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War Responsibility and Nonpartisan Diplomacy for Peace

The Tokyo Trial

Shidehara and the Tokyo Trial

When the Yoshida cabinet was inaugurated in May 1946, Shidehara was given the position of minister of state. In the previous chapter, I outlined some details of Shidehara's engagement with party politics. In this chapter, I wish to focus on how an ageing Shidehara viewed Japan's foreign relations and his perspective on history.¹ For this purpose, the Tokyo Trial is particularly important. In fact, Shidehara himself appeared in court during the trials, and his testimony can provide us with some insight into his understanding of history.

The Tokyo Trial was a series of international war crimes trials that were carried out on the basis of the tenth article of the Potsdam Declaration. The target of these trials was Japan's wartime leaders. Eleven foreign nations participated in all: the US, the UK, the Soviet Union, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and India. The official name for the trial was the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. A total of 28 people stood accused as suspected A-class war criminals. The trials commenced in May 1946 in Ichigaya. The chief justice was William Flood Webb of Australia, while the chief prosecutor was Joseph Berry Keenan of the US. In the November 1948

judgement, seven defendants were sentenced to death by hanging: Tōjō Hideki, Dohihara Kenji, Itagaki Seishirō, Kimura Heitarō, Mutō Akira, Matsui Iwane and Hirota Kōki. A further 16 people were sentenced to life imprisonment, including Araki Sadao, Hata Shunroku, Hiranuma Kiichirō, Kido Kōichi, Koiso Kuniaki, Minami Jirō, Shiratori Toshio and Umezu Yoshijirō.

Few topics are as controversial as the Tokyo Trial. One frequent point of contention regards the application of the *ex post facto* charges of ‘crimes against peace’ and ‘crimes against humanity’. Needless to say, there was no questioning as to whether Allied actions such as the dropping of atomic bombs were themselves instances of such crimes.

For such reasons, the Tokyo Trial has been referred to as an example of ‘victors’ justice’. In the debates surrounding the trial, the term ‘the Tokyo Trial view of history’ appears. Although there is no precise definition of ‘the Tokyo Trial view of history’, it is used to criticise an interpretation that seeks to reject Japanese modern history. I suggest that it is more or less synonymous with the expression ‘a masochistic view of history’.² It must be added that ‘the Tokyo Trial view of history’ has a somewhat unusual ring to it to begin with. Certainly, the Tokyo Trial may have been a case of ‘victor’s justice’. However, while the trial operated with the premise that a conspiracy had taken place, they did not in fact reject modern Japanese history totally. Moreover, the Shōwa emperor was not prosecuted. This was an outcome that the various participants—from the Japanese government and Tōjō Hideki to MacArthur and Chief Prosecutor Keenan—had been most concerned to avoid.

If the Tokyo Trial view of history is not a rejection of modern Japan *per se*, then what exactly is it? One basic theme of the trial was the US’s perspective on Japan at that time, which was founded upon a good-versus-evil dualism. According to this schema, moderates in Japan were confronted and overpowered by the militarists. Naturally, for the purposes of the occupation, the Shōwa emperor was classified as a moderate. If there was an understanding of history that comprehensively rejected modern Japan, then that would be the official historical view of the Soviet Union. Although the Japanese *zaibatsu* (financial conglomerates) were not brought to account at the Tokyo Trial, the Soviet Union regarded them as having considerable responsibility for the war. It also believed that the ‘Tanaka Memorial’, which set out Japan’s invasion plans, was a real

document. In China, meanwhile, there was a tendency to distinguish between the Japanese people and the militarists. This can be considered a different kind of dualism than the US's model.³

If we were to adopt an American-style dualistic model, then we would certainly have to categorise Shidehara as a representative of the moderate faction. Indeed, US Ambassador Grew had previously viewed Shidehara in such a manner. Shidehara was not the only Japanese official called to the witness stand who was viewed as a moderate. Figures such as Wakatsuki Reijirō, Okada Keisuke and Ugaki Kazushige were also viewed sympathetically. In fact, Keenan actually invited Wakatsuki, Okada, Ugaki and Yonai Mitsumasa to a cocktail party at his residence, where he cheerfully told them that 'you four gentlemen are the true lovers of peace in Japan'.⁴ Reading such accounts may naturally generate doubts as to whether the US could truly distinguish between the so-called moderates and militarists. Yonai, after all, was navy minister during the Second Sino-Japanese War and one of the officials responsible for expanding that conflict.⁵

With these details in mind, I would now like to outline Shidehara's final years. Shidehara was serving as minister of state in the Yoshida cabinet when he first appeared as a witness at the Tokyo Trial.⁶ He also testified on topics such as the Manchurian Incident when questioned by the international prosecution. Shidehara also helped in the reformation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The following discussion addresses two important questions: How did Shidehara evaluate the prewar years and the lead-up to the collapse of the empire? And how did he view the international status of Japan in the postwar era?

As a Witness for the Prosecution

The Tokyo Trial began on 3 May 1946. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a satellite office in Ichigaya in order to maintain necessary lines of communication.⁷ The Shidehara cabinet had recently resigned, on 22 April. Shidehara was now a minister of state in its successor, the Yoshida cabinet. The Yoshida cabinet was a coalition cabinet, containing ministers from Yoshida's own Liberal Party, as well as Shidehara's Progressive Party. On 18 June, the chief prosecutor, Keenan—who was visiting the US at the time—made some noteworthy comments on the Shōwa emperor. At a press conference in Washington, Keenan had stated that the emperor would not be prosecuted. News of this statement quickly reached Japan.⁸

With a feeling of relief, Shidehara headed towards Ichigaya on 25 June. He was to appear as a witness for the prosecution. Taking the witness stand with a tense expression, Shidehara was flanked on his right side by 10 court judges. In front of him, the prosecutors and the chief defence counsel faced each other, while to his left he was met with the stares of the assembled defendants. Sitting among the accused were some of Shidehara's former subordinates: Hirota Kōki, Shigemitsu Mamoru, Tōgō Shigenori and Shiratori Toshio. However, Matsuoka Yōsuke and Ōkawa Shūmei were not present. On the edges of the courtroom were sections for the press corps and members of the public as well as booths for interpreters. At the beginning of the trial, the prosecutor read Shidehara's affidavit out loud. The defence counsel for Ōshima Hiroshi then objected to the admission of Shidehara's affidavit. However, the objection was overruled by Chief Justice Webb. Ōshima previously served as Japan's ambassador to Germany, despite being from the army. Together with Shiratori Toshio—who was then the ambassador to Italy—he had advocated a Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy.

The focus of Shidehara's affidavit was the Manchurian Incident. He stated that, just before the Liutiaohu Incident, he had received a 'secret report' stating that the Kwantung Army had assembled and had taken explosive materials with them. Therefore, Shidehara wrote, he had anticipated that the army intended to take 'some kind of action'.⁹ Further, he claimed that although the Wakatsuki cabinet had worked to prevent further escalation following the incident, they were eventually left with no choice but to resign. In response, the defence counsel for Minami Jirō carried out a cross-examination (questioning conducted by the opposing party). As Shidehara had come to court to act as a witness for the prosecution, the defence counsel's questioning of him constituted cross-examination.

Minami Jirō's defence counsel carried out cross-examination concerning the source of Shidehara's so-called secret report. While struggling with his words, Shidehara admitted that the source was actually no more than a 'rumour' heard from Japanese residents of Manchuria who were visiting Tokyo, and that he 'did not mean to say he had received an official report'. Shidehara further testified that, at that time, War Minister Minami had 'cooperated to the extent that he could' and that, while Minami had sought to have the Kwantung Army restrained through cooperation from the War Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was unable to

directly investigate the cause of the incident.¹⁰ Although he did not seek to sacrifice Minami, Shidehara emphasised that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not at fault.

The defence counsel for Matsui Iwane would also not remain quiet. As a member of the military, Matsui had served as an army commander in the Central China Area Army during the Second Sino-Japanese War and had been charged with assisting in the attack on Nanjing. Matsui's defence counsel cited a number of incidents that occurred during Shidehara's time as foreign minister. These were the Nanjing Incident of 1927, the Wanpaoshan Incident and the Nakamura Incident. The Nanjing Incident of 1927 was discussed in Chapter 3. The Wanpaoshan Incident refers to a clash between Chinese peasants and Korean peasants that took place in Wanpaoshan, on the outskirts of the north-eastern Chinese city of Changchun. Finally, the Nakamura Incident refers to the murder of Captain Nakamura Shintarō of the Office of Army General Staff, who had been conducting a military geographical intelligence survey near Taonan in north-eastern China. Both the Wanpaoshan Incident and the Nakamura Incident took place in the summer of 1931 and were understood to have helped cause the Manchurian Incident.

With the defence counsel now attempting to assert Japan's own victimhood concerning the events of the period, Shidehara was able to regain his composure. His response regarding the Nanjing Incident of 1927 is particularly noteworthy:

Japanese residents [of the city] certainly suffered from looting, and some individuals were even wounded. However, I believe that there were no deaths ... I think the impact on the U.K. and the U.S. in particular was actually more horrendous.¹¹

There was also cross-examination from the defence counsel for Shiratori Toshio. Shiratori was director-general of the Intelligence Department during Shidehara's second term as foreign minister and had also been a central figure among the reformist clique at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Yet surprisingly, Shidehara showed a more favourable attitude towards Shiratori. He asserted that Shiratori had 'followed the peace policy line' of the Wakatsuki cabinet.¹² Here, Shidehara took a milder tone. In fact, he had absolutely no criticisms to make of former diplomatic officials, including Shiratori. This friendliness angered the prosecution, who argued that the cross-examination had turned into a direct examination (in other words, questioning by the side that called the witness).

Further strengthening this tendency was the cross-examination by Shigemitsu's defence counsel. Here Shidehara's testimony practically amounted to a defence of Shigemitsu. According to Shidehara, Shigemitsu became Japan's minister to China on his recommendation, and he was 'completely satisfied' with Shigemitsu's performance in that role.¹³ However, Shidehara acknowledged that he did not receive any early information from Shigemitsu on the plotting by the Kwangtung Army. Shidehara also noted that after the Liutiaohu Incident, Shigemitsu proposed a meeting with Song Ziwen (Soong Tzu-wen).

Shigemitsu's defence counsel continued his cross-examination of Shidehara on 26 June. Reflecting upon the Manchurian Incident, Shidehara stated emphatically that 'at that time, Minister Shigemitsu faithfully' cooperated. Shidehara also stated that, given the supreme command authority of the emperor:

It was hardly possible for the cabinet to issue official reprimands to all of the army, not just the Manchurian army. This was not within the official authority of the government.¹⁴

From Shidehara's perspective, it was not Minami who was ultimately responsible for the Manchurian Incident. Rather, the root issues of the incident could be traced to the army officials in the field, together with flaws in the system relating to chain of command.

Shidehara's testimony clearly included some distortions; though a witness for the prosecution, he repeatedly made statements that benefitted Shiratori and Shigemitsu. Although Shidehara was ideologically opposed to these two individuals, he sought to protect them. His true motivation here may well have been less the protection of the individuals and more the protection of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an organisation. One passage in Shigemitsu's diary states: 'When he appeared in court as a witness, Shidehara's testimony was beneficial to me'.¹⁵ It would seem that, standing before Minami and Shigemitsu, Shidehara acted as a witness for both the defence and the prosecution at the same time.

So it was that Shidehara offered his now quite distant memories as a form of testimony in the trials. As the accused, both Minami and Araki listened tensely to his answers. The manner of the proceedings would inform headlines in the *Asahi Shimbun*, such as 'Unable to "Restrain" the Kwangtung Army, the Manchurian Incident Expanded: Minister of State Shidehara Takes the Stand' and 'Responsibility for the Manchurian

Incident is with Army Minister Minami, Minister of State Shidehara Clearly Testifies'.¹⁶ Yet as noted above, Shidehara's true intention was not necessarily to criticise Minami. According to other newspapers, such as the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Shidehara 'did not so much as smile, as though he had bitten into a bitter-tasting bug'. Here, too, the headline read, 'Responsibility for the Manchurian Incident with the Army Minister'.¹⁷

Let us now move forward roughly one year in time, to 24 June 1947. On that day, Shidehara was questioned by the international prosecution at the National Diet Building. Here, too, the focus of the questioning was the Manchurian Incident. The international prosecution wanted to know how much Shidehara had guessed about the scheming of the Kwantung Army on the basis of information received before the incident from Hayashi Kyūjirō, former consul general in Fengtian (Mukden). They also wanted Shidehara to tell them more about the respective positions of War Minister Minami Jirō, Fengtian Special Service Agency Chief Dohihara Kenji and Kwantung Army Commander-in-Chief Honjō Shigeru.¹⁸ They were particularly persistent with their questions on Minami.

Concerning what the Liutiaohu Incident foreshadowed, Shidehara responded that the information he received came not from Hayashi but from Japanese merchants who had temporarily returned to Tokyo. When he then called for Minami after hearing this information, the war minister informed him that, while he was to respond to the situation, he also 'could not carry out strict punishments in order to maintain discipline, due to his concerns about potential disorder'.¹⁹ When questioned about Honjō and Dohihara, Shidehara replied he was not the only one insufficiently aware of the scheming taking place in the field; Minami, he said, was also relatively in the dark. In this case, however, Shidehara criticised Minami for being weak-willed. The international prosecutors were sceptical of Shidehara's testimony that day, particularly with regard to the claim that he did not receive sufficient information from Consul General Hayashi. Yet it was not Shidehara who was a defendant at the Tokyo Trial but Minami and Dohihara. It seemed as if the international prosecutors and Shidehara had reached an unspoken agreement to collaborate in laying most of the responsibility for the Manchurian Incident and its aftermath at the feet of the army.

Nevertheless, Shidehara's criticisms of Minami were not unusual. For example, Hirota Kōki, though he did not take the witness stand in court, indicated during questioning that he thought Minami had

a great deal to answer for regarding the Manchurian Incident.²⁰ It must be admitted that aspects of Shidehara's testimony were not much more than excuses. We know that Consul General Hayashi was actually aware of the Kwantung Army's plans before the Manchurian Incident, due to a warning from Kimura Eiichi, the director of the South Manchuria Railway. Further, Hayashi had passed this information on to the central authorities. Immediately after the incident, he also informed Shidehara that it was highly likely to have been a false-flag attack. As I discussed in Chapter 5 (Section 3), during a cabinet meeting held the day after the Liutiaohu Incident, Shidehara revealed that he had received a telegram from Hayashi. This was the reason that War Minister Minami did not receive the go-ahead to send the Japanese Korean Army as reinforcements.²¹

As a Witness for the Defence

In February 1947, the defence counsel began to present its counterevidence. On this occasion Shidehara was again called to testify, only this time as a witness for the accused. In July that year, Shidehara prepared the affidavit required for his appearance in court as a defence witness. Compared to the affidavit prepared in July the previous year, this affidavit went into more detail on Shidehara's relationship with Minami at the time of the Manchurian Incident. Shidehara claimed that he and Minami had cooperated to try to prevent the Manchurian Incident from expanding, and described the claim that they were at odds over the incident as no more than an 'empty rumor'.²² This statement appears to have been aimed at rebutting testimony from prosecution witness Tanaka Ryūkichi, who had claimed that Shidehara and Minami were at odds with each other.

As the day of the court hearing drew closer, however, Shidehara began to experience difficulty walking. Unable even to rise from bed due to extreme pain, he was taken to St Luke's International Hospital, where he was diagnosed with psoas muscle pain. The hospital medical report stated that, 'for the time being, he should remain warm and rest in bed, and receive ongoing medical care'.²³ He was now almost 77 years of age, and years of fatigue had finally caught up with him. With Shidehara in no condition to appear in court, the defence counsel was forced to visit his residence to question him.

Shidehara's residence was in Okamoto, in the Setagaya ward of Tokyo. In the early afternoon of 11 November 1947, a judge, three prosecutors and three members of the defence counsel arrived at the residence.

The head prosecutor was the Briton Arthur S. Comyns-Carr, who was accompanied by two other individuals. The defence counsels were those responsible for defending Koiso Kuniaki, Shigemitsu Mamoru and Minami Jirō, respectively. Of course, a stenographer and a member of the secretariat were also in attendance. Apart from one member of the defence counsel, practically the entire group were foreigners. Receiving the go-ahead from the prosecutors and the defence counsel, Shidehara began to give his testimony in fluent English.

According to Shidehara, before the Liutiaohu Incident, several Japanese residents of Manchuria visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to report that 'something unusual was happening'. Upon hearing this, Shidehara summoned War Minister Minami and asked him to enforce military discipline. Minami replied that he would take the necessary steps to deal with the situation. After the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, Shidehara continued to disclose to Minami copies of all telegrams received from the area. That said, Shidehara did not assert that Minami alone was responsible. He noted that Minami had attempted to carry out the decisions of the Wakatsuki cabinet; however, his instructions were not carried out by subordinates in the field. He also did not press for the sending of reinforcements from the Japanese Korean Army. Shidehara added that, when Minami attempted to prevent further expansion of the incident by restricting military funding, 'it appeared that members of the military might carry out a coup', and so 'Minami was forced to approach the problem in a more practical manner'.²⁴ As can be seen, Shidehara also sought to defend Minami in certain respects.

The report on Shidehara's testimony would be considered in court on 19 November 1947. In response, the defence counsel for Dohihara raised an objection. Even though Shidehara's testimony was of real significance for Dohihara, his defence was not warned beforehand that it would be considered that day. On the following day, 20 November, Dohihara's defence counsel made the same objection. Nevertheless, prosecutor Comyns-Carr somehow managed to have the cross-examination read out to the court. The court was also shown nine telegrams sent from Hayashi to Shidehara after the Liutiaohu Incident. These telegrams informed Shidehara of Dohihara's manoeuvring with respect to Puyi, last emperor of the Qing dynasty and future ruler of the puppet state of Manchukuo. The contents of the telegrams thus constituted a blow for Dohihara rather than for Minami.²⁵

Yet from the perspective of the court, the discussions surrounding the report on Shidehara's testimony had a negative impact on both Minami and Dohihara. In a diary entry dated to that time, Shigemitsu wrote:

The report on Shidehara's testimony continues—after arguing his position, Prosecutor Carr was permitted to read out aloud the document that the witness has approved of. There were exchanges of telegrams between the consul general in Mukden and the foreign minister, and [this information] has been disadvantageous for both Minami and Dohihara.²⁶

The *Yomiuri Shimbun* reported on the developments under the headline 'Minami without Power to Control the Kwantung Army, Report on Shidehara's Testimony'.²⁷ That said, the defence counsel was certainly not going to overlook the potential utility of Shidehara's testimony for their own ends. The defence counsel referenced Shidehara's testimony in the closing statement that they gave on Minami. According to this statement, Shidehara and Minami had remained close friends up until the present-day. Further, Minami had not proposed in cabinet meetings that Japan leave the League of Nations. Minami had also been cooperative during the Manchurian Incident. Finally, the information relating to the schemes of the Kwantung Army before the incident was unofficial.²⁸

The Tokyo Trial concluded with a ruling in November 1948. The ruling itself consisted of an extremely long text that only Chief Justice Webb was permitted to read aloud. For this reason, the reading of the judgement alone took an entire week. Minami and Dohihara were sentenced to life imprisonment and execution by hanging, respectively. Were these rulings just? There is reason to doubt that they were. Even if we look only at a specific part of the ruling, namely Section 1, Chapter 5, Part B, which is titled 'Invasion and Occupation of Manchuria', there are some conspicuous contradictions. The entry titled 'Foreign Minister Shidehara Continued Efforts at Mediation' states that, although Shidehara heard rumours before the Liutiaohu Incident that the Kwangtung Army was plotting something, he did not have any conclusive evidence. The entry emphasises that Shidehara thus pressed Minami for answers directly after the incident. This information, however, conflicts with that presented in another entry. The entry titled 'The Manchurian Incident Was Planned' states that Hayashi sent Shidehara information prior to the incident. When Shidehara protested to Minami, Minami responded by dispatching Tatekawa Yoshitsugu to Manchuria in order to prevent the plot.²⁹

As noted earlier, a basic theme of the trial was the US view of Japan. More specifically, I mean the schemata by which the Americans divided the Japanese leadership into the moderates (which included the Shōwa emperor) and the militarists. Following these schemata, when individuals such as Shidehara, Ugaki Kazushige, Wakatsuki Reijirō or Okada Keisuke took the witness stand, there was a tendency to interpret their testimony as that of ‘moderate’ figures accusing the ‘militarists’.³⁰ Certainly, there is some degree of truth to this interpretation. However, in Shidehara’s case at the very least, there was no desire to denounce the military. Indeed, the defence actually deployed Shidehara’s testimony in its closing statement because it helped to give a favourable impression. The criticism that Shidehara sought to shift blame to military figures is not necessarily accurate. This fact demonstrates just how ambiguous Shidehara’s position was regarding who was responsible for the war. As his testimony suggests, Shidehara disliked the rashness of Konoe Fumimaro far more than he did the military.³¹ In any case, what was crucially important for Shidehara was that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs be protected.

The Foreign Service Training Institute

Shidehara’s enduring commitment to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was on display in contexts outside the Ichigaya courtroom as well. Among these, we cannot overlook the establishment of the Foreign Service Training Institute. This institute had a predecessor. As early as 1941, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had set up a centre to train its new hires. This training centre was maintained until the period immediately following the end of the war. However, the lack of a proper organisational basis hindered its operation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs organisation reform in February 1946 led to the formal establishment of the Foreign Service Training Institute. For a site to run the institute, the ministry borrowed a building from Tōhō Bunka Gakuin, located in Ōtsuka, which is in Tokyo’s Bunkyo ward.

Along with Yoshida, Shidehara was instrumental in pushing for the opening of this institute. The first director was Vice-Minister Matsushima Shikao. At an opening ceremony held on 1 March, Shidehara had attended in his role as prime minister. Foreign Minister Yoshida was also in attendance. Upon rising to give his welcoming address, Director Matsushima ‘pointed out that the establishment of the institution was entirely thanks to the efforts of Prime Minister Shidehara’. Shidehara

then gave his own congratulatory speech, in which he ‘touched upon the indispensability of cultivating one’s character and improving one’s foreign language capabilities. Overflowing with genuine feeling, it deeply moved the assembled juniors’.³² The institute library contained some 17,000 volumes, including the collections of Ishii Kikujirō and Yamakawa Tadao. Naturally, there were foreign language classes available, but there were also classes on typing. The training period for new hires was set at six months.

The director who eventually succeeded Matsushima, Terasaki Tarō, was also vice-minister for foreign affairs. Although it was not unusual for the directorship to be handled by vice-ministers, having somebody work as director in name only did limit the training that new hires would receive. Hence it was recognised that the best possible outcome would be for a full-time director who could focus entirely upon the job. Shidehara and Yoshida both had the same person in mind for this role: Satō Naotake. At that time, Satō was still serving as Japan’s ambassador to the Soviet Union. He would finally return in May 1946. As noted above, this was the time when the Shidehara cabinet resigned. Asked if he would be interested in directing the institute, Satō responded cautiously. Only after he had confirmed with GHQ that he was not a potential target for the purges from public office did he finally accept. Hence, in August of that same year, Satō became the third director of the institute. He was the institute’s first full-time director, and, in a sense, he was also the first real director. Indeed, Satō also viewed himself in this manner.³³

Now a minister of state, Shidehara gave a speech at the ceremony for Satō’s inauguration. With Satō sitting before him, Shidehara recalled the days of his friendship with ministry adviser Denison and told the assembled institute trainees: ‘In my opinion, honesty is truly the best possible diplomatic policy’.³⁴ Prime Minister Yoshida, who at that time was also serving as foreign minister, was also in attendance. Elder ministry figures such as Obata Yūkichi and Matsudaira Tsuneo were also hired to help as advisers to the institute. From Shidehara’s perspective, Yoshida and the others were all once his subordinates. A famous specialist in diplomatic history would also come to give some lectures as a form of special training.

Why did Shidehara and Yoshida seek to establish the Foreign Service Training Institute at this time? After all, the occupation by the Allied forces had only just started, and even neutral countries had more or less cut off their diplomatic relations with Japan.³⁵ The prospects for regaining sovereignty in the near term were hardly bright. Under the occupation,

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was relegated to handling communication and negotiation between the Japanese government and the occupying force. For this reason, it had established an external bureau called the Central Liaison Office. Numerous ministry staff were sent to work in this bureau at the time.

Japan's overseas diplomatic establishments also remained closed, with a continuous stream of ministry officials withdrawing from the field and returning home. The ministry was also forced to make severe personnel cuts, causing a great deal of concern about the loss of talented staff. Numerous ministry officials began to seek out alternative employment as interpreters or lawyers. That said, Shidehara and Yoshida well understood that the day would come when Japan would regain its sovereignty and resume diplomatic relations with other countries. In preparation for the restoration of these relations, it was essential that the ministry retained a core of properly trained staff. Once, during his time as prime minister, Shidehara made the following remarks:

With a country such as ours that has many of its own peculiarities, the training of diplomatic officials necessarily differs from how it is carried out in, for example, the Western nations. It is extremely arduous and time-consuming. It is not something that can be done overnight. In order to be prepared for the future, therefore, it is necessary to devote ceaseless effort to cultivating and training [our future diplomats].³⁶

This is all to say that Shidehara understood that diplomats could not be properly trained in a short time. I note that the political power of those supporting the ministry was also essential for halting the loss of talented officials. Shidehara and Yoshida established the training institute for this very reason—to ensure that the ministry would have adequate numbers of able staff in the future. Yoshida also enjoyed looking out for young and upcoming staff, and, once a year, he would give instructional lectures at the institute. For Shidehara and Yoshida, therefore, the institute was no mere training facility.³⁷

It should be noted that the Demobilization Agency was also established under the Yoshida cabinet, in June 1946. Shidehara, who at that time was serving in the cabinet as a minister of state, was chosen as director of the agency. Shidehara also became the chairman of the Kasumigaseki Association, an informal social organisation for people associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³⁸

The UK and China

A high-priority task during the occupation was the restoration of the Japanese–American relationship. At that time, anyone in a position of responsibility was well aware of the overwhelming importance of the US. Upon forming a new cabinet as prime minister, Shidehara had once said to Prince Higashikuni:

Going forward, I aim to ensure that Japan–U.S. diplomacy proceeds in a measured manner. We will focus on coordinating with the U.S. to the best of our ability, with an eye towards the eventual revival of Japan's position.³⁹

To this end, Shidehara would frequently write correspondence not only to MacArthur but also to former US ambassadors to Japan such as Castle, Grew and Forbes.⁴⁰

Of course, Shidehara was not merely a pro-American politician. While his actions were very friendly toward the US, it had long been British-style diplomacy that had furnished him with his ideals. This did not change under the occupation. A particularly illuminating event in this respect was the December 1949 roundtable discussion between Shidehara, Yoshida Shigeru and Satō Naotake. While Yoshida was famous for his pro-British tendencies, Shidehara and Satō were hardly to be beaten in this regard. When Shidehara would praise Bryce or Grey during their talk, Satō would respond by citing British foreign ministers such as John Allsebrook Simon or Anthony Eden. The recollections shared by the three elder statesmen on this occasion invariably centred on the UK. In fact, the US did not come up at all.⁴¹

It should be noted that Shidehara did not have a rosy view of Japan's relationship with the UK. Once, in January 1946, when Shidehara was serving as prime minister, he met with his old acquaintance Sansom. Sansom, as noted in the previous chapter, was visiting Japan at that time in the role of the British representative to the Far Eastern Advisory Commission. At their meeting, Sansom informed Shidehara that in the UK, 'opinion was still very bitter by reason of Japanese atrocities, and that the Japanese Army had perhaps done more damage to Japan by their cruelties than by losing the war'.⁴² Shidehara must have been shocked by these words, for he subsequently relayed them to the Shōwa emperor and arranged for him to meet with Sansom. However, this meeting

never took place. As it happened, Sansom himself declined the offer of an audience with the emperor, citing his ongoing role as a member of an international delegation.

While Shidehara considered Japan's relationship with the UK and the US highly valuable, he did not ignore Asia. In March 1946, while serving as prime minister, Shidehara gave a lecture titled 'Watashi no Shina-kan' (My perspective on China). The audience was the Sino-Japanese Friendship Society of the Industry Club of Japan. In this lecture, Shidehara noted that:

From the time I arrived at Kasumigaseki [the district in central Tokyo where most of the major government ministries are located] ... I firmly believed that when it came to relations between China and Japan, what was needed was goodwill, cooperation, and understanding.⁴³

Yet, he added, the Chinese government and domestic (Japanese) public opinion remained unsympathetic. As for the present moment, Shidehara expressed his admiration for Chiang Kai-shek, who had said that China ought to 'turn bitterness into benevolence'. He added, 'I am extremely pleased to see how Mr. Chiang Kai-shek is dealing with the situation'.⁴⁴

However, Shidehara noted, if Japan were to urgently seek amicable relations with China at the current time, with the war only recently ended, it could place the Chinese government in an awkward position. Any immediate restoration of good relations would therefore be difficult. Nevertheless, Shidehara commented:

I am truly thankful, from the bottom of my heart, that Mr. Chiang Kai-shek has provided as much protection as possible to those Japanese citizens who remain residents in China. I believe that it is with just such actions that the foundation for future Sino-Japanese relations can be secured.⁴⁵

It would seem that, in the long-term at least, Shidehara was optimistic about Sino-Japanese relations.

In any case, the situation in China and Korea remained too fluid to make predictions. So, at this point, Shidehara did not prioritise plans for improving relations with Asia. Instead, he sought to assist with the more modest undertaking of academic research—specifically the rebuilding of Tōyō Bunko (the Oriental Library).

Tōyō Bunko was an Asian research institution known around the world. Shidehara had long been connected to this institution, from as far back as the period following the Great Kantō Earthquake. As mentioned earlier, Shidehara lost his home in one of the fires that broke out in the aftermath of the earthquake. It was at this point that the Iwasaki family gifted him the residence at Rikugien to serve as his new home. When Shidehara began to live at Rikugien, which is located in Komagome, Tōyō Bunko was just finishing the construction of its new building. In fact, it was directly opposite Shidehara's Rikugien residence. This was no coincidence. Tōyō Bunko was established by Iwasaki Hisaya, who was Iwasaki Yatarō's eldest son and the founder of the Mitsubishi *zaibatsu*. The Iwasaki family, which had turned part of the Rikugien gardens into grounds for their villa, had also allotted a south-eastern part of the original land area to Tōyō Bunko.⁴⁶ The chief director of Tōyō Bunko at the time was Inoue Junnosuke, who would later become minister of finance in the Hamaguchi cabinet.

In 1932, Shidehara's old acquaintance Hayashi Gonsuke became chief director of Tōyō Bunko. Then, in November 1935, Shidehara himself became councillor of Tōyō Bunko. Shidehara would be promoted to director in December 1939, after Chief Director Hayashi passed away in June that year. Later, in February 1941, Shidehara had his brother Shidehara Taira donate his collection of books to Tōyō Bunko.⁴⁷

Shidehara became chief director of Tōyō Bunko in October 1947. This directorship was more than an honorary post for Shidehara. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Shidehara had always been particularly fond of books. Unfortunately, the destruction wrought by the war had effectively led to the Tōyō Bunko shutting its doors for several years. Shidehara had also just become a member of the House of Representatives at this time. The president of the House of Councillors was Matsudaira Tsuneo, who was later followed by Satō Naotake. From Shidehara's perspective, both were still the equivalent of his juniors from their days at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Making use of his status, Shidehara poured his energy into negotiations with the National Diet Library and succeeded in having Tōyō Bunko re-opened as a branch of the National Diet Library. As chief director of Tōyō Bunko, Shidehara himself would sign the eventual agreement with the National Diet Library in August 1948.⁴⁸

Further, in the same year, Shidehara also became the chairman of the newly established Tōhō Kenkyū-kai (the Oriental Research Association). The purpose of this association was to sponsor informal gatherings to discuss

matters relating to China. It was attended by former diplomatic officials such as Ishii Itarō and Hayashide Kenjirō. Tōhō Kenkyū-kai is also known for publishing *Gendai Tōa-Jin Meikan* (Directory of contemporary East Asians). In the foreword that he supplied for this book in his capacity as chairman, Shidehara wrote: ‘Today, understanding the various nations of East Asia must be our urgent undertaking. Tōhō Kenkyū-kai was formed just after the war as a result of this very realization’.⁴⁹ In fact, the editing of the directory was effectively undertaken by the First Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research Bureau.

Nonpartisan Diplomacy and National Security

Nonpartisan Diplomacy

During this period, the executive branch of the Japanese government also underwent a series of transitions—from the first Yoshida cabinet to the Katayama cabinet and, subsequently, to the Ashida cabinet. Then, in October 1948, the Ashida cabinet also resigned en masse. The cause for this resignation was a corruption scandal relating to financing for Shōwa Denkō, a large chemical firm. The result was the formation of the second Yoshida cabinet. This cabinet would last for a long time, until the end of 1954. Meanwhile, Shidehara was re-elected in the general election of January 1949 and, in February, became the speaker of the House of Representatives. That is to say, rather than being made a minister of state again in the Yoshida cabinet, he was kicked upstairs to an honorary position.

At this time, in preparation for the conclusion of the peace-making process, Shidehara tasked himself with the development of a new diplomacy that would transcend party lines. I am speaking here of nonpartisan diplomacy. Of course, Shidehara had argued for many years that diplomacy and domestic politics ought to be separated. Yet his efforts to establish a new nonpartisan diplomacy were directly triggered by the June 1950 visit to Japan of John Foster Dulles, the special peace envoy. President Truman had entrusted Dulles with the handling of peace negotiations with Japan.

It should be noted that this was not Dulles's first time in Japan. He had visited Japan and China in February and March 1938. In preparation for his upcoming visit to Japan, which would last 10 days, Dulles had asked Ambassador to the US Saitō Hiroshi to write him numerous introductory letters. In Tokyo, he would meet with moderates such as Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Horinouchi Kensuke, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, Makino Nobuaki, Kabayama Aisuke and Shidehara himself. Dulles had formed a positive opinion of these moderate-faction politicians at the time. It should be noted that because Shidehara met with Dulles only briefly, Dulles did not come away with a particularly strong impression of Shidehara.⁵⁰ It was US Ambassador Grew who had strongly recommended to Shidehara that he meet with Dulles. In his letter to Shidehara, Grew said that Dulles, 'an old friend of mine', was investigating the Far East and wanted very much to meet with Shidehara.⁵¹ There is reason to question whether Dulles was really as eager to meet Shidehara as Grew stated. It may instead have been that Grew himself thought Shidehara was the kind of person whom Dulles ought to meet. In any case, Grew's enthusiasm for Shidehara did not infect Dulles in 1938.

Yet, as it turned out, Grew's efforts would bear fruit over 20 years later. When Dulles visited Japan in June 1950, Shidehara had earned a reputation as a liberal politician. This was when Shidehara began to push for the development of nonpartisan diplomacy, and it seems that he received some prompting from Dulles. It should be noted that Dulles had been involved with foreign policy as far back as before the war, when he was working as a Republican Party-affiliated lawyer.⁵²

Shidehara's first step was to reach out to figures such as Tomabechi Gizō, the Democratic Party of Japan's supreme committee chairman, and Asanuma Inejirō, the Socialist Party of Japan's chief secretary, to sound them out on the idea of nonpartisan diplomacy. While Tomabechi was receptive to the idea, the Socialist Party declined Shidehara's proposal. In June 1950 Asanuma had already told Dulles, who was then in Japan, that 'the Socialist Party is unable to accept the nonpartisan diplomacy of the Liberal Party'.⁵³ It may have been that Shidehara's ties to the Socialist Party leaders were not strong enough to win them over to such plans. Nevertheless, Shidehara was so enthused about the prospects of nonpartisan diplomacy that it seemed rash to Prime Minister Yoshida and Ashida of the Democratic Party.

If that was the case, what exactly did Shidehara's nonpartisan diplomacy consist of? In fact, there was nothing special about it. It was simply about not allowing diplomacy to be used as a political football. More details on this point can be found in a speech Shidehara gave in November 1950. According to this speech, Shidehara had been motivated by a 'bitter experience' that he underwent during his time in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 'Diplomatic problems were frequently turned into fodder for political disputes', he noted. 'Caught between the political parties, our ministry, which was tasked with actually raising diplomatic problems [with the politicians], often ended up being worked half to death.' Having once undergone such experiences firsthand in the days before he became a politician, Shidehara took a certain pride in believing he was the right person to promote nonpartisan diplomacy. Shidehara's model for this new form of diplomacy was the UK. He argued that 'in the U.K. they speak of the continuity of prior diplomacy ... I [therefore] received the impression that the U.K.'s diplomacy was the most trustworthy'. Conversely, in the US even the Treaty of Versailles was rejected in Congress. Only in recent years had the US begun to recognise the importance of nonpartisan diplomatic efforts. It was for this reason that Shidehara 'argued for the need to remove diplomatic problems from the sphere for party conflicts'.⁵⁴

Hence Shidehara sought to promote the continuity of diplomatic policy within the party politics system. Certainly, Shidehara's convictions about nonpartisan diplomacy were right. It could even be said that he demonstrated considerable discernment in this regard. It is also clear why he saw the UK as a model for such diplomacy. However, the kind of nonpartisan diplomacy that Shidehara envisaged presumed a certain maturity among opposition politicians, the general public and the mass media. It is highly doubtful that such a style of diplomacy could have been promptly applied in Japan at that time. In the end, Shidehara's proposed nonpartisan diplomacy was ignored not only by the political opposition but also by Prime Minister Yoshida and the secretary-general of the Liberal Party, Satō Eisaku. The possibility that the Socialist Party would agree to support nonpartisan diplomacy was also slim.⁵⁵

National Security

Nevertheless, during this period Shidehara's diplomatic stance continued to evolve. Before the war, he saw the initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as only natural. After the war he came to recognise that the

governing party had a role to play and even busied himself with attempts at bringing the opposition on board. Given this new stance, what kind of foreign policy issues was Shidehara seeking to have addressed?

Major issues of contention included Japan's rearmament and the stationing of US forces. From the beginning, Shidehara did not have any clear plans regarding Japan's national security in the postwar era. In a meeting with Yoshida Shigeru, Satō Naotake and Matsudaira Tsuneo, Shidehara recognised that Japan was defenceless against possible invasion but still trusted in a vaguely defined 'world public opinion'. At the same time, Shidehara also asserted that he was 'absolutely opposed to joining the United Nations'.⁵⁶ In his view, such an international body could not be relied upon for national defence and should not be permitted to erode Japan's ability to undertake its own independent diplomatic efforts. Shidehara's perspective here appears to have hardly changed from the days when he was angered by the intervention of the League of Nations in East Asia. During a different roundtable discussion, when questioned about permanent neutrality, Shidehara disdainfully replied: 'What benefit would doing something like that have?'⁵⁷

Nevertheless, with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, Shidehara began to think more seriously about national security. It should be noted that, in those days, the biggest concern was domestic political stability. A July 1950 report by Dulles is quite informative in this regard. According to Dulles, who had just concluded his visit to Japan, Shidehara was far franker than the ambiguous Prime Minister Yoshida. Shidehara had told Dulles that, because 'any rearmament would be far too expensive', he very much wanted the US to continue to station its soldiers in Japan. Dulles said Shidehara had told him that 'the Communists had been allowed too much liberty and that if American forces were withdrawn at once, the Japanese would not be able to contain possible Communist activity'. Shidehara had further told Dulles that 'there was strong sentiment against Russia among the Japanese'. Therefore, even if Japan were one day occupied by the Soviet Union, they would never cooperate with the Soviets in the way that they currently cooperated with the Americans. Hence, he argued, 'in the end their military victory would prove a failure'. According to Dulles, 'Baron Shidehara was the only one with whom we talked who expressed this rather extreme view'.⁵⁸

As this report shows, Shidehara was even more enthusiastic than Yoshida about the potential of keeping Japan only lightly armed and focusing on economic development. Shidehara's thinking on the Soviet Union also seems to have changed somewhat from the prewar years. After all, before the war, Shidehara had been relatively uncommitted to the fight against communism. It may be that as the Cold War progressed, he revised his opinions on the matter.

As the turmoil of the Korean War deepened, Shidehara became the chairman of a joint council for considering problems of national defence. Members of the council included figures such as Satō Naotake, president of the House of Councillors; Uehara Etsujirō, chairperson of the Liberal Party's House of Representatives Diplomacy Committee; Tomabechi Gizō, chairperson of the Democrat Party's Supreme Committee; and Baba Tsunego, president of the Yomiuri Shimbun Company. Shidehara had apparently come to recognise the necessity of rearming Japan, despite the dilemmas presented by Article 9 of the constitution. On the other hand, Shidehara also informed Matsumura Kenzō—still purged from public office—that 'the U.S. will not force us to rearm'.⁵⁹ Such statements indicate the extent to which Shidehara valued the US army forces garrisoned in Japan.

Last Writings

Fifty Years of Diplomacy

In the summer of 1950, Shidehara began to feel that Japan–US relations were improving—not only in politics and economics, but also in cultural matters. Shidehara noted:

Americans are particularly enthusiastic about Japan studies. They are also interested in traditional arts such as *ikebana* flower arrangement, tea ceremonies, and haiku and tanka poetry. I am exceedingly pleased to see that people are beginning to see Japan with fresh eyes.⁶⁰

To Shidehara, it felt like the dawn of a new era. It was at this time that the US army invited him to Yokosuka. He also attended a play with members of the occupation forces: *Madame Butterfly*, a tragic love story about the relationship between a Nagasaki geisha and an US naval officer. However,

viewers from the occupation forces hated the play. One officer sitting alongside Shidehara grumbled: 'I do not think any American would be as heartless as the man in this play'. Shidehara noted that the experience 'caused me to engage in some reflection' about his own perceptions.⁶¹

Shidehara also criticised another play being produced at the time, titled *Tōjin Okichi*. This play was based on a fictionalised account of an actual person from Shimoda named Okichi, who had served as a waiting maid for US Consul General Townsend Harris near the end of the Tokugawa shogunate. Upon seeing the play, Shidehara could not help but voice his displeasure. In his words, *Tōjin Okichi* mixed 'Japanese-style sentimentalism with a hefty amount of sexual allure', with the result that the play 'slighted Harris's integrity and caused the Americans to take offense'. In Shidehara's view, the real-life Harris had 'devoted himself to the opening up of Japan and to its culture'. Shidehara decided to express his criticisms in a piece for the New Year's issue of *Kaizō* magazine. Quoting Harris's biography, which had been published in New York, he pointed out that it painted a picture of a man who lived a 'virtuous life, in complete opposition to the problems [shown] in *Tōjin Okichi*'. Shidehara concluded by noting that, given that the peace conference was now drawing near, 'it may be necessary to reconsider, once more, the achievements of Harris, who had contributed so much to the opening up of Japan'.⁶² In fact, Shidehara wrote these words just a few months before his sudden passing.

The year 1950 was the last one that Shidehara would live out in full. Shidehara responded to a request from the *Yomiuri Shimbun* for a serialised dictation, which began in the autumn of 1950. He dictated a series of pieces that were then edited and appeared in the newspaper under the title 'Gaikō 50 Nen' (Fifty years of diplomacy). Sixty-one instalments were published in all, with the Manchurian Incident covered from parts 39 to 46. 'Gaikō Gojūnen' would later be published by the Yomiuri Shimbun Company as a standalone book, also titled *Gaikō Gojūnen*. Shidehara composed the foreword for this collection on 2 March 1951. In this foreword, he wrote:

The historical facts raised in this work have not been adulterated with imaginary hypothesis or dramatization. Rather, I have relied upon my memories of the events and have resolved to be as accurate as possible.⁶³

To edit the work, Shidehara received assistance from former diplomatic officials Mushanokōji Kintomo and Ishii Itarō.

He also devoted part of this final year to the task of writing an essay in English. His aim was to make a contribution to the journal *Foreign Affairs*. This was not the first time that Shidehara had written a piece for a US magazine. As noted above, he took a similar step during the Washington Naval Conference.⁶⁴ That said, it was certainly rare. On this occasion, Shidehara had begun to write at the direct request of John Gunther. In 1950, this well-known US journalist was covering MacArthur and other head staffs at GHQ. It was Gunther's first time in Japan since 1938. After meeting with Shidehara, Gunther strongly recommended that he consider submitting an essay to *Foreign Affairs*. Gunther viewed Shidehara as an old liberal who had resisted Japanese proponents of war. He was also well disposed towards Shidehara's secretary, Kishi Kuramatsu.⁶⁵

With Gunther having been kind enough to offer this advice, Shidehara decided to follow through. He began work on an essay in English titled 'Genesis of the Manchurian Incident of 1931'. The recollections that it contained stretched back to before World War I. At that time Japan was a debtor nation. With the coming of World War I, it managed to become a creditor nation, to only then endure the disaster of the Great Kantō Earthquake. Another distinguishing feature of the 1920s was that it was a time of disarmament—so much so, in fact, that military men became disgruntled. As Shidehara pointed out, the Japanese military was desperate to recover some of the glory of the past. On the diplomatic side, Japan's relationship with China had also been put under strain. In Shidehara's view, this was because 'the Chinese did not seem ready to grasp the hand of friendship which I, as Foreign Minister, was constantly holding out for them'.⁶⁶ On the contrary, the Nationalist government had rejected Japan's request for formal approval of the appointment of Obata Yūkichi as minister. There was also the Nakamura Incident and the Wanpaoshan Incident.

From here, Shidehara's draft of the 'Genesis of the Manchurian Incident' reached its main conclusions. Shidehara noted that:

Whispers among our civilian population in Manchuria, hinting that some secret warlike manoeuvres were in the course of preparation by a clique of Japanese junior officers reached my ears towards the beginning of September, 1931.⁶⁷

Upon hearing this, Shidehara warned War Minister Minami. Yet, although Minami signalled that he would deal with the situation, the following weeks saw only further escalation. Upon learning of the Liutiaohu

Incident from the morning edition of a newspaper on 19 September, Shidehara rushed to call the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was informed that the ministry had received a telegram from Consul General Hayashi with the same information. Shidehara depicted Minami at the time of the Manchurian Incident as somebody who was, for the most part, cooperative. Shidehara also noted that Japan's then minister to China, Shigemitsu Mamoru, attempted to negotiate directly with Song Ziwen. However, the Chinese government instead appealed to the League of Nations. Shidehara concluded his draft by arguing that China should have prioritised direct negotiations over such an appeal. In his view, the result of China's course of action was that an early resolution to the Manchurian Incident was frustrated, and 'the specter of an extensive and intensive war was fast approaching'.⁶⁸

As can be seen from the above outline, Shidehara's draft of the 'Genesis of the Manchurian Incident' for *Foreign Affairs* was hardly full of novel ideas. For the most part, it was a rehash of the testimony that he had given at the Tokyo Trial. Shidehara presumably wrote 'Genesis of the Manchurian Incident' with 'Gaikō Gojūnen' by his side for reference. The contents of 'Genesis of the Manchurian Incident' were extremely similar to 'Gaikō Gojūnen'. One thing the above details reveal is that the 'Genesis of the Manchurian Incident' was not merely a collection of reminiscences. This work can also be seen as including Shidehara's attempts at self-justification. It was necessary for Shidehara to present himself as the 'old liberal' that Gunther saw him as. The appearance of the essay in *Foreign Affairs* appeared to be just a matter of time.

Sadly, however, 'Genesis of the Manchurian Incident' would be Shidehara's last work. On 10 March 1951, Shidehara suddenly passed away. Only eight days had gone by since he wrote the foreword for *Gaikō Gojūnen*. As a result, 'Genesis' never appeared in *Foreign Affairs*. However, the draft did catch the attention of the editors of *Chūō Kōron*. After receiving permission from Shidehara's family, the literary magazine prepared the manuscript for publication. For this task they also received assistance from Shidehara's former secretary, Kishi Kuramatsu. The work was published in the May 1951 edition of *Chūō Kōron* under the revised title 'The Ghosts of War: Origins of the Manchurian Incident'. During this same period, *Foreign Affairs* published an essay by Yoshida Shigeru. While Yoshida did not use this opportunity to advocate the kind of nonpartisan diplomacy

that Shidehara desired, it did show the extent to which both he and Dulles were now beginning to look ahead to the era that would follow the peace settlement.⁶⁹

What Did Shidehara Leave Unfinished?

In this chapter we have looked at Shidehara's final years. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Shidehara had struggled to deal with party politics. While he participated in the formation of the Democratic Party as president of the Progressive Party, he soon fell out with the Ashida clique and, in the end, led his own faction to merge with Yoshida's Liberal Party. According to Nagai Matsuzō, who had served as vice-minister for foreign affairs during Shidehara's second term as foreign minister, Shidehara ought to have withdrawn from politics following the dissolution of his cabinet, without coming into conflict with Ashida.⁷⁰

There were some matters that Shidehara had left unfinished. The dissemination of the new constitution that he himself had worked on was one obvious example. Yet his largest concern was the future of Japan's foreign relations. His diplomatic activities in his final years can be placed into four major categories. First, Shidehara was concerned about the fate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the occupation and endeavoured to ensure it was revamped. Second, with an eye to the future conclusion of a peace settlement and Japan's regaining of sovereignty, he advocated the development of nonpartisan diplomacy. Although Shidehara's promotion of nonpartisan diplomacy was directly triggered by Dulles's visit to Japan, its intellectual precursors can be found in the UK. Third, Shidehara was even more enthusiastic than Yoshida in hoping that the US forces would remain garrisoned in Japan. Fourth, as can be seen with his criticism of *Tōjin Okichi*, or his efforts to rebuild Tōyō Bunko, Shidehara also understood the importance of culture for foreign relations.

In particular, Shidehara's feelings for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concealed a fondness for the glories of the past. Although he had attended the Tokyo Trial as a witness for the prosecution, in truth, he sought to protect figures such as Shigemitsu and Shiratori, whom he considered as collateral family. Shidehara had also attended court as a witness for the defence. Indeed, his comments were referenced by Minami's defence counsel in his closing statement, as they benefitted the client. This basic tone did not change in Shidehara's final work, written for *Foreign Affairs*. Hence a degree of ambiguity remains in Shidehara's thinking on wartime

responsibility. Of course, Shidehara was hardly unusual in this regard. In any case, as can be seen from his work in establishing the training institute, Shidehara saw his highest priority as the preservation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The above points are also interesting when considered with respect to their continuity (or discontinuity) between the prewar and postwar eras. From Shidehara's perspective, if we exclude Tanaka diplomacy and the Twenty-One Demands issued to China, Japanese domestic and foreign policy developed smoothly until the early 1930s. Starting with the Manchurian Incident, however, that policy went off the rails. Shidehara therefore considered it important that he use his own experience to benefit postwar Japan. In his view, what this experience showed was that two things needed to occur: first, economic-centred diplomacy needed to be established; second, a new order had to be created in East Asia that would be based upon cooperation with the US and the UK. Essential for these purposes was the restoration of trust in Japan's foreign relations, and this in turn required the promotion of nonpartisan diplomacy.

Unfortunately, Shidehara had neither the authority nor the remaining years needed to fully achieve these goals. With Japan yet to recover its sovereignty, he would pass away in March 1951. In this sense, both the continuities and the discontinuities of Japanese diplomacy were encapsulated in Shidehara's short postwar experience. And that is not all. Shidehara also had a secret wish that ultimately went unfulfilled. From the very beginning, Shidehara had had a fastidious and scholarly nature. He spent his final years surrounded by books, both foreign and domestic, and dreamed of writing his life's work in English—a history of Japanese diplomacy. In practice, however, he spent the last of his years as a politician, an occupation for which he was ill suited. It might have been far better if he had devoted himself to writing. We may wonder whether, at the time of his death, Shidehara spared a moment to regret that he had to leave with this diplomatic history still unwritten.⁷¹

Endnotes

1 This chapter is based on my previous work: Hattori Ryūji, 'Shidehara Kijūrō no Senzen to Sengo: Tokyo Saiban wo Koete' [Shidehara Kijūrō before and after the war: Beyond the Tokyo Trial], *Chūō Daigaku Ronshū*, no. 26 (March 2005): 1–15.

Important studies with respect to this chapter are Shidehara Peace Foundation, *Shidehara Kijūrō*; Kunugi, 'Shidehara Kijūrō', 87–131. The former is a hagiographic biography written by a close associate of Shidehara. Although much can be learned from the latter, it emphasises how Shidehara

sought to transfer responsibility of the Manchurian Incident to Minami Jirō at the Tokyo Trial, and it requires some re-examination. Further, it does not mention that Shidehara attended the Tokyo Trial as a defence witness, and there are areas where a comparison with Ministry of Foreign Affairs records reveals that the research was insufficient.

2 Texts that discuss 'the Tokyo Trial view of history' include Yoshida Yutaka, *Nihonjin no Sensōkan*, 206–08; Nakamura Masanori, *Gendai-shi wo Manabu: Sengo Kaikaku to Gendai Nihon* [Learning modern history: Postwar reform and modern Japan] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1997), 93–120.

3 L. N. Smirnov and E. B. Zaytsev, *Sud v Tokio* (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo Ministerstva oborony SSSR, 1978), 8–11, 34–47; L. N. Smirnov and E. B. Zaytsev, *Tokyo Saiban* [The Tokyo Trial], trans. Kawakami Takeshi and Naono Atsushi, comm. Awaya Kentarō (Tokyo: Ōtsuki Shoten, 1980), 8–11, 31–42, 500–01, 510, 517; Anatolii Andreevich Gromyko and Boris Nikolaevich Ponomarev, eds, *Istoriya vneshnei politiki SSSR, 1917–1985*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Nauka, 1986), 264.

For details on the Soviet's actions, see Awaya, *Tōkyō Saiban-ron*, 209–26; Awaya Kentarō and NHK News Crew, *Tōkyō Saiban eno Michi* [The road to the Tokyo Trial] (Tokyo: Japan Broadcast Publishing Co., 1994), 144–62, 205–07. For more recent research on the Tokyo Trial, see Higurashi, *Tōkyō Saiban no Kokusai Kankei*. However, this text rarely mentions Shidehara.

It should also be noted that Keenan visited China and reported to MacArthur on the situation there. See interview with Madame Chiang Kai-shek, Shanghai, 28 March 1946, Joseph Berry Keenan Papers, Box 2, Harvard Law School Library, Harvard University; Keenan to MacArthur, 8 April 1946, Keenan Papers, Box 2.

4 Wakatsuki, *Meiji, Taishō, Shōwa Seikai Hishi*, 406.

5 Aizawa Kiyoshi, *Kaigun no Sentaku: Saikō—Shinjuwan eno Michi* [The choice of the navy: Reconsidered—the road to Pearl Harbour] (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 2002), 85–86, 101–12, 135–40, 171, 202–04.

6 As minister of state, Shidehara was once invited by the Shōwa emperor to a tea party at the imperial court. Upon arrival, he was seated next to Prime Minister Yoshida. See diary of Wada Hirō, 14 August 1946, in 'Wada Hirō Kankei Bunsho' [Documents relating to Wada Hirō], no. 477, Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, National Diet Library.

7 The Tokyo Trial was not the only war crime trials to be held. For a more detailed examination of the general situation of war crime trials at that time, see Minister of Foreign Affairs Liaison Office, Investigation Section, 'Senpan Saiban no Kihon Shiryo' [Basic resources on war crimes trials], November 1950, in 'Honpō Sensō Hanzainin Kankei Zakken', vol. 1.

For court stenographic transcripts of the Tokyo Trial, as prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Liaison Office, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs Liaison Office, ed., *Kyokutō Kokusai Gunji Saiban Hanketsu Sokki-roku* [Stenographic records of rulings at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East] (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Liaison Office, 1948).

8 *Asahi Shimbun*, 20 June 1946.

9 'Kyokutō Kokusai Gunji Saiban Sokki-roku' [Stenographic records of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East], no. 18, 25 June 1946, in *Kyokutō Kokusai Gunji Saiban Sokki-roku* [Stenographic records of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East], ed. Nitta Mitsuo, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Yūshōdō, 1968), 178.

10 Ibid., 180–81.

11 Ibid., 183.

12 Ibid., 184.

13 Ibid., 185.

14 'Kyokutō Kokusai Gunji Saiban Sokki-roku', no. 19, June 26, 1946, in Nitta, *Kyokutō Kokusai Gunji Saiban Sokki-roku*, vol. 1, 188–92.

15 Shigemitsu, *Sugamo Nikki*, 22. Essentially the same point is made in Itō and Watanabe, *Shigemitsu Mamoru Shuki*, 660.

16 *Asahi Shimbun*, 26, 27 June 1946.

17 *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 26, 27 June 1946.

18 Former Kwantung Army Commander-in-Chief Honjō committed suicide in November 1945.

19 Awaya Kentarō and Yoshida Yutaka, eds, *Kokusai Kensatsu-kyoku (IPS) Jinmon Chōsho* [Interrogation records of the International Prosecution Section], vol. 48 (Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Center, 1993), 1–14.

Shidehara's telegrams from Hayashi from August to September 1931 were submitted by order of GHQ. A copy can be found in 'Manshū Jihen: Zai Hōten Hayashi Sōryōji Hatsu Shidehara Gaishō Are Denpō Tsuzuri (Fuku)' [The Manchurian Incident: File on telegraphs from Mukden Consul General Hayashi to Foreign Minister Shidehara (duplicates)], vol. 2, A.1.1.0.21, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. On the cover it states, 'August and September, Shōwa 6: File on Telegraphs from Mukden Consul General Hayashi to Foreign Minister Shidehara—file of all document copies submitted on June 10, Shōwa 21, under GHQ order 16894-1B'. These telegrams addressed to Shidehara are also included in *Archives in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, 1868–1945: Documents of the International Military Tribunal*, Reels 55, 56 (Washington: Library of Congress, 1949–1951).

20 Awaya and Yoshida, *Kokusai Kensatsu-kyoku (IPS) Jinmon Chōsho*, vol. 28, 385. See also Awaya Kentarō, *Miketsu no Sensō Sekinin* [The undetermined responsibility for the war] (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 1994), 108.

21 Inaba et al., *Taiheiyō Sensō eno Michi*, extra vol.: Resources, 114–15; Kobayashi and Shimada, *Gendai-shi Shiryo*, vol. 7, 184; Kobayashi, Shimada and Inaba, *Gendai-shi Shiryo*, vol. 11, 313; Hayashi to Shidehara, 19 September 1931, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho: Manshū Jihen*, vol. 1, no. 3, 3; Hayashi to Shidehara, 19 September, *ibid.*, 6.

See also Morishima, *Inbō, Ansatsu, Guntō*, 419; Seki, 'Manshū Jihen Zenshi', 412, 419, 433; Shimada Toshihiko, 'Manshū Jihen no Tenkai', 12–13; Ogata, *Manshū Jihen to Seisaku no Keisei Katei*, 104; Hayashi, *Manshū Jihen to Hōten Sōryōji*, 114–15.

22 Affidavit by Shidehara Kijūrō, 28 July 1947, in 'Kyokutō Kokusai Gunji Saiban Shiryō' [Documents on the International Military Tribunal for the Far East], vol. 288, Special Documents Room, Kokushikan University Library. For the copy, see 'Shidehara Kijūrō Sensei Kyōjutsusho' [Affidavit of Shidehara Kijūrō], 28 July 1947, 1-4E-013-00-Shō 49 Kunai-04859-100, National Archives of Japan.

For information on Tanaka's testimony, see 'Kyokutō Kokusai Gunji Saiban Sokki-roku', no. 26, 6 July 1946, in Nitta Mitsuo, *Kyokutō Kokusai Gunji Saiban Sokki-roku*, vol. 1, 290; Awaya, Adachi and Kobayashi, *Tōkyō Saiban Shiryō*, 3, 138, 217.

23 Shidehara Kijūrō's medical certificate, as issued by St Luke's International Hospital, 7 November 1947, in 'Kyokutō Kokusai Gunji Saiban Shiryō', vol. 287, Special Documents Room, Kokushikan University Library.

24 Court testimony no. 3479, in 'Kyokutō Kokusai Gunji Saiban Shiryō', vol. 288, Special Documents Room, Kokushikan University Library.

25 'Kyokutō Kokusai Gunji Saiban Sokki-roku', no. 317, 19 November 1947, in Nitta, *Kyokutō Kokusai Gunji Saiban Sokki-roku*, vol. 7, 560–562; 'Kyokutō Kokusai Gunji Saiban Sokki-roku', no. 318, 20 November 1947, *ibid.*, 563–583; Asahi Shimbun Court Press Corp, *Tōkyō Saiban* [The Tokyo Trial], vol. 2 (Tokyo: Tokyo Trial Publication Society, 1962), 616–18.

26 Shigemitsu, *Sugamo Nikki*, 300.

27 *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 21 November 1947.

28 'Kyokutō Kokusai Gunji Saiban Shiryō', vol. 44, Special Documents Room, Kokushikan University Library.

29 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Liaison Office, *Kyokutō Kokusai Gunji Saiban Hanketsu Sokki-roku*, 99–101; Mainichi Shimbunsha, ed., *Tōkyō Saiban Hanketsu: Kyokutō Gunji Saiban-sho Hanketsu-bun* [Tokyo Trial ruling: The judgement of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East] (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbun, 1949), 141–44.

30 Arai Shinichi, *Dainiji Sekai Taisen* [World War II] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1973), 5–6; Yoshida Yutaka, *Shōwa Tennō no Shūsen-shi* [A history of the Shōwa emperor at the end of the war] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992), 196.

31 Shidehara, *Gaikō 50 Nen*, 207–12.

32 *Kasumigaseki-kai Kaihō*, no. 14 (February 1946): 5–6; Foreign Service Training Institute, *Gaimu Kanri Kenshūjo Gaikan* [Overview of the Foreign Service Training Institute] (Tokyo: Foreign Service Training Institute, 1948), 1–7, 15; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hundred-Year History Compilation Association, *Gaimushō no 100 Nen*, vol. 2, 1354–69; Matsunaga Nobuo, *Aru Gaikō-kan no Kaiso* [Recollections of a diplomat] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 2002), 29.

33 Satō, *Kaiko 80 Nen*, 517. Satō would also serve as the privy councillor at the same time, from November 1946. See Satō to Suzuki Tadakatsu, 11 December 1946, in ‘Suzuki Tadakatsu Kankei Bunsho’ [Documents relating to Suzuki Tadakatsu], no. 15, Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, National Diet Library.

34 *Kasumigaseki-kai Kaihō*, no. 19 (July 1946): 1–3; Shidehara Peace Foundation, *Shidehara Kijūrō*, 56–60.

One such lecture was given by Irie Keishirō, who spoke on topics such as the Xinhai Revolution, Swiss permanent neutrality and the Locarno security arrangements. See Irie Keishirō, *Kindai Gaikō-shi Shō* [Excerpts of modern diplomatic history] (Tokyo: Foreign Service Training Institute, 1960).

35 Foreign Minister Yoshida to Kase Shunichi, minister to Switzerland, Morishima Morito, minister to Portugal, and Shichida Motoharu, minister to Afghanistan, 20 November 1945, in ‘Taiheiyō Sensō Shūketsu niyoru Honpō Gaikōken no Teishi oyobi Kaifuku nitaru Keii’ [The loss of Japan’s diplomatic rights as a result of the conclusion of the Pacific War, and the circumstances surrounding their recovery], A.1.0.0.13, Reel A’-0090, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

36 ‘Shidehara Naikaku Sōridaijin Shachūdan’ [Talk given on a train by Prime Minister Shidehara], printed in every newspaper on 8 November 1945, 1-2A-040-00-shi-00306-100, National Archives of Japan.

37 Okazaki Katsuo, ‘Sengo 20 Nen no Henreki’ [Wandering through 20 years of the postwar era] (4), *Kasumigaseki-kai Kaihō*, no. 244 (June 1966): 16; Miyake, ‘Yoshida-san wo Shinobite Omou Kotodomo (11)’, *Kasumigaseki-kai Kaihō*, no. 294 (August 1970): 10–12; Foreign Service Training Institute, *Gaimushō Kenshūjo 10 Nenshi* [A 10-year history of the Foreign Service Training Institute] (Tokyo: Foreign Service Training Institute, 1956), 1–17, 59; Kajima Peace Research Center, ed., *Keizai Gaikō no Genjō wo Kataru: Ichi Gaikō Jitsumu-ka no Me* [Speaking on the realities of economic diplomacy: From the perspective of a practitioner of diplomacy] (Tokyo: Bensei Shuppan, 2003), 5.

38 *Kasumigaseki-kai Kaihō*, no. 39 (February 1948): 7. Shidehara also became the chairman of the Japan Club in June 1946. See Japan Club, *Nihon Club 100 Nen-shi*, 55.

39 Higashikuni, *Higashikuni Naruhiko Nikki*, 247. However, in the relevant entry of ‘Higashikuni-no-miya Nisshi’, 7 October 1945, there are no statements of this nature.

40 ‘Shidehara Heiwa Bunko’, Reel 17.

41 Yoshida, Shidehara and Sato, ‘Gaikō Jūō-dan’.

42 Sansom to Sterndale Bennett, 22 February 1946, F 3512/556/23, FO 371/54286, National Archives. See also Yamagiwa and Nakamura, *Shiryō Nihon Senryō*, vol. 1, 537–38, 557–59; Kosuge Nobuko, *Sengo Wakai* [The postwar reconciliation] (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 2005), 121.

43 Shidehara Kijūrō, ‘Watashi no Shina-kan’ [My perspective on China], 25 March 1946, in ‘Shidehara Heiwa Bunko’, Reel 18.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Iwasaki Family Bibliographical Publishing Association, ed., *Iwasaki Hisaya Den* [A biography of Iwasaki Hisaya] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1979), 270–80, 299–304.

47 Tōyō Bunko, *Tōyōbunko 15 Nen-shi* [A 15-year history of Tōyō Bunko] (Tokyo: Tōyō Bunko, 1939), 35; Tōyō Bunko, *Zaidan Hōjin Tōyōbunko Ryaku-shi* [A brief history of Tōyō Bunko Foundation] (Tokyo: Tōyō Bunko, 1957), 10–15.

48 Tōyō Bunko, *Shōwa 30 Nendo: Tōyōbunko Nenpō* [The 30th year of Shōwa: Tōyō Bunko annual report] (Tokyo: Tōyō Bunko, 1957), 2–5, 9. For details on the circumstances leading up to the appointment of both individuals to the office of president of the House of Councillors, see Yamamoto Yūzō, ‘Satō-san to Ryokufūkai’ [Mr Satō and the Ryokufūkai], *Kasumigaseki-kai Kaihō*, no. 301 (March 1971): 14–15.

49 Shidehara to Wakayama Press Co., 30 March 1948, Record Group 331, Box 22750, National Archives; *Kasumigaseki-kai Kaihō*, no. 37 (January 1948): 5; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research Bureau, *Gendai Tōa-Jin Meikan* [Directory of contemporary East Asians] (Tokyo: Tōhō Kenkyū-kai, 1950). See also Shidehara to Cai Mengjian, 23 January 1951, in *Zhuanji Wenxue* 42, no. 2 (February 1983), 72, Chengting T. Wang Papers, Box 2, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University.

50 Schedule of Dulles, 16 February 1938, John Foster Dulles Papers, Reel 3, Princeton University Library; Dulles to Saito Hiroshi, 25 March 1938, Reel 3, Dulles Papers. I also referred to Iguchi Haruo, ‘John Foster Dulles no Gaikō Shisō: Senzen, Sengo no Renzokusei’ [The diplomatic thought of John Foster Dulles: The continuity of the prewar and postwar eras], *Dōshisha America Kenkyū*, no. 34 (March 1998): 43, 45.

51 Grew to Shidehara, 11 February 1938, Grew Papers, Letters, vol. 92. See also Shidehara, *Gaikō 50 Nen*, 285.

52 Summary Report by J. F. Dulles, 7 July 1950, 794.00/7–750, Decimal File 1950–54, Box 4229, Record Group 59, National Archives; tribute by Dulles, *New York Times*, 11 March 1951. A similar entry is in Department of State, ed., *FRUS, 1950*, vol. 6 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976), 1230–37.

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54 Magō Club, ed., ‘Shidehara Shūgin Gichō Kōen’ [Address by Shidehara, speaker of the House of Representatives], 17 November 1950, in ‘Shidehara Heiwa Bunko’, Reel 18. See also Murai Ryōta, ‘Dai Ichiji Taisen-go Sekai to Kenseikai no Fukkō: Seiken-tō eno Seichō to Seitō Naikaku-sei, 1918–25 Nen’ [The world after World War I and the rise of the Kenseikai: The trend towards becoming a governing party and the party cabinet system, 1918–25], *Kōbe Hōgaku Nenpō*, no. 17 (March 2001): 213–15.

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- 60 Shidehara Kijūrō, 'Tōjin Okichi to Ochō Fujin' [Tōjin Okichi and Mrs Ochō], *Kaizō* 32, no. 1 (January 1951): 142.
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- 65 John Gunther, *The Riddle of MacArthur: Japan, Korea, and the Far East* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951), 3, 104–05, 145.
- 66 Shidehara Kijūrō, 'Genesis of the Manchurian Incident of 1931', in 'Shidehara Heiwa Bunko', Reels 7 and 19.
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