¹ See generally Jagat S. Mehta, The Indus Water Treaty: A Case Study in the Resolution of an International River Basin-Conflict, 12 Nat. Resources F. 69 (1988); Asit K. Biswas, Indus Water Treaty: The Negotiating Process, 17 Water Int’l 201 (1992).

² See G. T. Keith Pitman, The Role of the World Bank in Enhancing Cooperation and Resolving Conflict on International Watercourses: The Case of the Indus Basin, in International Watercourses: Enhancing Cooperation and Managing Conflict 155 (World Bank Technical Paper No. 414, Salman M. A. Salman & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes eds., 1998) [hereinafter International Watercourses].

³ Indus Waters Treaty, Sept. 19, 1960, India-Pak., 419 UNTS 125, United Nations, Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions Concerning the Utilization of International Rivers for Other Purposes Than Navigation 300, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/12, UN Sales No. 63.V.4 (1963) [hereinafter UN Legislative Texts].

⁴ Nepal and India: Splashing Out, Economist, Jan. 25, 1997, at 79.

⁵ “Only 0.64% of that potential is now harnessed. Foreign consultants say 25,000 MW are easily exploitable if and when India and Nepal reach some agreement on pricing.” Far E. Econ. Rev., Mar. 8, 1990, at 26.

⁶ India, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Aff. Rec., Mar. 1991, at 35.

⁷ The Kosi Agreement concluded between the two countries in 1954 to utilize the waters of the Kosi, Nepal’s third biggest river, was to provide hydroelectric power, irrigation and flood control, mainly for India. For the text of the Kosi Agreement, Apr. 25, 1954, India-Nepal, see FAO Development Law Service, Treaties Concerning the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Asia 60 (FAO Legislative Study No. 55, 1995) [hereinafter FAO Legislative Study], UN Legislative Texts, supra note 3, at 290. India and Nepal concluded another agreement in 1959 relating to the Gandak Irrigation and Power Project to utilize the waters of the Gandaki, the second largest river in Nepal, for the generation of hydroelectric power, irrigation and flood control, again mainly for India. Like the Kosi Agreement, the Gandak Agreement was a multipurpose project designed to construct a barrage on Nepalese territory near the Indo-Nepalese border. For the text of the Agreement, Dec. 4, 1959, India-Nepal, see UN Legislative Texts, supra, at 295.

⁸ The 1990 Constitution of Nepal provides in Article 126 that the ratification, accession, acceptance or approval of treaties or agreements on the following matters must be done by a two-thirds majority of the members present in a joint session of both houses of Parliament: (a) peace and friendship; (b) defense and strategic alliance; (c) boundaries of the Kingdom of Nepal; (d) natural resources and distribution of their uses. Pursuant to this provision of the Constitution, the Nepal Treaty Act, 1990, was enacted. For an English translation of the 1990 Constitution, see 13 Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Nepal (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1994). For the Nepal Treaty Act, see 3 Recent Laws of Nepal, pt. 3, at 6 (Dhruba Bar Singh Thapa ed., 1991).

⁹ Treaty concerning the Integrated Development of the Mahakali River Including Sarada Barrage, Tanakpur Barrage and Pancheshwar Project, Feb. 12, 1996, India-Nepal, 36 ILM 531 (1997). See India, Nepal sign, pact on river water, Times of India, Feb. 13, 1996.

¹⁰ See A Watershed on the Mahakali, Himal South Asia, Mar. 1996, at 11.

¹¹ It was reported that during the negotiations for the preparation of the DPR, India said that it needed an additional flow of 201 cusecs on the Mahakali River to maintain its second auxiliary Sarada project. It is this “new” development that seems to have delayed the whole process of completing the DPR. See Nepal Negates Prior Consumptive Rights on Mahakali, Kathmandu Post, Dec. 1, 1997, at 2.

¹² See the views of the Nepalese Water Resources Minister, Pashupati S. J. B. Rana, id., Nov. 7, 1997, at 3. See also the views of a Nepalese lawmaker, Khanal, id., Dec. 30, 1997, at 1.

¹³ See Ajaya Dixit & Monirul Mirza, Who’s Afraid of Farakka’s Accord? himal South Asia, Jan./Feb. 1997, at 56, 57.

¹⁴ See Statute of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission, Nov. 24, 1972, reprinted in FAO Legislative Study, supra note 7, at 25.

¹⁵ The barrage had been built at a huge cost (1.56 billion rupees) and India had maintained that since it was the only means of saving the port of Calcutta from extinction, it could not be abandoned. See Statement of the Official Spokesman of the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Feb. 18, 1976), in 1 India-Bangladesh Relations: Documents 1971–1994, at 388, 390 (Avtar Singh Bhasin ed., Delhi 1996).

¹⁶ For the text of this agreement, Apr. 18, 1975, see id. at 386.

¹⁷ See Agreement on Sharing of the Ganges Waters at Farakka and on Augmenting Its Flows, Nov. 5, 1977, Bangl.-India, 1066 UNTS 3, reprinted in 17 ILM 103 (1978).

¹⁸ However, the main opposition political party in Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) led by Khaleda Zia, opposed the Treaty, stating that it was a “sellout” to India of Bangladesh’s entitlement by the Government of Sheikh Hasina. They called the Treaty an “unequal and incomplete agreement.” See, e.g., M. Anwarul Haq, 30-year Historic Water Treaty, Daily Star (Dhaka), Dec. 13, 1996, at 1; M. Manirazzaman Miah, How Much Water in the Ganges? id., Apr. 9, 1997; Atiqur Rahman & Swapan Chakrabarty, Water Accord: Opposition Charges Sell out, Dhaka Courier, Dec. 20, 1996, at 6.

¹⁹ See Mark Nicholson, Ganges Deal Boosts Relations, Fin. Times (London), Dec. 13, 1996, at 5.

²⁰ Treaty on Sharing of the Ganga/Ganges Waters at Farakka, Dec. 12, 1996, Bangl.-India, 36 ILM 523 (1997) [hereinafter Ganges Treaty].

²¹ See generally Salman M. A. Salman, Sharing the Ganges Waters between India and Bangladesh: An Analysis of the 1996 Treaty, in International Watercourses, supra note 2, at 127.

²² Ganges Treaty, supra note 20, Preamble (emphasis added).

²³ Id. (emphasis added).

²⁴ Ganges Treaty, supra note 20, Art. II(ii).

²⁵ Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, 51 International Law Association, Conference Report 484 (1966).

²⁶ Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, GA Res. 51/229, annex (May 21,1997), 36 ILM 700 (1997).

²⁷ See FAO Legislative Study, supra note 7, at 25.

²⁸ Such a scenario actually played out in the very first year of the application of the Treaty. When the flow at Farakka fell below 50,000 cusecs, the two parties should have started immediate consultations to make adjustments on an emergency basis. But no such meeting took place. Even the preplanned visit to Bangladesh by the Indian Water Resources Minister, Janeswar Mishra, was postponed following political developments in India that had thrown doubt on the fate of the Deve Gowda Government. SeePrakash Nanda, Indo-Bangla Water Treaty in Jeopardy, Times of India, Apr. 4, 1997.