¹ See, for example, MacRae, Duncan, Dimensions of Congressional Voting: A Statistical Study of the House of Representatives in the Eighty-First Congress (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958)Google Scholar; Truman, David B., The Congressional Party (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1959)Google Scholar; Gray, Charles H., “A Scale Analysis of the Voting Records of Senators Kennedy, Johnson, and Goldwater, 1957–1960,” this Review, 59 (1965), 615–621Google Scholar.

² Turner, Julius, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1951)Google Scholar; Jewell, Malcolm E., “Party Voting in American State Legislatures,” this Review, 49 (1955), 773–791Google Scholar; Sorauf, Frank J., Party and Representation (New York: Atherton Press, 1963)Google Scholar; Key, V. O. Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, 5th ed. (New York: Crowell, 1965), pp. 677–689Google Scholar.

³ Matthews, Donald R., United States Senators and Their World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960)Google Scholar; Rieselbach, Leroy N., “The Demography of the Congressional Vote on Foreign Aid, 1939–1958,” this Review, 58 (1964), 577–588Google Scholar.

⁴ Pritchett, C. Herman, The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values, 1937–1947 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948)Google Scholar; Pritchett, , Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954)Google Scholar; Ulmer, S. Sidney, “The Analysis of Behavior Patterns in the United States Supreme Court,” Journal of Politics, 22 (1960), 629–653CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ulmer, , “Toward a Theory of Sub-Group Formation in the United States Supreme Court,” Journal of Politics, 27 (1965), 133–153CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tanenhaus, Joseph, “Supreme Court Attitudes Toward Federal Administrative Agencies, 1947–1956—An Application of Social Science Methods to the Study of the Judicial Process,” Vanderbilt Law Review, 14 (1961), 473–502Google Scholar; Schubert, Glendon, Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959)Google Scholar; Schubert, , “The 1960 Term of the Supreme Court: A Psychological Analysis,” this Review, 56 (1962), 90–108Google Scholar; Schubert, , The Judicial Mind: The Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices 1946–1963 (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965)Google Scholar; Sehmidhauser, John R., “Judicial Behavior and the Sectional Crisis of 1837–1860,” Journal of Politics, 23 (1961), 615–640CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sehmidhauser, , “Stare Decisis, Dissent, and the Backgrounds of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States,” University of Toronto Law Journal, 14 (1962), 194–212CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Schubert, Glendon has traced the development of judicial behavior research in two articles: “Behavioral Research in Public Law,” this Review, 57 (1963), 433–445Google Scholar and “From Public Law to Judicial-Behavior,” Judicial Decision-Making, Schubert, (ed.) (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 1–10Google Scholar. The latter work also contains an extensive bibliography of judicial behavior research on pp. 257–65. Also see Shapiro, Martin, Law and Politics in the Supreme Court (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964)Google Scholar, chap. 1.

⁵ Schubert, , Quantitative Analysis, pp. 129–42Google Scholar; Ulmer, S. Sidney, “The Political Party Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court,” Journal of Public Law, 11 (1962), 352–362Google Scholar; Nagel, Stuart S., “Judicial Characteristics and Judicial Decision-Making” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1961)Google Scholar and the articles derived from that study, especially “Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions,” this Review, 55 (1961), 843–850Google Scholar and “Ethnic Affiliations and Judicial Propensities,” Journal of Politics, 24 (1962), 94–110Google Scholar; Herndon, James F., “Relationships Between Partisanship and the Decisions of State Supreme Courts” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1963)Google Scholar.

⁶ Only a handful of studies of the courts of appeals have been conducted by political scientists. Among them are: Salisbury, Robert H., “The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1940–1950: A Study of Judicial Relationships” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1955)Google Scholar; Downing, Rondal, “The U.S. Courts of Appeals and Employer Unfair Labor Practices Cases, 1936–1958” (mimeo, 1959)Google Scholar; Dozeman, Alvin, “A Study of Selected Aspects of Behavior of the Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit” (unpublished Master's thesis, Michigan State University, 1960)Google Scholar; Peltason, Jack W., Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961)Google Scholar; Vines, Kenneth N., “The Role of the Circuit Courts of Appeal in the Federal Judicial Process: A Case Study,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, 7 (1963), 305–320CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Loeb, Louis L., “Judicial Blocs and Judicial Values in Four Selected United States Courts of Appeals, 1957–1960 Terms” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, American University, 1964)Google Scholar; Loeb, , “Judicial Blocs and Judicial Values in Civil Liberties Cases Decided by the Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,” American University Law Review, 14 (1965), 146 ff.Google Scholar; Schick, Marvin, “The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: A Study of Judicial Behavior” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1965)Google Scholar.

⁷ The time period chosen conforms to the three fiscal years 1962, 1963, and 1964. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts bases its statistics on the cases decided or terminated during the fiscal year.

⁸ The cases utilized are listed in Appendix A, pp. 274–339, of my “Politics, Judges, and the Administration of Justice: The Backgrounds, Recruitment, and Decisional Tendencies of the Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1961–4” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1965; microfilm no. 65-9924, University Microfilms, Michigan). A detailed exposition of the methods and statistics used, their justification, and their limitations is presented there.

⁹ See, for example, Pritchett, Roosevelt Court, op. cit., p. xii; Pritchett, Civil Liberties, op. cit., pp. 186–192; Schubert, Quantitative Analysis, op. cit., chap. 1.

¹⁰ Note that Vines, op. cit., utilizes district court reversals.

¹¹ These assumptions are treated as hypotheses and are tested in Goldman, op. cit., pp. 162–3, 175 n. 16, 192–6. The results lend support to the hypotheses.

¹² There were some non-unanimous decisions and unanimous reversals rendered during the time period studied which did not fit the categories and were not used. These cases, for the most part, involved patent and trademark issues and various commercial law cases (for example, cases involving disputing insurance companies).

¹³ See Goldman, op. cit., pp. 36–43 for a discussion of this point.

¹⁴ Note that Vines, op. cit., and in “Federal District Judges and Race Relations Cases in the South,” Journal of Politics, 26 (1964), 337–357CrossRefGoogle Scholar utilizes the disposition of racial relations cases by various judges on different courts deciding different cases which nevertheless contain the same general issue (i.e. Negro civil liberties).

¹⁵ It might be argued that most or all of the Fifth Circuit cases we examined involving, for example, criminal, civil liberties, or labor issues, are inherently different from such cases raised in the Second or Ninth circuits. While this may be true for Negro civil liberties cases, the writer is unaware of any compelling evidence to lead one to suppose that it holds true for the other issues. In any event, the hypothesis that the underlying issues of the various cases subsumed within the categories differ on a geographical basis can only be tested by a content analysis of the cases themselves. It is relevant to note that students of the Supreme Court apparently reject this hypothesis and do not classify cases by their geographical origins.

¹⁶ Alternatively, simple percentages could have been used. In the example above, the judge would be considered to have favored the claims of criminal defendants in 70% of the selected cases he handled. The method used in this study, however, seemed less cumbersome to work with. In addition, the continuum was considered to be an ordinal scale whereas the percentage implies an interval scale.

¹⁷ Consensus on the United States Supreme Court (in terms of percentage of unanimous decisions) is markedly less. See Table 1 in Schubert, The Judicial Mind, op. cit., p. 45.

¹⁸ See Murphy, Walter F., Elements of Judicial Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964)Google Scholar, for examples concerning the United States Supreme Court.

¹⁹ See, for example, Lasswell, Harold D., Power and Personality (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1948), pp. 61–88Google Scholar; Nagel, Stuart S., “Off-the-Bench Judicial Attitudes,” ch. 2 in Schubert, (ed.), Judicial Decision-MakingGoogle Scholar, op. cit.; Sickels, Robert J., “The Illusion of Judicial Consensus: Zoning Decisions in the Maryland Court of Appeals,” this Review, 59 (1965), 100–104Google Scholar.

²⁰ Cf. Vines, “The Role of Circuit Courts of Appeal in the Federal Judicial Process,” op. cit.

²¹ It should be stressed that Table 3 is only a very rough approximation (based on the absolute number of cases) of the sources of judicial conflict. A more precise analysis would require the determination, for each issue, by circuit, of the percentage of the total number of cases which comprised non-unanimous and unanimous reversals cases. See Goldman, Table 25, op. cit., p. 170.

²² A minimum of five cases and typically ten cases were used to determine each judge's score for each category. It is relevant to note that the number of positions on the appeals courts varies from three on the First Circuit to nine on the Second, Fifth, Ninth, and District of Columbia circuits. These latter circuits also have the most judicial business. The results thus contain some distortion because of the large number of judges from the four largest circuits and the large number of cases which facilitated the collection of case data necessary to determine the scores. The maximum distortion was on the government regulation issue where 25 of the 38 judges with scores were from the four largest circuits.

²³ The Spearman rank correlation coefficient is described in detail by Siegel, Sidney, Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1956), pp. 202–213Google Scholar. The formula used to calculate the coefficients presented in Table 4 was one corrected for ties (found in Siegel, p. 207).

²⁴ Cf. Harold J. Spaeth, “Warren Court Attitudes Toward Business: The ‘B’ Scale,” in Judicial Decision-Making, op. cit., pp. 79–108; Tanenhaus, “Supreme Court Attitudes Toward Federal Administrative Agencies,” op. cit.

²⁵ This finding bears some similarity to Schubert's finding in his article on “The 1960 Term of the Supreme Court,” op. cit., pp. 101–2, concerning the F scale (fiscal cases). Schubert noted that “the rankings of the justices on F is different from their rankings on either C [the civil liberties scale] or E [economic liberalism].” Also see Schubert, The Judicial Mind, op. cit., pp. 150–155, and Table 27, p. 173.

²⁶ Note that another analysis reported in Goldman, op. cit., pp. 179–197, uncovered the existence of voting blocs on all but the First, Sixth, and Eighth circuits. This finding tends to support the interpretation of the rank order correlation analysis in the above text.

²⁷ The Mann-Whitney U Test was used to determine whether there was a statistically significant difference in medians and distribution of the scores for each of the categories by the Democrats and Republicans. The U test is described in Siegel, op. cit., pp. 116–127. Nonparametric inference statistics were used in this study because the cases utilized are only a sample of the decisions the appeals judges have made in the past and will make in the future. On the appropriateness of inferential statistics see Tanenhaus, “Supreme Court Attitudes Toward Federal Administrative Agencies,” op. cit., and also Tanenhaus, and Somit, Albert, American Political Science: Profile of a Discipline (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), pp. 144–149Google Scholar.

²⁸ See Schubert's definition of “economic liberalism” in “The 1960 Term,” op. cit., p. 100, and The Judicial Mind, op. cit., pp. 160–170.

²⁹ See Lane, Robert E., “Political Personality and Electoral Choice,” this Review, 49 (1955), 173–190Google Scholar; Stouffer, Samuel A., Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1955)Google Scholar; McClosky, Herbertet al., “Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers,” this Review, 54 (1960), 406–427Google Scholar; Flinn, Thomas A. and Wirt, Frederick M., “Local Party Leaders: Groups of Like Minded Men,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, 9 (1965), 77–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Flinn and Wirt as well as McClosky report that differences between Democratic and Republican party leaders on questions of civil liberties are not as prominent as differences on economic issues.

³⁰ Had there been more non-unanimously decided cases involving criminal law and civil liberties, we would have been able to test this hypothesis.

³¹ See Goldman, op. cit., chap. 7, for the findings concerning additional political variables tested for the study. On the relationship of party affiliation to the judicial behavior on other courts see Schubert, Quantitative Analysis, op. cit., pp. 129–142; Ulmer, “The Political Party Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court,” op. cit.; Herndon, op. cit.; Nagel, “Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions,” op. cit.; Bowen, Don R., “The Explanation of Judicial Voting Behavior from Sociological Characteristics of Judges” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1965)Google Scholar.

³² These findings contradict those of Stuart Nagel's (for state supreme court justices) reported in “Ethnic Affiliations and Judicial Propensities,” op. cit. Also see Bowen, op. cit.

³³ The test used to determine the statistical significance of the differences among the medians for each category was the Kruskal-Wallis one way analysis of variance by ranks. See Siegel, op. cit., pp. 184–193 for a description of the test.

³⁴ The number of Jewish judges on the appeals courts is too small for us to draw reliable inferences from the data. The discussion of religious affiliation is therefore confined to a consideration of Catholic and Protestant judges.

³⁵ Cf. Nagel, op. cit., supra, n. 32.

³⁶ See Campbell, Anguset al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1960)Google Scholar.

³⁷ Democratic administrations have appointed a greater percentage of Catholics to federal courts than have Republican administrations. There are also indications that Democratic appointees tend to have lower socio-economic origins than Republican appointees. See Goldman, op. cit., chap. 3, and my “Characteristics of Eisenhower and Kennedy Appointees to the Lower Federal Courts,” Western Political Quarterly 18 (1965), 753–763Google Scholar.

³⁸ The selection process concerning appointments to the U.S. courts of appeals is discussed in Goldman, “Politics, Judges, and the Administration of Justice,” op. cit., chap. 4. Also see Chase, Harold, “Federal Judges: The Appointing Process” (paper read before the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1964)Google Scholar and Professor Chase's forthcoming study to be published by the Brookings Institution.