3

Macro-patterns of normative order

Key propositions

- Globally, crime is a much more deadly and destructive problem than war (so far) and suicide is much more deadly than war and crime combined (though less destructive of cities, civilisations and ecosystems). Yet a fertile path is to see war, crime and suicide as part of the same cascade of problems, all partially shaped by complex cycles of anomie that are difficult to steer, but that can be steered.
- Anomie is conceived of in ways more ancient than those popular in contemporary criminology. Anomie means widespread uncertainty about the normative order, about what are the rules of the game and uncertainty about whose authority is legitimate. Confusion about the arbitrary enforcement of arbitrary rules is domination by definition. Uncertainty about what the rules are also makes it harder for defenders of freedom to attack bad rules and bad rule and easier for despots to obfuscate, saying the rules are X to one group but not X to another.
- Legal cynicism about the rules of the game is a related concept and, like anomie, correlates with crime.
- Anomie is recurrently a factor in the onset of waves of crime and war.
- In a wide range of circumstances, anomie accelerates crime and, at times, other forms of dominating disorder, including civil war and terrorism.

- Anomie is one of the mechanisms that explains why crime risks cascades to more crime, and to war, and war risks cascades to more war and more crime.
- When an invading army or internal insurgency smashes a society apart, its normative order tends to shatter, cascading to further violence and anomie.
- Law enforcement that imprisons or kills the leaders of organised crime, terrorist or insurgency groups can also create an anomic fragmentation of those illegal groups that makes violence worse rather than better.
- However, when a social order that is not reeling from an invasion holds together during war, war can result in survivor societies rallying behind their normative order.
- Moreover, after wider spaces are pacified by a war than were pacified before the war, settled sovereignty over wider territories can diffuse peaceful coexistence.
- Vast empires of conquest have historically not only widened zones of pacification of violence; they have also quite often created spaces where the rule of law, human rights and the tempering of power could mature. So, war that transcends anomie with peaceful sovereignty can result in less crime, less domination and more freedom.
- Durkheim helps us see complex contingency and recursivity of anomie contributing to violence. At one historical juncture, anomie promotes violence. This then loops contingently to alternative cycles. One contingency is a cascade of anomie and violence in the next historical moment that shatters a society, creating cycles of more anomie and more violence. Then a communal revival from violence rises from the ashes to conquer anomie, even with nonviolence. If cascades of violence can be paused, prevented from becoming endless, the social order can hold under fire. During wars that are not too long or devastating, the social order often becomes more unified. This is more likely when the societies involved in wars are not invaded and occupied. Another loop can occur when violence establishes a monopoly of force and peaceful sovereignty over a swathe of territory that pacifies violence and anomie.
- A different loop arises when that monopoly of force dominates and excludes. When a monopoly of force is untempered, it risks unravelling that sovereignty in a return to cycles of anomie and violence (as Russia illustrates throughout its modern history to the present). All these are potential turning points that good governance can steer to the peaceful waters of freedom with low levels of crime. Most developed democracies

have achieved these outcomes reasonably well since World War II, from small ones like Denmark, Norway and New Zealand to large ones like Germany, Japan and South Korea since it democratised. This is less true for the most militarised powers of this era, the United States and Russia. They have recurrently used their muscle in anomic and destabilising ways. At other times, the great powers have cooperated to support the United Nations and help it sustain the international normative order in the cause of peace and freedom.

- The complex ways in which the foregoing list of propositions interact give a helpful account of why violent crime has been in long-run decline in Europe for the past 800 years. At the same time, the propensity of anomic effects to pass tipping points can be understood to explain major reversals from that trajectory in and beyond Europe during those 800 years.
- More recently, the complex ways in which these propositions interact account for the short-term but steep reversal to increases in crime across most of the West from 1960 to 1992. They also give an account of why France is a major exception to that reversal to crime trending in this western way, why violence in Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa continued to increase during the post-1992 western crime drop and why the great East Asian crime drop preceded the western crime drop by more than four decades and continued to fall during the 1960–92 period when crime was rising in the West.
- The big-picture story of war, crime and normative order that this chapter tells demonstrates not a unidirectional civilising process, but human agency in making peace and making war, in making institutional choices that cascade crime and violence or that cascade nonviolence.

Modern and ancient normative order

Historians and international relations scholars tend not to discuss the conflict dynamics of this chapter as cascades of violence in which crime accounts for more deaths and destroyed lives than war. To be fair, not all historians of war are obsessed only with the deeds of great men and great armies to the neglect of little acts of violence that occur inside family homes, schools and on street corners. Yet there is a contribution for criminologists to make in studying waves of crime that bear relationships to waves of war.

Anomie is a central variable in macrocriminology. It is more than just one of those variables that can explain why these people have a 50 per cent higher crime rate than those people; it can be central to an account of why some places and times have 100 times as much violence as others. But anomie is a complex historical phenomenon that does not follow any simple linear path. Human history is punctuated by massive tipping points in anomie. Anomie recurrently accelerates cycles of crime, violence and further disorder to the point of the violent overthrow of states. In countries ravaged by fighting, anomie tends to get even worse. Peace settlements at the end of wars settle new sovereignties in ways that frequently become further tipping points. Anomie and violence can be pacified by the new sovereignty. Then I argue that a major variable in shaping whether pacification lasts is whether it is pacification with freedom, with tempered power, or pacification with unchecked powers for the secret police.

Consider, for example, how anomie gripped Germany following the collapse of the monarchy (the defeat of the Kaiser in World War I) and hyperinflation associated with the Great Depression from 1929. This normative disorder created a political opportunity for Adolf Hitler's Nazis, who actively schemed to accelerate anomie and violence. Ultimately, they seized power in Germany, criminalised the state and spread anomie and violence across Europe (and far beyond, with help from their allies). Less than 13 years after Hitler's election as chancellor, he was defeated militarily by a coalition led by the United States (which had become the western hegemon) and the Soviet Union (which thence became the eastern hegemon). China gradually began to re-emerge as an Asian hegemon after the communists won their long civil war in 1949. On both sides of the Iron Curtain that divided postwar Eurasia, these major powers pacified violence rather successfully. West Germany under American hegemony quickly became a low-crime society, as did East Germany under Soviet hegemony, but in a more limited and complex way. In the theoretical terms of this book, the hegemony of the United States bequeathed sovereignty to the successor West German state that was tempered by checks and balances on the abuse of power. The United States helped Japan to accomplish that as well. Japan and West Germany are no longer criminalised states, no longer anomic societies. They are low-crime societies that are no longer destabilisers or sowers of violence in other societies.

We saw in the previous chapter, however, that the formidably successful pacification of crime and violence by the successor communist states of Eastern Europe is a less solid and resilient accomplishment because these were criminalised states with massively criminalised black markets. This book will show that China is an even more complex case than the former Soviet bloc in this regard. China is rife with citizen protests at the local level. We saw in the previous chapter that local anomie is harnessed into a form of enforced self-efficacy steered by the Communist Party. China has grown capitalist markets that have competed more effectively than the black markets of its early decades of power. The Shanghai Stock Exchange is as different from the criminalised market that it was decades ago as it is different in its imperfections from western exchanges; it is governed today by a mix of 'more plural and hybrid forms of ownership, control, and regulatory governance' (Li et al. 2020). This chapter adds other complexities beyond these Chinese complexities in the role of anomie that rises, tips and falls to great declines in crime and violence.

The theory of freedom and crime developed in this book draws together older forms of macrocriminology. The approach weaves together webs of dialogue, support and control that temper dangerous societies. This chapter integrates conceptions of normative order heavily influenced by ancient Chinese, Mesopotamian, Persian and Greek philosophy and institutionalised in important ways in the empires their ideas shaped, particularly the ancient Roman Republic (Pettit 1997; Pocock 2016; Skinner 2012). While a foundational Greek version of anomie has a particular attraction for the theory of freedom and crime, this book also integrates newer interpretations of these ideas in Montesquieu, Durkheim and Merton. The framework in subsequent chapters integrates social capital theories of crime, particularly the theories of collective efficacy of Robert Sampson and his colleagues—integrated with the micro-theory of self-efficacy and social capital in Bandura (1986, 2000, 2016). In this chapter, even some empirically supported elements of control theory (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990) and its Hobbesian foundations are integrated into the framework. This occurs even though my theoretical approach is one that in fundamental ways is at odds with control theory.

The next section is about the important ways in which normative order is different, particularly around questions of class structure, in the twenty-first century than in previous centuries. Subsequent chapters return to these themes of markets and late-modern institutional anomie, connecting the anomie insights of this chapter to market modernity. Before that,

this chapter will discuss more ancient and early modern themes of war, sovereignty and anomie. First, in the section after next, the chapter makes the case for more ancient ways of thinking about normative order as being more useful than how anomie is deployed in contemporary criminology. Then the chapter considers the big-picture patterns of homicide across continents and centuries. How are they shaped by anomie, war and sovereignty? It is argued that war makes states and states make war (as do empires) when they are pursuing their sovereignty and repelling enemies. But states and empires also make peace when sovereignty is settled across pacified spaces. They become spaces where highwaymen, insurgents, terrorists and revolutionaries are likewise suppressed by sovereign domination of armed force, or rather are discouraged from so much as considering pursuit of their objectives at the point of a gun.

The class structure of normative order

Markets have been one of the great disrupters of normative orders in modern history. This is a theme in Farrall and Karstedt's (2019) book on the neglected importance of middle-class crime in criminology and the anomic forces implicated in it. Middle-class crime might be 'white-collar crime writ small', but it is writ far, wide and consequentially in Farrall and Karstedt's oeuvre. This is happening when Wilson and Dragusanu (2008: 1) find the middle class to be exploding in an unprecedented way as a 'world middle class' that is a globally 'expanding middle' that accounts for a growing proportion of the world's population and pollution in newly developed economies.

The theme of anomie and market structure is evocatively established in historiography—for example, in E.P. Thompson's (1963) *The Making of the English Working Class*. The transition to a market economy ruptured England's moral economy:

Thompson argued that the riotous actions of peasants during the corn shortages of the 18th century could be understood as attempts to assert (and restore) a moral dimension to the market and to ensure traditional bonds and obligations against the emerging liberal economy. (Farrall and Karstedt 2019: 194)

Future chapters develop these themes as they consider institutional anomie theory. Farrall and Karstedt (2019: Ch. 8) found institutional anomie was a consistently strong explanation of middle-class crime in the

United Kingdom, West Germany and East Germany as it transitioned from communism. ‘Legal cynicism’ (Sampson and Bartusch 1998) contributed most to their quantitative explanation of institutional market anomie. Alongside fear of victimisation by the market, feelings of being treated unfairly in markets, motivation to ‘retaliate’ to get some of their share back through markets, celebrating risk-taking criminality as something discussed among friends, distrust in institutions, legal cynicism, perceptions of being overregulated by red tape, crime motivated by greed and lure (Shover and Hochstetler 2005) more than by need, and devaluation of informal rules of fair and ethical behaviour all became for Farrall and Karstedt patterns of a wider ‘syndrome of institutional market anomie’.

I keep returning to their work in this book as a corrective to my own history as a Sutherlandesque criminologist dedicated to correcting criminology’s theoretical errors arising from the neglect of crimes of the powerful. Farrall and Karstedt show that crimes of the middle class are distinctive because they are insufficiently alluring for the ruling class to be bothered with, and beyond the reach of the poor. They also bear a distinctively late-modern connection to anomie. One of the empirical gems in their results is that people who talk to their friends a lot about how to protect themselves from victimisation in the marketplace also talk to those friends about how to get away with being offenders in the marketplace. Most middle-class crime, Farrall and Karstedt (2019) find, is motivated by greed rather than need. Commodification, a marketised mentality, drives capitalism forward at the same time as it risks its destabilisation. Commodification becomes pathologised by the ‘relentless promotion of self-interest’ at the expense of citizenship values. When middle-class morality is maximally corroded, this is a danger for capitalism. Top-down corrosion of capitalism by crime in the business suites can cause markets to crash and is an important complement to corrosion by poverty and crime in the streets (and police violence in response). But crime in the lounge suites of middle-class citizens, laptops poised at their distrusting fingertips as they tap away at their petty frauds, is vital to rounding out the collapse of trust in major institutions—state institutions, private banks and private media—that worldwide is occurring top-down, bottom-up and middle-out from capitalism’s middle-class heartland. Crime in business suites may help to motivate and neutralise both crime in the streets and crime in the middle-class lounge suites. All the forms of illegitimacy these classes inflict on one another may feed back in complex ways into anomie, into the crimes the members of each class impose on others.

This can make sense of the surveys of Valerie Braithwaite's Centre for Tax System Integrity that show that most Australians across all classes in most years commit some kind of fraud on their tax return (ctsi.org.au). Yet the research base from that project, particularly from estimates of the size of the underground economy (Schneider 2002, 2005; Schneider and Buehn 2018), also suggests that Australia is like the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany in being part of the high tax-compliance region of the world that is mostly concentrated in northern and Western Europe, North America and perhaps China. All southern European countries have lower tax compliance and a larger underground economy. Eastern Europe has much larger underground economies still (fluctuating at slightly below or above half the real economy in the worst cases of Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova and Belarus). Many economies further east and south of Eastern Europe—such as Thailand, Cambodia, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Gabon, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Bolivia, Peru, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Panama and Uruguay—are so much lower that most of the real economy is outside the legitimate economy. In this latter list of economies, most of the real economy is consistently a black market of some kind. At their worst, large shadow economies in states with low legitimacy lead to high rates of murder in the shadows when disputes in criminal markets cannot be resolved in the courts because they relate to criminal transactions (Tuttle 2019).

Intergenerational conflict over the normative order is conceived of in this chapter as important in late modernity. Markets created adolescence as something important for the first time in western history only since 1950. Distinctive markets in fashion, music, social media and leisure for the young mean that teenagers are no longer junior versions of adults in their tastes and dress, but carriers of age-distinctive identities. In the West, the newest middle-class generation shows signs of resentment that their parents or grandparents, particularly the baby boomers, got a better deal than them on issues like free university education. In the course of the international collaborations of the Centre for Tax System Integrity, Valerie Braithwaite and I were privy to the in-house research of western tax authorities on tax morale, particularly in cases like Sweden, where the youngest generation of taxpayers was more willing to cheat than past generations for this reason. One vindication of this in Braithwaite and Ahmed's (2005) Australian research was that young university graduates who were carrying forward a debt on government loans to pay for

university places that used to be free were more likely to cheat on their tax. They were more likely still to be tax cheats if they perceived the university education they paid for as a rip-off or shoddy in quality!

A different set of studies by Eliza Ahmed also resonates with Farrall and Karstedt's writing on middle-class victim–offender constellations—the middle class as victims of crimes that help neutralise their criminal offending. Ahmed and Braithwaite's (2006) research on bullying in schools and workplaces in Bangladesh and Australia showed that the world is not made up of bullies and victims. The larger group of bully-victims—people who both bully and suffer bullying—is more structurally important to the normative decay of nonviolent associational orders in schools and workplaces. One reason for this that Ahmed found is the bully-victims combined all the shame management and pride management (narcissism) pathologies of both the bullies and the victims. This resonance is valuable for seeing the richness of Farrall and Karstedt (2019) as connecting not only up to the high politics of anomie in capitalist societies, but also right down to more general insights of relevance to the low politics of anomie in school playgrounds.

Recursive anomie, cascades of violence

This section considers ancient thinking that lays a foundation for anomie theory, starting with Confucius, Cyrus the Great of Persia, the Greeks, Romans and Hobbes. It then considers its modern legacy, particularly from Emile Durkheim and Robert K. Merton. Durkheim (1952) helps us to see that crime is fostered by conditions of collapse of the normative order. In the process, the analysis begins to shape the case for a republican conception of freedom as nondomination in the footsteps of ancients of the Middle East like Cyrus (Ambler 2001; Briant 2002) and Romans like Cicero.¹

In a Durkheimian way, the theory is advanced that anomie creates conditions for crime, for the violence of war and for the self-violence of suicide. Yet the existential threat of war and of crime waves also frequently

1 Cicero was a defender not only of a republican conception of the freedom of not being under the arbitrary power of a ruler (Pettit 1997), but also of the Roman Republic because he believed it pacified smaller states that constantly fought barbaric wars with each other—for example, Greece (Morris 2014: 34).

mobilises societies to rally around the normative order, bringing anomie under control. Recursivity is a term used in this book not just about the dynamics of anomie. Recursivity means here that the output of a macro process becomes an input of that process, generating a loop that unfolds sequences and structures that can be of unbounded length and complexity (Corballis 2014).

Complex Durkheimian recursivity of anomie and crime helps account for big patterns of criminality in human history. It does not submit neatly to linear models of positivist criminology. For example, in this chapter, it helps account for why a very long-run decline in violence was decisively reversed in Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand between 1960 and 1992. Also involved in explaining this macro trend is an unprecedented surge in wars involving the West and East Asia between 1911 and 1953. We could possibly extend this wave of war later if the deadly wars in Indochina from the 1960s are included. The most recent data, however, locate the most decisive statistical turning point to reduced interstate battle deaths as 1950 (Cunnen et al. 2020).

I argue that the huge waves of war up to the end of the Korean War, from 1911 to 1953, at first helped halt the long-run downward plunge of the homicide rate to form the bottom of a two-century-long U-distribution of crime in the West. These waves of northern and western wars then helped sharply increase western crime between 1960 and 1992. An argument is made for long lags in these cascades of violence because the impact of the violence of unprecedented killing in wars on the generation of veterans' children was often greater than the impact on the veterans themselves. This is because by the time the average veteran is discharged from the military their age already approaches or exceeds the end of the highest criminality phase of the life cycle. This is not so with their children. This macro-transgenerational impact was mediated by populist postwar glorification of the violence of war, by child abuse and gender-based violence in veterans' families. When cracks appeared in western normative orders from the 1960s, fuelled by the feeling that citizens were being squeezed between dishonest big business and big government, violence was seen by western protagonists of the left and the right as imperative for defending their ideologies.

This book identifies worrying structural risks in the global system without being pessimistic. Human actors have already grasped their agency in major ways to reject violence and build global movements

for the nonviolent transformation of societies (see the trend in Figure 3.1). This book argues that cascades of criminalisation of markets and states have frequently been reversed in human history. We have a lot of experience as a species that has taught us much about how to reverse cascades of crime and violence. While criminalised markets and states are wicked challenges, we cannot tackle crime or climate change or prevent war without strong states and strong markets whose power is tempered by checks and balances. Tempered sovereignty is an important part of rising to the challenge.

Historical patterns of violence

This chapter deploys a macrocriminological lens to help see the big picture of global and local patterns of crime and violence across human history.

Unrecorded criminality associated with war—failure to count the crimes that hundreds of millions of combatants committed in other countries during the peak war years from 1911 to 1953—makes it problematic to claim that crime rates *actually* were at the bottom of a long U-curve between 1911 and 1953. We cannot be sure that criminality—especially murder, torture, other human rights abuses and black-market crimes by westerners—were not in fact increasing in the five decades before 1960. We can be more confident that crime was increasing in most western countries during the three decades after 1960.

It is likely that more rapes were committed in Germany in 1945 by Allied soldiers than have ever been reported in one year in any of the Allied countries. The rapes by Russian soldiers alone, but also by American soldiers alone, in that year were almost certainly greater than any number of rapes ever recorded officially in any western country in any year. Barbara Johr (1992: 58; Sander and Johr 2005) reported the highest estimates, that 1.4–1.9 million German women and girls were raped, particularly as the Red Army approached Berlin. She counted the deaths of 240,000 German women associated with war rapes. Most historians who are experts on this subject believe this estimate is too high, but that it is a large six-figure number. Kaiser et al. (2018) found that 6.8 per cent of a sample of children of the wartime occupation reported that they were born as a result of rape; while Gebhardt (2016) estimated 5 per cent from official records and estimated that for every rape that resulted in a pregnancy, there were 10 more that did not. Messerschmidt (2006) claims that 10 per cent

of German rape victims committed suicide. Historian Geoffrey Roberts (2013) reported 70,000–100,000 war rapes by Soviet forces in Vienna. At the high end, German feminist historian Miriam Gebhardt (2016) estimated—partly from records of wartime and occupation rapes kept by local priests and partly from West German Federal Statistics Office records of children fathered by American soldiers—that 190,000 German women were raped by American soldiers during the occupation up to 1955 but most in 1945. The data exclude the rape of men and boys by American soldiers, which is certainly something that also happened in Germany (Williams 2016). American criminologist Robert Lilley (2007) estimated 11,000 rapes based on an analysis of US Army records for 1945–46. The West’s ‘Greatest Generation’ (who grew up in the 1920s and 1930s and fought in World War II) is seen as a low-crime generation. Criminologically, this might be questioned as a myth, at least for its men. Rape was massively widespread in the Allied occupation of Japan as well (Takemae 2003). It is not part of Australia’s history of World War II that women mopped up in the region devastated by the atomic war crime in Hiroshima could fear Australian soldiers most for the brutality of rape (Tanaka 2018).

In the broadest sense, this book concludes that Norbert Elias (1982) and Steven Pinker (2011) may be right that there has been a long-run trend towards reduced violence over the past millennium. Nevertheless, as Elias (1996) himself conceded in *The Germans*, there are big continental exceptions to this pattern. East Asia became more violent—indeed, the most violent part of the world—for many decades up to 1953; and Latin America (especially Central America) became much more violent after the crescendo of its waves of state crime and civil wars from the 1970s (many associated with the United States’ War on Drugs), and then became the most violent region of the world (closely followed by Africa). We can also get clues to an explanation that might fit the macro-patterns by looking at country exceptions to the continental patterns of recent history, such as France, Cambodia and a cluster of South Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka) that have experienced high violence in recent decades. We see that explanation as a long-run cascading of peace and nonviolence, complicated by the interruptions of cascades of war and cascades of crime, each reinforcing the other, at specific space-time hotspots (Braithwaite and D’Costa 2018).

In Pinker's long-run pacification, we see waves of war during the past millennium that badly disrupt that pacification of war and crime. This seems evident with the wave of war that culminated in the Hundred Years' War and the Thirty Years' War in Europe, and the 1911–53 wave of wars that encompassed the two most deadly wars of modernity. The wave of anticommunist and anti-drug-cartel wars of Latin America from the 1970s and 1980s was another important interruption to cascades of nonviolence. Latin American waves of state and anti-state violence from the 1970s also interrupted the consolidation of a normative order. In countries like Mexico, the wars against armed drug-trafficking organisations continued ferociously during the twenty-first century, accounting for more killings than the invasion, insurgency and drug wars in Afghanistan. Post-independence proxy wars between the Cold War powers from the 1960s right through the 1980s and beyond in Africa formed another wave of violence of profound historical importance. Another wave of prominence for global patterns of crime was the disruption of East Asian normative order from the time of the British attacks on China in the Opium Wars, if not earlier.

We can partially agree with Elias (1996) when he sees such reversals as decivilising movements against a long-run civilising trend. These cascade effects intersect with anomie effects on violence, and violence effects on anomie. Elias insightfully diagnoses Hitler as a masterful manipulator of anomie. He quotes Hitler as characterising the terrorists who destabilised the Weimar Republic as 'uprooted and [who] thus have lost all inner connection with a regulated human social order ... determined to take a stand against any kind of order, filled by hatred of every authority' (Elias 1996: 227). Elias concluded that '[t]he violence of the National Socialist movement, with the aid of privately organized defence associations ... brought about the almost complete dissolution of the monopoly of force ... destroy[ing] the Weimar Republic from within' and laying the foundation for Hitler to promise an end to anomie; 'this negative purpose was given a positive face' (Elias 1996: 228). For Elias, German fascism is also a 'paradigmatic' case of

what the leaders of a civilized nation are capable of doing in their struggle for the restoration or preservation of their imperial role when a chronic feeling of decline, of being encircled by enemies and driven into a corner, awakens the conviction that only absolute ruthlessness can save their fading power and glory. (Elias 1996: 360)

Elias conceded to his critic Zygmunt Bauman (1989) that industrialised modernity concentrates power in ways that can be easy to capture and hard to control; this made incivilities like carpet bombing and the industrial slaughter of the Holocaust more possible (see also Balint 2011). The view of Bauman and Balint is what makes the tempering of power a critical issue for the twenty-first century.

Many are uncomfortable with Elias's usage of 'the civilising process' because the word civilisation has a western heritage meaning western civilisation as superior to 'backward' civilisations. As David Garland (1990: 245) points out, Elias's mission had no normative baggage of western superiority. His mission was to map specific transformations across time *within* the West in emotional life and behaviour that are linked to the expansion of social interdependencies; he does this by a close reading of historical sources such as etiquette manuals. For my project of integrating explanatory and normative theory, this book must reconcile a desire to make good use of Elias even though civility is not a theoretically central concept for the book. Pinker is right to see what Braithwaite and D'Costa (2018) describe as nonviolence as highly associated with Elias's civilising process. I have discovered and documented more learnings about nonviolence that could be read as a civilising process in Elias terms in Africa, Afghanistan, Kashmir and Bougainville than from the West, just as Broadhurst et al. (2015) learnt so much from the history of Cambodia by viewing it through Elias's lens. In practical terms, the way this book makes use of Elias is similar to how Pinker, Broadhurst and Bouhours or Eisner use Elias.

Pacified spaces and normative order

One paradoxical recursivity of classical anomie is that anomie can foster crime and violence (including wars) (Braithwaite et al. 2010a), and extremes of violence that are interpreted as existential threats to societies can mobilise commitments to, and the strengthening of, the normative order. This is complemented in human history by a paradoxical recursivity of sovereignty effects on violence. Bloody struggles to assert sovereignty over a territory—be it sovereignty over city-states, nation-states or great empires—cascade to waves of wars and cascades of crime (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018). Yet something transformative happens once sovereignty is established with one armed force dominating all other armed groups across a territory. Max Weber called this the state monopoly of armed force that

defines statehood. 'Monopoly' is slightly misleading for contemporary societies with so much privatised armed security, drug cartels, foreign proxy forces and UN peacekeeping. Nevertheless, once one armed force dominates all other armed forces across a territory, it eventually tends to accomplish pacification of violence. State and empire security forces over time pacify the warlords and highwaymen who once terrorised those travelling its roads. That sovereignty, when it is sufficient to sustain armed domination of the territory, subdues the ambitions of plotters of coups, revolutions, terror and other forms of armed insurrection. This Hobbesian conclusion lays a foundation for the analysis in future chapters of the recursive paradoxes of domination. On the one hand, military domination pacifies spaces under sovereign control; on the other hand, the persistence of militarisation and domination in a sovereign territory can sow the seeds of new wars.

The republican imperative is that the dominations of war that create state sovereignties must morph into a rule of law that underwrites nondomination. That rule of law can supplant the rule of the gun. Then a freedom is enabled that rejects domination by the arbitrary power of arms. A paradox for this chapter is that Charles Tilly (1975: 42) was insightful when he said 'war made the state and the state made war'. This means that 'extraction and struggle over the means of war created the central organizational structure of states' (Tilly 1992: 14). In particular, a heightened fear of war following the seventeenth-century 'military revolution' fuelled the creation of modern states with better infrastructure and more effective regimes for raising tax revenue to fund defence. Yet Morris (2014: 18) was also right when he showed that 'over the past ten thousand years war made the state and the state made peace'. Wars, Morris found, enabled more powerful states and empires to create wider zones of pacification than existed in earlier eras of smaller states such as city-states. That both Tilly and Morris are right is the paradoxical complexity of the recursivity highlighted in this chapter.

This is also true of empires. We will illustrate that truth in this chapter with the rule of the most brutal of empires such as the Roman Empire, the Persian Empire, the Chinese and Mongol empires and the British Empire. These empires pacified vast spaces by war and those pacified spaces then became places where freedom from violence could grow with guarantees of a rule of law. These empires then even gave birth to conceptions of human rights that guaranteed freedoms, abolished slavery and showed leadership towards tempering power through the separation of powers.

We see this paradoxical dynamic with the most murderous of empires, Genghis Khan's Mongol Empire (1206–1368). It was the Mongols rather than the Han Chinese who did most of the conquest that expanded to contemporary China. Genghis Khan's was the empire that conquered a larger territory than any in human history because it was more murderous than those it conquered. It defeated other great empires in China and Persia by laying siege to cities, making it clear that, unless there was total surrender without resistance, the entire population of the city would be slaughtered. After recurrent demonstration effects of such total slaughter, the next cities along Genghis Khan's ride to empire would surrender immediately and totally.

This was part of the paradox of pacification. In the end, Genghis Khan pacified all the societies along the Silk Road connecting East Asia to the Middle East and Europe so successfully that young women could travel safely along it without being robbed or assaulted. Other women could become rulers of the greatest of territories including the former Chinese and Persian empires that continued to be embryonic crucibles of progress towards good governance under their female Mongol rulers. These were feminist rekindlings of limited but significant empowerment of women (Weatherford 2010). The early kindling of freedom, feminism and competing conceptions of the rule of law as ideas were diffused by medieval intellectuals along the pacified Silk Road. Markets also flourished: China and India together continued to account for the majority of the global economy in purchasing power parity terms² until 1820 (until industrial capitalism) (Mahbubani 2020). The trade routes pacified along the Silk Road enabled the wealth of these two great trading empires.

The criminological literature at more meso levels shows comparable paradoxes of feedback loops in the relationship between violence and the control of territory. Street gangs in late-modern cities mobilised violence against competing gangs to secure domination of some small patch of urban territory. Police learnt that it was not always wise to deploy policing strategies that so disrupted the territorial control of gangs as to create new gang wars for control of territory. William Foot Whyte (1943) in *Street Corner Society* and Gerald Suttles (1968) in *The Social Order of the Slum* both showed ethnographically that older gang leaders calmed the violence of younger hotheads in the gang, and beyond the gang, in the domains

2 Mahbubani (2020) argues persuasively that purchasing power parity GDP is the most relevant measure of geopolitical sway and the extension of sovereignty.

they dominated. Putting those gang leaders in prison could therefore increase violence rather than reduce it. Systematic quantitative research has shown across the past two decades in Mexico that decapitation strategies that arrested or killed drug cartel leaders made violence much worse (Calderón et al. 2015; Dell 2015; Phillips 2015; Ríos 2013; Atuesta and Pérez-Dávila 2018; Lessing 2018). Spaces that were formerly zones with a certain degree of pacification under a gang leader became battle zones as successor leaders fought for the spoils of succession; larger gangs that oversaw wide zones of relative peace disintegrated into many smaller warring gangs. Papachristos and Kirk (2015: 530) also point to a gang-splintering dynamic of a more micro–meso kind in parts of Chicago that experienced steep rises in gun homicides during the past decade.

Comparably, when domination of the territory of an empire begins to disintegrate, war is more likely to break out, as we saw with the breakup of the Ottoman and then the Habsburg empires in the leadup to World War I. The Thirty Years' War, which we will see was associated with an earlier wave of war and crime, was also about a failed attempt to disintegrate the sovereignty of the Habsburg Empire. In 1918, the world looked back on the two most deadly wars of history both being about existential breakup threats to the Habsburg Empire. The evidence is generally strong for a long-run macro-association between the breakup of empires and waves of war and also of waves of criminal violence (Ferguson 2006; Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018).

Summary so far: Recursive anomie, recursive violence and sovereignty

In sum, the analysis of this chapter turns first on a paradoxical Durkheimian recursivity of anomie becoming destabilising crime and violence, resulting in more anomie. Second, however, once violence succeeds in establishing a monopoly of armed force in a space, the suppression of anomie can result. The Hobbesian paradox is that sovereignty is accomplished by terrible destabilising waves of violence and then it is sovereign power that pacifies violence. Braithwaite and D'Costa (2018) discussed the empirical evidence for all these dynamics. They found that cascades of nonviolence depend on peace agreements that generally cannot be secured only by rewarding armed groups that surrender their weapons. It is also necessary to create a successor state with a police and military that are sufficiently

dominant in their control of armed force to suppress recurrent coups, terrorism, armed insurrections and criminal gangs. An interesting analysis of anthropological data from 32 societies from the Human Relations Area Files by Rosenfeld and Messner (1991) found that societies with a standing army or some other differentiated military organisation had lower levels of homicide and violence. Centralised specialists in social control, be they courts or armies, take the pressure off ordinary people and political leaders alike when trust and reconciliation fail. Future chapters describe this as the paradox of institutionalised distrust and enculturated trust. The distrustful militarised pacification of spaces enables civil societies to get on with the work of the enculturation of trust inside those spaces. These data also seem to affirm the importance of not forgetting Hobbes (1651) on the dangers of a war of all against all in the absence of centralised state authority to use legal coercion as a last resort to regulate violence.³

We will attempt to make sense of the big patterns of crime and violence in human history with a cascade analysis of the recursivity of anomie and violence combined with the complex recursivity of sovereignty and violence. Violence begets violence until a Hobbesian tipping point is reached, where a sovereign monopoly of violence entrenches pacification. This sense-making of macro-patterns of human history is part of what macrocriminology might seek. Yet the sense these recursivities make of long-run patterns of crime and war violence is not very decisive evidence for their explanatory power. This is because many other sets of complex explanations might account for these patterns. Indeed, for any place and time, more complexly attuned and fine-grained local explanations will almost always provide better accounts than a general macrocriminological theory. Braithwaite and D'Costa (2018) discussed less-macro evidence of associations between anomie and crime and between sovereignty (or its breakup) and crime. This evidence will be discussed in more summary ways in this chapter. These are the more important kinds of evidence

3 This goes to a grave error of early republican thinking about standing armies as a danger to freedom. This error was compounded by the constitution of the new US republic when it entrenched a constitutional right to bear arms to enable civilian militias as alternatives to standing armies. The gun culture that resulted was reinforced by high early homicide rates of 250 per 100,000 in Virginia, with rates reaching almost 500 in the seventeenth century (Roth 2012). Note that these English settlers came from England, where homicide rates had always been below 10 during these centuries (Eisner 2001, 2003, 2014). Hence, while US homicide rates may be much higher than those of Europe today, they have declined much more sharply than in Europe. There was much more for the progressive US regulation of gun carrying in public to accomplish than was needed in England, especially at the anomic southern and western frontiers of the United States as it spread genocide and land theft across a vast expanse.

for my hypotheses about recursive relationships among anomie, cascades of crime and war, and sovereignty that pacifies spaces and consolidates normative order in ways that ultimately allow freedom to flourish. The most important conclusion in the work of Braithwaite and D'Costa (2018) is that agency always rests in the hands of local and national actors like Gandhi or Mandela who can act to flip cascades of violence to cascades of nonviolence, healing and preventive diplomacy.

Ancient anomie

This chapter seeks to rehabilitate a classic interpretation of anomie. Anomie is interpreted to mean a disintegration of the normative order so that people do not know what the rules of the game are and do not know whose authority they should regard as legitimate. Anomie theorists in criminology pay little attention to whose authority citizens should regard as legitimate. This occurs even though Durkheim (1958: 79–89) wrote about the importance of democracy for granting legitimacy to rulers and to rules. In our Peacebuilding Compared project, it became clear how important this is to normative order and to violence when societies are at war with themselves, with one government in exile and another in the capital both claiming legitimacy, killing those who challenge that legitimacy. Normative disintegration produces normative vacuums that are dangerous for human societies. This is because normative vacuums attract the most tyrannous and violent forces (Dahrendorf 1985). At the same time, normative integration is also a dangerous game in the way it can induce violence by a majority community against those not embraced into that community (Karstedt 2011b). The Ku Klux Klan effected a white-supremacist normative integration of a certain kind in southern US communities that it dominated. The danger here, according to the analysis in this book, is the combination of a strong normative order and a politics of domination, stigmatisation and exclusion. We see both problems with the rise of the Taliban as an armed rule-of-law movement in Kandahar Province in 1994. The rise of the Taliban made women safe from rape and travellers safe from highwaymen in a society that had been disintegrating into a war of all against all (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018; Kilcullen 2011). The rise of the Taliban to sovereignty, however, triggered a politics of domination, exclusion and stigmatisation across Afghanistan. From the space the Taliban pacified, terrorists it embraced ultimately contributed to a global cascade of violence that accelerated dramatically

after 11 September 2001. The sequence here is anomic violence followed by pacification, sovereignty by a monopoly of force and violence reduction, followed by violent state domination and exclusion that cascaded another cycle of violence.

These ideas have a long history. Confucius was the most influential ancient thinker on normative order. He is the ancient whose influence most persists today. The Confucian perspective on normative order emphasises five norms and three bonds. The five key norms of the Confucian order are rather general principles that continue to resonate beyond East Asia. They are: *ren* (仁, 'benevolence'), *yi* (義, 'righteousness', which restorative justice theorists might want to reframe as 'just relationships'),⁴ *li* (禮, 'respect'), *zhi* (智, 'wisdom') and *xin* (信, 'trust') (Liu et al. 2012; Liu and Palermo 2009). The three bonds, *sangang* (三綱), refer to appropriate vertical human relationships of authority and followership—namely, ruler–subject, father–son and husband–wife. Because dominating hierarchical relationships so often involve obligations of subjects to follow rulers, sons to fathers and wives to husbands, the three bonds are unattractive to liberals, republicans and feminists. For this reason, Dennis Wong and his colleagues⁵ commend a contemporary freedom-enhancing interpretation of Confucianism that sidelines the three bonds and emphasises the five norms. Had Durkheim reflected on Confucianism, he might have advanced the alternative that the three bonds could also be transformed to respecting the fundamental humanity of others and reflecting on institutions of deliberation and democracy (Durkheim 1958: 79–89). Wong addresses this in a Confucian way by seeking to replace the valorising of *sangang* with Confucian *wuchang*. *Wuchang* valorises horizontal human relationships of the kind that are vital to deliberative democracy, relational justice and contemporary restorative justice in China, as opposed to the vertical relationships of the three bonds (Mok and Wong 2013; Wong 2014). Wong's idea is that a low-crime normative order is possible based more on the horizontal communal enforcement of relational justice and the basic principles of the five key norms and less on

4 In correspondence with Dennis Wong, he agreed that *yi* is hard to translate, but that 'just relationships' is a helpful way of doing so for western audiences. In one strand of the traditional Confucian literature, *yi* denotes appropriateness. It means interacting with others with appropriate attitudes, with a heavy emphasis on the Golden Rule and generous reciprocity. Wong continued in this correspondence: '[T]here is an old Chinese saying describing the spirit of *yi* by saying that "你敬我一尺 我敬你一丈" [If you respect me for an inch, I will respect you for one foot]'.

5 I am grateful to Dennis Wong from the City University of Hong Kong for a number of wonderful conversations on his reading of Confucianism during the past 20 years.

state and patriarchal enforcement of law. The role of law is relegated to a last resort in this contemporary Confucian vision. Western feminism also generally failed to notice that between the 1890s and 1920 (the era of Sun Yat-sen's republican revolution and first-wave western feminism), Chinese feminist political reformers, revolutionaries and cultural critics

redeployed or reintegrated Confucian ideas, articulating their progressive ideas in Confucian vernacular. They addressed concerns about gender equality, education, and oppression by renovating Confucian terms. Reformers argued for a politics of embracing the contributions of all to humanity (*expansive ren*, 仁), of responding to lived experience (critical *dao*, *jian shu dao*, 谏恕道), and of co-cultivating self and healthy community (*xiushen da renhe*, *datong wei liren*, 修身达人和, 大同为立人). (Li and Ackerly 2021 [whose work bears the evocative title '(Ren)ovating feminism: Confucian feminism in times of political transformation in China'])

For similar reasons, Thomas Hobbes' (1651) offer of a choice between order through an absolute sovereign and chaos (the state of nature) is an unattractive one. It is seen as a false choice by advocates of liberty today. Hobbes was right that a strong state is necessary to restore order after civil wars. It was natural for Hobbes to value state normative ordering, living as he did in the war of all against all during and after the English Civil War. After periods of chaos, a despotic Leviathan is a less attractive way of mooring the normative order than state power tempered by countervailing sources of authority and contestation. This book shows why Hobbes was wrong to value state sovereignty that is absolute and indivisible. Hobbes was also important to criminology in laying the psychological foundations for control theory. Hobbes and control theory share the assumption that people will be knaves unless they are brought under control. Part of the motivation of restorative and responsive regulatory theory is the empirical insight that if you treat people as knaves, they are more likely to become knaves.

When the Romans left Britain a millennium and a half before Hobbes, Britons cheered their liberation from the Roman yoke. The country then quickly descended into such chaos and violence that terrified Britons wrote to Rome asking its legions to return to restore order (Collier 2009: 173). In the Monty Python film *The Life of Brian*, a group of disgruntled Jewish revolutionaries lament: 'What have the Romans ever done for us?' A fellow revolutionary answers, well, there are the aqueducts, then another mentions roads, another clean water, then bridges, education,

medicine, sanitation, irrigation, peace and streets that are safe at night. Hobbes was not completely wrong in seeing British and Hebrew society as slow at learning the benefits of state sovereignty, but he was wrong in seeing domination as the key to successful state-building.

Thin modern freedom

After Confucius and the Roman republic and before Hobbes, thinking about what liberty means began to thin out according to a republican narrative of the history of freedom (Pettit 1997). Liberty increasingly came to mean non-interference rather than nondomination. As markets became institutionally more important, market mentalities of freedom took hold. The state continued to be granted a fundamental role in delivering the security and social order within which markets were free to flourish. But beyond that, liberty was valorised as non-interference in citizens' choices, particularly non-interference by the state. In the libertarian vision of the state's role in freedom that grew in popularity, the state should be but a 'nightwatchman'. A market mentality of freedom is what contemporary thinkers like to call neoliberalism. Scholars in the republican tradition contrast this with liberty before liberalism. Republican theorists conceive of this thinning of the ideal of freedom by market mentalities as being well under way by the time of Hobbes.

In the republican debates of the founding fathers of the American Revolution, and in the thinking of republican feminists of that era such as Mary Wollstonecraft (1792), the thicker republican conception of the freedom of not being a slave to dominant powers was still alive. We can see republican freedom as nondomination in the thinking of Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and other American founders and in Montesquieu, who so inspired them. To this day, that light on the republican hill has never been extinguished. Some capitalisms, especially Anglo-Saxon ones, became more determinedly neoliberal, while others—for example, in Scandinavia, Germany and other northern European societies—continued to sustain more social democratic sensibilities about social coordination to temper the excesses of domination by liberal markets (Hall and Soskice 2001). Other capitalisms still are more Hobbesian. Authoritarian capitalism is on the rise in post-communist Russia, Hungary and Poland and most notably in a China that, contra Dennis Wong, also leans heavily on hierarchical control by the 'three bonds'. Authoritarian capitalism also flourishes in Bangladesh, Saudi

Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and quite a number of other economies that have been growing faster than liberal market economies. Authoritarian capitalist ideology also gained impetus during its rise in formerly liberal capitalist societies such as Donald Trump's United States and in formerly social democratic capitalist societies such as India, Brazil, the Philippines, Turkey, Poland, Hungary and Austria.

While there are many differences in the way normative order is valued across these different contemporary versions of capitalism, let us return to Dennis Wong's project of a contemporarily relevant version of Confucianism as one option. In so doing, I do not advocate it, but simply point out that it is one of many visions of normative order that cleaves back to 'liberty before liberalism', while being aware of the dangers of domination and therefore rejecting hierarchical authoritarianism. Chapter 8 considers some of the strengths of Sun Yat-sen's republican constitution of China through Dennis Wong's lens.

Wong's adaptation of a rule of Confucian principles combined with a compassionate justice of horizontal relationships help us to see that normative order is about this to an important degree globally. One important principle in the writing of Confucius was the Golden Rule: do unto others as you would have them do unto you. The Golden Rule also later appears in the biblical teachings of Jesus and of the Prophet Mohammed and it probably exists earlier in the Egyptian and Persian empires (Hertzler 1934). For wars of conquest, the Golden Rule was always pushed aside, but during long periods of peace after recurrent wars, the Golden Rule played an important part in the normative order of the Silk Road along which traders could safely travel, as could ideas of freedom (Braithwaite 2017a, 2017b). The Golden Rule, by republican lights, is a helpful bedrock for forging a well-tempered intercommunal normative order. Because people do not want to be treated as slaves, doing unto others as you would have them do unto you prohibits slavery. We see this antislavery bedrock of freedom in the Old Testament liberation of the Hebrew slaves, in the Persian Empire of Cyrus the Great liberating various enslaved groups and carving in stone certain rights to freedom from domination (Ambler 2001; Briant 2002).⁶

6 Persia built the largest empire of the ancient world and a more enduring empire than other great empires like the Roman and British. A millennium and a half after Cyrus, one Persian prince told his son in 1080 to: 'Understand this truth. The kingdom can be held by the army, and the army by gold; and gold is acquired through agricultural development; and agricultural development through justice and equity. Therefore be just and equitable.' Morris (2014: 140) quotes this advice and then comments that 'conquerors who refused to learn this truth did not last long'.

That bedrock normative order against slavery is constantly under threat from rulers of powerful states and from capitalist markets. Powerful states resent attempts to constrain their will to enslave and torture others by warfare, or to push aside the Golden Rule in a war on terror, a war on drugs or a war on crime. Slavery might be ‘abolished’ at different historical moments, but resilient markets fight back with new modalities of human trafficking, new ways of enslaving factory workers in Bangladesh to the projects of western brands hell-bent on producing the cheapest possible clothing for western consumers. Entrepreneurs of the darknet defend their right to non-interference as they enable the enslavement of children by international paedophile networks. The persistent threats are clear. Those who control states defend their prerogatives of state domination. Rulers, fathers and husbands who control the prerogatives of the three bonds of Confucianism defend that patriarchal domination. Those who grow fat on market power defend non-interference in markets and neoliberalism; those who profit from cyber-commerce defend internet freedom and claim that cybercrime and cyberwar are the price we must pay for that freedom. Pluralist agonistic contestation of these hegemonies is no easy challenge (see Chapter 12).

This book explores hierarchical power and the power of markets as great criminogenic forces of human history. The deep bedrock of normative resonance in the Golden Rule and resistance to slavery and domination in ‘liberty before liberalism’ is hard to preserve against their sway, as is ‘liberty before liberalism’s’ valorisation of relational justice under threat from monopoly control of justice by markets in legal professionalism. These interpretations of freedom have been constantly challenged at least since the time of Cyrus the Great by untempered state power and then by the rising power of markets untempered by concern to resist enslavement by markets.

Durkheim’s anomie

Emile Durkheim (1952) is a foundational thinker in the history of seeing suicide and crime as fostered by conditions of collapse of normative order. This remains true even though there is more than a grain of insight in distinguishing Durkheim from Merton with the quip that ‘for Merton, *anomie causes deviance*, while for Durkheim *deviance prevents anomie*’ (Hilbert 1989: 242). Durkheim’s writing reveals the importance of the

way reactions to crime can consolidate a normative order,⁷ so recursivity lurks in Durkheim's theory of the relationship between anomie and crime. Durkheim himself does not deploy the concept of recursivity. We can build on Durkheim by seeing the complex recursivity of anomie contributing to violence at one historical moment. This then loops contingently to a number of different kinds of cycles: violence in the next moment shatters a society, creating cycles of more anomie and more violence; then the communal response to violence reduces anomie when the society does not shatter (when the social order holds under fire); another loop occurs when violence establishes a monopoly of force and peaceful sovereignty over a swathe of territory; yet another loop arises when domination and exclusion unravel that sovereignty in a return to cycles of anomie and violence.

While it is a simple proposition that there is an imperative to secure sovereignty and to temper sovereign power, predicting when and how these recursive loops of normative order and disorder will feed one into another is complex. All we can hope for is an understanding that all of these are recurrent dynamics. Once we grasp their complex loops, we might seek to monitor and steer them wisely with a politics of checks and balances. Predicting crime along these recursive loops has challenges akin to those facing the world at the time of writing when the Covid-19 virus is spreading. Medical experts cannot predict the speed of spread for any country, when the pandemic will die out or when it will return for further waves. While the best medical brains cannot predict the trajectories of these cycles, they can understand the character of these dynamics to inform their monitoring of them and their agency to intervene aggressively or gently as required. And the evidence seems clear that some societies have saved lives by exercising this wisdom more adeptly and assiduously than others. Social scientists are not in such a wildly inferior position to this as they seek to monitor the recursivity of diverse loops of anomie, domination and crime.

7 'Crime brings together upright consciences and concentrates them. We have only to notice what happens, particularly in a small town, when some moral scandal has just been committed. They stop each other on the street, they visit each other, they seek to come together to talk of the event and to wax indignant in common ... If the offence is serious, the whole group attacked masses itself in the face of the danger and unites' (Durkheim 1933: 102–3). War would also seem to be the kind of 'great collective shock' that brings citizens together in rituals that concentrate relational life and give people meaning and a sense of identity. From relational work in 'moments of collective ferment' are born 'the great ideals upon which civilizations rest' (Durkheim 1965: 241; 1952: 91).

In the Greek, *anomia* has the broadest meaning, which remains fertile for understanding the crimes of contemporary capitalism. It means in the Greek, literally, a condition of being without norms. The Greek etymology of ‘*anomie*’ is from *a* (‘without’) and *nomos* (‘law’ or ‘norms’). ‘Norms’ is a much wider concept than rules: it means customary expectations of behaviour that coordinate one’s interactions with others. Biblical *anomia* was lawlessness that encompassed disregard of God’s written and living word (Bible Hub 2004–21). *Anomia* encompassed a breakdown of principles as well as of rules in the original Greek meaning. Durkheim (1952) generally cleaves closer to the original Greek conception than contemporary criminologists, though Durkheim also gives *anomie* a range of more specific meanings that are used inconsistently between different works (DiCristina 2016). Durkheim’s (1933, 1952) analysis of rising crime during the Industrial Revolution in France led him to propose that the breakdown of the traditional normative order fuelled crime as well as violence against the self. For Durkheim, priests, soldiers, lawyers and magistrates were little afflicted with *anomie*, but those involved in the occupations of trade and commerce were (Durkheim 1958: 29–30). Markets drive social disintegration and the disintegration of communal regulation and self-regulation. When there is ‘abrupt growth of power and wealth ... limits are unknown between the possible and the impossible, what is just and what is unjust, legitimate claims and hopes and those that are immoderate’ (Durkheim 1952: 253). Durkheim mostly focused on rapid changes in the norms of a society (rather than normlessness) and the suicidal feelings of alienation, purposelessness and ‘insatiable appetites’ to which this gave rise.

This chapter focuses on those insights within the classical tradition, while the next chapter shifts focus to insight from *anomie Américaine* that starts with Robert K. Merton. A connection between the two is the recurrent tendency for the normative order to break down at the centres of power when power claws its way to domination and then contrives a polity that fails to temper power. ‘Greed is good’ normlessness on Wall Street recurrently threatens capitalism itself. It threatens the benefits that tempered capitalism can deliver (Chapters 6–8). The ethos of the untempered populist power of a Donald Trump or a Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines is a threat to the separated powers of the republic. So, too, is an ideology of ‘Make America Great Again’ or ‘Make China

Great Again'. Such ideology is a threat to the regulation of domination in international affairs by the normative order of a Golden Rule that can motivate the mutual benefits of international law.

Restorative inclusion and anomie

We will reveal from historical experience that the path to a low-violence society is normative integration combined with bridging capital to embrace society's outcasts within and its enemies without. Reconciliation institutions of multilevel governance hold some of the keys to that reintegration. These bridging institutions range from the high politics of the United Nations and its Security Council to interfaith dialogue between religious communities that have a history of stigmatising each other, down to community-level institutions that bridge reintegration between feuding families or fighting gangs in schools and on the street. In Jamaica, there have been two major waves of rising violence between organised crime gangs in recent history that were triggered by incidents of schoolyard bullying by the child of a gang leader that were responded to violently by children of members of a competing gang. Another such intergang 'war' started in a Dublin schoolyard.⁸ Institutions to rebuild the relevant bridges, whether in the schoolyard or UN peace negotiations between war leaders, are more likely to succeed when they are infused with values of respect towards and dignity for the feared other (Braithwaite 2002: Ch. 6). A critical element of the normative order here is that it shames disintegrative shaming; it reintegratively shames stigmatisation as it values respect, human dignity and the inclusion of former outcasts (Ahmed et al. 2001).

This book argues that the macrocriminological evidence is formidable about the complex role of anomie in inducing violence. If we build a strong normative order without also eliminating stigmatisation and strengthening reintegration, we also risk a violent society in which the strength of the normative order stimulates crime (Karstedt 2011b). While the journey towards a low-violence society has made more than promising long-run progress in many societies, it has also planted the seeds of devastating reversal. The most worrying of these remain nuclear

8 The data that describe these incidents come from police interviews I conducted in Jamaica and Ireland for Peacebuilding Compared research in 2018.

weapons, which one day—more likely by accident⁹ or perhaps by terrorist folly, rather than at the hand of a wilful great power—will cascade to a nuclear exchange. Those of us who survive it could suffer a return to a war of all against all. Nuclear war could cascade to an environmental catastrophe that in turn could return the West to something worse than the Hobbesian world left by the English Civil War or the Thirty Years' War of Catholic–Protestant religious conflict that wiped out so much of the population of Central Europe. Civility will not survive unless we do better at reinforcing the institutions that defend it. Unfortunately, the path from Hobbes to tempered modernity is littered with terrible reversals and errors of institutional design.

A great accomplishment for freedom was institutionalising a court system and a rule of law that have been remarkably successful in eliminating blood feuds. Indeed, we might say that one of the most undervalued benefits of the rule of law is that the rise of institutions like tort law allowed disputants to settle a conflict and move on without violence. Cooney's (1997) historical research developed this explanation of the long-run decline of English homicide rates. Eisner (2003: 126) also discussed sharply falling homicide rates between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries across Europe, which was the period during which some European countries institutionalised courts to discipline violence. Pinker (2011) developed it further in terms of his interpretation of how the rule of law contributed to the rise of his version of a civilising process across Europe from at least the early seventeenth century and probably even

9 On risks of accident, miscalculation, misunderstanding or technical malfunction, see Morris's (2014: 3–5) account of the 26 September 1983 decision by Stanislav Petrov to defy a 'high reliability' launch order in response to an erroneous signal of a US missile launch directed at Russia. Later that year, the neurotic Soviet Premier Yuri Andropov, confined to bed with a failing kidney, convinced himself irrationally that NATO was mobilising for a first strike, causing another panic (Morris 2014: 286). Ellsberg (2017) and Beebe (2019) provide among the most sophisticated accounts of how and why near misses of nuclear war have occurred with such worrying frequency in the past on the US, Soviet and other sides. They show why cyberwar and cybercrime that are not aimed at disabling satellite communications vital for launching retaliatory nuclear strikes are increasingly likely to be nevertheless misinterpreted as preparation for war. They explain why the authority to launch must be decentralised away from the president to reduce the risks of presidential decapitation and why generals are at risk of seeing themselves as being too late to use nuclear weapons before they lose them to an enemy strike (see also National Security Archive 2020a, 2020b; Allison 2017).

earlier (Eisner 2003).¹⁰ Yet this progress in the regulation of anomie came with the Enlightenment error of discarding the reconciliation institutions whose functions the courts took over. This is the restorative justice theory critique of Enlightenment criminal justice (Braithwaite 2002). Chapter 9 argues that state courts and state coercion are dangerous if they are not regulated by restorative justice, and restorative justice is dangerous if it is not regulated by state courts. The Hobbesian shift that occurred in the seventeenth century in Europe from the regulation of crimes up to murder by reconciliation meetings to regulation by state courts was a swing that was necessary and effective in reducing violence (Eisner 2001, 2003, 2008, 2014). But it was a pendulum that swung too far—leaving the courts insufficiently tempered by restorative justice and legal pluralism—according to this book. Valerie Braithwaite (2009b) would say it failed to find the sweet spot in the balance between Hobbesian security values and Gandhian or Confucian harmony values. The better path would have been to retain those older reconciliation institutions to operate in parallel with courts. It is possible to have a formalism that enables informalism in justice together with an informalism that enables formalism, creating constructive tension and mutual accountability, each to temper the other (Braithwaite 2002). This civic republican interpretation of the history of the effectiveness of justice institutions in preventing violence is just one special case of the more general theory of freedom achieved by tempering power.

One option is indeed to rebuild those pre-Enlightenment institutions in a contemporary way that reinvigorates restorative justice. This deserves consideration not because restorative justice is better than formal criminal law any more than the criminal law ideologues of the Enlightenment were right in believing that formal law is more civilised than reconciliation through medieval European moots. A key institutional challenge for building the low-crime, low-domination society is to bridge formal law to horizontal relational justice so people seeking justice shuttle back and

10 One of the underestimated strengths of a fair justice system is that it builds social capital, the crime-prevention strengths of which are discussed in Chapter 7. We want a society in which trust begets trust. As societies seek to enculturate trust, it is also imperative to institutionalise distrust (Braithwaite 1998). So, when we promise to work for an employer for pay, if the employer refuses to pay, we do not want to live in a society in which we have to personally threaten our employer, risking violence, to be paid. No, we want the institutionalised distrust of labour laws and labour inspectorates that force employers to obey the law. Through reliance on state regulators to institutionalise distrust with respect to the rights to protection from violence, from crooked bosses and from landlords who ignore fire safety, we create safe spaces for citizens to get on with the business of enculturating trust.

forth across those bridges, each enabling and strengthening the work of the other in protecting people from the ravages of anomie (Porter 2016, 2018). Hobbesian statism and criminology's statism have been compounded by market liberalism and New Public Management thinning out the 'relational state' (Muir and Parker 2014; Peake and Forsyth forthcoming). Punitive legalists in ancient China also worked for centuries at thinning out the relational aspects of state Confucianism that Sun Yat-sen so valued (Acemoglu and Robinson 2019: Ch. 7). This induced a wider failure of the Chinese state to keep pace with western development and western freedom in the eighteenth to twentieth centuries. That happened because its 'despotic Leviathan' was ultimately weakened by centralising bureaucratic and legal traditions that excluded societal mobilisation and political participation. It also spiralled East Asia into more widespread violence during these centuries than any continent may have suffered throughout recorded history. Acemoglu and Robinson (2019: 75) conceive of one weakness of the despotic Chinese state in competition with western states as being that it wants for state capacity driven by 'a robust society to push it, cooperate with it, or contest its power'. Paradoxically, when the Communist Party of China decided during the past decade to legislate for the biggest restorative justice program in the world with a law of the widest universality of sweep of any country, the reform failed to greatly transform because it was not backed by the restorative social movement politics that drove reform in other countries. As a result, restorative justice progress was widely trumped by the entrenched local professional interests of justice bureaucrats in legal formalism (Zhang 2021a, 2021b). This book argues that embedded autonomy (Evans 1995), the relational state, relational workplaces, relational families and relational communities form a social fabric that must be actively rebuilt.

This is a worry about modernity that we can also see in the late Durkheim (1933: 262): 'It is not enough that society take in a great many people, but they must be, in addition, intimately enough in contact to act and react on one another.' This means abandoning the way of thinking of legal scholars who conceive of Germanic moots as the justice of barbarians who destroyed Roman law when they destroyed Rome. Rather, we embrace Acemoglu and Robinson (2019: 47) when they conclude that domination was tempered through 'the marriage of the bottom-up, participatory institutions and norms of Germanic tribes and the centralizing bureaucratic and legal traditions of the Roman Empire' and the Christian church. This marriage allowed deliberative societal power to check state power, and state

power to check the power of civil society deliberation. Rulers of empires as powerful as Charlemagne had to play by the rules of general assemblies. ‘Very different types of states emerged in parts of Europe where either the Roman tradition or the bottom-up politics of the Germanic tribes were absent (such as Iceland or Byzantium)’ (Acemoglu and Robinson 2019: 47). Intriguingly, this also goes to Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2019: Ch. 13) diagnosis of what went wrong with German institutional balance in the first half of the twentieth century. They conclude that Weimar Germany descended into a vicious zero-sum battle between a state and a civil society that sought to destroy each other. German institutions lost their capacity to reconcile conflicts between the state and civil society; trust totally collapsed in a deadly winner-takes-all battle for survival in which the communists and the aristocracy were losers who rivalled the Nazis in their culpability. Acemoglu and Robinson diagnose the 1970 collapse of Chilean democracy in similar terms. The social democrats of the Weimar Republic were culpable, too. They were just learning how to be social democrats and how not to be communists in the 1920s and early 1930s. They were not social democratic enough, not Keynesian enough, resulting in worse mismanagement of the Great Depression than most societies suffered. Debt from World War I reparations rendered their challenges deeper than for other governments.

Now let us build this argument of the chapter step by step by first conceptualising anomie more clearly, then turning to whether Norbert Elias was right to discern a civilising process in the evolution of human affairs towards more effective self-regulation of excess in emotions like anger and revenge. My conclusion accords with Elias’s (1996) that human societies suffer recurrent decivilising moments in their histories. If communal, national and international societies fail to build strong institutions to regulate cascades of violence, decivilising forces triumph over civilisational dynamics of peaceful order. The subsequent chapters of this book are about what is required to prevent the descent into a downward spiral of violence and domination, including balanced capital formation, regulation of markets in crony capitalism and policies to bridge inequalities between ingroups and outcasts, between the dominated and those who dominate.

Progress towards less violent and less criminal societies has been paradoxically advanced by the armies of tyrants. The Roman legions brought Roman law to some lawless lands. Before the Romans, the Persian Empire spread the idea of carving into stone laws that bound the king

as well as his subjects across its vast empire. Genghis Khan's murderous Golden Horde re-pacified the Silk Road so bridges, interdependencies and civilisational ideas could travel it, such as the idea that the defeated Persian Empire and the defeated Chinese Empire could each be ruled by a woman. Napoleon's Grande Armée brought the French Civil Code into central and Eastern Europe to liberate serfs for the first time, ending feudalism and granting citizenship rights that applied to peasants. The Ottoman Empire successfully promoted religious tolerance among Muslims, Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians and others. All these empires had other moments when they brought tyranny and brutal militarisation and crushed freedom when freedom clashed with the empire's geopolitical objectives. When these empires disintegrated, anomie, violence and new tyrannies cascaded (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018). It is hard to imagine any colonial tyranny worse than the slave society Belgian colonialism imposed on Congo. But when Belgium recklessly pulled out without a stabilising transition to local democratic rule, civil war cascaded again and again in ways that continue to make the Democratic Republic of Congo the society of the past 25 years in which the risks of being murdered or raped may have been higher than for any country (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018: Pt I).

The age of empires ended before empires mastered the challenge of transitions that retain rule-of-law virtues left behind by the empire while building robust new guarantees of anomie prevention. Chapter 7 argues that a risk to the western world if China one day has an economic and political crisis so deep that it begins to disintegrate is that the West could suffer cascades of violence and its own collapse into depression or hyperinflation that will require vigilance against the risk of renewal of western authoritarianism. Reckless elements in western intelligence services who seek to destabilise the Chinese economy fail to understand that China played a major role in western recovery from the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and the 2020 Covid financial crisis; that the economic disintegration of China could be a bigger risk to the West than was Germany's economic disintegration after World War I. Unless we lift our imaginations to grapple with such macro-challenges that multilevel governance can and must conquer, criminology's micro-accomplishments in revealing techniques for reducing crime, in the narrowly circumscribed circumstances of today, will crumble along with the societal fabric that sustains such micro-accomplishments.

Anomie and social control

One of the four key hypotheses of control theory is that belief in the law contributes to compliance with it (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). This is the most self-evident part of control theory for many critics, as it is the most self-evident part of differential association theory (that definitions favourable to involvement in crime do encourage crime) (Sutherland 1947; Akers 1998). It need not necessarily be the case that because people have a strong belief in the law, they will be more likely to comply with it. Yet numerous empirical evaluations of control theory and learning theories of crime do support this hypothesis. Some evidence suggests that when moral belief in the law is strong, self-control does not explain crime; self-control explains crime when the normative order of strong belief in the law is absent (Schoepfer and A. Piquero 2006; Intravia et al. 2018). These data also lay a micro-foundation for the classical anomie claim that normlessness—normative breakdown—is associated with crime, as do other studies of anomie (Pridemore et al. 2007). We have seen that Karstedt and Farrall's (2006) survey data from three societies revealed a syndrome of market anomie was strongly associated with 'crimes of everyday life'. Anomic crimes of the twenty-first-century middle class, according to Farrall and Karstedt (2019), are associated with the fact that they feel squeezed between big government and big business exploitation. Farrall and Karstedt (2019) make a powerful case that it is the institutional anomie form of anomie theory discussed in the next chapter that may prove most important to explaining macro-patterns of crime. While some of their theorised coefficients are very small, in all cases, the institutional anomie path coefficients are high, as are the 'legal cynicism' coefficients.

At the meso-level, the Peacebuilding Compared research team found that in the periods and places where there was a breakdown of agreement on what were the rules of the game in Indonesia (and collapse of the consensus on who legitimately held the reins of the state), violence spiked dramatically in many hotspots across the society (Braithwaite et al. 2010a). Where anomie was less pronounced, however—which was in most places across this country—violence was stable and low. Moreover, these anomic spikes of violence occurred in the context of a diverse multicultural society of 270 million people with large cells of vibrant, violent subcultures of Islamic radicalism. Indonesia is a society that at the macrolevel has generally enjoyed a low level of violence, an imprisonment rate of less than 40 per 100,000 and a low level of anomie for most of its history, and

particularly since 2002. From 1998 to 2004 was also the period when it experienced a more formidable increase in freedom and democratisation than any country since the end of the Cold War. While democracy and the thickening of fabrics of freedom conduce to the stabilisation of anomie and legal cynicism, transition to democracy recurrently disrupts the normative order (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018). In future chapters, we will discuss the evidence for more specific versions of the anomie–crime relationship—most notably, institutional anomie theory.

A history of norms against violence since World War I

The church bells that chimed across Europe to rejoice in the 1918 armistice manifested cascade of a promising form of international social capital for a decade. This is referred to as Wilsonianism by Americans, after Woodrow Wilson, their president at the time of the armistice. It produced the League of Nations, which, while it collapsed under the weight of its failure to prevent the wars of the 1930s, laid the foundations for a second, more successful attempt with the creation of the United Nations after World War II.

Even more important were Gandhi's initial nonviolent struggles against oppression during these early decades of the twentieth century—first in South Africa, then in opposition to British colonialism in India. When Gandhi was assassinated in 1948 by a religious fanatic during the postcolonial partition of India, his project of nonviolence seemed in tatters. The most deadly war in human history had just happened in quick historical succession after World War I, and much of Asia was still in flames and would stay that way for years to come. The most violent and oppressive decades of the Apartheid regime in South Africa were still ahead of it. Gandhi's beloved India was tearing itself apart, with perhaps 2 million people murdered during the partition of Pakistan from India as Hindus murdered Muslims and Muslims killed Hindus, with many Christians and Sikhs also caught up in the slaughter. Yet Figure 3.1 shows that when Gandhi started his campaigns, nonviolent activism for maximalist political change (such as from colonialism, from dictatorship to democracy or some other regime change) barely existed on a planet plundered by violence. What Gandhi and his comrades laid was a platform for nonviolent struggle to overtake armed revolutionary struggle as the

dominant strategy for regime change (as Figure 3.1 reveals). Gandhian nonviolence as an alternative to armed struggle became as influential among western activists (Scalmer 2011) as it was among eastern and southern revolutionaries.

Figure 3.1 Nonviolent and violent uprisings

Sources: Author's graph, with thanks to Erica Chenoweth (2016a, 2016b: 2) for access to her Major Episodes of Contention dataset.

The chimes of the church bells of 1918 were silenced when hyperinflation, the Great Depression and the rise of fascism crushed the League of Nations along with the trust and hopes of peace-loving people everywhere. First, Japanese militarism started wars in Asia from 1928. Then, in 1936, the Spanish Civil War between fascists and republicans delivered four decades of fascist rule by General Francisco Franco, Benito Mussolini's Italian invasion of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somaliland, and even fascists on the streets of Sydney. Finally, Nazis sought to conquer all of Europe. Yet good scholars of crime argue that before that great collapse of financial capital that cascaded to a deep crash of international social capital after 1929 there had been what Norbert Elias (1982) interpreted as a long-run civilising process (Eisner 2001, 2008, 2014; Pinker 2011; Broadhurst et al. 2018).

The crime statistics for western nations suggest the Great Depression was near the beginning of the bottom of a long U-curve in wealthy countries. The U plunged downwards for almost 100 years following a slight upturn in crime that ended around 1840. This slight upturn to 1840 ended after western societies began to work out how to manage the rapid urbanisation and urban crime that had accelerated alongside industrialisation (Braithwaite 1989: 111–18). Crime in most western countries stayed near the bottom of that U from the end of World War I, through the Great Depression, through the stagnant years of the 1930s when fascism grew, the World War II years and the postwar 1940s and 1950s, actually falling slightly at the bottom of the U across these decades right through to 1960 (Eisner 2008).

There were many books (including Braithwaite 1979) that tried to make sense of why crime did not spike during and after the 1930s depression by pointing out that inequality reduced as a result of the depression because, as great as the suffering of the poor was, the rich suffered an even greater decline in their income and wealth. The rich did most of the jumping from tall buildings, while the poor kept plugging away at what had always been bad circumstances. The great welfare state initiatives of the New Deal and its progressive tax policies were also game changers of domination reduction. While the Spanish Civil War and Italian, German and Japanese militarist expansionism were destroying freedom across a devastated planet, the 1939 outbreak of ‘world war’ was unifying for the combatant countries on both sides. Unity overcame anomie, promoting great national progress in building social capital among what some of the Allied powers called their Greatest Generation. The Greatest Generation trope is one of how a generation born amid the suffering of World War I endured the hardship of the Great Depression and World War II to steer western societies to the peaceful, reconstructive civility of the 1950s.

Yet we have seen that when that Greatest Generation of the western Allies occupied Germany, they raped massive numbers of German and Austrian women and that Australian occupying troops even did that around Hiroshima.¹¹ When the Greatest Generation returned from the war,

11 Yuri Tanaka (2018: 115–16) describes the precarious survival of one Japanese rape victim who was violated by no fewer than 20 Australian soldiers and abandoned in a wasteland. One of the Japanese sex workers from Kure (Hiroshima's port), most of whom had lost all their relatives in Hiroshima, said: ‘Most of the people in Kure stayed inside their houses, and pretended they knew nothing about the rape by occupation forces. The Australian soldiers were the worst. They dragged young women into their jeeps, took them to the mountain, and then raped them. I heard them screaming for help nearly every night. A policeman from the Hiroshima police station came to me, and asked me to work as a prostitute for the Australians—he wanted me and other prostitutes to act as a sort of “firebreak” so that the young women wouldn’t get raped. We agreed to do this, and contributed greatly’ (Tanaka 2018: 115).

they threw their own generation of women who had kept the factories running during the war out of their jobs and put them back into domestic servitude just as surely as they put African-American and Aboriginal Australian war heroes back into servitude. President Roosevelt's World War II political leaders imprisoned a generation of Japanese-Americans for no crime beyond being Japanese. In Canada, great universities terminated the enrolments of Japanese-Canadian students for no better reason than the fact they were ethnically Japanese. My dear mother lost two husbands to the Sandakan Death Marches in North Borneo; her second husband (my father) was one of six who survived, compared with the 2,428 Australian and British soldiers and thousands of Asian slave labourers who perished at Sandakan. When Australian troops took North Borneo, they sent hundreds of Japanese prisoners-of-war to their deaths in a counter death march (R. Braithwaite 2016). When an Australian wing commander noticed that not all of the civilian housing of Dresden had been incinerated by the firebombing of 1945, he ordered his bombers to go around one more time to spread the conflagration fully across the remaining civilian housing (Taylor 2005: 326).

Australians from that Greatest Generation played important roles in developing the atomic bombs that decimated the innocents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. One was a kind professor at my university whom I greatly admired. The Greatest Generation persuaded us that this war crime was not a war crime at all, but the only way fanatical Japanese could be persuaded to end the war. Our education did not invite us to question this, even though the evidence for it was thin. The Greatest Generation did not inform us that there had been advocacy by scientists for a demonstration explosion that would not be a mass atrocity, which they believed could have persuaded the Japanese to surrender. This was the Greatest Generation who continued to lead the alleged civilising process through the 1950s.

The 1960s saw the beginnings of political resistance to the politics of this generation by their children, particularly resistance to the ruthlessness of the politics of combating communism by promoting wars, coups and political assassinations in the Global South (Chomsky 1969). Crime and drug abuse also began to escalate steeply in the 1960s. They continued to do so through the 1970s and 1980s and into the 1990s in many western countries. LaFree and Drass (2002: 782) found that homicide rates for the period 1956–98 moved in a 'positive direction' for 88 per cent of industrialised and industrialising countries and showed 'rapid growth' for

65 per cent of them. The past 30 years have seen my rebellious, criminal baby-boomer generation all safely transitioned to the calm waters of their 60s and 70s. During this period when we baby boomers aged, crime rates fell across most of the western world (Aebi and Linde 2014). Lappi-Seppälä and Lehti (2014: 146) showed that western homicide rates increased from 1960 to the early 1990s and then declined. That decline from the 1990s until 2010 in the west was counterbalanced by an increase in Latin America. Latin America had become a crucial supply region for the widespread habits of drug abuse that took off during the youth of the baby boomers. Fajnzylber et al.'s (1998: 28) results show that the Latin American countries that had the highest drug production had the highest homicide rates:

[A] rise in drug trafficking, as in Colombia in the 1970s, can raise the national crime rate. The econometric results suggest that the rise in the crime rate may be felt long after the initial shock—countries can be engulfed in a crime wave. (Fajnzylber et al. 1998: 31; see also Briceño-León et al. 2008)

Violence in Latin America also escalated when leftist political movements from the 1950s to the 1990s—many inspired by the triumph of Castro and Che Guevara in Cuba—were suppressed murderously by authoritarian regimes. So, Latin America in this period of history suffered a series of civil wars and drug wars that cascaded to street violence (Chapter 11).

American criminology created a new industry around explaining the great crime drop in the West from the 1990s (Blumstein and Wallman 2000). One reason so little of it was especially convincing was because it advanced so many contradictory explanations, including some to do with the brilliant work of the criminal justice system through the elevated imprisonment of felons or 'broken windows policing', for example. These were distinctively American explanations, when the same crime drop was evident right across the western world. Eisner's (2008, 2014) data show that these trends were synchronised to a remarkable degree across Western, central and southern Europe, the United States, Canada and Australia in the sense that in every one of his country cases the upturn started close to 1960. And in every country case the crime drop started close to 1992. The 'average year' across Europe for the start of the homicide rise is the same year as the start of the homicide rise in the United States, 1960. The average year of its end, 1992, is the same as the US date of the end of the crime rise. What varies is the magnitude of the rise and fall.

Hence, Eisner (2008) argues that US-centric explanations like broken-windows policing are unpersuasive. They leave unanswered why policing or deterrence policies could explain the phenomenon when deterrence and policing policies were moving every which way across these disparate countries (and indeed within different cities inside the United States). Another complication pointed out by Farrall and Karstedt (2019) is that ‘crimes of the middle class’, which have exceptionally low detection rates, seem to have increased sharply since 1992. This was partly driven by their finding that access to the internet doubled both middle-class victimisation and middle-class offending. Admittedly, these are mostly rather minor crimes. Farrall and Karstedt (2019: Ch. 8) point out that arrests for fraud and embezzlement have risen notably in the United States since 1988, as they have in other societies.

More fundamentally, the project of explaining the crime drop anywhere since 1992 aims at the wrong target. A better target is why crime increased so steeply across the West between 1960 and 1992. That is the period of exception, not the crime drop. Since 1992, the western world has been back on the same basic downward trajectory for violence that it had been on since at least the sixteenth century, though the US homicide rate turned back up in very recent years (Krajicek 2017), with one of the factors being what Chapter 11 interprets as a cascade effect with mass shootings, and perhaps with police shootings escalating anomie during the Trump presidency, even though police murders are almost never counted as homicides. Worldwide deaths from armed conflict have also reversed again to be up quite sharply since Pinker’s (2011) book was published. The number of major civil wars tripled in the past decade, with battle deaths increasing even more steeply, after both declined throughout the 1990s and 2000s (von Einsiedel 2017). This is in spite of President Trump, who campaigned against the Bush–Obama wars, promised not to cascade any new ones and kept that promise as president. Communist China so far has been even less of a provocateur of wars than the United States, so we have seen a shift from great power rivalry as the great provoker of civil war to organised crime groups seeking wealth and power as the more important instigators of war (von Einsiedel 2017), thereby also blurring ever more profoundly the war versus crime distinction in armed killing. Most of the rise in civil war of the past decade was a cascading of recurrent wars rather than the start of new ones (von Einsiedel 2017: 3). Another decade of data has been sufficient to reach the conclusion that Pinker’s (2011) civilising account was too simple and too linear.

Broadly, we would want to identify an explanation that accounts for something that changed in 1992 that was also going on until 1960, but not between 1960 and 1992. Eisner (2008) therefore questions the explanations for the crime drop related to shifts in the nature of capitalism that were occurring just as swiftly, if not more so, in the 32 crime-rise years before 1992. It would be tedious to track through all the US-centric explanations for the crime drop that fail to explain why this also occurs in so many countries that do not share the US-centric explanation, and that fail to also explain the preceding crime rise. Eisner (2008) has already done an excellent job of this explanation-by-explanation critique. I also do not argue that all this US-centric assessment of its crime drop gets it wrong in every way. Movements in crime rates are driven by complexes of multilevel micro and macro factors. It is just that for a book on macrocriminology, I agree with Eisner that the more exciting challenge is to search for macro explanations that might make more sense of the totality of the pattern in the data.

Eisner (2001, 2003, 2008) could be more self-critical of his own more cultural explanations that draw on Elias's civilising process, on similarities between Emile Durkheim's sociology and Elias and on Max Weber's (2002) *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. He does concede that culture is an 'elusive concept'; however, 'systems of values and ideas, when embedded in social institutions, do have the potential of changing everyday routines and interaction patterns' (Eisner 2003: 130). Exactly what these institutions are, however, is not developed in detail by Eisner. He finds a strong negative association between homicide and book production per capita across time and interprets this as being associated with institutions of self-discipline that diffused reading and writing skills—monasteries and schools (Eisner 2014: 107). Protestant institutions are clearly important candidates for Max Weber. Yet the preference of the analysis in this book will be to argue that the explosion of Protestantism into the Thirty Years' War initially decivilised Europe in a major way. After that, why were the institutions that Eisner believed did the embedding of the great civilising cultural changes: a) strengthening until 1960 (reflected in declining homicide rates between 1840 and World War I, though with an only slightly declining trend between World War I and 1960) (Eisner 2008: 296); b) weakening between 1960 and 1992 with the decivilising crime rise; and c) strengthening again after 1992, with homicide mostly falling again?

We could excuse ourselves, as Eisner does to a degree in his early work, from an obligation to explain the shifts since World War II by saying that they are small compared with the cumulative shifts of the six centuries before that. Yet we would expect a mostly unidirectional trend over many centuries to be large compared with trends that flatten (1920–60), reverse up (1960–92) and then reverse down (after 1992) in less than 100 years (Eisner 2008: 296). It would be wrong to say that the rise in crime between 1960 and 1992 of 179 per cent (averaged from the low to the high for 14 European countries) (Eisner 2008: 305) is a small trend across a short period. Under any normal social science interpretation, this trend is large, long and rather consistent, at least for the West. So, it will not do to dismiss it as small. Eisner (2008: 308) points out that a doubling of European homicide rates between 1960 and 1992 is small compared with differences that were more than 50 times as great for one period compared with another across the late Middle Ages and even perhaps for the United States between the seventeenth and the twenty-first centuries (see Footnote 3). However, Eisner notes that actually the rise in robbery rates in Europe after 1960 was of the same order (approaching a fiftyfold increase). Robbery was almost a nonexistent crime in 1950s Europe, and indeed in 1950s Russia and China perhaps even more so, as argued in Chapter 2. We must also bear in mind that the long-run rise in homicide between 1960 and 1992 was in fact kept artificially low by improvements in ambulance response times and medical care that increased the survival prospects of people stabbed or shot.

A suggestion for reinforcing the wonderful strengths of Eisner's analyses is to invoke militarisation (and how this connects to anomie) as a complementary institutional explanation of the trends since 1840. This is not a totalising explanation, but one to add into his mix of explanations towards building a comprehensive account of the macro patterns. It starts with what Eric Hobsbawm described as the comparatively peaceful 'long nineteenth century' ending with World War I, in comparison with warlike previous European history up to the defeat of Napoleon. Europe saw a comparatively peaceful take-off of capitalism for a century once the bloody Napoleonic Wars were settled. This was followed by the violence of *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991* (Hobsbawm 1994). Braithwaite and D'Costa (2018) concluded that, during the 107 years after 1911, cascades of militarisation drove cascades of violence. Chapter 11 takes up this evidence and also discusses the evidence of how war cascades to elevated postwar crime rates.

There is, furthermore, a great deal of evidence that wars or mass killings in one country cascade to heightened probabilities of further wars or mass killings in that country and in neighbouring countries (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018; Sambanis 2001; Gleditsch 2002, 2007; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Ward and Gleditsch 2002; A. Braithwaite 2016; Houweling and Siccama 1985, 1988; Chenoweth and Perkoski 2017). Alex Braithwaite and Li (2007), Braithwaite and Johnson (2012) and Braithwaite and Chu (2018) show quantitatively that terrorist incidents cascade from and cluster at geographical hotspots within and between societies. Chapter 11 argues that cascades of violence and militarisation are so powerful because: a) war cascades to more war; b) war cascades to crime; c) crime cascades to more crime; and d) crime cascades to war. Hence, a macro approach requires that we should not be overly criminological and should be open to explanations of violence as war–crime–war violence.

Eisner (2008: 311) makes the good point that culture is his 'favourite candidate' for explaining the trends because it is 'the only phenomenon that travels fast enough to affect such vast areas roughly simultaneously'. Braithwaite and D'Costa (2018) argue that war cascades rapidly and with wider effects than people notice through their historical reading. They cannot see it without examining the documented data on how widely the cascade effects of militarism run. Consider how historically rapidly so many countries joined World War I and World War II. Of the dozens of countries involved in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia and North America, in both cases, the slowest cascade was to the United States, which was not so slow, taking just a few years for both World War I and World War II to unsettle its peace. Braithwaite and D'Costa (2018) argue that nonviolence is a cascade phenomenon as well, but sadly, while violence cascades fast, nonviolence cascades slowly.

Eisner (2014) invokes David Garland's (2001) *Culture of Control* and Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) control theory as pointing to cultural factors that might be effective in reducing homicide. The explanatory theory of reintegrative shaming (Braithwaite 1989; Ahmed et al. 2001) goes along with this to a degree because it explicitly integrates control theory into a more complex and macrostructural theory of interdependence, inequality, shame without stigma and reintegration. Yet there is not much explanatory power in explaining behaviour that is out of control, like most murder, with a want of self-control as the independent variable. Explaining hate speech with hatefulness might be accurate, but it does not get us as

far as our explanatory ambition should take us. Moreover, Braithwaite and D'Costa's (2018) data support Gerlach's (2010) conclusion that extremely violent societies are not violent in some cultural or essential way. Rather, societies often rapidly transition in and out of extremely violent periods of their histories as a result of crises (as discussed further in Chapter 11).

When Eisner (2014) shows that, presumably because alcohol reduces self-control, historical levels of alcohol consumption move up and down in unison with homicide rates, here there are at least specific institutional policies we can consider to reduce alcohol consumption in order to reduce violent crime. These policy levers connect to alcohol regulatory institutions for markets in drug addiction and educational institutions, among others. The macrocriminologist is interested in explanations that connect to the macrosociology of institutions, including health regulatory institutions (as invoked by institutional anomie theory and as discussed in Chapter 8).

When war conquers anomie

This chapter has already argued that anomie quite often helps explain both military violence and crime. However, military violence that is an existential threat to a society can unify it in a Durkheimian way, conquering anomie, as we saw with the discussion around World War II's Greatest Generation. At least the martial conquest of anomie is possible when the war is not being fought on the streets of one's capital. This is what we mean by recursivity that can be built from Durkheim's approach to the relationship between anomie and violence. Violence can be reacted to by strengthened social cohesion; this explains violence control in Durkheim (including explanation of self-violence, suicide). We can understand broad patterns of violence and crime in terms of the crosscutting effects of militarisation on two key variables: anomie and the legitimisation of violence. Because war normalises violence, families can suffer much violence when veterans return home. Family violence is rarely reported and may not show up sharply in crime statistics. Especially when a soldier suffers post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) for their country, the family is inclined to forgive and the society is inclined to look away and even institutionalise reintegrative legal innovations like Veterans' Courts. But the criminality committed in public spaces by brutalised war veterans and their brutalised children (mainly as male-on-male violence) may show up

more visibly. Recent Australian data show greatly elevated levels of drug abuse, alcoholism, PTSD, suicide risk and even rape among the children of Vietnam veterans (Commonwealth of Australia 2014; Chapter 11, this volume). Direct effects are also important, as evidenced by the datum (suppressed by the state and the media) that *at least* 36 per cent of US mass shooters were trained by the US military and by the datum that many mass shooters dress and act as if they are in the military during their crime (Swanson 2021).

Militarisation constitutes an institutional form that incubates a violent culture in which violence is legitimated rather than shameful. This is a way of adding an institutional layer of understanding to the institutional change already identified by Elias. Like Eisner (2008: 305), I read Elias's civilising process as 'reintegrative'. Elias articulates how violence becomes progressively more shameful during the civilising process (Braithwaite 1993). Hence, Braithwaite (1989) and Ahmed et al. (2001) long sought to understand historical trends in crime and other forms of violence in terms of patterns of reintegrative shaming, shame acknowledgement over violence and humble pride in nonviolence. In most cases, when someone wrongs a person, that person will not even contemplate solving this problem by murdering the person who committed the wrong. We refrain from murder because murder is unthinkable to us; it is right off our deliberative agenda. We do not decide against murdering the person who provokes us because we calculate the probabilities that we will be caught or the severity of the punishment (as discussed in Chapter 9).

A main game of criminology is therefore about understanding how this 'thinkable-ness' of murder *is* occasionally constituted. When soldiers return from war, their training and their battlefield experience have actively desensitised them to the unthinkable-ness of killing, and indeed rape. When the normalisation of violence they experienced in the military affects their childrearing, their male children, but also their female children, learn that one path to getting their way is violence and domination of the other. Violent male patriarchs may not have happy marriages; their children have little idea of what a happy marriage looks like. Yet those children can learn that violence is how to get one's way; threats and domination work in the practices of their male role model in getting what they want. Likewise, when children see that self-harm is thinkable when their veteran parents manage emotional problems through contemplating self-harm, violence against the self becomes an

option their children are more open to consider. These are some of the war–crime cascade dynamics diagnosed in Braithwaite and D’Costa (2018), but only some of them.

Actually, militarisation as an explanation of violence is forcefully present in the writing of Eisner (2014)¹² and Elias. Yet the institutional layers of concern to Elias constitute a much wider canvas than militarisation. We turn now to that wider canvas.

Cascading nonviolent norms across the past millennium

Braithwaite’s (1993) exegesis on Elias argued that Elias saw shame as being in the ascendent rather than declining during the past 700 years. Two related structural changes were important in the rise of social disapproval as the predominant form of social control: the growth of the state as a monopolist of physical force and the proliferation of a more elaborate division of labour. The process is illustrated by the transformation of the nobility from a class of knights into a class of courtiers as physical force was progressively monopolised by a monarch. The monopolisation of force created pacified social spaces. Prior to this pacification, with violence an unavoidable and everyday event, ‘a strong and continuous moderation of drives and affects is neither necessary, possible nor useful’ (Elias 1982: 236). A feudal era with a warrior upper class was a threat not only to the safety of warriors themselves, but also to all people.

The members of the warrior upper class enjoyed extraordinary freedom in living out their feelings and passions through uninhibited satisfaction of sexual pleasure and gratification of vengeful impulses through acts

12 Eisner (2014: 17), in discussing results from Ross’s (1985) studies of 90 small-scale traditional societies, helpfully points out that: ‘Violence was found to be high in societies with harsh socialization practices (.22) and lacking affectionate socialization practices (–.31). This would suggest that levels of violence are transmitted over generations through a socialization pattern that emphasizes the warrior abilities of young men and that promotes notions of masculine honour and toughness. Interestingly, though, the effects of both socialization variables became non-significant once the variable measuring external conflict (i.e. war) was added to the equation. This probably suggests, as Ember and Ember (1994) have argued, that external conflict promotes more martial and aggressive socialization practices, which in turn lead to higher levels of internal conflict.’ Like Ross (1985), Ember and Ember (1994) found from a multivariate analysis of Murdoch and White’s Standard Cross-Cultural Sample of 186 societies that the frequency of external wars and socialisation for aggression were important predictors of homicide.

of torture and dismemberment. This is consistent with the evidence we have on the extraordinarily high levels of homicide in the Middle Ages (Gurr 1980: 44). The evidence suggests a substantial downward trend in violent crime in England from the thirteenth century extending well into the twentieth century—a trend Gurr (1981) attributes in part to the strengthening of internal controls against violence (see also Garland 1990: 233–34). During the sixteenth century, according to Elias, unrestrained passion became less a source of power and more an impediment to it. The affective make-up of the nobility changed as warriors became courtiers (whence ‘courtesy’), peddling influence at the court of a monarch who monopolised force (Braithwaite 1993: 3).

As La Bruyère wrote: ‘Life at court is a serious melancholy game, which requires of us that we arrange our pieces and our batteries, have a plan, follow it, foil that of our adversary’ (quoted in Elias 1982: 270). Gradually, the sword became less important than words and intrigue in competing for career success. This happened because the court of an absolute monarch was a social formation in which a great many people were continuously dependent on one another. Elias likened the court to a stock exchange, where the value of each individual was continually being formed and assessed. The most important determinants of this value were ‘the favour he enjoys with the king, the influence he has with other mighty ones, his importance in the play of courtly cliques’. In this subtle game of building value in a diplomatic market, ‘physical force and direct affective outbursts are prohibited and a threat to existence’ (Elias 1982: 271). What was demanded of each participant was self-control and exact knowledge of every other player with whom they were interdependent. Loss of affective control could debase the currency of one’s courtly reputation, threatening one’s whole position at court:

A man who knows the court is master of his gestures, of his eyes and his expression; he is deep, impenetrable. He dissimulates the bad turns he does, smiles at his enemies, suppresses his ill-temper, disguises his passions, disavows his heart, acts against his feelings. (Elias 1982: 272)

Elias illustrated how the affective structure of the warrior class was doomed through cases of bold and brave knights like the Duke of Montmorency being sidelined by consummate courtiers such as Cardinal Richelieu (Elias 1982: 279).

The role of the court and its associated institutions in dismantling the violent apparatus of feudalism remained influential for many centuries, even in England, where the court waned earlier than on the Continent as the preeminent site for politicking. The eighteenth-century reign of Beau Nash at the quasi-court of Bath civilised country squires by hastening the disappearance of the sword as the proper adornment of a gentleman's thigh; as a result, the settling of disagreements with cold steel became increasingly infrequent (Trevelyan 1985: 385). Similarly, among humbler males, stabbing was replaced with the 'civilised' rules of fair play of the boxing ring (Braithwaite 1993: 4).

In his comments on a draft of this book, Manuel Eisner commented that in his data from the *Interactive London Medieval Murder Map* (2018), goldsmiths were the most murderous actors, and much more murderous than the warrior class. Even the boxing ring came to be viewed as uncivilised in early Victorian times, and withered away, only to be revived in the twentieth century. Trevelyan (1973: 504) quaintly described it as a 'largely American' preoccupation, 'tempered with gloves'. State formation further aided Elias's civilising process by creating large zones of pacification that allowed the capitalism of transport, trade and money to circulate in ever greater safety. The rise of state security went hand in hand with the rise of markets that made trust-building and 'chains of interdependence' imperative for wealth creation. This interdependence and trust were the heart of financial capital and social capital formation (Chapter 7); unrestrained violence was a threat to social and financial capital formation.

Elias, like Nathan Harris (2001), does not distinguish guilt from shame because self-control is about the internalisation of macro-cultural imperatives of emergent modernity. The conflict expressed in shame–fear is not merely a conflict of the individual with prevalent social opinion; the individual's behaviour has brought them into conflict with the part of themselves that represents this social opinion (Elias 1982: 292). Elias illustrates with how shame works in the emotions required to manage travel on roads:

One should think of the country roads of a simple warrior society with a barter economy. With a few exceptions, there is very little traffic; the main danger which man here represents for other men is an attack by soldiers or thieves. When people look around them, scanning the trees and hills or the road itself, they do so primarily because they must always be prepared for armed attack, and only

secondarily because they have to avoid collision. Life on the main roads of this society demands a constant readiness to fight, and free play of the emotions in defence of one's life or possessions from physical attack. Traffic on the main roads of a big city in the complex society of our time demands a quite different moulding of the psychological apparatus. Here the danger of physical attack is minimal. Cars are rushing in all directions; pedestrians and cyclists are trying to thread their way through the melee of cars; policemen stand at the main crossroads to regulate the traffic with varying success. But this external control is founded on the assumption that every individual is himself regulating his behaviour with the utmost exactitude in accordance with the necessities of this network. The chief danger that people here represent for others results from someone in this bustle losing his self-control. A constant and highly differentiated regulation of one's own behavior is needed for the individual to steer his way through the traffic. (Elias 1982: 233–34)

In summary, then, militarised relationships as paths to power, travel and security are progressively replaced in Elias with market relationships that require interdependence as paths to wealth and power. Interdependence, moreover, is vital for survival in urban life with its complex division of labour and multiplication of norms that regulate markets.

Thinking about decivilising exceptions

One clue as to where improved explanations of homicide trends since World War II might lie comes from Eisner's (2008: 307) text where he says: '[W]ith two exceptions (Finland and France, the latter because of the increased levels of homicide during the Algerian War) about 40–60 percent of the variation are represented by the joint trend' (all the European cases unified along the same homicide trend line).

Eisner's clue is to advance the extreme brutality of the Algerian civil war as a reason for the French exception to the general pattern of postwar homicide (with French homicides increasing from World War II and in the 1950s, when homicide was falling in the rest of the West, stabilising, then declining from 1994 to the 2018 UNODC homicide rate of 1.2). France mobilised 1.5 million troops to fight the Algerian war of independence between 1954 and 1962. During the peak years of fighting between 1956 and 1962, France averaged 470,000 troops fighting in Algeria;

25,600 never came home. Some 150,000 Algerian combatants perished and 350,000 to 1 million civilians were killed in a bloodbath close to France and vivid in the French imagination. From the 1950s, it also had troops fighting in other colonies, such as Indochina, as France resisted the decolonisation path agreed with President Roosevelt as World War II ended—a path the British and Dutch empires were taking at that time, and that the Spanish and Portuguese had mostly taken a century earlier.

Now I have five more clues that are also about war that have captured my imagination. This is not the same as saying they are necessarily clues with any generally evocative character. The second clue is the analysis of Broadhurst et al. (2015, 2018) that violence started to fall very sharply and more or less continuously in Cambodia within a couple of years of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) finishing its work, and peace finally consolidating in the country. This sharp drop in crime and violence came after the long Indochina war, after genocide in Cambodia and then a Vietnamese invasion that started with border clashes in 1975, followed by a full invasion and regime change that removed the Khmer Rouge in 1977. According to UNODC, the homicide rate peaked in 1998 in Cambodia at 6.8—somewhat later than in the West—and did not come down to the level of most western countries until it settled at 1.8 for much of the past decade. The pattern is broadly the same, however, even though the rates of homicide and armed killing fell six years later and more steeply than in the West. The combination of this pattern of comparability with the West and the steepness of the decline in violence from large-scale genocide to below-average homicide (in global terms) holds the appeal of this clue. We will see that the decline in Rwanda to a below-average homicide rate after its genocide bears comparison with Cambodia.

A third clue is a much more major exception. It is the transcontinental exceptionalism of Latin America and the Caribbean. In Amy Nivette's (2011) meta-analysis of cross-national predictors of crime, the strongest mean effects were a Latin America and Caribbean regional dummy variable, with Latin American and Caribbean countries having much higher homicide rates than the rest of the world. A close second across the studies in Nivette's meta-analysis was income inequality. Latin American homicide rates, furthermore, *increased* formidably both before and after the great western crime decline from 1992 (LaFree and Drass 2002: 786–87), but especially strongly from 1990. As with France and Cambodia, in Latin America, we interpret the rise in interpersonal violence during the

long-run crime drop in the West as a consequence of brutalisation by war and state violence. While the decline in state violence and war deaths in France and Cambodia saw recovery from that brutalisation after a notable lag, there has been no recovery yet in Latin America because state violence and war deaths are driven less by classic civil war than by a war on drugs that is ongoing. Likewise, we will now see clues of a brutalisation effect in Europe and long lags to recovery from the brutalisation of waves of wars in the early centuries of the second millennium. These waves included the Hundred Years' War and the Thirty Years' War (1618–48).

A fourth clue is particularly speculative, based as it is on much more limited data, with more vexing comparability issues, than we have on the first three clues. This is that England may have experienced a sharp rise in homicide rates starting in the mid-1200s and peaking in the mid-1300s, when the only homicide rate of 100 per 100,000 is recorded (Eisner 2014: 80). During the first half of the 1200s, before this crime rise, most of Eisner's (2001: 622) estimates are not far above 10 per 100,000 (though some are below 10, and two are below five). While homicide rates start to decline in the decades after 1350, these decades are still an exceptionally high homicide period. The decades after the 1350 peak are the last period in the dataset when all estimates are far above 10 per 100,000. Ninety per cent of datapoints after those decades that follow the 1350 peak are well below 10; *all* are below 10 after 1630. A steep rise in homicide appears to occur after those early decades of the 1200s, culminating around 1350 with estimates of more than 50 and as high as one hundred. While these data on rises in crime rates are from long ago, the English datapoints are much denser than for any other country in Eisner's (2001, 2003, 2014, 2017) data, which synthesises the research of many historians, and in any data that can currently be accessed by criminologists.

These are data that have been particularly influential in the big-sweep interpretations of Steven Pinker (2011). Note that this—the sharpest crime rise we can suspect in English history¹³—occurs during and after an exceptionally bloody and long warlike period, even for British history. It comes with large lags after unusually tumultuous invasions of England by the Vikings ending in 1066, by the Norman Conquest starting when the Viking invasions ended, followed by many Saxon revolts, the first three Crusades that started in 1096 and ended in 1192 and many and

13 For updated data on the sharpness of this rise for all of Europe, see Eisner (2014: 88).

varied revolts of barons. This was followed *during* the century and a half of homicide rises until 1350 and beyond by further Crusades and barons' wars, the bloody Wars of Scottish Independence that ran from 1296 to 1357 and then the Hundred Years' War, starting in 1337. Datapoints for England then disappeared during the latter part of the Hundred Years' War, which may have been the bloodiest period of European history since the defeat of the Roman Empire. Datapoints for England do not resume until the late 1500s, when all estimates are around or well below 10 per 100,000 (Eisner 2001: 622). While these early data are low in reliability, they are at least English data, and it may be the only place where criminologists can see anything like a 1,000 per cent increase in homicide rates in any 100-year period. This is a clue about the possible importance of periods of history that are militarised in a protracted and widespread way in the case of the Hundred Years' War and the Crusades, which affected and brutalised thinking across wide swathes of Christendom.

Apart from the steep decline in homicide from 1840 until World War I that is apparent for all of Europe (Eisner 2008: 296; see also Spierenburg 2008), the second period where a more complex pattern of sharp decline in homicide is evident in Eisner's (2003: 95) European data is in the 1600s. Homicide rates halved between the periods 1600–50 (the Thirty Years' War era) and 1650–1700 in Europe (Eisner 2014: 80–81). No other comparison of two adjacent 50-year periods approaches the steepness of this drop. This is followed by a period from the late 1600s to the late 1700s when there is no visible decline.¹⁴ The sharpest decline in Eisner's (2001: 626; 2014: 80) data for this period comes at the end of the Thirty Years' War (1618–48) for Germany. Germany's average homicide rate for the period 1600–50 is 10; for 1650–1700, it is three (Eisner 2014: 80). This is our fifth clue. What we now call Germany was the part of Europe that suffered the most extreme horrors of the Thirty Years' War, which was even more deadly than the Hundred Years' War three centuries earlier, and the third most deadly war (after World Wars I and II in battlefield deaths as a percentage of the world population) (Ferguson 2006: xxxv). So, it is significant to note that the German homicide rate was more than three times as high between 1600–50 compared with 1650–1700. The Thirty Years' War may not have been as protracted as the Hundred Years'

14 Eisner's Table 2 (2003: 95) creates a misleading impression of average homicide rates falling sharply from the seventeenth century (average of 11) to the eighteenth century (average, 3.2) when the fall occurred from very high levels to very low levels inside the seventeenth century, then relative stability from the late 1600s to the late 1700s, then sharp decline again in the late 1700s.

War or the Crusades, but it was even more bloody and savage and so radically reshaped a macro-politics of inclusion, exclusion, stigmatisation and heresy across Christendom from which Northern Ireland has yet to recover.

We saw in Footnote 3 that English migrants who populated what became the United States after the American Revolution experienced homicide rates up to 50 times those of the England they left for a society seeking to expand its frontiers through force of arms and without settled institutions in those frontier zones. This was when a good number of them, such as the Quakers who went to Pennsylvania and other religious minorities who fled to North America, were pacifists! This early American exceptionalism is a sixth clue. William Penn worked sincerely at his pacifism and inclusion, but in the end, Pennsylvania was pacified by other men's guns, militarisation and indigenous genocide.

My six clues, it should be clear, are all about war and about long lags of the brutalisation effects of war on crime. Latin America and the Caribbean are such a macro-clue that cautions against thinking too narrowly about what counts as an armed conflict that cascades to crime. It vindicates Braithwaite and D'Costa's (2018: 309–10) choice to define an armed conflict broadly as one in which 'one armed group with a command structure is engaged in group attacks with weapons on another armed group with a command structure'. Mexican, Salvadorian and Colombian drug wars very much satisfy this definition. The Latin American clue also vindicates the possible importance of militarisation as 'control or shaping of other institutions by the military and imbuing other institutions with a military character' (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018: 320).

These are only six clues towards inductive inference that might shape macrocriminological theory. They are not systematic quantitative analyses designed to refute the hypotheses they invoke. The final sections of Chapter 2 and Chapter 8 discuss what this would require. The six clues are just a journey making inductive theory-building transparent, as is the declaration that they are influenced by the macrocriminological induction in Braithwaite and D'Costa (2018) that war cascades to crime and crime cascades to further crime (Braithwaite 2020a), as crime and war cascade to further crime and war (Chapter 11). Next, I suggest that we can better understand why they might be evocative clues by considering the story of the unprecedented levels of war violence globally between 1911 and 1953.

Global decivilisation (1911–1953)?

The world can be interpreted as suffering a cataclysmic decivilising shift, in Elias's (1982) terms, across 42 years from 1911 to 1953. Or, at least, it suffered cascades of war at a scale of killing never seen before in human history (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018). I mark its beginning with the 1911 Italian invasion of Libya, which may have caused half the population of that country to lose their lives. This continued through Balkan wars that further broke up the Ottoman Empire and finally brought us to World War I (1914–18). Japan sent troops to China to block the union of Manchuria with the Chinese Nationalist cause in 1928, commencing 17 years of Japanese militarism across many corners of Asia and the Pacific. Then, from the mid-1930s, fascist parties in Spain, Italy and Germany began to promote multiple wars that culminated 11 years later with the end of World War II. In the years immediately after World War II, many wars of nation-building and ethnic cleansing raged across Europe, especially the cleansing of Germans, and especially in Eastern Europe. But it was not only Eastern Europe that was affected and not only Germans who were being ethnically cleansed.¹⁵ Meanwhile, a civil war that raged in China until 1949 finally brought Mao Zedong's communists to power. Postcolonial conflicts broke out in Greater India, Indonesia and other large and small emerging southern nations in the 1940s and 1950s. The Chinese Civil War was immediately followed by war between Chinese-backed communists in the north of Korea and American-backed anticommunists in the south. The Korean War finally ended with the loss of almost 5 million lives, mostly civilian, after a 1953 ceasefire.

This narrative reveals that neither World War I nor World War II was 'a war'; each was a cascade of many wars of varied kinds. The Chinese Civil War of the late 1940s (with approximately 10 million deaths) and the Korean War (almost 5 million deaths) of the early 1950s did not seem huge wars after the two cascades of world war. Yet these wars rank highly on the list of the most-deadly wars of modernity and contributed

15 For example, the 31 million people uprooted across Europe between 1944 and 1948 included Bulgarians driven out of eastern Macedonia and western Thrace, Greeks fleeing Macedonia and western Thrace, Greeks fleeing Turkey, Muslims fleeing Greece, Serbs ethnically cleansing Croats, Magyars expelled from southern Slovakia, Ukrainians driven from Poland, Ukrainian slaughter of Poles and Poles fleeing Russia. There was even a fully fledged pogrom against Jews in Kielce, Poland, in July 1946, among other cleansings (Ferguson 2006: 584; Lake and Rothchild 1998: 166–68). European states were greatly ethnically homogenised through this postwar bloodletting.

to the pattern of late-modern wars in which most of those slaughtered were civilians. Hence, the period from the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire from 1911 to the Korean War ceasefire can be conceived of as the most decivilising period of recorded human history in terms of warfare, and particularly warfare with civilian slaughter. This could possibly be qualified by saying this was true at least since the all-conquering, murderous lifetime of Genghis Khan and his Mongol successors eight centuries ago.¹⁶ The big picture of violence can be seen this way even though the homicide rate recorded by domestic police in the West is at the long bottom plateau of the U during this period. That gently declining flatness of the crime rate in the records of western criminologists of the era means little during such an unprecedented tumult of human history, when so many countries saw prisoners-of-war shot and tortured, civilians raped, houses intentionally torched and property looted, and countless innocents intentionally imprisoned and starved for who they were rather than what they had done.

Could it be that the endless war crimes of the four decades ending in 1953 were motivated by such existential threats to states that war greatly unified them, defeating anomie, reinforcing the strong normative code of the western Allies' Greatest Generation, as they staved off their enemies? With US General Douglas MacArthur and other influential Republicans arguing for the deployment of nuclear weapons in Korea and fighting a total war against China to defeat it before it acquired nuclear weapons, the Korean War was certainly included among the wars seen in many corners of the planet as an existential threat. We will come to perceive what is going on here in the next chapter and beyond as existential threats strengthening both bonding and bridging social capital within one's national group yet severing bridging capital to enemies outside the nation. Societies suffering existential threats, such as the Blitz in London, for example, pull together; they become more reintegrative with one another inside, yet more stigmatising of outsiders. Public opinion data show that embattled political leaders often reunify normative commitment to their rule and to their political projects by starting or joining wars, especially when political elites are unified in support of the war (Berinsky 2007). When interventions go badly, however, elite and opinion poll support can disintegrate quickly.

16 Genghis Khan's wars did not kill anywhere near the numbers killed in war between 1911 and 1953, but possibly did kill tens of millions (Morris 2014: 145) and therefore possibly across many wars a larger proportion of the world's population of the time.

At the same time as there was a process that solidified national social capital during the world wars, it was also a decivilising movement in Elias's (1982) terms on the streets of the towns where the war was fought. Four decades of horrific wars normalised violence. While the wars since 1953 were much less terrible than those of the four decades preceding them, there were shocking tolls that started with the French colonial wars, particularly in Vietnam, Cambodia and a wider South-East Asian war, a shocking sequence of postcolonial civil wars and invasions by neighbours in Lebanon and Syria, the sequence of wars in Afghanistan, the Iran–Iraq war of the 1980s and the Congolese wars that started in the 1990s, among many other civil wars.

None of the last wars, however, was read by the baby-boomer generation in the West as a war that posed an existential threat to their societies, even as they were read that way by many Afghans or Iraqis. Most baby boomers wanted a generation of peace. In a sense, the barbarism their parents and grandparents suffered planted civilising seeds of pacifism in the baby boomers, especially in Germany and Japan, but also among the baby boomers of Paris, London, New York, Toronto, Sydney and Auckland. All wars plant both seeds of further barbarism and seeds of a politics of resistance to barbarism. The baby boomers mostly opposed military engagement in Asian, African, Latin American and Middle Eastern proxy wars against enemies of the West. This divided the baby boomers against their parents' generation, particularly on the desirability of fighting communists in proxy wars in the Global South 'so we would not have to fight them at home'. The Greatest Generation believed their struggles in the Depression and the world wars and the exit into the peaceful prosperity of the 1950s and 1960s vindicated the world order for which they had fought on the Allied side and surrendered to on the Axis side. It vindicated western capitalism led by the United States. A large proportion of the baby-boomer generation in the West simply did not buy this by 1968—not the virtues of western domination, particularly not the virtues of its dirty proxy wars, not even the virtues of its materialism and capitalism, and not the virtues of being a politically quiescent 'organisation man' (Whyte 1956). The most educated baby boomers particularly did not settle into being cogs in these machines as their fathers had, nor domestic servants to them as their mothers had.

Anomie grew in the face of contested wars, whereas it had declined inside western alliance societies during the wars to 1953. While the women of the baby-boomer generation were given far greater opportunities and

suffered less domestic servitude than their mothers, female baby boomers unsettled the patriarchal normative order more forcefully than had their mothers in what came to be called second-wave feminism. They took up the cause of their grandmothers from the first feminist wave of the turn of the twentieth century. The Greatest Generation pushed back against the rebellion of the daughters, and against lesbianism with particular disgust. Gay, bisexual and transgender sons who came out in growing numbers were also met with revulsion by the Greatest Generation's 'fear of freedom' (Fromm 1942). By the 1990s, as the Greatest Generation began to die out, a new normative order had begun to settle, which accepted gendered and sexual diversity. Proxy wars against communists that had divided the Greatest Generation of the West against the baby boomers had largely ceased by the 1990s.

In recent years, terrorism has been widely seen as a serious threat, but it is not the case that one generation sees terrorism as an existential threat, while another is opposed to confronting it. The terrorist attacks of the twenty-first century perhaps did more to unify societies than to divide them anomically, though they did divide Muslim minorities against Christian majorities in many parts of the planet. Terrorism did not unify as broadly and deeply, however, as the existential threats nations confronted in World War II or in the massive confrontation with communism that risked nuclear war in Korea and beyond.

We can see the trajectory of this great normative fracture, and then healing, in the reaction of the young in Australia to Anzac Day marches (Australia and New Zealand's veterans' day). Many baby boomers vilified Anzac Day marches in their youth as glorifying war. My partner, Valerie, participated in the feminist marches against Rape in War that attempted to join Anzac Day marches, infuriating the Greatest Generation. Today, children of we baby boomers participate in Anzac Day commemorations with a homage to veterans that hugely exceeds that paid by their parents when they were young. At the same time, postwar and Cold War militarism have mellowed. Contemporary Anzac Day commemorations are less shrill and jingoistic; our former enemies attend to share in the sorrow of the tragic waste that is war. This is a normative order of the West both significantly repaired and significantly restored that has healed some of the wounds of past generational and international divides.

There are definitively short-term lagged effects on soldiers returning from wars and postwar increases in homicide and suicide rates. Archer and Gartner (1984) found that homicide rates rise after nations participate in wars at home or abroad and rise most after the wars in which the killing is greatest—a result replicated by Stamatel and Romans (2018). Ghobarah et al. (2003) confirmed this cross-nationally for suicide as well as homicide. Marks (2001: 89, 133) found in South Africa that former male combatants experienced anomie, powerlessness and emasculation that became a ‘slippery slide into the underworld of crime’. We have learnt from Iraq (Boyle 2014: Ch. 8) that rates of violent death often go up after a war ‘ends’, perhaps more than fiftyfold (Otterman et al. 2010: 147), with only El Salvador—another post-conflict society—having a higher total violent death rate than Iraq between 2004 and 2009 (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2011: Ch. 2). This result has also been discovered in a number of African and other conflicts in which killing (Duffield 2001: 188), and even more so sexual and gender-based violence, increases after a peace agreement is signed. Likewise, this occurred after some Latin American civil wars—most notably, the continent’s biggest recent wars, in El Salvador and Guatemala, where a doubling of already extreme homicide rates at the end of the war delivered a higher death rate than during many of the peak years of civil war (Muggah and Krause 2011: 180; Richani 2007; Westendorf 2015: 8). El Salvador’s peak homicide rate in 1995, three years after its war ended, was 142 per 100,000, according to UNODC’s International Homicide Statistics database—a higher peak than any during the eight centuries in Eisner’s (2014) European dataset and one of many considerable Latin American refutations of Pinker’s (2011) claims that *The Better Angels of Our Nature* have triumphed. It is an even more considerable challenge when one takes account of the formidable evidence that ‘the disappeared’, if counted, would massively increase the homicide rate. Homicide rates have been massively contrived downwards by murderers both in state security forces and in drug gangs when they have an interest in claiming that the level of killing in El Salvador is not as bad as their critics allege (Carcach and Artola 2016). The widespread transformation of murders into disappearances that might be interpreted as a result of emigration continues to the present day in El Salvador. Ball et al. (1999) found in Guatemala between 1960 and 1996 that in years of low violence, 50 per cent of political killings were reported in the media, falling to 5 per cent in years of high violence.

In Ghobarah et al. (2003), the lags after war that showed significant effects on homicide and suicide were effects of war deaths on homicide over a five-year lag and suicide deaths two years after those five years. Ghobarah et al. (2003: fn. 8) seem to have also run 13-year lags, with this having positive but weaker effects. Yet we know that Australian children of Vietnam veterans had more elevated suicide risks than their veteran parents (Commonwealth of Australia 2014).¹⁷ By the time veterans retire from the military, they may not have many of the peak years of crime and suicide risk left on their clocks, but their children are yet to enter their years of maximum risk. This suggests we should be studying a range of lagged effects longer than 20-year intergenerational lags in addition to the short-term lags in the extant literature. There should be both a short-term lag effect on the veteran generation and a 10–30-plus-year lag effect mediated through their children's generation that extends to children born a number of years after the war.

There has not been an empirically informed macrocriminology that has taken an interest in the possibility that the decivilising effects of unusually bloody wars may have cumulative and longer lags that are both short-term and longer-term because of their effects on two successive generations. The suffering of the children of Vietnam War combatants, however, is hugely less widespread in impact than the suffering of the children and then the grandchildren of the generations who waded through the blood of four decades of wars that finally ended in 1953. With the small states of the former Yugoslavia put in a separate category in the 1990s, across the rest of the West, the tens of thousands of westerners killed in all the wars of the past 68 years are a tiny number compared with the tens of millions of them killed in the wars of the previous 42 years to 1953.

Hence the hypothesis that those 42 years of fighting existential wars by the West left a postwar legacy of anomie when the children of the postwar generation grew up. An accumulation of lagged PTSD passed

17 Suicide attempts were found to occur among a remarkably high 62 per cent of Croatian male war veterans with PTSD (Maršanić et al. 2014). Hendin and Hass (1991) found that among Vietnam veterans, combat guilt—for example, memories of killing women and children—were associated with suicide attempts and contemplation of suicide. This also seems to be associated with transgenerational mental health problems for the children of Vietnam veterans (Rosenheck and Fontana 1998). Bremner et al. (1993) found Vietnam veterans who had suffered PTSD inflicted highly elevated levels of physical abuse on their children. Kaplan et al. (2007) found that veterans across all wars were twice as likely as the general population to die from suicide. The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in statistics on suicide rates among Americans, long reported that Vietnam veterans experienced the highest suicide rates.

across successive generations of male warriors desensitised to violence and domination in the two world wars was transmitted to their children, who were often brutalised by the war veterans of the Greatest Generation. The baby-boomer generation was exposed constantly on the new medium of television to content that glorified these wars, legitimated killing and venerated the heroism of the Greatest Generation.

These cultural artefacts of the legitimization of violence are likely to have longer lag effects than suicide risks that themselves can be long: a veteran has a child 10 years after the war and his child suicides as a heroin addict 30 years after that—a 40-year lag that might contribute to explaining why the effect of the 42 years of war killing may not have extinguished even 39 years later in 1992 when the crime drop started. The cultural artefacts of the glorification of killing endure even longer than that lag. Films from the 1950s that legitimated war violence were rerun for the children of the 1960s and 1970s on their television sets. The evidence that television content that vindicates violence can engender violence in a generation is now clear enough (Paik and Comstock 1994; Anderson and Bushman 2002; but see Savage and Yancey 2008, who find more limited effects). The legitimization effect of the 42 years of war was instantiated in many other ways beyond television that were more than straightforwardly cultural. Some of the legitimization of war killing was widely politically structured. In Australia, most male high school students in elite schools and a large proportion in working-class schools participated in the cadet corps, in which they dressed in military uniforms, learnt drill, how to fire a rifle and a machine gun, how to patrol in a jungle environment and how to deploy and return fire. It taught elite high school students how to be ‘officers’ and ‘sergeants’ who led other boys into violent projects. These high school war games continued into university life in university army reserve regiments that trained in university drill halls. These were closed when the baby boomers became university leaders.

On the side of the generational opposition to militarism, the politics of violence was also deeply structural. There were cultural elements to it, such as the ubiquitous posters of Che Guevara in baby-boomer bedrooms. The radical student generation read Chairman Mao’s *Little Red Book* on political power growing out of the barrel of a gun and Frantz Fanon’s *The Wretched of the Earth* (1965), especially in 1968—the year the uprising in Paris was the spark for an amazing global cascade of student uprisings against the western politics of the Cold War. Fanon was a member of the Algerian National Liberation Front. His writing aggressively legitimated

violence on the side of the oppressed. He characterised Europe as an incubus of decivilisation, as we see in this series of quotes from the concluding two pages of his book:

When I search for Man in the technique and the style of Europe, I see only a succession of negations of man, and an avalanche of murders ...

Two centuries ago, a former European colony decided to catch up with Europe. It succeeded so well that the United States of America became a monster, in which the taints, the sickness and the inhumanity of Europe have grown to appalling dimensions ...

Comrades, have we not other work to do than to create a third Europe? The West saw itself as a spiritual adventure. It is in the name of the spirit of Europe, that Europe has made her encroachments, that she has justified her crimes and legitimized the slavery in which she holds four-fifths of humanity. (Fanon 1965)

What we see in the work of radical writers of the Global South in the 1960s like Fanon is the utter rejection of European institutions and the European normative order as civilising. This was because it preached peace internally from its pulpits but practised mass murder externally. Today, it is still hard to see the evidence that Africa has accepted embrace into the normative order of European 'civilisation'. Europe and North America are still seen in Africa as lands of violent racists and oppressors. If a genocide occurs in Rwanda or Congo, if a botched NATO regime-change operation unfolds to remove Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, the presidents of the United States and France can receive more of the blame in Africa than the local operatives who do the killing on the ground. With each mass atrocity, the normative divide between Africa and NATO widens that bit more. The interesting thing that happened from 1968 is that white western students started to identify with the advocacy of Fanon to fight fire with fire. A global anomic divide between the Global South and the West mapped on to a generational divide inside the West. Make no mistake, this mapping globalised the legitimization of violence. As a student advocate of nonviolence, I vividly remember the first university lecturer who approvingly quoted Fanon on the cleansing power of violence: 'Violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect' (Fanon 1965).

Valerie Braithwaite and I remember being shocked when we participated in the Vietnam Moratorium marches from the late 1960s that the voices that took over the chanting were saying: 'One side right, one side wrong, victory to the Viet Cong.' We were part of the nonviolence wing of the student movement, but so many were not. Many advocated violence inside the West as well in a way that broke totally with the normative order. In the United States, Eldridge Cleaver and some other leaders of the Black Power Movement took this further to argue that for black men to rape white women was an insurrectional act against the colonisers of black humanity. The structure of the world system that drove this global pattern of violence was the West and the communist bloc fearing one another's nuclear weapons. They wanted to defeat the other militarily but feared doing so directly. This had to be done by a cold war in the Global North and a hot war in the Global South. They chose to fight each other through proxy fighters in the Global South. Che Guevara and Richard Nixon both believed in a domino theory whereby strategic violence would cause the dominoes of the Global South to fall either into the hands of communism or into the custody of the West. As Che put it: 'Create two, three, many Vietnams' (Guevara 2003).

So, I am suggesting a generational divide that absorbed violent ideologies from both sides of the North–South divide. In the West, it was a war-and-peace anomie effect that had short lags from proxy wars against communism in the Global South, especially once the Vietnam War started. And it was a PTSD and normalised violence effect of war that had long three-generational lags across veteran families decimated by domestic violence: from the World War I generation to World War II and to the violent baby-boomer generation.

This was vivid in my family biography. My beloved grandfather was a machine gunner of Germans at the Somme. Like Hitler, who was in the very trenches on the opposite side he sought to mow down, Grandad was gassed. Grandad threw my father out of his home as a young man when he threatened to hit Grandad after Grandad allegedly threatened Grandma with violence. Dad came back from the Sandakan Death Marches in World War II less traumatised than the other survivors, one of whom threatened to shoot his wife and children and then later turned the gun on himself. Yet still I remember the childhood visits to Dad in the 'nerve ward' of the veterans' hospital, the veterans with cigarettes in their shaking hands. Dad was such a fine, strong, principled man, but damaged. There were the screaming dreams at night in the years before his emotional

recovery consolidated. Not that my dad thought Vietnam a wise war, but he thought it terrible disloyalty to our troops that his three children would protest in the streets against that war. One day, this kind of argument boiled over and my brother was thrown out of our house. Successive Braithwaite generations of veterans of the two world wars, both fathers ejecting their sons from the family home, never to return. Such sadness for the mothers. I inject this personal narrative for reasons of reflexivity, to allow the reader to judge that this author only thinks this way about the history of western violence because of an atypical family experience of the politics of violence. For this author, however, his family is a hologram that contains within its microcosm the deep structures of the whole historical pattern of violence, of all the macro images of the horrors of violence of the big wars that ran from the Somme of my grandfather Joe to Vietnam, which engorged my classmates. My generation is defined by those three terrible wars and so my generation must understand successive generations who are less defined by them. They think differently as a result.

One part of the anomie surge was a 'greed is good'¹⁸ mentality among formidable fragments of the privileged populations of Wall Street and dominated fragments of deindustrialised cities formed into gangs to sell drugs. The fathers of the baby boomers, whether they frequented the streets of slums or Wall Street, could be greedy, but the Greatest Generation was less attracted to the creeds of the greed-is-good subcultures of criminality than their wayward children. The Greatest Generation also ruled in a more egalitarian world. We discussed earlier how the Great Depression and its Keynesian legacy pulled the rich back to the pack, as did World War II. The top marginal income tax rates on the rich remained more than 80 per cent in most western societies, including the United States, long into the 1950s as governments recovered fiscally from the burdens of fighting such huge wars over such long periods of history. After the 1950s, inequalities widened again and have continued to further widen since (Piketty 2014), which has not helped with sustaining low crime rates (as discussed in the middle chapters of this book).

Obviously, there is a great complex of other crosscutting variables to consider before we begin to fully understand why crime surged in the West from the early 1960s to the early 1990s and then settled back to lower rates. Nevertheless, there is another attraction of this macro interpretation

18 Words associated with Wall Street criminal offender Michael Milken and Michael Douglas's character in the film *Wall Street*.

of heightened western anomie between 1960 and 1992, and heightened trauma and desensitisation to violence and domination as a result of the four decades wading through blood: this is that it makes sense of the massive countertrend, which is Latin America. Remember Amy Nivette's (2011) meta-analysis of homicide showing the strongest mean effects were for a Latin America and Caribbean regional dummy variable, with Latin American and Caribbean countries having much higher homicide rates than the rest of the world. Recall that Latin American homicide rates increased formidably both during and after the great western crime decline (LaFree and Drass 2002: 786–87). One reason mentioned already for high and increasing Latin American homicide rates is the contribution made by gangs associated with the drug trade supplying the North American market. A second reason is that Latin America has the highest inequality of any region of the world; this inequality has been increasing, and income inequality had the second highest effect size after the Latin America and Caribbean regional dummy variable in increasing homicide in Nivette's (2011) meta-analysis. Schargrofsky and Freira (2021) confirmed not only the importance of the Gini coefficient in explaining why the countries of this region have higher levels of crime than the rest of the world, but also showed that within Latin America and the Caribbean, levels of inequality is the only variable showing a robust causal effect across national and sub-national levels to predict which are the hot spots of crime within the region, as measured by victimisation surveys as well as homicide rates.

A third factor is that Latin America's worst period of war and state violence was not World War I or II nor the Korean or Vietnam wars, none of which engaged Latin American armies. No, it was internal Latin American conflicts that started *after* the worst 42 years of conflict violence in the history of the West and progressively worsened in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. So, if there were enduring and long lags after the four decades up to 1953 of the West's wade through blood, we might expect long lags after the Latin American conflicts up to the 1980s. This would mean Latin American lagged violence still had some years to run if it lasted for four decades. Moreover, as already argued, drug wars were more deadly than civil wars in many countries and continue to be so this century, to the point that more people have been killed in Mexico's drug wars of this century than in Afghanistan's twenty-first-century wars (Marc 2016).¹⁹

19 The late twentieth-century war deaths were many times worse than the twenty-first-century war deaths in Afghanistan.

This book argues that the Latin American societies that have averted cascades of recurrent civil war and the worst excesses of the US-enforced War on Drugs, and the worst extremes of inequality, are the societies that have avoided the very highest homicide rates in recent decades. These countries include Chile (with a homicide rate of 3.6 per 100,000 at the time of writing) and Cuba (4.2) in the current UNODC statistics.

The regional problem is not limited to the former Spanish, Portuguese and French colonies. For a number of decades, the former British colony of Jamaica has ranked in the top few countries for homicide rates for the South American and the Caribbean regions (Harriott 2011). The major drivers are consistent with the regional pattern: armed violence waged between political factions with contesting views about how to respond to the postcolonial grievances of former slaves and peasants violently oppressed by a colonial landlord class. One Jamaican political party was armed by Cuba, the other by the US Central Intelligence Agency. Street gangs that mobilised violence to deliver votes and political loyalty to one side or the other morphed into organised crime groups that participate in the drug trade and diverse other forms of organised crime. While these organised crime groups perpetrate exceptionally high levels of killings that deliver the exceptional Jamaican homicide rate, the offshore wings of Jamaican drug traffickers murder more people overseas than in Jamaica, particularly in the United States, but also in Canada and the United Kingdom. This in turn has cascaded to Jamaica having among the highest rates of killings by police in the world. Of the 13 countries with the highest current rates of killings by police per capita, only three are not from the Americas (Syria, the Philippines and Afghanistan).

Asia

Military power plays a paradoxical role in the pacification of violence. We have already seen that before nation-states began to replace empires, the most murderous army in human history pacified the Silk Road. This was an instance of the trade-based interdependence that is central to Elias's civilising process. China had earlier pacified the Silk Road as well—for example, with the Tang Dynasty's seventh-century conquest of nomadic western powers, which allowed China to reassert control of, and expand, what were then long-degraded trading routes (Bowen 2017).

This is a profoundly important historical example of the paradox of military pacification being a stepping-stone to widened spaces of security and civility.

Between Genghis Khan's pacification of the Silk Road and Chinese President Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative sit a number of periods when millions were killed in exceptional political violence in China. One was between the final disintegration of the Chinese Empire aided by western incursions and the Cultural Revolution near the end of Chairman Mao's rule. During this period, Asia was the most violent region of the planet. The last Chinese dynasty, the Qing, finally fell in 1911–12, but this was at the end of a long period of disintegration driven by western colonialism. As in Latin America, in China, drug wars contributed greatly to the disintegration of the empire and Asia's steep rise in violence, particularly the Opium Wars between the United Kingdom and China, which resulted in China losing Hong Kong to Britain and other territories to France and Japan. The Opium Wars of 1839–42 and 1856–60 were a result of the Qing (Manchu) Dynasty attempting to shut the British opium trade from India to China, which was hugely profitable for the British.

After the first Opium War came the Taiping Rebellion (1850–64). This civil war to overthrow the Qing Dynasty became one of the most deadly wars in human history, taking probably far more than 20 million lives, even possibly several times that number. The oppressive treaties Britain imposed on China after defeating it in the Opium Wars were a humiliation that showed its neighbours how feeble China had become. The Opium Wars thereby undermined Chinese regional power. This allowed France to colonise Indochina and Japan to seize Taiwan and effectively control Korea (both of which had been Chinese tributaries). The United Kingdom, France, Japan, Germany and Russia all established domains of influence inside China. Defeat by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895–96 further disintegrated the empire. In 1900, the Boxer Rebellion saw peasants rise up against the foreigners and the Qing Dynasty. The Qing eventually joined the uprising against the foreigners but was defeated and then replaced with Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary republican regime in 1911. This was the end of 2,000 years of empire in China. The democratic republic did not last. It disintegrated under pressure from the warlord era of 1916 to 1928 when different military factions fought to carve up control of the country.

Mao's communist army ultimately pacified the warlords and then the entire country into the comparatively low-crime society discussed in Chapter 2 after it took over (particularly during Chinese communism's early decades). The communist civil war raged from 1927 to 1949, taking probably 10 million lives. Then the Second Sino-Japanese War took more than twice as many lives as the civil war during the period from 1935 to 1945. After that, there was the Korean War. Asia then saw many wars against communism that took millions of lives in both Indochina and Afghanistan and large numbers of lives in more than a dozen other Asian societies. Drug wars in Burma (Myanmar) and Thailand started when the Kuomintang was pursued there by Mao's army and assisted by the CIA to set up drug empires in the Golden Triangle (McCoy 1972).

While Asia's most powerful societies—China, Japan, Korea and India—were pacified after the extremely bloody periods they all suffered up to 1953, they then became low-crime and falling-violence societies. This crime drop occurred during the period of the great crime rise in the West up to 1992. This began to disintegrate in India with the worst Muslim uprising in Kashmir commencing in 1947, threatening nuclear war between India and Pakistan, and continuing to the present (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018). A proliferation of ethnic wars for autonomy and Maoist insurgencies continued in the twenty-first century in half of India's states. So, in fact, India (and Pakistan and Sri Lanka) was on a trajectory towards being counted among the most violent societies on Earth from the end of the 1980s (Karstedt 2012a, 2014b), just as the great crime drop was beginning in the West. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–98 was also followed by a brief, unusually violent period, especially in Indonesia (Braithwaite et al. 2010a). It only lasted a few years and we have seen that Indonesia quickly became a low-crime society again early this century. Like the southern regions of Asia—from Nepal to Bangladesh, Myanmar, Cambodia, India, Sri Lanka, Timor and Indonesia—even the fraught western periphery of Asia in Afghanistan and Iran has had far lower levels of war deaths in the twenty-first century than in the back half of the twentieth century.

It is much easier to summarise the macro crime picture for Europe than it is for Asia because Asia is such a big place, comprising half the world's population. Asia and the Pacific have many ongoing wars; the worst risks of nuclear war, across the borders between the two Koreas and between India and Pakistan; and many places where violence is still out of control, from Afghanistan to Myanmar to the Highlands of Papua New

Guinea (Braithwaite and D’Costa 2018). Even so, the macro picture is of a pacification of violence of the Elias and Pinker kind in Asia since the end of the Cold War or earlier, particularly in East Asia. Up to the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, Asia was the most war-afflicted region of the planet, accounting for more wars and more war deaths than any other region, including Africa. After the Cold War ended, Asia (as long as we exclude the Middle East) became one of the most peaceful parts of the planet and the massive population of East Asia—from Siberia, Manchuria, Mongolia, China, Japan, Korea, Vietnam and Cambodia right down to Indonesia—had become the most peaceful on the planet. That has continued to the time of writing. Asia today has many countries with low homicide rates and lower imprisonment rates than the least-violent European countries. China continues to be a complicated case, however. It is very effectively pacified, with criminal gangs holding limited sway compared with past centuries and a UNODC recorded homicide rate that has reduced sharply this century to below 0.6 per 100,000 in the most recent three years. Yet market crime is booming and, in Xinjiang, we see genocide in this decade through a million Muslim Uyghurs forcibly interred in re-education camps, with Chinese Muslim terrorism cascading across the region—for example, to Pakistan, Afghanistan and other countries of Central Asia—as a reaction (Braithwaite and D’Costa 2018).

While the Latin American regional dummy had the largest positive coefficient in explaining where homicide is high in Nivette (2011), overall, the East Asian regional dummy had the strongest coefficient for low homicide rates.

Hence, the big picture for Asia is of more virulent twentieth-century militarisation than in Europe and war deaths from the mid-nineteenth century to the end of the Cold War many times greater than Europe’s war deaths. For example, more people were killed in East Asia in World War II than in the rest of the world combined. Asia had declines in war deaths and crime, particularly in East Asia, that were more formidable, steeper and to much lower levels than the rest of the world. For all of Asia (including the Middle East in UNODC regions), the average homicide rate is slightly lower than Europe and less than half the world average. The picture is certainly more plural and woollier than it is for Europe, but it is of a massive civilising of war that comes first and then a civilising of violent crime, so that societies like Japan and Indonesia have the lowest homicide rates of any country with more than 100 million residents

(indeed any society of more than 20 million), and Hong Kong, Macau and Singapore are countries with populations below 10 million with even lower homicide rates than Japan and Indonesia.

All the largest Asian countries also have comparatively low imprisonment rates. India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Japan have all fairly consistently maintained imprisonment rates of less than 40 per 100,000 this century, with Bangladesh mostly in the 40s (though 81 per cent of Bangladesh's prison population is on remand awaiting trial!). China is the outlier among large Asian countries, with an imprisonment rate of 118. China might still seem low given that 53 per cent of the world's countries have an imprisonment rate over 150 and the imprisoned Chinese include an unusually large number of political prisoners (Walmsley 2019). On the other hand, there is a great deal of unrecorded pre-trial detention in China.

Africa

Africa and the Middle East replaced Asia in the latter decades of the twentieth century as the regions accounting for the highest rates of war deaths, the largest number of wars and the longest wars. Africa's homicide rate (13), according to the UNODC (2019: 14), is only a little below that of the Americas (17.2; though half of Central America's 26 and South America's 24). Africa's rate is more than four times that of Europe (3) and five times Asia's including the Middle East (2.3). Southern Africa actually has a considerably higher average homicide rate than Central America, the Caribbean and South America (UNODC 2013: 23) and seems to be rising in recent years (UNODC 2019: 22). Even though the African data are the least satisfactory for all continents, Africa is interpreted as the most violent continent today because it simultaneously has homicide rates not far behind Latin America and the Caribbean and a substantially higher rate of war deaths. Africa and the Americas combined account for 73 per cent of the world's recorded homicide victims (UNODC 2019: 13) and undoubtedly far more than their share of unrecorded homicides. War deaths in Africa, nevertheless, are much lower this century than they were between 1980 and 2000 (Roser 2015). Many African wars were Cold War proxy wars. Furthermore, Africa's most murderous conflicts, in the Great Lakes region (the Congos, Rwanda, Burundi, Central African Republic, Uganda, Sudan, South Sudan), have been partially subdued. Such a downward movement is not apparent for homicide. South Africa

is a clear exception, with homicide rates more than halved, falling from almost 80 per 100,000 to 65 in 1995 and to 31 in 2012 (UNODC 2013: 33)—still very high and it has edged back up somewhat in recent years. One is tempted to interpret this in terms of recovery from South Africa's armed conflicts of the 1970s and 1980s during which both sides aggressively legitimated violence until Nelson Mandela led the country to nonviolence in the peace process of the early 1990s.

Overall, more African countries have experienced upward than downward movement in homicide rates during the past 10 years. Long time-series data for Africa are simply not available. Where upward movement has occurred, UNODC (2013: 32–33) analysts note these are countries and regions that have suffered recent armed conflict. Hence, the best conclusion for Africa from limited data seems to be a decrease in war violence this century, but some new waves of disappearances (often uncounted as crimes because state security forces are the ones disappearing people), increased state crime and nonstate crime. Families have not recovered from the PTSD and the normalisation of violence that war continues to drive forward. Nor perhaps has Africa recovered from the violence of colonialism and the slave trade any more than African Americans have recovered from slavery. New waves of trade in slaves have arisen in war-torn countries such as Libya and Democratic Republic of Congo (as they have in Afghanistan).

Some African societies such as Rwanda have recovered remarkably well from total breakdown of the normative order, genocide and collapse of sovereignty, to build a strong renewed sovereignty and normative order, with a UNODC homicide rate down to 2.5 by 2015. Others such as Ghana have managed to build a civil society without cascading severe violence since independence, with a UNODC homicide rate of around 2 per 100,000 for most of the past decade.

Thinking in time about crime and freedom

Crime control is an art of freedom and freedom is an art of politics. Crime control requires a normative commitment to freedom that runs deeper than the desire to be politically popular. The art of thinking in time is imperative (Neustadt and May 1986). Peace diplomacy to prevent violence has not taken strides forward this century: the great powers are not working as well together to prevent conflict and promote

disarmament as they did in the late twentieth century. Social science has value, too: if we know that a recurrent consequence of starting a war is cascades to diverse tyrannies, including to more wars, to homicide and suicide at home, and even to something as unexpected as elevated rates of rape among daughters of veterans 20 years later (O'Toole et al. 2018), we must eschew the politics of simply comparing the short-term costs of victory against the costs of inaction.

This chapter makes clear that thinking in time is the hard part. This is because anomie moves in recursive loops that have tipping points that can re-establish normative order through a new sovereignty or unravel and disintegrate an empire that had a peaceful settled sovereignty. If anomie's recursivity can have positive or negative feedback loops, this complexity allows no simple thinking from historical analogy. Thinking in time means creating lists of how this situation is similar *and different* to an analogy that appeals to us as a lesson of history. Thinking in time involves asking questions about whether each of the positive and negative feedback loops from anomie might tip into play. It involves asking what the story of this problem is in this moment of place-time, not just what science has to tell us about the problem. In the face of uncertainty about these judgements, monitoring of how the complex recursivity of normative order is playing out at any historical moment is central to the art of the politics of freedom. Finally, the art of freedom involves the courage to be decisive even when confronted with many unknowns and unknowables. It means rejecting analysis paralysis in favour of enacting one's theory of how to drive forward freedom's frontiers, but with humility. Humility means monitoring the recursivity of turning points to failure, continuously repairing the ship of politics at sea and adjusting its sails on the basis of feedback.

This book reveals no deadly simple mechanics of crime and freedom. It develops the beginnings of a theory to guide those who have a political commitment to less crime and more freedom. The book is grounded in a particular reading of the evidence. That reading, of course, must be contested. Surely, parts of it will be refuted in the years ahead. What I hope to have been persuasive about in this chapter is that loops of anomie might be repeatedly implicated in changes in the levels of crime and freedom that are massive compared with the changes in crime rates that even the most powerful crime science reveals as consequences of criminal justice policy changes. Positive criminology is therefore useful, but less important to comprehension of the low-crime society than anomie and the politics of freedom as nondomination.

Chapter 2 opined that Cold War commentators were wrong to see high crime rates in the United States between 1960 and 1992 as the price of freedom. This book will argue in the chapters to follow that they were a sign of unfreedom, of a society failing to deliver a fair share and failing to stick with its New Deal, creating a much less equal US society than existed before 1960. Compared with the market ethics of American capitalism in the 1950s, this century confronts us with a society of corrosive legal cynicism among the growing middle-class group that became victim-offenders of criminalised markets, in the terms described by Farrall and Karstedt (2019). The working class is shrinking; they have lost their jobs to deindustrialisation and, in a number of western societies, have turned towards authoritarian politics again, as they did in the 1930s. America, as in most of the West, became a society with low and falling levels of trust by citizens in its institutions—a society more willing to put its trust in demagoguery and social media clickbait. I have argued that generational divides have become more important to anomie, today dividing more between baby boomers and their children, who so often have less secure jobs and a welfare safety net with bigger holes than the net that protected their parents. Before that, I identified a massive normative divide between the baby boomers and their parents in countries like the United States and Australia.

The American normative order was comparatively unified during the New Deal era and during the existential struggles of World War II through to the end of the Korean War. The argument is that during the Vietnam War era considerable disintegration of the normative order occurred, however. Societies rot like fish from anomic breakdowns, from the head down, from the commanding heights of capitalism, from Wall Street down. Farrall and Karstedt's (2019) data suggest that in the United Kingdom and Germany, they also rot from the middle out. 'Greed is good' not only became a mantra on Wall Street and in the City of London; it also became relevant to middle-class people who became both victims of the scams of the internet era and perpetrators of middle-class crime. It is relevant in their conversations with middle-class friends about how to beat the system and its 'red tape'. For Indigenous minorities in Australia, or China or the United States for that matter, looking up to the contemporary greed of the business elite and the middle class whose ancestors stole Indigenous lands in genocidal frontier wars, stealing something back can even seem just.

It makes limited sense to view China as a very low-crime society today, even if it is hugely less violent than it was until 1950 and even though its UNODC homicide rate is very low. There are also cracks in China's normative order. Hundreds of thousands of riots by citizens about some grievance occur every year in China, often with violence. The Chinese Communist Party itself has estimated that there are more than 200 rural protests a day in the country, mostly about local corruption and inequality (Thornton and Thornton 2012: 84). China's citizens will have little trust in the state or its markets when its major economic crisis inevitably arrives. They see all too clearly that in the past, when the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Chinese banks that are now the wealthiest corporations on the planet got the shakes in even little ways, the authoritarian state intervened to tilt the mirror, to create the impression that everything was rosy on the Shanghai bourse. Chinese investors hedge in western real estate markets because they know the trust in the smoke and mirrors their authoritarian leaders contrive into its markets could disintegrate into a massively distrustful run.

The victims of China's market crimes seem at least as greedy as their counterparts in the United Kingdom and Germany (Farrall and Karstedt 2019); Confucius's Golden Rule has lost its shine. Contrary to what might have been predicted by Robert Merton, Chinese respondents to the World Values Survey are less likely to agree that 'less emphasis on money and material possessions is good' than citizens from most countries, including the United States, England, Wales and Germany (Chamlin and Cochran 2007: 52). Not only are the market crimes of the commanding heights of Chinese capitalism, and of its massive middle class, out of control, but also common property crime has risen hugely since China's low-crime decades of the 1950s and 1960s. The chapters that follow, however, argue that more capitalism and more crime are no more inevitable than more freedom. Tempered capitalism can deliver more freedom and less crime than untempered socialism and untempered capitalism. The great historical discovery of the old social democratic politics was that some elements of socialism are among the ways to temper tyrannies of capitalism. A national health system that publicly guarantees health care to every citizen, however poor, is an example, as the United States should have learnt from its woeful response to the Covid-19 pandemic. The forthcoming chapters pursue these themes.

Continued recursivity of market crimes and anomie at these two brittle commanding heights of the world economy in the United States and China is a massive threat to the whole global system. We saw in 2008 how an epidemic of petty mortgage frauds in US housing markets could cause a crash in faraway countries that had no serious problems with the integrity of their mortgage markets. As we saw with the collapse of the German economy into hyperinflation in the 1920s and 1930s and the Yugoslavian economy in the 1980s and 1990s, a genuinely major economic crisis can cascade to extreme anomie and extreme authoritarianism and warmongering by leaders playing to outgroup narratives to secure their political survival (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018).

Criminologists need not be mere spectators of such great events triggered by the recursivity of market crimes and anomie. Later chapters contend that a more competent American criminology could have helped, and a more competent FBI could have prevented, the Global Financial Crisis in 2004 or 2005 when the epidemic of housing loan frauds first became visible on FBI information systems. Just as a more responsive FBI and a more responsive criminology might have convened the right kinds of regulatory conversations to stop the rot of this financial market crime before it cascaded to crisis, so an FBI that was more oriented to prevention, and less obsessed with prosecution, might have prevented the 9/11 terrorist attacks (as the 9/11 Commission concluded) and the anomic adventurism of invading Afghanistan and Iraq to which this cascaded. Criminologists should have an important role to play when the drums of war beat as they did in 2001. Sadly, however, criminology was largely silent and social scientifically irrelevant.

This book argues that cascades of corruption and the capture of markets by a wealthy elite tend to cascade to criminalisation of the state. We see the worst examples of this in the contemporary states that have been most afflicted by post-Cold War violence—pre-eminently, the Democratic Republic of Congo. Yet we see the same phenomenon in the largely internally pacified United States and the number-two economy in the western alliance, Japan, where the Trump administration and various Liberal Democratic Party administrations (most famously, that of Kakuei Tanaka), respectively, criminalised the state in significant ways, though less catastrophically than we see in Congo.

Conclusion

Every local community at every point in human history has its own particularities of cascades of violence, cascades of nonviolence, pacifications by sovereignty and its breakup, cascades of normative order and breakdown into disorder when violence overwhelms society. Fine-grained intensive study of these particularities is the most revealing way to understand these worlds of war and crime, of sovereignty, normative order and pacification. Five previous books from the Peacebuilding Compared project have attempted to provide regional, national, provincial and hotspot case studies of violence and the rise and fall of normative orders (johnbraithwaite.com/peacebuilding/).

On that foundation, this chapter has begun to demonstrate that the macrocriminological lens contributes something distinctive. It can help us grasp bigger-picture understandings of the global and local patterning of crime and violence. The bigger picture is about crises that cascade anomie, anomie that cascades to crime, anomie that cascades market crises, criminalised markets that cascade other forms of criminalisation, including criminalisation of the state and authoritarian wars of aggression, but also corrosive crimes of greed by a disenchanted middle class and a collapse of tax system integrity that challenges the capacity of the state to be inclusive and to solve other large crises like climate change and Covid-19. We return to the theme of tax system integrity throughout the book.

If we build a strong normative order without also eliminating stigmatisation and without strengthening inclusion and reintegration, we risk a violent society in which the tyrannies of the majority prevail and the strength of the normative order promotes crime (Karstedt 2011b). The strength of the normative order of the Ku Klux Klan in some parts of the southern United States in the twentieth century illustrates this kind of reinforcement of violent crime. It is not just that a totalising Hobbesian sovereignty that is not tempered by rule of law, freedoms and the separation of powers will ultimately permit a resumption of cascades of violence of the disenfranchised. It is also that a Hobbesian politics of domination enables economic crimes of cronies, security crimes of the deep state, torture, disappearances, corruption, embezzlement and crimes of capitalists who capture state protection and patronage. In societies where dominations, inequalities and exclusionary, stigmatising practices

reign unchecked, both crimes of domination and crimes of the dominated flourish. Crimes of exploitation cascade, and the crimes of those who are exploited also explode.²⁰

Yet the paradox is that sovereignty, checked and balanced, is necessary to resolve anomic uncertainty over who will take responsibility to pacify spaces, to disarm highwaymen and roaming rapists, armed gangs and ambitious plotters of coups. Empires have, nevertheless, afflicted profound dominations in the process of claiming that sovereignty over the large swathes of territory that today we call the United States, China, Russia, Australia or Indonesia. When they do that dirty business of militarised domination, crime cascades for a generation after its worst excesses recede. This at least is a macrocriminological interpretation of some actual evidence from the history of violence that Chapter 8 ponders how to test more systematically.

International law is imperative to crime prevention in nailing down the stability of sovereignties so no state can in future get away with expanding its frontiers through war, nor with any other crime of aggression. Then we can hope for less violence of war that cascades to crime and new wars a generation later, as we have seen as a result of misguided military adventurism and war crimes in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and beyond this century (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018). Military adventurism of the kind in which the United States indulged in Iraq and Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan risks the undermining of state legitimacy. It is anomic. Genuine defence against existential threats, which is legitimated by international law and by the will of democracies, can unify, transcend anomie and disintegration, build the legitimacy of states and prevent future crime and future war. Yes, Tilly (1975: 42) was right that 'war made the state and the state made war'; yet, balanced and tempered state power, when legally stabilised, pacifies spaces and can help states prevent crime and make peace (Morris 2014: 18).

The big-picture story of the history of war and crime recounted in reaching these conclusions demonstrates no unidirectional civilising process, but a great deal of human agency in making peace and making war, in cascades

20 Criminologists who believe we must view political violence in a way that is disconnected from criminal violence might ponder LaFree et al.'s (2018) finding that violent extremists were distinguished from nonviolent radicals in the United States by violent political actors being less likely to have stable employment and more likely to have criminal records, a history of mental illness and violent peers.

of violence and cascades of nonviolence. Cascades of nonviolence and the institutions that enable them—the United Nations, the European Union, good peace mediation and trust-building practices, the laws of war and the kind of rejection of armed struggle to resist tyranny for which Nelson Mandela opted—can quell anomie in the global order and within states, reversing war–crime cascades.

The complex ways in which the propositions of the opening summary of this chapter interact give an account of why violent crime has been in long-run decline for the past 800 years. They can also give an account of major reversals from that trajectory during those centuries and why middle-class property crime trends differently. Emile Durkheim was right, as we discuss in more detail in chapters that follow, that crime and war can bring people together to consolidate normative order. But even when a society is unified by fighting a war, there are tipping points in anomie that throw it into reverse—for example, as intergenerational divides break up the postwar society. Macrocriminology can be no better at predicting when these tipping points of anomie and violence will occur than macroeconomics can be at predicting when market crashes will occur. Both, however, can get better at understanding how these recursivities work and how their tipping points tip. Most importantly, they can get better at putting in place checks and balances that prepare societies well for the inevitability of recursively complex anomie.

More recently, the complex ways the propositions opening the chapter interact help us to understand why there was a short-term but steep reversal to increases in crime across most of the West from 1960 to 1992. They also give an account of why France is a major exception to that reversal to crime trending up in the West, why violence in Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa continued to increase during the post-1992 western crime drop, and why the great East Asian crime drop preceded the Western crime drop by more than four decades, falling during the 1960–92 period when crime was rising in the West.

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