¹ From Holsti, Ole R. and Rosenau, James N., “Vietnam, Consensus, and the/Belief Systems of American Leaders,” World Politics, XXXII (October 1979), 1–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² Jervis, Robert, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976)Google Scholar, chap. 6.

³ Iukhanov, Iu., “Pobeda V'etnama” [Victory of Vietnam], Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia (May 1973), p. 28.Google Scholar

⁴ Kennan, , “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, xxv (July 1947), 566–82Google Scholar; it has been republished in many places, for instance, Gati, Charles, ed., Caging the Bear: Containment and the Cold War (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), 9–20.Google Scholar

⁵ Steinbruner, John, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).Google Scholar

⁶ See Dallin, Alexander, “Soviet Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: A Framework for Analysis,” in Hoffmann, Erik P. and Fleron, Frederic J., eds., The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (Hawthorne, N.Y.: Aldine, 1980), 36–49.Google Scholar

⁷ For examples emphasizing the geopolitical basis of Soviet actions, see Hedrick Smith, “Russia's Power Strategy: Reflections on Afghanistan,” ibid., 737–47, and Kenneth Maxwell, “A New Scramble for Africa,” ibid., 515–34. The theme of continuity is well argued by Gati, Charles, “The Stalinist Legacy in Soviet Foreign Policy,”in Cohen, Stephen F. and others, eds., The Soviet Union Since Stalin (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980).Google Scholar Another example in this vein is Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr, “Mis conceptions about Russia Are a Threat to America,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 58 (Aprils 1980), 797–834.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸ Sometimes, of course, differences in the Soviet press are so transparent as to satisfy any inter-ocular strike test. Note, for instance, the following passages: “The Americans are now strenuously emphasizing that they did their best to talk their Chinese friends out of extensive military operations on the border with Vietnam. That is probably so. For the Americans realized that China's attack on Vietnam, particularly after Deng Xiaoping's visit, would place Washington and all Western appeasers of China in an extremely ambiguous and politically vulnerable position” (Bovin, A., Izvestia, February 20, 1979Google Scholar; emphasis added). “Having completed its military preparations, the Beijing leadership endeavored to secure political support for its aggression from the United Stares. The American capital alleges that these endeavors were unsuccessful and that the Americans tried to persuade Beijing not to attack Vietnam. But not even the U.S. press believes this.” (Col. Leontiev, A., Krasnaia zvezda, February 21, 1979Google Scholar; emphasis added.)

⁹ The newspapers were coded from December 13, 1972 to February 28, 1973. The journals were covered for a comparable period as defined by the rule that the article must have been signed to press on or after December 13, 1972, and it must have been prepared for printing before February 28, 1973.

¹⁰ If the oversights of the two coders had not been correlated, we would have identified 98% of the lessons: the second coder would have found 86% of the lessons missed by the first coder, or a total of .86 + (.86 × .14) = .98. A more realistic estimate would allow for the fact that the oversights are probably correlated. Conservatively, one may estimate that the second coder would find at least half of the lessons missed by the first coder; this would produce a total of 93% or 96%.

¹¹ An interesting exception was that practically no mention was made of China during this period. Only two statements were encountered that could be called lessons about China (Appendix, 4-A).

¹² Pravda, January 31, 1973.

¹³ Mikheev, Iu., “Istoricheskoe znachenie prekrashcheniia voiny vo V'etname” [The Historical Significance of the End of the War in Vietnam], SShA (April 1973), II.Google Scholar

¹⁴ The best brief discussion of right and left in Soviet foreign policy is Dallin (fn. 6), on which the above paragraph draws heavily.

¹⁵ We decided not to include one lesson of this type on the scale, because it was used so often by all media as to be almost entirely ritualistic—that Vietnam won because of its will and courage (I-A-2). We did, however, compute the scale with and without I-A-2. No major differences in interpretation result.

¹⁸ During the period surveyed, the journals carried no articles that cited lessons of Vietnam by foreigners.

¹⁹ Holsti and Rosenau (fn. 1), 14–17. Two collections on the American lessons of Vietnam, are Lake, Anthony, The Vietnam Legacy (New York: New York University Press, 1976)Google Scholar, and Thompson, W. Scott and Frizzell, Donaldson D., eds., The Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Crane, Russak, 1976).Google Scholar

²⁰ Holsti and Rosenau (fn. 1).

²¹ For instance, the articles by Kudriavtsev, V. in Izvestia, February 1 and 5, 1973.Google Scholar

²² Spechler, , Domestic Influence on Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington: University Press of America, 1978), 5.Google Scholar

²³ Pipes, Richard, “Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nucleai War,” Commentary, Vol. 64 (July 1977), 21–34.Google Scholar

²⁴ For the most strident statement of this genre, see Solzhenitsyn (fn. 7).

²⁵ A good example of a view of Soviet-American interactions that emphasizes mirror-image responses to external events is Garrison, William and Modigliani, André, Un tangling the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).Google Scholar

²⁶ In addition, the thinking exemplified by the two citations of a reverse domino theory (Appendix, 6-E)—one example of a mirror image—may also have added to the arguments for intervention.

²⁷ Krasnaia zvezda, December 19, 1972, p. 3.