where you can hide that I cannot find you." We will see which one of these two promises is fulfilled.

VOA: But aren’t you afraid for the people, for yourself, for the Taliban Taleban? your The United States is a powerful country?

Omar: God Almighty says that "Almighty God... is a friend of the believers" and he is helping the believers and the Muslims. And God says he He will never be satisfied with the infidels. In terms of worldly affairs, America is very strong. Even if it were twice as strong, or twice that, it could would not be strong enough to defeat us. We are confident that no one can harm us if God is with us. And if God is not with us, there is no need for anyone else. Someone right here can shoot us and kill us.

[ Note, It is particularly curious that these last two sentences are missing in the Guardian’s text, as they were actually in the VOA’s broadcast version. A. S. A. 8/10/05]

VOA: You are telling me you are not concerned, but But Afghans all over the world are concerned.

Omar: We are also concerned. Great issues lie ahead. But we depend on God’s mercy. This may appear to be a moment of certainty for us, but God’s mercy is with the Muslims. Consider our point of view: if we give Osama away today, Muslims who are now pleading to give him up would then be reviling us for giving him up. The very same people would be asking: "Why did you sacrifice the prestige of Islam? Why did you bring shame on Muslims?" Everyone is afraid of America and wants to please it. But let me tell you something. Americans will not be able to prevent such acts like as the one that has just occurred because America has taken Islam hostage.
America has done that in the Islamic world and especially in the Arab countries. If you look at Islamic countries, the people are in despair. They are complaining that Islam is gone. Secular law has replaced Islamic law. But people remain firm in their Islamic beliefs. In their pain and frustration, some of them commit suicide acts. They feel they have nothing to lose. If the US really wants to end this evil, it knows how to do it. It should end its virtual grip on Islam. It should let go. Then it will be relieved forever, and the rest of the world can go about its business.

VOA: What do you mean by saying America has taken the Islamic Muslim world hostage?

Omar: I mean that America controls the governments of the Islamic countries. America keeps after them until they do its bidding. But they are very distant from their own people. The people ask to follow Islam, but the governments do not listen. The people are powerless against their governments because they are in the grip of the United States. In that way, they become corrupt and ignore the people. If someone follows the path of Islam, the government arrests him, tortures him or kills him. This is the doing of America. If it stops supporting those governments and lets the people deal with them, then such things won't happen.

America has created the evil that is attacking it. The evil will not disappear even if I die and Osama dies and others die. This is US policy. The US should step back and review its policy. It should stop trying to impose its empire on the rest of the world, especially on in Islamic countries. In the name of humanitarian aid, Americans brought thousands of bibles to Afghanistan and were propagating Christianity. If they dare do that here can you imagine what they have been doing in Arab countries. The Muslims understand that. They also know they can't do anything about it. So they kill themselves in suicide attacks. They no longer want life on this earth.

VOA: So you won't give it means you are not giving Osama bin Laden to the US up?

Omar: No, We , we cannot do that. If we did, it means we are not Muslims... , that Islam is finished. If we were afraid of attack, we could have surrendered him the last time when we were threatened and attacked. So America can hit us again, and this. This time we don't even have a friend.

VOA: If you fight America with all your its might - can the Taliban Taleban do that? Won't Don't you think that America could beat you, and won't your the people would suffer even more?

Omar: On the surface, it looks as if that is the case. But I'm I am very confident that it won't turn out this that way. Please note this: there . There is nothing else, nothing more, we can do except depend on almighty Almighty God. If a person does, really depends on God, then he is assured that the Almighty will help him, have mercy on him and he will succeed. Another point: Osama was here in Afghanistan even before us, but nobody wanted him. They forced him out of Sudan, and he came to Afghanistan. We didn't even exist then. Our movement was not here. So why did they not pursue him then? Either they didn't want him or no one was ready to turn him in. If no one was willing to turn him in, then why should we? Are we cowards to bring upon ourselves a great shame? This whole thing is an excuse. We will not turn him in.

Note: The text of the interview as published in the Guardian has a word count, using MS Word tools, of about 600, which would require a talking speed of only 50 words per minute for the 12 minutes the interview is said to have taken. Average talking speed in serious conversation is close to 100 words per minute, suggesting how much of the interview is missing. Average talking speed for the US presidential inaugural addresses from 1989 to 2001 is reported as 108 words per minute, with a range of 99 to 114 wpm. This data found at: http://www.netyak.com/YAKbites/facts.htm

The text as given by VOA, has an additional ~385 words, based on a hand count. Allowing for 14 pauses between questions and answers, there is an equivalent total of just over one thousand words. This suggests that there are an equivalent of about 100-300 words that may still be missing. Part of this would be made up by the beginning and ending salutations.

This interview section has not been fully proofed.
8/09/05