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Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Robert H. Salisbury
Robert H. Salisbury*
Affiliation:
Washington University
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Abstract

Interest group theory traditionally assumed that policies advocated by group representatives in some sense grow out of the interests or values of the group's members. Mancur Olson and others compelled important revisions in this assumption, but still left the process of interest advocacy to membership groups. It is contended here that institutions, such as corporations or local governments, occupy a dominant position with respect to interest representation in Washington, and this finding requires substantial revisions in both theoretical and descriptive formulations of the governmental process.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 78 , Issue 1 , March 1984 , pp. 64 - 76
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1984

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