CHANGES IN THE EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT POLICY AFTER 2020

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the changes that will take place in the development policy of the European Union after 2020 from the perspective of the Visegrád Group states. The article begins from a short description of the systems of development cooperation among the four states of the Visegrád Group. The analysed elements are i.a.: evolution of engagement of V4 states in development cooperation and assumptions of their assistance programmes, particularly the assisted sectors and countries. Through the above, the author indicates that the V4 states have a similar historical experience of their cooperation with developing countries and their development programmes have similar characteristics (for example, the assistance level, supported sectors and countries) and problems, i.a. in execution of their international obligations. As a result, the V4 states are not in the centre of the debate on development assistance. The next part of the article analyses the conditions of development policies, indicating both changes in the international environment of the European Union, such as the increasing differentiation among the developing countries, growth of the position of BRIC countries or adoption of the new development agenda, and also the changes that have occurred within the European Union itself, including i.a.: institutional changes and Brexit. The above constitutes the basis for the analysis of potential changes in the development policy of the European Union after 2020. The paper ends with an analysis of the challenges faced by the V4 states on their way to effective participation in international development cooperation.

membership of the European Union than a conscious political decision. The rapid increase in expenditure for ODA was continued until 2008. After that year, the V4 countries decreased their assistance due to the economic crisis. In spite of the relatively high dynamic of the nominal growth, the relation of ODA to DNB is still small, amounting to between 0.11% and 0.13% (the average for DAC OECD countries is 0.31%). It is worth mentioning that over 70% of the development aid of V4 is transferred via international organizations, mainly the European Union. Ethiopia. This group also includes many countries with which V4 had cooperated before 1989 within the frames of Comecon (Jankowski, 2015: 131-132;Szent-Iványi: 4 Africa has never played a significant role in the V4 foreign policy and therefore it is usually excluded from assistance programmes. In spite of many promises and declarations, aid for Africa has never gone beyond rhetoric. This situation is a result of a lack of political, historical and economic ties with that region (Kopiński, 2011: 8-10;Lightfoot, 2008: 135).
However, some improvement within that scope should be noted, as for example in recent years the assistance provided by Poland to Africa has increased from USD 2.6 M in 2010 to USD 80.3 M in 2016.
There is a rather distant relation between the list of priority countries and those which receive most of the bilateral aid. The majority of the assistance is provided to states which fail to comply with democratic standards and which have an average level of development due to political and economic reasons. The assistance provided by the V4 countries is fragmented, less effective and visible due to the fact that the support is granted to dozens of countries each year. Consequently, many states receive aid of barely several thousands of dollars. It is mainly a result of the lack of cohesion among the targets of economic diplomacy promoted by the ministries of economy and the targets of foreign policy specified by the ministries of foreign affairs (Jankowski, 2015: 132-134). Development assistance is considered to be a means of foreign policy for the creation of a positive image of donors, introducing stability and regional security, supporting democratization in the region, gaining favour of local elites and stimulating economic contacts (Olsen, 2005: 594;Szent-Iványi: 5).
The V4 countries also have a similar sector strategy. In spite of the relatively many declared subject priorities, the development cooperation programmes of V4 reserve a special role for the areas of democratization, human rights and system transformation. The abovementioned areas are especially visible in supporting the partners in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Choosing them derives from the confidence of having a unique experience of political and economic transformation initiated after 1989 and therefore having an advantage over other donors. This confidence was enhanced after the Arab Spring, when the V4 countries offered their assistance to the states of Northern Africa. For example, Poland claimed Libya and Tunisia to be priority countries (Kugiel, 2012: 106-109

The changing context of development cooperation of the European Union
While making assumptions for its development policy, the European Union must take into account numerous changes that have appeared in its environment, especially in the world economy, international relations, global problems and within itself. Those factors indicate the conditions for the functioning of development assistance of the European Union, especially the challenges it will face.  (Lundsgaarde, 2012: 706). In 2030, the states of the South will represent 70% of the world consumption and 80% of its middleclass. As a result of that, the development assistance plays a less and less important role in stimulating their economies, as its amount is smaller than other flows of capital, such as foreign direct investments and money sent by migrants (Odén and Wohlgemuth, 2015: 2-3). It is becoming necessary to adjust the means of cooperation and their diversity to new needs of developing countries, taking into consideration their social and economic conditions. Due to that, the discussion on the future of development cooperation concentrates on measures beyond the traditional development assistance, for example the stimulation of investments, trade etc. (Janus, Klingebiel and Paulo, 2014: 1).
On the other hand, many developing countries struggle against ferocious internal conflicts, political and economic instability. Poverty is one of the sources of threat to international security as it stimulates the radicalization of societies, generates terrorism, internal conflicts and migration. Consequently, the European Union must take into consideration the decrease in the security level, especially in its vicinity, in North Africa and the Middle East. Development assistance may be a precious measure for solving those problems. Development and security are strictly related to each other. It is claimed that security is a necessary condition of economic development (Bossuyt and Sherriff, 2017: 1).
That Another aspect worth mentioning is the economic crisis that affected the eurozone. It is an important factor limiting the ambition of the European Union within the frames of executing its international role and position. The above-mentioned challenges and ambitious goals require significant financial spending. At the same time, as a result of the economic crisis, the majority of member states tend to cut their expenditure, also in the area of development policy. It has repeatedly been a serious problem. For example, while working on the 11 th European Development Fund, the European Commission presented a number of proposals for increasing assistance, but none of them was accepted by the member states and most them pressed for decreasing EU expenditure. In their letter to President Barosso, the leaders of Great Britain, Germany, France, Holland and Finland underlined that "The challenge for the European Union in the coming years will not be to spend more, but to spend better" (Kilnes, 2012: 2). Apart from the level of development assistance, it is important how it is distributed.

Potential directions of change in
Currently, the instruments for financing external actions are seen as complicated and timeconsuming in management. Critics underline that the current external actions, including development cooperation, lack a strategic approach. The purpose of the reform of financial instruments should be their simplification, including a reduction in their numbers, which will allow for an increase in assistance efficiency and effectiveness (Di Ciommo, Sherriff and Bossuyt, 2017: 3-7). The new instruments should focus on executing long-distance goals such as liquidation of poverty, sustainable development or supporting democratic governments and human rights.
That is why it is recommended to establish an instrument whose expenditure would be fully qualified as ODA and a separate instrument for humanitarian aid. The purpose of the new instrument should be to support the execution of sustainable development goals (CONCORD, 2017: 8;Di Ciommo, Sherriff and Bossuyt, 2017: 7;OXFAM, 2018: 5-6, 11-12 It is necessary to increase the effectiveness and flexibility of the measures used. Some experience in this matter is provided by the currently used fiduciary funds and financial instruments combining public and private means. However, the development assistance itself is insufficient and, therefore, it is crucial to prompt the activity of private and business The European Commission consequently decreases its support for the donees classified among the countries of middle and higher income. Part of the observers even claim that in the longer perspective it is possible that the financial assistance is completely cancelled for some developing countries (Herrero, et. al., 2015: 19). At the same time, the European Union adopted a number of regional (for example concerning the Caribbean and the Pacific regions) and subregional (for example: Horn of Africa, Sahel) strategies setting the rules of cooperation, including development cooperation (Carbone, 2013: 750). The negative consequences of that action must also be taken into consideration. Critics of the new development policy of the EU indicate their inadequateness. In accordance with the criteria developed by the World Bank, 81% of poor people live in countries with a medium income.
In spite of relatively good economic rates, many of those countries are vulnerable to disruptions. The least developed countries in turn usually have no efficiency and capacity to effectively use the measures, which can limit the effectiveness of assistance. Consequently, in spite of the declared pursue to liquidate poverty, that goal may be reached only in part (Herbert, 2012: 8-10;Markova, 2013: 11).
Cooperation between the European Union and the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific will be subject to change. Official negotiations concerning the future of cooperation will begin in August 2018. The communication of 2016 presents possible options for cooperation and preferences towards them. The first likely scenario assumes resigning from signing a new agreement and further cooperation with ACP states in the present form.
In such a case, the relations with ACP as a whole would be substituted with more effective cooperation with particular regional groups or concentrate on selected matters or the countries in biggest need. The second scenario involves prolonging the Cotonou Agreement after its review and update. That option of cooperation will not ensure the necessary cohesion and will not take advantage of the growing regionalism in the ACP states. The last cooperation scenario assumes signing a framework agreement with a whole group of ACP states and detail agreements with single regions. The framework agreement would set general assumptions and goals of cooperation, while the regional agreements would include specific provisions related to political, economic and development cooperation, adjusting to the needs and characteristics of each region (JOIN(2016) 52 final: 29-30; Kugiel and Wnukowski,

Summary: challenges and opportunities for V4 countries
Changes within international development cooperation, especially those related to the policy of the European Union, create a number of challenges for the states of the Visegrád Group. One of the possible answers to them is the preservation of the present development policy in an unchanged form. In spite of the declared will to execute the goals of sustainable development, the V4 states are not obliged to actually do so. Lack of execution does not cause any negative legal consequences, as the international obligations related to development cooperation are soft law only. These would not be the first not executed declarations of the V4 states on development assistance (for example: the obligation on the level of assistance). On the one hand, it would allow for further use of development assistance for own political and economic reasons related to Eastern Europe and the Balkans and some financial savings due to the lack of need to increase the assistance level. Such an option would surely mean the marginalization of the V4 in the matter, being one of the key elements of international relations. It would particularly have a negative impact on the image of the V4 and its position in the European Union, for which development assistance is one of the most important elements of foreign policy. It would also deteriorate contacts between the V4 and developing countries. Lack of solidarity with developing countries and neutrality towards the efforts of the European Union would also make it difficult to convince Western European states to more intensively engage in V4 projects, for example within the Eastern Partnership. Therefore, the more probable decision is the one of wider engagement in the execution of the new development agenda (Kugiel, 2015: 2). Such a scenario forces the introduction of a number of changes, for which the V4 countries do not seem to be ready.
Undoubtedly one of the biggest challenges faced by the V4 is the lack of political will, which limits both activities and financial resources. Political elites perceive development cooperation more as an unwanted obligation deriving from membership of the EU, OECD or other international organizations, than as an independent instrument of the state's foreign policy. This results in international cooperation being of secondary importance to the foreign policy of the V4. Lack of political will limits social awareness, causes little engagement of the civic society and lack of knowledge on threats deriving from global problems i.a. poverty or climate change. The public opinion of the V4 still sees their countries as poor and struggling against a number of economic and social problems.
Consequently, politicians do not risk any decision on leading a more intensive development policy as they are afraid of the negative reaction of society. Lack of political will entails lack of knowledge and administrative capacity. The V4 personnel working on the execution of the development cooperation policy is incomparably smaller than the one in Western European countries. Its shortage is deepened by the high level of staff rotation. Consequently, there is lack of experience, knowledge and institutional memory (Lightfoot, 2008: 130-131;Szent-Iványi and Tétényi, 2013: 829).
The V4 (Jankowski, 2015: 75;Kugiel, 2012: 116). It must also be considered that developing countries might not be interested in economic and political transformation. Third of all, there is no evidence that sharing transformation experience is effective. Ondrej Horky uses the word "myth" to describe it. The concept of system transformation is more an element of rhetoric covering real national interests (Horký, 2012: 27 are their priority, they are in fact practically marginalized (Zajączkowski, 2013b: 4-5). An increase in diplomatic activity of the V4 in Africa is an opportunity to reverse that tendency.
It might be gained with bilateral meetings and the adoption of activation programmes for trade, for example Polish "GoAfrica" and Hungarian "Opening to the South" (Cibian, 2017: 12 Only by active participation in works on the reform of the policy and its execution after 2020 will the V4 be able to really create the policy of the European Union. The creation of a common assistance programme of the V4 is a chance to overcome some of the above-mentioned problems. Wider cooperation would result in V4 actions being more effective and the V4 position stronger (Zajączkowski, 2013b: 4). V4 countries can be inspired by the Scandinavian Nordic+ programme and the Visegrad 4-Eastern Partnership Programme (V4EaP) launched by the International Visegrad Fund. Execution of common actions can be held by lack of mutual trust, particularly the reluctance of some V4 countries towards the Polish ambition to be the leader of the group (Kugiel, 2012: 114-115, 118).