地域学研究
Online ISSN : 1880-6465
Print ISSN : 0287-6256
ISSN-L : 0287-6256
論文
「ふるさと納税」による返礼品競争
── 租税競争モデルに基づく理論的研究 ──
加藤 秀弥柳原 光芳
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ジャーナル 認証あり

2021 年 51 巻 2 号 p. 175-195

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  The so-called “Furusato Nouzei System” (hometown tax donation) has been introduced in Japan since 2008. This system provides tax deductions to people donating money to a local government they choose as the recipient. This system has brought about regional competition across local governments, and its competition has become more and more fierce by providing attractive gifts to encourage people to donate more. In fact, some local governments’ tax revenues are decreased by tax deductions and local governments gathering the donations. Many papers criticize that this system decreases the total amount of local tax revenues due to regional (gift) competitions. In contrast, there are no theoretical studies on the effects of the system.

  Therefore, this paper examines how various variables under the “Furusato Nouzei System” or population movement from a larger population region to a smaller population region affects effective tax rates, including the gift for “Furusato Nouzei”, of both local governments and the tax revenues of local and central governments. In order to examine these effects, we constructed a simple two-region tax competition model considering the degree of attachment to the region in which residents live.

  The main results are as follows. First, “Furusato Nouzei” is done from the larger population region to the smaller population region. Second, the population movement from the smaller population region to the larger population region promotes fierce competition in the effective tax rate. That is, if the population difference between two regions is not large enough, its movement can decrease not only the tax revenue of the small population region but also the tax revenue of the larger population region. Third, a rise in the upper limit of tax deduction decreases the tax revenues of the larger population region. If the population of the larger population region is not large enough, a rise in the upper limit of tax deductions can decrease the tax revenue in the smaller population region. Lastly, the population movement or a rise in all variables except the lower limit of tax deductions decreases the tax revenue of the central government.

JEL Classifications:H31, H71, H77, N45

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