Investor’s Information Sharing with Firms in Oligopoly

@article{ART002479366},
author={ 조명환 },
title={Investor’s Information Sharing with Firms in Oligopoly},
journal={The Korean Economic Review},
issn={0254-3737},
year={2019},
volume={35},
number={2},
pages={439-469},
doi={10.22841/kerdoi.2019.35.2.007},
url={http://dx.doi.org/10.22841/kerdoi.2019.35.2.007}

TY - JOUR
AU - 조명환
TI - Investor’s Information Sharing with Firms in Oligopoly
T2 - The Korean Economic Review
PY - 2019
VL - 35
IS - 2
PB - 한국경제학회
SP - 439-469
SN - 0254-3737
AB - We study the incentives for an investor to transmit information to its invested firms in an oligopoly. The investor has more information on market conditions than the firms and reveals it publicly or privately before the firms produce the goods. When the investor uses a public channel to transmit information, the investor does not reveal any of its information to the firms. When the investor uses a private channel to transmit information, it partially reveals such a private information to the firm. Indeed, this is possible only when the investor invests relatively more in one firm than in another firm.
KW - Oligopoly, Cournot Competition, Information Asymmetry, Information Transmission
DO - 10.22841/kerdoi.2019.35.2.007
UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.22841/kerdoi.2019.35.2.007
ER -

조명환 (2019). Investor’s Information Sharing with Firms in Oligopoly. The Korean Economic Review, 35( 2), 439- 469.

조명환 . 2019, “Investor’s Information Sharing with Firms in Oligopoly”, The Korean Economic Review, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 439-469. Available from: doi:10.22841/kerdoi.2019.35.2.007

조명환 “Investor’s Information Sharing with Firms in Oligopoly” The Korean Economic Review 35.2 pp. 439-469 (2019): 439.

조명환 . Investor’s Information Sharing with Firms in Oligopoly The Korean Economic Review [Internet]. 2019; 35( 2), : 439-469. Available from: doi:10.22841/kerdoi.2019.35.2.007

조명환 . “Investor’s Information Sharing with Firms in Oligopoly” The Korean Economic Review 35, no.2 (2019): 439-469. doi: 10.22841/kerdoi.2019.35.2.007

홈 권호 목록 논문 목록 논문 상세

Investor’s Information Sharing with Firms in Oligopoly

The Korean Economic Review

약어 : KER

2019, vol.35, no.2, pp.439 - 469

DOI : 10.22841/kerdoi.2019.35.2.007

발행기관 : 한국경제학회

연구분야 : 경제학

조명환¹

¹서울시립대학교

인용한 논문 수 : 2 서지 간략 보기

초록

We study the incentives for an investor to transmit information to its invested firms in an oligopoly. The investor has more information on market conditions than the firms and reveals it publicly or privately before the firms produce the goods. When the investor uses a public channel to transmit information, the investor does not reveal any of its information to the firms. When the investor uses a private channel to transmit information, it partially reveals such a private information to the firm. Indeed, this is possible only when the investor invests relatively more in one firm than in another firm.

키워드

Oligopoly, Cournot Competition, Information Asymmetry, Information Transmission

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