A rumour in Propertius*

Paulo Martins
Universidade de São Paulo

mixtaque cum ueris passim commenta uagantur
milia rumourum confusaque uerba volutant¹

This paper investigates the relationship between historical reality and *personae poeticae* as fiction in Propertius 2.7.² Besides its poetic value, this elegy shows us precisely the border between reality and fiction in which Roman elegy is situated. On the one hand, we observe the *personae poeticae* as fictional constructions, and, on the other hand, we can glimpse referential aspects of the

* I would like to thank my students, Cecilia Gonçalves Lopes and Lya Valéria Grizzo Serignolli, the work with the originals and the corrections and suggestions of Jessica Anne Wasterhold.

¹ Ov., *Met.* 12.54–55.

² I use for this analysis Teubner's edition, elaborated by Fedeli in 1984, and reviewed by him in his commentaries, in 2005, to Propertius' second book, but not forgetting other editions (Giardina (2010), Goold (1990), Heyworth (2007b), Moya and Ruiz de Elvira (2001), Viarre (2005) and commentaries Butler (1905), Camps (1966), Richardson, Jr. (1977), Fedeli (2005), Heyworth (2007c) and Shackleton Bailey (1956).

Roman society of this period. Nevertheless, the *personae* may be impregnated with real characteristics as well, since we can neither deny the historical existence of Propertius, Maecenas and Augustus, nor that historical events may be nuanced by rumour, which can be considered as a rhetorical kind of proof.

Gavisa es[t] certe sublatam, *Cynthia*, legem,
 qua quondam edicta flemus uterque diu,
 ni nos diuideret: quamuis diducere amantis
 non queat inuitos Iuppiter ipse duos.
 'At magnus *Caesar*.' sed magnus *Caesar* in armis: -5
 deuictae gentes nil in amore ualent.
 nam citius paterer caput hoc discedere collo,
 quam possem nuptae perdere more faces,
 aut ego transirem tua limina clausa maritus,
 respiciens udis prodita luminibus. -10
 a mea tum qualis caneret tibi tibia somnos,
 tibia funesta tristior illa tuba!
 unde mihi patriis natos praebere triumphis?
 nullus de nostro sanguine miles erit.
 quod si uera meae comitarem castra puellae, -15
 non mihi sat magnus *Castoris* iret equus.
 hinc etenim tantum meruit mea gloria nomen,
 gloria ad hibernos lata *Borysthenidas*.
 tu mihi sola places: placeam tibi, *Cynthia*, solus:
 hic erit et patrio nomine pluris amor. -20

Four questions, beyond the textual surface of the elegy 2.7, arise: a) In what terms may the information – seemingly historical – about the annulment and the edition of a law, presented in a fictional text, give us concrete elements about this law? b) Up to what point may this text present an opinion – in favor or against – Augustus? c) What does, in the elegiac genre, this essentially referential information mean when we consider that this genre is essentially fictional? d) If this information has any historical value, may the roman elegy be considered a genre between reality and fiction?

Even though Maria Wyke works essentially with the construction of the *persona* Cynthia, I believe she builds up a premise applied to referential aspects in the elegies that may be useful when it comes to the use of the revoked law (presented by Propertius as the poem's motor force, according to Wyke): the poetic discourse, of which Cynthia is a part, is firmly informed by political, moral and literary discourses of the Augustan period. Thus, even if we deny Cynthia an extra-poetic existence, we cannot deny her relationship with the society.³

I begin, then, with this: even if the law does not exist, it is unquestionable that its representation as a constituted law in a text (as part of the poetic discourse) is involved with political, moral and literary discourses of the period. I go beyond: it is not possible to deny its involvement with *discourses*, that is, *rumours* spread in that society as public opinion.⁴ As Wyke shows Cynthia participates in a poetic language of love and, in this way, although she is not related to the poet's actual love life, she is related to the *grammar* of this poetry.⁵ It seems to me that all the referential elements translated in the elegiac poetical discourse are connected with this elegiac grammar that presupposes those *rumours*.

In the republican and imperial Rome, *rumour* may be considered an institution, that is, it has a legal statute and is observed when justice is applied, since it is a kind of proof. We can find it in Seneca the Elder's *Controuersiae*, in formulations

³ Wyke (1989, 27).

⁴ Bettini (2008, 351) presents an excellent relationship between the sense of *verb fari* and its gerund *fandus* and the idea of rumour, hearsay: We should recognize that in an oral culture such as Rome was, systems of belief and cultural representation are constructed primarily on the basis of verbal communication—in other words, hearsay. But “hearsay” is not simply gossip; rather, it is a source of knowledge for the formulation of shared rules. “Hearsay” defines what is *fandus*, that which is at the same time both “sayable” and “just.”

⁵ Wyke (1989, 35).

like *rumour erat de adulterio matris et procuratoris*,⁶ in which the death of a *pater familias* is discussed (two suspects are presented, the son and the attorney of the family, possibly the widow's lover). More than simple exercises of declamation, the institutionalization of *rumour* as a kind of proof is presented by Quintilian in *Institutio Oratoria*, supported by Aristotle and Cicero. The orator stresses that, among the non-artificial proofs, *rumour* possesses the same credibility of previous judgements, evidences extracted from torture, documents, oaths and witnesses. So, if *rumour* is a kind of proof, we have to consider its power and its penetration among the Romans and even among the Greeks.⁷

On the other hand, nowadays many have studied this trans-historical phenomenon – the *rumour*. It does not interest me, here, to review its treatment by Social Psychology or Sociology, but to stress some important characteristics of the phenomenon and how we can look at it in this poetic and political context. It is known that *rumour* exists if the subject has any importance to the person who listens to it and who spreads it. This is why *rumour* moves around in a given environment – besides, of course, all the interests that people have in transmitting it.⁸ There are three kinds of *rumour*, which are divided into three pairs: a₁) retrospective rumors focused upon the implications of past events; a₂) prospective or predictive rumors anticipating the future; b₁) rumors planted and systematically transmitted to serve the ends of special group; b₂) spontaneous; c₁) rumors which represent extreme flights of imaginative fantasy; c₂) rational. Facing so many possibilities, I do not aim to classify or establish a taxonomy to *rumour*, but to understand that it serves the collectivity (whose voice represents common sense or a belief). That is, *rumour* as a discourse has no author or source;

⁶ Sen. *Contr.* 7.5. pr.

⁷ Quint., *Inst.* 5.1.2; 5.9.1. Cic., *Inu.* 2.46; *De Or.* 2.27.116; Arist., *Rhet.* 1418a.

⁸ Allport; Postman (1946–7, 503 – 4).

for, rumour transmits temporary and floating attitudes or, beliefs that people form in order to interpret new emerging situations.⁹ More recently rumour was defined by Rosnow; Kimmel¹⁰ as a proposition, not verified, of a belief that has relevance to people actively involved in its dissemination. So, rumours are supposedly factual, but lack authenticity and confirmation. This way we may see the difference between rumour and news (the last one being verified and confirmed). Rumour shares, with gossip, the aspect of not being proved – although they differ in importance and relevance--rumours are related to topics which are noteworthy to a group, while gossip is chitchat.¹¹

Taking this into consideration, we are led to think that *rumor* or *rumores* are, sometimes, to the History produced by the Romans and may show up in Livy, Tacitus or Suetonius (no matter how different they may be). Vitruvius, on the other hand, discussing a *monumentum*, a source of water, refers to a rumour about it: *is autem falsa opinione putatur uenerio morbo implicare eos, qui ex eo biberint. sed haec opinio quare per orbem terrae falso rumore sit peruagata (...)*.¹² I do not consider it important whether this spring source passed any venereal disease. The *falsus rumour* interests me. If there is a *falsus rumour*, there is also a *uerus rumour*. Rumour is “hearsay,” which may be truth or deception. Horace, in *Sat.* 2.6.50-60, talking about his friendship with Maecenas, shows us how useful he was to the general, his friend, answering his *nugae* during his trips. Such nearness would have caused envy among people in Rome. Once, when they met him in Campus Martius, they asked him questions of a sort which could be answered by anyone who was close to the source/event (?):

⁹ Peterson; Gist (1951, 159).

¹⁰ Rosnow; Kimmel (2000, 122).

¹¹ Bordia; DiFonzo (2004, 33).

¹² Vitr. 2.8.12.

‘fortunae filius’ omnes.
frigidus a rostris manat per compita rumor:
 quicumque obuius est, me consulit: ‘o bone – nam te
 scire, deos quoniam propius contingis oportet –,
 numquid de Dacis audisti?’ ‘nil equidem.’ ‘ut tu
 semper eris derisor.’ ‘at omnes di exagitent me,
 si quicquam.’ ‘quid? militibus promissa Triquetra
 praedia Caesar an est Itala tellure daturus?’
 iurantem me scire nihil mirantur ut unum
 scilicet egregii mortalem altique silenti.¹³

In this passage of the *Satires*, it is easily observed that *rumour* is used as information, but it needs reliable *confirmation*-- it is not a trustworthy source by itself. In this situation, Horace’s acquaintances, knowing how close he was to Maecenas, ask him to guarantee the information which came out of rumour. That is, rumour may be untrue, true, or lack confirmation. It is worth noticing that what Nisbet tells us:

An ancient reader would understand the urban environment, and sympathise with the concern of the crowd. When public life is conducted in the open air, ‘a chill rumour’ in Horace’s phrase ‘seeps from street-corner to street-corner’ (*Satires* 2.6.50 *frigidus a rostris manat per compita rumor*). If trouble came in the middle of the night, a public-spirited or curious citizen went outside to see what was happening, as when Propertius had a row with Cynthia (4.8.2). In the alleys of an old city a crowd soon built up, and Cicero needs only a few words to communicate a sense of crisis. It is unlikely that he had precise evidence for the details, but most readers would be content with an account that seemed plausible in the situation. Much ancient oratory, and history, is neither obviously true nor obviously false, but a reasonable guess at the sort of thing that might well have happened.¹⁴

¹³ Hor., *Serm.* 2.6.49-58.

¹⁴ Nisbet (1992, 8).

Nisbet's last statement (*Much ancient oratory, and history, is neither obviously true nor obviously false, but a reasonable guess at the sort of things that might well have happened*) seems to me essential for understanding rumour among the Romans and understanding how this social phenomenon passes through various genres (in this case, the epistolary genre). I believe that rumour is crucial in the construction of the verisimilitude in Roman literature, even if such representation may distort historical reality. Livy, when talking about Scipio's disease, admits that rumours may aid the anticipation of actual outcomes – as a sort of trial balloon:

Scipio ipse graui morbo implicitus, grauiore tamen fama cum ad id quisque quod audierat insita hominibus libidine alendi de industria rumores adiceret aliquid, prouinciam omnem ac maxime longinqua eius turbauit; apparuitque quantam excitatura molem uera fuisset clades cum uanus rumor tantas procellas exciuisset. non socii in fide, non exercitus in officio mansit.¹⁵

Another point that this passage reveals is the proximity between rumour and fama. It is common to associate fame with something true, consolidated by public opinion. But in the Roman World *fama* may be based on information without any evidence – thus, it is unbelievable. OLD's second definition of *fama* puts it near *hearsay, rumour, gossip* – that is, we have the same problem: we do not identify a trustworthy source. Another detail that may help us see the difference between them is that rumour is the result of rumination – linked to the sound animals make when masticate (there is, then, a distinction between rumour and *fama*). While *fama* is the product of a powerful voice that replaces others by the presence of a second speaker – which

¹⁵ Liv. 28.24.

may be society or a group -, *rumour* may seem the product of a slow process of accumulation from one person to another.¹⁶

There is a passage in Julius Caesar about the proliferation and the effects of rumours: *Haec Afranius Petreiusque et eorum amici pleniora etiam atque uberiora Romam ad suos perscribebant. multa rumores adfingebant, ut paene bellum confectum videretur*.¹⁷ Here, the rumour that is spread is false and produces a *uisio*, for *multa rumoures adfingebant*. This same *uisio*, then, is associated with political communication in the city of Rome, according to Laurence, the results of the elections and the assemblies seem to have been dependent on the political knowledge and on the behavior of the Roman citizens informed by *rumours* spread by word-of-mouth. Then: *In this chain communication the process was not lineal. Each time the information was conveyed to another person that person interpreted and speculated about what the information meant, prior to communicating with another person*.¹⁸ The addressees would delete what was not important and would emphasize what they believed was important, adding more information than they possessed.

The term *rumour* among the elegists is very relevant, especially in Propertius and in Ovid,¹⁹ and to a lesser extent in Tibullus too.²⁰ In Propertius 1.5, for example, the “ego”, addressing himself to Gallus – and this is very meaningful, for the *persona poetica* Galo may be identified with the elegiac poet – warns Cynthia that any track (*uestigia*) of her infidelity will become *rumour*: *quod si parua tuae dederis uestigia culpae, / quam cito de tanto nomine rumor eris!*²¹ and still reaffirms that,

¹⁶ Bettini (2008, 361).

¹⁷ Caes., *Ciu.* 1. 53.

¹⁸ Laurence (1994, 63).

¹⁹ Prop. 1.5.26; 1.13.13; 2.18D.38; 2.32.24; 4.4.47 e 4.5.7. Ov., *Ep.* 16.141; *Fast.* 3.543; 4. 307; 6. 527; *Trist.* 3.12.43; *Pont.* 2.1.49; 3. 1. 82; 3.4.59; 4.4.19.

²⁰ Tib. 3.20.1 e 3.20.4.

²¹ Prop. 1.5.25-26.

in such a circumstance, he will only be able to offer a shoulder for her to cry on. This situation shows how strong *rumour* could be, especially if we think about the place where it is born – *nequitia*–, an element that frames those elegiac actions. In Propertius 1.13, the “ego”, before the same person, Gallus – says he is an expert in matters of love and that this knowledge has not come from *bad rumour*, nor from any omen. He says his knowledge comes from seeing, and he asks Gallus whether he has a witness that may refute him: *haec ego non rumore malo, non augure doctus;/ uidi ego: me quaeso teste negare potes?*²² Here we find some shading of *rumour*--there may be a *malus rumour* (but there may also be a *bonus rumour*). *Malus rumour* is parallel, in *fides*, to the omen whose frailty is derived from the lack of evidence (which is proved by line 14, with its *uidi ego*, that is, the “ego” is the eyewitness of the events). This construction of the verdict ascribed to the “ego” seems to me to be essential in elegiac discourse; for, it effects truth (whose association with the *nomen Propertius* contributes to verisimilitude, which confused the critics so much).

For decades, scholars treated this law that is announced in Propertius 2.7 as historical data, that is, as a poetic element, which would reflect the specific reality of a biographical truth of the elegiac *personae*. So, as Propertius is a historical fact in the poems, Cynthia is a pseudonym for Hostia²³ (following Apuleius, *Apol.* 10). By this approach the revoked law in 2.7 would be social, institutional and legal data, which would frame

²² Prop. 1.13.13–14.

²³ Wyke (1989, 35): “The Propertian elegiac narrative does not, then, celebrate a Hostia, but creates a fictive female whose minimally defined status as mistress, physical characteristics, and name are determined by the grammar of erotic discourse in which she appears. The employment of terms like “pseudonym” in modern critical discourse overlooks the positive act of creation involved in the depiction of elegy’s mistresses. Therefore, when reading Augustan elegy, it seems most appropriate to talk not of pseudonyms and poeticized girlfriends but of poetic or elegiac woman.”

those non-fictional characters. The anti-biographical criticism of Allen,²⁴ Veyne²⁵ and Wyke²⁶, - to which I subscribe²⁷ -, rejects this hypothesis- or, at least, minimized. If we do not take the law as concrete and real, this elegy becomes fiction *in totum*. However, I believe this anti-biographical interpretation may be too extreme - converting the hypothetical law into a synthesis of events and/or concrete aspirations of the historical moment which reverberates in the elegiac discourse as verisimilitude in the poetic grammar, a *rumour*, so to speak.

For example, Gordon Williams²⁸ assumes a reckless position, in my point of view, when he understands that Propertius is a historical source for this law which would have been approved (*edicta*) and revoked (*sublata*). On the one hand, it presupposes the existence of the subject affected by a positive legal document whose credibility is unquestionable and, on the other, it disregards the generic expression of the literary text. Thus, the lack of evidence about the law in historical sources argues against the adamant position of Williams: *The fact seems generally to have been suppressed and is missing in the main historical sources.*²⁹ It seems obvious to me that the fact that there are not any references about this law strengthens the possibility that it has never existed formally. However, it is not safe to assume that the discussion about the appropriateness and relevance of this law in the period is unreasonable, since it is widely known that there was an intention of restoration of the Republic's moral standards during the Augustan Principate,³⁰ which will

²⁴ Allen (1950).

²⁵ Veyne (1983).

²⁶ Wyke (2002).

²⁷ Martins (2009); (2015a); (2015b).

²⁸ Ver Goddard (1923, 153-6).

²⁹ Williams (1962, 28).

³⁰ Bowditch (2009, 403).

publish in 18 and 17 BC,³¹ the *Lex Iulia Maritandis Ordinibus* and *Lex Iulia Adulteriis Coercendis*, respectively, and in 9 AD, *Lex Papia Poppaea*, laws.³² For, in the years preceding these laws, the intention of moral reform, along with other effective political actions of Octavius, may not constitute historical acts, but did bolster the program of moralization of Rome. As for these laws specifically, we have concrete information in *Justinianus' Digesta* 23.2: *De ritu nuptiarum*, and 38.11: *Vnde Vir et Vxor*, and in the Isidorus' *Origins*.³³ Their stories are not sufficiently clarified yet. Del Castillo, besides defending, for example, the existence of the 28 BC law, draws a hypothesis that it would be more extensive in marriage bans than the one from 18 BC, so that in addition to prohibiting marriage between free men and courtesans or actresses and between senators and freed women, it extended the latter to *equites*.

More recently, and this may be significant, some scholars continue taking as reasonable the thesis that Propertius is a historical source and, therefore, the proposition that elegy 2.7 is the only source that has survived, despite severe criticism of this thesis produced from the 1950's on. Syndikus has already warned us in this regard:

*Octavian (...) there was also one that was intended to revive the morality in marriage and family relations customary in Ancient Rome. When this law caused resentment in the totally changed society he withdrew the law, without, however, abandoning his intention forever.*³⁴

³¹ Cohen (1990, 124).

³² See Frier; McGinn (2004, 34-9).

³³ Isid. *Orig.* 5.15.1.

³⁴ Syndikus, 2006, 260.

The acceptance of the elegy as a document is grounded, according to him, in the fragile argument of his opponents:³⁵ “the arguments (...) would have to be more convincing.” Interestingly, I find it clear that it is precisely this scholar who does not present more convincing arguments. Based on Williams, Wallace - Hadrill said that the issue of laws that encouraged procreation and ensured military power is explicitly clear in the Augustan poets and, accordingly, presents as an illustration of this argument this elegy of Propertius and Horace’s Ode 3.6. However, he does not relativize the historical use of this poetic source, as we should expect from the historian.³⁶

Del Castillo also supports the hypothesis of the existence of the 28 BC law, based on an argument formulated from Dio Cassius,³⁷ who, accustomed to the imperial constitutions, would report as if the emperor legislated for himself. He, therefore, makes reference to this Augustan legal project without specifying it more clearly. He says only that Augustus had given orders that provincial governors be elected by groups, except those who had had some privilege as a result of marriage and descendants.³⁸ The difficulty in finding a truth between historical and literary sources is further complicated by legal sources, making it an increasingly difficult discussion.³⁹

Badian,⁴⁰ when dealing with this law as *a phantom law of marriage*, finds Gordon Williams and others’ arguments for the existence of a law in 28, citing a passage in Tacitus, Annals 3.25, persuasive: *Historically, serious discussion seems to have come from the direction of Tacitus and only gradually moved to*

³⁵ Kienast (1982, 137 ss.) e Beck (2000, 303-24).

³⁶ Wallace-Hadrill (2009, 251).

³⁷ DC 53.13.2.

³⁸ Del Castillo (2005, 180).

³⁹ Raditsa (1980, 280).

⁴⁰ Badian (1985, 82).

Propertius. According to the author of the *Annals*, Rome sees, in these first three years after Actium, the enactment of a series of moralizing laws:

Relatum dein de moderanda Papia Poppaea, quam senior Augustus post Iulias rogationes incitandis caelibum poenis et augendo aerario sanxerat. nec ideo coniugia et educationes liberum frequentabantur praeualida orbitate: ceterum multitudo periclitantium gliscebat, cum omnis domus delatorum interpretationibus subuerteretur, utque antehac flagitiis ita tunc legibus laborabatur. ea res admonet ut de principiis iuris et quibus modis ad hanc multitudinem infinitam ac uarietatem legum peruentum sit altius disseram.⁴¹

Tacitus continues forward:

sexto demum consulate Caesar Augustus, potentiae securus, quae triumviratu iusserat aboleuit deditque iura quis pace et principe uteremur. acriora ex eo uincla, inditi custodes et lege Papia Poppaea praemiis inducti ut, si a priuilegiis parentum cessaretur, uelut parens omnium populus uacantia teneret.⁴²

The first passage in Tacitus points to a series of actions that Octavius would have performed after their triumvirate. However, at the end of his government they had not had the desired effects, so Octavius revoked and created certain laws that would afterwards need reforms, including those that regulated celibacy and encouraged procreation. In the second passage, such actions have their historical period, since they continue into the sixth consulate. This would, therefore, be a period of reformulation of customs and the creation of laws and taxes that would have restored the moral standards of the Republic, having had the effect needed at the time, while opening the way

⁴¹ Tac., *Ann.* 3.25.

⁴² Tac., *Ann.* 3.28.

for the laws of 18 and 17 BC and 9 AD. About this historical moment, Suetonius, in turn, approves:

Leges retractavit et quasdam ex integro sanxit, ut sumptuariam et de adulteriis et de pudicitia, de ambitu, de maritandis ordinibus. hanc cum aliquanto seuerius quam ceteras emendasset, prae tumultu recusantium perferre non potuit nisi adempta demum lenitate parte poenarum et uacatione trienni data auctisque praemiis.⁴³

In this passage he leads the discussion of reforms to its reception, and therefore, to its impact. Fundamentally, the idea contained in the expression *prae tumultu recusantium* points to it. That is, certain reforms carried to term in the sixth consulate had to be revised almost immediately and, among them, the laws of marriage, celibacy and procreation. This same expression seems to me to be linked with the idea of rumour, since the biographer does not specify clearly what kind of uprising, riots or disorder they are and who effectively rejected the measures. This inaccuracy, in my view, supports the idea that Octavius' actions, not just a law, may have contributed to a rumour in Rome.

In the preface of *Ab urbe condita*, Livy, when making a reference to the moral circumstances of the Republic, sums up the period:

ad illa mihi pro se quisque acriter intendat animum, quae uita, qui mores fuerint, per quos uiros quibusque artibus domi militiaeque et partum et auctum imperium sit; labente deinde paulatim disciplina uelut desidentes primo mores sequatur animo, deinde ut magis magisque lapsi sint, tum ire coeperint praecipites, donec ad haec tempora quibus nec uitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus peruentum est.⁴⁴

⁴³ Suet., *Aug.* 34.

⁴⁴ Liv. 1 pr. 9-10.

There is, in the sentence *donec ad haec tempora quibus neuitia nostra nec remedies pati possumus peruentum est*, an interesting assessment of the late Republic and early Empire, since it reveals the general circumstances and the moral issues which concerned the social actors of the moment in Rome. It must be remembered that the first five books of Livy were published between 27-25 BC, so the preface may be dated approximately to these years. Collares, commenting on Livy's preface, says: "*the term *remedia* appears as a representation of a specific context, suggesting, as has envisaged Petersen (1961, 440), a veiled criticism to the set of reforms articulated by Octavius, especially those proposed in the year 28 BC concerning the moral precepts of marriage.*"⁴⁵ Curiously, although Livy is composing History and Propertius Elegy, both of them refer to the moral reforms with reservations, despite the fact that both had access to power. Livy identifies two opposing ideas --vices and cures for them--, noting that the Roman people can endure neither. Propertius, in his turn, is happy with the *uitia* and saddened by its end, the *remedia*. The fact is that, even if they disagree about the vices, both disapprove of the measures meant to solve them. Yet, for both authors, as in Suetonius, the reference to reforms are veiled, not explicit, ensuring once again some place to *rumour*.

Another historical source often alluded to, and which can be taken as an argument in favor of the existence of this 28 BC law, is an *aureus* coined in the same year, the sixth consulship of Octavius. The artifact refers to the *princeps*' restoration of a law and a right, but we do not know which law it is and which law was restored in this specific case. We have to consider the changes in the political system, since we are in a time of transition--the end of the triumvirate and the beginning of the Principate (*princeps senatus*). New rights ask for new laws.

⁴⁵ Collares (2010, 119-20).

The reverse of this aureus (coined in the province of Asia) is significant, since it shows us Octavius in his toga and sitting at a *curialis sella* – the official seat of the higher judiciary, the consulate – holding a *uolumen* of laws enacted by him, which is confirmed by the legend LEGES ET IVRA P[RO]P[UL]O R[OMANO] RESTITVIT ('He has restored to the People of Rome their laws and their rights'). The obverse of the coin features a typical legend, that is, IMP[ERATOR] CAESAR DIVI F[ILIVS] (Emperor Caesar son of the divine), and the date of the coin, i.e., VI COS – sixth consulate.⁴⁶ Richardson proposes a general thesis, and therefore not specific, to the context of this currency when he argues that the coin refers to a return to the old ways, marked by a series of actions – symbolic ones, in my point of view.⁴⁷ The return to normal laws and the restitution of people's rights in general (and not by a specific law of adultery) are presented to the people in a monetary form, in the formal register of legal jargon, so that purely bureaucratic and informal events that would mark the end of a regime receive a high, official tone. In a way, therefore,

⁴⁶ See Rich; Williams (1999, 169-213); Martins (2011, 139-50). Hor., *Carm.* 4.15.

⁴⁷ Richardson (2012, 85).

we may link this information to rumours, especially because the currency has a provincial coinage. When reading the term *iura*, any Roman would understand the set of rights, duties, powers, and obligations, that were related to him according to his place in the civic community,⁴⁸ the life in society returned to normal, and then his group would have again their rights guaranteed. This same use of a currency can be seen a few years earlier, when Octavius issues a series of coins with the image of a comet that was associated with deified Julius Caesar.⁴⁹ So, in this case, a planted *rumour* (b₁) became propaganda.

Badian, although asserting that *sublata lex* refers to an obsolete tax measure, and not to a “law,” as the poem suggests, concludes that, based on historiographical information, we may not say anything about the content of this legal document. In particular, it is not possible to state how the taxes were assessed for celibacy or on the absence of children. We do not know how the *uxorium aes* worked. Could any censor take it, whenever he wanted? Then, he adds: “*Propertius’ whole elaboration in that sense is mere poetic treatment: Dichtung and not Wahrheit*”. Thus, we should not expect: “an unreasonable amount of reality in poetry”. After all, he continues:

critics and historians have perhaps been guilty of doing just this: to deduce the nature and purpose of the law alluded to from its treatment by the poet is not sound method either literary or historical interpretation.⁵⁰

Finally, Galinsky, when dealing with the laws of 18 and 17 BC and AD 9, said this was a gradual process in order that they be approved, as they were approved after some stages (including the years 28 and 27, which were important). He continues to present his position on Propertius 2.7: “*Whether there was in*

⁴⁸ See Cizek (1990, 52-3).

⁴⁹ See Gurval (1997) e Pandey (2013).

⁵⁰ Badian (1985, 97-8).

fact such a law has been a matter of heated controversy (Badian vs. Williams). *There are no references to it in other writers (...). This indicates that such matters were certainly on his mind from early on.*⁵¹

Interpretation of poetic references as historical ones, in fact, can generate a double mistake: the poetic analysis is restricted, or rather, subordinated, limiting the universal, to paraphrase Aristotle in the *Poetics*,⁵² to what it was - as the historical event loses its authority when it draws upon a genre that deals with what could be.

Another biographical fact that is discussed in this elegy, is the nominal reference to Octavius in vv. 5-6 and the value judgment that the elegy may be making. As we have seen, there are a few immediate implications made by the text; however, two issues must be observed more carefully, not necessarily in this order: the direct speech that opens the couplet; and the existence or not of historical critics to Octavius through the kind of analytic treatment that should be given to a poetic-historical persona as Octavius which may be inferred from a poem.

The question of direct speech *at magnus Caesar*, despite having been sidelined by Butler, Camps, Goold, Moya y Ruiz Elvira, was discussed by Fedeli and Richardson, Jr. The latter states: “*the implication that Caesar sets out to outdo Jupiter in these matters is light and deft. The speaker is still the poet; he is simply quoting a catch phrase that lent itself to quotation with either admiration or irony.*”⁵³ In this case, it is interesting to associate this direct speech to the concept of *rumour* that I mentioned before. Whether the statement can be read as an ironic or admiring quotation, in both cases, it may just be a *rumour*, reflecting current political opinion. In turn, Fedeli says: “*Properzio prevede una facile obiezione da parte di un interlocutore*

⁵¹ Galinsky (1996, 131).

⁵² Arist, *Poet.* 1451a to 1452a.

⁵³ Richardson, Jr (2006, 231)

*fittizio (non certo da parte de Cinzia, che mal ci s'immagina impegnata in una discussione sui massimi sistemi) ...*⁵⁴ The same argument can be associated with Fedeli's statement, introducing a fictional character to this party, which does not preclude, of course, the character of rumour.

Boucher, in turn, reaffirms the biographical-referential interpretation of Roman elegy: "*mais il reste un point où Properce s'est opposé au prince de façon visible et indiscutable; celui de la reform des moeurs. Pour rester l'amant of Cynthie refuse il le mariage et la paternité, il refuse to donner des soldats à sa patrie.*"⁵⁵ Stahl also has a contrary position: "*this (...) does not (yet) change Propertius 'stand (as expressed in 2.7) against authoritarian interference with his personal and poetic sphere to the pro-Augustan position'*".⁵⁶ Both Stahl's and Boucher's views endorse biographical readings, support the invariance of types or genres of discourse, poetry or prose, undermine the detail of specific textualities of poetic discourse, giving it possibilities that were not foreseen and removing from it its fictional character.

Gale notes that there are a variety of interpretations of 2.7 --both pro- and anti-Augustan.⁵⁷ Thus, pro-Augustan readings, as Cairns' (2007), and anti-Augustan, as Lyne's (1980) and Stahl's (1985), are controversial. Gale finds attractiveness and weaknesses in both, for example, arguing that this poem shares general and strategic errors in the treatment of *militia amoris*. The poet, according to her, is neither in favor nor against Augustus, for he is interested in presenting ambivalence to the reader. We are asked to decide which parts are sincere:

The literary and political (or ideological) levels of meaning are not separable, and we should not simply

⁵⁴ Fedeli (2005, 228).

⁵⁵ Boucher (1980, 135).

⁵⁶ Stahl (1985, 162).

⁵⁷ Gale (1997, 78-9).

dismiss Propertius' use of the *militia amoris*, and his anti-establishment stance more generally, as literary conventions. On the other hand, the very overt 'literariness' of elegy opens up levels of irony which make it impossible (or at least inadequate) to regard the poet as offering us a straightforward ideological program or political message.⁵⁸

Dealing with the general issue involving the relationship between writers and the princeps, Heyworth contributes much when pointing to an argument about the Ovidian text and its modern reception. He says that, while an ancient poet could not have total control over the reception of his texts, it does not mean that he has written it without any specific intention. He also informs us that, in his attempt to rebuild the sense of several poems by Propertius, he assumes that they were originally written by a single individual, whose character and attitudes had a consistency and unity similar to what we experience within ourselves, either through personal knowledge or by other means. His poetry expresses a façade and an identity with a name, Propertius. The attitudes of this *persona* are soon established initially, leading us to interpret whatever he wrote from the perspective of an elegiac lover.⁵⁹

A possible relationship between the *princeps*, the elegiac poet and the *Leges Iuliae* is presented by Della Corte. First, it is shown that the main feature of these laws is to treat celibacy, that is, the singleness of Roman citizens. It states that if the single man did not marry because of a desire for chastity, there would be nothing wrong. However, many of them did so in order to have a concubine *per sfogare così la propria immonda libidine*, hindering the country's ability to survive in the future. In this sense, the laws of moral austerity, before worrying about morality, were founded on population growth. Hence, one of its precepts was to reduce the marriageable age of *puellae*. Augustus

⁵⁸ Gale, 1997, 91).

⁵⁹ Heyworth (2007a, 94-5).

was actually worried as *pochi intendessero sposarsi and pochissimi volessero mettere figli al mondo*.⁶⁰ It is precisely these men, or at least the image of these young people to which the elegiac lover refers and, hence, by similarity, to the elegiac poet himself. It is around these elements that Della Corte mistakenly proposes that the Roman elegiac poets refused the *cursus honorum* and the subsequent military involvement and declared themselves pacifists. They also endured infamy while continuing to live next to their own *dona* or *puella*.

The fact that Gale's statement somehow considers the position of Cairns does not make it less reasonable; however, her second position is closer to mine. For, I start from the premise that we must reject the tacit assumption underlying many interpretations-- that Propertius' poems are equivalent to, or at least can be equated with confessional statements, with a journal, or even with a communicative practice of single recipient - therefore, absolutely personal and real. Rather, the elegy is directed to a wider audience than their nominal recipients - all very well constructed - and it is necessary for the poet to adopt and adapt its elegiac persona to the appropriate set of elegiac conventions, assuming specific *res* and *uerba*. It is precisely in this sense that Cairns proposes a constructed persona, adapted to the preconditions of his own speech.⁶¹ This *persona*, completely built from the first book, maintains a clear relationship with Augustus.

If there is an explicitly ethical construction around the elegiac self, despite the nominal identification, and, therefore,

⁶⁰ Della Corte (1982, 540-2).

⁶¹ Cairns (2006, 322): his solution was to depict himself as an unhappy lover of an 'antisocial' cast, disliking war, reluctant to marry, and generally shirking civic obligations. Johnson (2014, 43): The Propertian lover is not a husband and not a father, nor is he cursed with that patriarchal temper, so revered in the past, one of whose chief obligations is to keep control of one's women (wives, daughters, concubines). Rather, he is - or pretends to be - not the master of his mistress but her slave, and that voluntary (and unreal) slavery allows him to claim that he has liberated himself from the stern voices of the implacable fathers.

historical construction, one has to understand Propertius as a hybrid and liminal figure, whose way of being simultaneously embraces two different worlds: the *rumour* and the reality, without either one moving away from the verisimilar at any time. It seems to me that the other equally historical figures, which are targets of the elegiac texts, such as Gallus, Ponticus, Maecenas, Caesar, or Tullus, undergo the same process of composition. So, the essentially poetic mechanism, in this sense, takes advantage of the given framework, i.e., the historical *nomen*, and applies to it elegiac colors and flavors – be they lyrical, satirical, epistolary, epic, etc. Even though Maecenas and Augustus are present in the elegy as historical characters, or historically guided, their *être* presents themselves as contaminated, so to speak, by generic fictionality of the elegy itself and this fictionality is recognized by the audience, at least since Catullus. Octavius, being part of that cultured and literate reception, recognizes «his elegiac role,» and is aware of the general dimension of this kind of poetry. He realizes the distinction between the *princeps* who proposes to carry out the moral reforms in the future (after Actium) and the rebellious young lovers accustomed to the elegiac *demi-monde*, who opposed the reform and participated in the *rumores* surrounding the moralization of Rome.

The politicization of the elegiac poets as pro-Augustan or anti-Augustan, therefore, is a mistake because, I believe, the presence of historical facts and characters does not endorse this genre as concrete and real testimony. The most we can ask of this genre as a source of concrete evidence is to treat them as *rumores*, that is, conjectural evidence as presented in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*⁶² and referenced, for example, in practical perspective by Cicero in *Pro Caelio*.⁶³ Soon, any opinions proposed in elegies in relation to an Augustan policy should not refer poetic ego

⁶² *Her.* 2.11.

⁶³ See Dufallo (2000, 121) and Fear (2005, 14-7).

utterance as for or against someone. But this selection must be made by text reception, reaffirming what Monica Gale said, as we have seen.

Thus answering the questions that I proposed, we understand that referential information of historical events presented in this elegy should be approached carefully and with attention, as they are not supported by positive historical sources. Such an idea may only be considered as something credibly founded in *rumour* which, as we have seen, can be of service to a dominant group (b_1), or, otherwise, occur spontaneously as explanation of public opinion or latent opinion (b_2). In the specific case of the law presented as a motivator of happy and unhappy conditions of the *poeticae personae*, *Cynthia* and *Propertius*, even if it is clear that, in Octavius's political objectives after 31 BC., there is an intention of restoring Republican moral values, it is certain that there are also not any record of laws that condemn adultery and, at the same time, encourage procreation, such as the Julian laws of 17 and 18 BC, or even the *Papia Poppea* of 9 AD, with the exception of a coin which prevents us from confirming any data regarding these laws or rights stated in the legend *Leges et Iura restituit*.

So, when using elegiac poetry as a historical source, we may understand that disagreement over Octavius's project of moralization does not enjoy unanimous support among citizens, while Elegy represents a credible opposition in the form of the elegiac *personae* in Rome. It also reveals a potential public opinion about Augustan moral policies in the years that follow Actium.

The second aspect to which supposedly we have access in the elegy would be Propertius' anti-Augustan position – when he proposes two peremptory statements: a) The denial of a supreme power to Caesar, saying that he has no power over love and b) The *recusatio* of children to add to the legions of Rome. Although consider Octavius an unquestionable historical

figure and not merely a poetic character, the genre makes certain demands. For example, the *Persona* Octavius must, because of the genre, favor the expansion of the empire, while Propertius and Cynthia should be against the actions that separate the lovers under the government. This opposition does not reflect, therefore, Propertius' actual opposition regarding Octavius, but it is a scenario necessary to the elegiac genre.

We must also remember that *recusatio* was more than a simple assumption of callimachean style. It was part of the social theater of Rome in the period. The social actors are, therefore, willing to produce their *recusationes*, even if under the power of the princeps. Augustus himself, well exemplified by Freudenburg, was fruitful in *recusationes* - *imperii recusatio* - that could safely be read along with the *recusationes* by poets of literary circles close to him. The proposition undermines Propertius's anti-augustan position, since it was a procedure widely used by Augustus. In this sense, Octavius is fully aware of the poetic conventions inherent to the genre.

The third issue to be taken up, in conclusion, is the role of most poetry, including Roman erotic elegy, as a reflection of historical and cultural circumstances. We must always keep in mind that poetry is not the genre that serves historical record -- other genres have been formulated for this purpose. This seems to have been surpassed at least since Aristotle's *Poetics*, as we have seen. However, it is undeniable that ancient poetry is full of social and cultural characteristics suited to an ideal reader's opinions and lifestyle. This ideal reader acts as enunciator, receiver and its first translator, so to speak/in a sense. It is this necessary and privileged interpreter, whom the elegy of Propertius, therefore, addresses in the voice of the a type of man who is fully immersed in the present state of affairs. That is, his lifestyle is reflected by the elegiac lover and, accordingly, any measures that may oppose his *modus uiuendi* will be resisted (?).

Propertius 2.7 represents this particular vision, not as accurate historical record of an event, but as a believable perspective that may be important for us to understand. Treating Propertius 2.7 as a particular way of seeing the world allows us to study the Roman world not as a monolithic block, but as a sum of characteristics including loving untruths that run into everyday truths, producing a border genre.

References

- Allen, A. W. 1950. 'Sincerity' and the Roman Elegists. In: CPh, 45, 3, 145-60. [<http://www.jstor.org/stable/266153>]
- Allport, G. W.; Postman, L. 1946-7. *An Analysis of Rumor*. In: The Public Opinion Quarterly, 10, 4, 501-517. [DOI: 10.1093/poq/10.4.501]
- Badian, E. 1985. *A Phanton Marriage Law*. In: Philologus, 129, 82-98. [DOI: 10.1524/phil.1985.129.12.82]
- Beck, M. 2000. *Properzens Elegie 2, 7 und die augusteische Gesetzgebung*. In: Philologus, 144, 303-24. [DOI: 10.1524/phil.2000.144.2.303]
- Bettini, M. 2008. *Weighty Words, Suspect Speech: Fari in Roman Culture*. In: Arethusa, 41, 2, 313-375. [DOI: 10.1353/are.0.0000].
- Bordia, P.; Di Fonzo, N.. 2004. *Problem Solving in Social Interactions on the Internet: Rumor as Social Cognition*. In: Social Psychology Quarterly, 67, 1, 33-49. [DOI: 10.1177/2F019027250406700105]
- Boucher, J.-P. 1965, 1980. *Études sur Properce. Problèmes d'Inspiration e d'Art*. 2^a ed. Paris: Éditions E. de Boccard.
- Bowditch, L. 2009. *Palatine Apollo And The Imperial Gaze: Propertius 2.31 and 2.32*. In: AJPh, 130, 3, 401-438. [DOI: 10.1353/ajp.0.0064]
- Butler, H. E. 1905. *Sexti Properti Oera Omnia with a Commentary*. London: Archibald Constable & CO. LTD.
- Cairns, F. 1979. *Propertius on Augustus' Marriage Law (II, 7)*. In: Cairns, F.. 2007. *Papers on Roman Elegy (1969-2003)*. Bologna: Eikasmos, Patron Editore: 141-55. [=Grazer Beiträge 8, (1979):185-204].
- _____. 2006. *Sextus Propertius. The Augustan Elegist*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Cohen, D. 1991. *The Augustan Law on Adultery*. In: Kertzer, D. I.; Saller, R. P., eds. 1991. *The Family in Italy. From Antiquity To The Present*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 109-126.
- Camps, W. A. 1966. *Propertius Elegies Book II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Collares, M. A. 2010. *Representações do Senado Romano na Ab urbe Condita de Tito Lívio. Livros 21-30*. São Paulo: Cultura Acadêmica Editora
- Cizek, E. 1990. *Mentalités et institutions politiques romaines*. Paris: Fayart
- Della Corte, F. 1982. *Le Leges Iuliae e l'elegia romana*. In: ANRW, II.30, 1, 539-558
- Del Castillo, A. 2005. "En Torno a la Problemática sobre la Condición Jurídica de Cynthia, Musa de Propertio" In: Ibañez, J. M^a. N. (2005). *Estudios sobre la Mujer en la Cultura Griega y Latina*. León: Universidad de León: 179-91.
- Dufallo, B. 2001. *Appius' Indignation: Gossip, Tradition, and Performance in Republican Rome*. In: TAPhA, 131, 119-142. [DOI: 10.1353/apa.2001.0005]
- Fear, T. 2005. *Propertian Closure*. In: Ancona, R.; Greene, E., eds. 2005. *Gendered Dynamics in Latin Love Poetry*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 13-40.
- Fedeli, P. 1984. *Sexti Properti Elegiarum Libri IV*. Edidit Paulo Fedeli. Studigardiae: in Aedibus B. G. Teubneri.
- _____. 2005. *Properzio Elegie Libro II*. Introduzione, testo e Commento. Cambridge: Francis Cairns.
- Freudenburg, K. 2014. *Recusatio as Political Theatre: Horace's Letter to Augustus*. In: JRS, 104, 1-28. DOI: <<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S007543581300124X>>.
- Frier B. W.; McGinn, T. A. J. 2004. *A casebook on Roman family law* (Classical resources series / American Philological Association; no. 5). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gale, M.R. 1997. *Propertius 2.7: Militia Amoris and the Ironies of Elegy* in JRS, 87: 77-91. [DOI: 10.2307/301370]
- Galinsky, K. 1969. *The Triumph Theme in Augustan Elegy*. In: WS 82, 75-107.
- _____. 1996. *Augustan Culture*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Giardina, G. 2010. *Elegie. Properzio*. Pisa & Roma: Fabrizio Serra Editore.
- Goddard, E. H. 1923. *Propertius, Cynthia, and Augustus*. In: CR 37,7-8, 153-6. [DOI: 10.1017/S0009840X00085152]
- Goold, G. P. 1990. *Propertius Elegies*. Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard University Press.
- Gontijo Flores, G. 2014. *Elegias de Sexto Propércio*. Belo Horizonte: Autêntica.
- Gurval, R. A. 1997. *Caesar's Comet: The Politics and Poetics of an Augustan Myth*. In: MAAR, 42, 39-71. [<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4238747>]
- Heyworth, S. J. 2007a. *Propertius, Patronage and Politics*. In: BICS 50: 93-128. [DOI: 10.1111/j.2041-5370.200.tb00266.x]
- _____. 2007b. *Sexti Properti Elegos*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- _____. 2007c. *Cynthia. A Companion to the Text of Propertius*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Johnson, W. R. 2012. *Propertius*. In: Gold, B. K., ed. *A Companion to Roman Love Elegy*. Malden: Wiley & Blackwell: 39-52.
- Kienast, D. 1982. *Augustus. Princeps und Monarch*. Darmstadt: Philipp von Zabern.
- Laurence, R. 1994. *Rumour and Communication in Roman Politics*. In: G&R, 41, 1, 62-74. [DOI: 10.1017/S0017383500023214]
- Lyne, R.O. A. M. 1980. *The Latin Love Poets from Catullus to Horace*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Martins, P. 2009. *Elegia Romana. Construção e Efeito*. São Paulo: Humanitas. [DOI:10.13140/2.1.3644.9605]
- _____. 2011a. *Breve história da crítica da Literatura Latina* in *Classica (Brasil)* 21, 2, 189-204.
- _____. 2011b. *Imagem e Poder. Considerações sobre a Representação de Otávio Augusto*. São Paulo: EDUSP. [DOI: 10.13140/2.1.3959.5844]
- _____. 2015a. *O jogo elegíaco: fronteiras entre a cultura intelectual e a ficção poética*. In: *Nuntius Antiquus*, 11, 1, 137-172 [DOI: 10.17851/1983-3636.11.1.137-172]
- _____. 2015b. *Sobre a metapoesia em Propércio e na poesia erótica romana: o poeta rufião*, *Classica (Brasil)*, 28, 1, 125-159
- Moya, F.; Ruiz de Elvira, A.. 2001. *Propércio Elegias*. Introducción, Traducción y Notas (Fedeli, 1984 com alterações). Madrid: Cátedra.

- Nascimento, A. A.; Pimentel, M. C.; Alberto, P. F.; Segurado e Campos, J. A.. 2002. *Propércio Elegias*. Texto Latino e Introdução de Paolo Fedeli. Assis e Lisboa: Accademia Properziana del Subasio e Centro de Estudos Clássicos da Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa.
- Nisbet, R. G. M.. 1992. *The Orator And The Reader: Manipulation and Response in Cicero's Fifth Verrine*. Woodman, T.; Powell, J.. *Author and audience in Latin literature*, 1-17.
- Pandey, N. B. . 2013. *Caesar's Comet, the Julian Star, and the Invention of Augustus*. In: TAPhA, 143, 405-449.
- Petersen, H..1961. *Livy and Augustus*. In: TPAPhA, 92, 440-452.
- Peterson, W. A.; Gist, G. P. 1951. *Rumor and Public Opinion*. In: American Journal of Sociology, 57, 2, 159-167. [DOI:10.1086/220916]
- Raditsa, L. F. 1980. *Augustus' Legislation Concerning Marriage, Procreation, Love Affairs and Adultery*. In: ANRW, 2, 13, 278-339.
- Rich, J.; Williams, J. H. C.. 1999. *LEGES ET IVRA P.R. RESTITVIT. A new aureus of Octavian and the Settlement of 28-27 B.C.*. In: Numismatic Chronicle, 5, 159, 169-213.
- Richardson, J. S.. 2012. *Augustan Rome. 44 BC to 14 AD*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Richardson, Jr., L.. 1977. *Propertius Elegies I-IV*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press & American Philological Association.
- Rosnow, R. L.; Kimmel, A. J.. 2000. *Rumor* in *Encyclopedia of Psychology*, Vol. 7, edited by Alan E. Kazdin. New York: Oxford University Press: 122-23.
- Shackleton Baley, D. R.. 1956. *Propertiana*. Cambridge: At The University Press.
- Sindikus, H. P.. 2006. *The second Book* in Günther, H.-Ch., ed. 2006. *Brill's Companion to Propertius*. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 246-318.
- Smith, W.. 1875. *A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities*. London: John Murray.
- Stahl, H.-P.. 1985. *Propertius: Love and War. Individual and State Under Augustus*. Berkeley: University California Press.
- Veyne, P.. 1983. *L'élegie érotique romaine*. Paris: Le Seuil.
- _____. 1985. *A Elegia Erótica Romana. O Amor, a Poesia e o Ocidente*. São Paulo: Brasiliense.

- Viarre, S. 2005. *Properce Élégies*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
- Wallace-Hadrill, A.. 2009. *Family and Inheritance in the Augustan Marriage Laws*. In: Edmondson, J.. 2009. *Augustus*. Edinburgh Readings on Ancient World. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press. [=PCPhS, 27 (1981): 58-80.]
- Williams, G.. 1962. *Poetry in the Moral Climate of Augustan Rome*. In: JRS, 52, 28-46. [DOI: 10.2307/297875]
- Wyke, M.. 1989. *Mistress as Metaphor in Augustan Elegy*. In: Helios 16, 25-47.
- . 1989b. *In pursuit of love, the poetic self and a process of reading: Augustan elegy in the 1980s*. In: JRS, 79, 167-8. [DOI: 10.2307/301188]