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Japan's Intervention in China

Japan and the Northern Expedition

The Shandong Expedition

The Seiyūkai party, led by Tanaka Giichi, formed a government in April 1927. At that time Prime Minister Tanaka also took on the role of foreign minister. Freed from his ministerial responsibilities, Shidehara spent a period of convalescence due to appendicitis at his coastal residence in Kotsubo, in the Zushi region south of Yokohama. This residence had been given the name 'Shūen-sō' (Shūen villa) by Saionji Kinmochi. After Shidehara recuperated from his illness, he visited Saionji in Okitsu to express his thanks. On this occasion he asked Saionji why he had given the residence the name of 'Shūen-sō'. Saionji told him that the meaning of the character 'for "en" (遠) was to convey the sense of "world", and means that you [Shidehara] are gathering together the hopes of the world'.¹ Saionji wanted to remind Shidehara that, although he was no longer the foreign minister for the time being, a great deal of responsibility rested upon his shoulders. I also note that from January of the previous year (1926), while Shidehara was still foreign minister, he had been nominated by the imperial household for a position in the House of Peers. Of the factions that constituted the Diet, he would go on to associate with the relatively neutral Dōwakai.²

In the political world, the formation of the Tanaka cabinet was the occasion for the Kenseikai and Seiyūhontō parties to merge. This development led to the birth of the Rikken Minseitō (the Constitutional Democratic Party, hereafter simply referred to as the Minseitō) in June 1927. The first president of the Minseitō was Hamaguchi Osachi. In fact, it was Shidehara who had persuaded Hamaguchi to assume the responsibility of party president. Although Hamaguchi then offered him the role of vice-president, Shidehara declined.

During this period, the Tanaka cabinet authorised the deployment of Japanese troops to the Shandong Peninsula in China. The impetus was the further advancement of the Northern Expedition, led by Chiang Kai-shek. Under the official justification of protecting local Japanese residents, the Tanaka cabinet authorised the first Shandong deployment in May 1927. The Tanaka cabinet authorised a second deployment in April of the following year. This move led to a clash with China's National Revolutionary Army in Jinan, west of Qingdao. The occurrence of the 'Jinan Incident' (in Japanese, the 'Sainan Incident') led to the Tanaka cabinet responding by committing even further, with the third Shandong deployment. Then, in June, Zhang Zuolin of the Mukden clique was assassinated when the train he was travelling in was bombed. In time, it was learned that the perpetrators of the assassination plot were actually the Kwantung Army (the branch of the Japanese army stationed in Kwantung-leased territory on the Liaodong Peninsula). The details of this 'Huanggutun Incident' (or, in Japanese, the 'Zhang Zuolin Explosion Death Incident') were not widely known in Japan; government documents simply referred to 'A Certain Important Incident in Manchuria'.³

The situation in China at the time of Chiang Kai-shek's Northern Expedition was therefore one of rapid change, while at the same time, the Tanaka cabinet's policy was characterised by dependency on military force. What did Shidehara think of these developments? Shidehara expressed his view in a private June 1927 letter to Adachi Mineichirō, Japan's ambassador to Belgium:

Now that the upheaval in China is at its height, it is a great nuisance for the world's powers. Yet there is little doubt that for the citizens of China, the trend in thinking after the world war is towards a gradual political awakening, particularly in light of the examples of what occurred in Turkey and Egypt. Calls for the termination of unequal treaties or the overthrow of imperialism are now being recognized as a reflection of true national self-consciousness.

I believe that attempts by external forces to apply force in order to prevent these shifts are not only doomed to failure but may actually provoke matters further.⁴

In other words, according to Shidehara, not only was it impossible to prevent China's 'awakening' and 'national self-consciousness' with 'external forces' but also such measures could actually exacerbate the situation.

That is not to say that Shidehara thought Japan had to acquiesce to China's demands and renounce its interests in China. For example, when Belgium declared that it would return its foreign concessions in Tianjin, in the hopes that it could thereby develop its relations with China, Shidehara asked Adachi: 'Is this not a mistake on their part in judging the political situation in China?'⁵

'Overview of the Chinese Problem'

Although Shidehara was still in poor health, he would gradually become more active. The cause was the general election of February 1928. This was the first election in Japan with universal suffrage for male citizens. During the lead-up to the election, the Seiyūkai criticised the previous Wakatsuki cabinet for their policies on China. In reaction, Shidehara embarked upon trips to cities such as Nagoya and Osaka to present his views in public speeches. Newspapers from the period reported:

Former foreign minister Mr. Shidehara Kijūrō fears that the Tanaka cabinet's handling of China policy may incur international misunderstanding and place the empire [Japan] in an unfavorable position. On this occasion, he has spoken forcefully on various aspects of his diplomatic approach, appealing to the citizens of the nation.⁶

Shidehara gave his speeches in order to convince his fellow citizens of the benefits of his diplomatic ideals, rather than to support any particular candidate in the general election. Their contents were conveyed in newspaper print, alongside photos. The *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, for example, reported:

Expressing his regret that [the ideals of] Shidehara diplomacy had been trampled upon by the current cabinet, former foreign minister Baron Shidehara Kijūrō has made his way down to the Kansai area, via Nagoya, in order to publicly critique the government's approach to China policy.⁷

Although the governing Seiyūkai party would narrowly come in first place in the election, the Minseitō was able to close the gap to a single seat. In this political context, Shidehara published an essay titled 'Shina Mondai Gaikan' (Overview of the Chinese problem) in the April 1928 issue of *Gaikō Jihō*. This essay was a vehicle for Shidehara to discuss his own recommended policy on China. In the essay, Shidehara wrote:

Today's China is no longer the China of the past. If you believe that it is still possible to recklessly use military force and pressure in order to achieve your goals through confrontation, you will fail to apprehend how the times have changed.⁸

On the other hand:

If the citizens of China believe that they themselves can use violence and threats in order to subdue the great powers, ignoring their responsibilities and rigidly thinking only of their rights, then this would in turn be their mistake.⁹

In the same essay, Shidehara quoted his own Diet address to discuss China's communism, arguing:

The question of how many people should be in control of political power, and what kind of domestic policies would be appropriate for China, is, of course, a matter that must be resolved by the citizens of that country.¹⁰

On the topic of the Wakatsuki cabinet's China policy, Shidehara repeated the following four points from his Diet address:

1. Respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China and abide by the principle of absolute non-interference in internal conflicts.
2. Pledge to promote a relationship of prosperous coexistence and economic cooperation between the two nations.
3. Respond to reasonable requests from the citizens of China with sympathy and goodwill and work resolutely toward a cooperative resolution.
4. While taking as patient and tolerant an attitude as possible with respect to current conditions in China, use all available reasonable methods to protect our legitimate and important rights and interests.¹¹

According to 'Shina Mondai Gaikan', Sino-Japanese relations improved from the time of the Washington Naval Conference to the mid-1920s:

Since the turning point of the Washington Conference, the relationship between our two nations gradually improved. In particular, our [ministry] staff played a central role in the Chinese Tariffs Special Conference and the Extraterritorial Rights Committee convened in Beijing last year. They worked in an impartial and temperate manner, thereby concretely demonstrating to China our sympathetic attitude. This, alongside our approach of absolutely not interfering in China's domestic conflict, served to bring the citizens of our two nations significantly closer together and improve mutual understanding.¹²

Shidehara was clearly proud of how his policies served to reform Japan's relations with China.

In the essay, Shidehara also set forth his thinking, albeit in an indirect manner, on whether it was correct to deploy troops to Shandong. In his view, when dispatching troops, it was important to carefully consider the possible outcomes, including any negative impacts on business dealings. Military intervention should only ever be an 'emergency measure'. For Shidehara, 'suddenly sending soldiers without first working out some form of preliminary measures must be regarded as gravely unfortunate for the nation'.¹³ Finally, Shidehara touched upon his own speech at the Washington Naval Conference:

Our nation feels most urgently a concern for the speed at which peace and unity may be restored to China, as well as for the economic development of both nations' rich natural resources ... We must acknowledge that our own nation has particularly important interests in China, far more so than any geographically distant foreign land ... What we seek is a footing for economic activity whereby both nations may benefit, under the principles of an open door policy and equal opportunity. I believe that at the time [of my speech] the above points received unanimous support.¹⁴

In the above manner, Shidehara asserted that Japan should avoid interference in China's affairs, in the interest of promoting peace and economic commercial activity in that nation. Further, even though Japan had special interests in China, it ought not to attempt to shut out other nations from economic participation. Publicly expressing this position was also Shidehara's way of attempting to reign in the Tanaka cabinet. He concluded the essay with the following words:

It is my earnest desire that we might cut through present-day publicity stunts and various forms of emotional discord and, from the vantage point of pure concern for the nation, reach our judgements following earnest and calm consideration of the problem at hand.¹⁵

When viewed over the long-term, it would seem that Shidehara's opinion was correct. Yet what about the short-term? It is difficult to see what concrete policies could be drawn up to protect Japanese interests and residents. It is also doubtful as to whether this approach convinced the Japanese populace. It may well be that from Shidehara's perspective, politicians, the media and even the citizenry were immature, yet the fact remains that Shidehara received a significant degree of criticism from these quarters. One example is an essay by Honda Kumatarō titled 'Tai-Shi Gaikō no Hatan' (The bankruptcy of diplomacy towards China). After being forced out of his position by Shidehara, former diplomat Honda had become a commentator on Japanese diplomacy. On the topic of the previous Wakatsuki cabinet, Honda wrote:

Time and again it led us to unstable situations, due to a lack of understanding as to the complex nature of China's revolutionary movement, and a failure to establish any foundational policies.¹⁶

'My Views on Diplomacy'

When Shidehara aired his views publicly in the manner outlined above, he was not simply giving his advice as a bureaucrat. Rather, in the context of a two-party political system, he was effectively siding with the Minseitō against the Seiyūkai. Shidehara also engaged with the Minseitō in other ways. For example, he participated in the formulation of a Minseitō statement on Chinese policy, alongside figures such as Hamaguchi Osachi, Egi Tasuku, Kobashi Ichita, Nagai Ryūtarō and Adachi Kenzō. He also spoke with Hamaguchi and other members of the party on the occasion of his speech on Chinese policy to the Japan–China Economic Association in Osaka. Further, Shidehara even consulted Hamaguchi on the topic of the Kellogg–Briand Pact.¹⁷ The Kellogg–Briand Pact, which outlawed war, was signed in Paris in August 1928. Through such discussions, Shidehara's position would also influence Hamaguchi's thinking. We see this influence in Hamaguchi's view that 'we must give sufficient opportunity for peace and unity to take hold in China' and that diplomacy had to avoid becoming entangled in political strife.¹⁸

Shidehara would also publish a dialogue transcript in the Minseitō organ magazine, *Minsei*. As suggested by the title, 'Yashiteki Tanaka Gaikō' (The charlatanry of Tanaka diplomacy), it was a severe criticism of Tanaka's diplomatic approach. Shidehara attacked the Tanaka cabinet for its role in the Jinan Incident, writing that 'to pretend you can do something that is impossible is to act no differently than a street-side conjurer'.¹⁹ In the past, when still foreign minister, Shidehara had also published his Diet address in the organ magazine of the Kenseikai (which, it should be recalled, was one of the two parties that merged to become the Minseitō). In having reached this point, however, we can see that Shidehara's deep sense of crisis with regard to Tanaka diplomacy had pushed him even further towards alignment with the Minseitō.

We can get a clearer sense of this more partisan Shidehara from the speech he gave on 19 October 1928 at Keiō University entitled 'Gaikō Kanken' (My views on diplomacy). In this speech, Shidehara argued forcefully that 'the essence of diplomacy does not lie in scheming'.²⁰ That is to say, diplomacy conducted through scheming had little to offer a nation in the long-term. This was because:

As the life of a nation is to be eternal, those who would scheme for the purpose of a temporary benefit must prepare themselves for the serious calamities that would one day occur as a result.²¹

What did Shidehara mean here by diplomacy conducted through scheming? He mentioned the Triple Intervention as one such 'example of scheming diplomacy in the Far East'. (In the Triple Intervention of 1895, Russia, Germany and France intervened following Japan's victory over Qing-dynasty China.) 'Needless to say, the Triple Intervention was a diplomatic conspiracy, a serious international crime.' Yet, even though Japan was forced to return the Liaodong Peninsula to China as a result of the Triple Intervention, 'it was China itself who was the first to suffer poetic justice'. This was because:

China was betrayed by the two governments of Russia and Germany, which it once regarded as its friends. Not only was China deprived of the benefits it hoped to gain through the Triple Intervention, but it ended up losing all of Manchuria, along with Shandong province, with no choice but to allow Russia and Germany to carry out their invasion strategies unimpeded.²²

Shidehara stated:

Diplomacy is not a conjurer's trick. Those who seek to deceive the eyes of onlookers, producing hundreds of feet of paper, a dove of peace, or the national flag expressing the dignity of the nation from the interior cavity of an empty box, in order to receive the praise of the masses, are not politicians but magicians.²³

Shidehara's conviction was that diplomacy must be based upon honesty and begin by establishing a relationship of trust.

With this speech, Shidehara offered an explanation for his response in March the previous year to the Nanjing Incident of 1927, alongside a criticism of the Tanaka cabinet. He wrote:

These days, there are those who view the Nanjing Incident as a product of the weak diplomacy Japan and other powers had pursued in the past with respect to China. Further, they may say that it followed from the Japanese government at that time following a path of absolute non-resistance. This kind of false speculation is circulating in our society even now. One cannot help but be shocked, however, at the sight of ministry officials of the present government openly disseminating such falsities.²⁴

On the other hand, Shidehara also made demands of China's diplomacy. As he argued:

The methods that the Chinese side are utilizing today, for the purpose of abolishing its unequal treaties, differ quite significantly from how our own nation dealt with the very same problem.²⁵

That is to say, in the case of Japan:

Rather than blame the great powers, we first blamed ourselves. Rather than calling for the overthrow of imperialism and so on, we first quietly put all our energy into reforming our national political affairs.²⁶

However, in the case of China, 'the present situation is that it is unwilling to wait for an improvement in domestic governance, instead directly pressing for the revision and termination of currently existing treaties'.²⁷ In reality, however, there had been many reforms and attempts at self-strengthening in China, which Shidehara underestimated.

That being the case, what kind of policies should Japan adopt with respect to China? Shidehara argued for a combination of non-intervention and the protection of national interests. By 'non-intervention', Shidehara meant that:

With various parties opposing each other in China's political world, it is essential to absolutely avoid lending any form of unfair aid to one side, or to work towards removing another side.²⁸

His reason for taking this stance was that 'our rights and interests [in China] were certainly not bestowed by any one political faction'.²⁹ Shidehara then turned to the 'idea that the carrying out of a policy of non-intervention nevertheless requires some discrete intervention for the purpose of protecting our rights and interests'. However, he added: 'Such thinking actually looks down upon our benefits, our position [in China]'.³⁰

By advancing this view, Shidehara criticised the Tanaka cabinet's deployment of troops to Shandong. He concluded his speech by making a final point on the importance of economic diplomacy:

Our government must not stop at merely protecting our economic rights within a particular region of China. Rather, it must adopt a much bigger perspective and endeavor to promote greater economic ties between Japan and the entirety of China.³¹

Here Shidehara was direct in his criticism of the Tanaka cabinet. The bluntness of this speech is quite conspicuous when compared with his 'Overview of the Chinese Problem' essay of half a year earlier. Perhaps he felt more confident in sharing his real thoughts before a more limited audience. Certainly, having witnessed the fallout of the Jinan Incident and the assassination of Zhang Zuolin, Shidehara had an even stronger conviction as to the importance of non-intervention and economic diplomacy.

The Argument with Prime Minister Tanaka

Shidehara would have been anxious not only about the effects of Tanaka diplomacy abroad but also about how Ministry of Foreign Affairs personnel were faring. There were two significant shifts with respect to personnel during the era of the Tanaka cabinet, both of which would later have an impact on Shidehara's second term as foreign minister. First, there

was the rise of reformists such as Arita Hachirō and Shigemitsu Mamoru. Arita became the director-general of the Asian Bureau, while Shigemitsu became the consulate general in Shanghai. Alongside Arita's appointment as Asian Bureau director-general, Shidehara's confidant Kimura Eiichi was made minister to Czechoslovakia. Second, Yoshida Shigeru became vice-minister for foreign affairs, replacing Debuchi Katsuji. Yoshida was not originally a member of the central clique within the ministry. It was due to his closeness to figures such as the Seiyūkai's Mori Tsutomu, the parliamentary vice-minister for foreign affairs, that he was able to secure this position. Thus, some referred to Yoshida as 'the uninvited vice-minister'. Debuchi, meanwhile, was made ambassador to the US.

Mori Tsutomu, parliamentary vice-minister for foreign affairs, had been critical of Shidehara's policy of non-intervention. He was also behind the move to push Shidehara's confidants, Vice-Minister Debuchi and Asian Bureau Director-General Kimura, out of their respective positions. Mori looked down upon career diplomats but saw Yoshida Shigeru and Shiratori Toshio as exceptions. While Tanaka initially resisted making these extensive changes in personnel, he apparently relented and accepted Yoshida as vice-minister following the assassination of Zhang Zuolin of June 1928 and the impasse that had been reached with Japan's China policy.

Given the circumstances, Shidehara could not have been particularly enthusiastic about Yoshida's appointment as the vice-minister. In fact, Yoshida had also disliked Shidehara for some time. When Shidehara was vice-minister for foreign affairs, Yoshida was acting director of the Document Section. A strong-willed individual, he did not get on well with Vice-Minister Shidehara. Even when Shidehara summoned him, he was apparently not quick to respond. Later, when the Manchurian Incident occurred during Shidehara's second term as foreign minister, Yoshida was also critical: 'He is not skilled at handling unexpected incidents'.³²

Nevertheless, the most problematic individual for Shidehara was Prime Minister Tanaka himself. Tanaka's Manchuria policy began to stagnate following the Huanggutun Incident. Japan was unable to get China to recognise its right to lease land in southern Manchuria, which had long been a contentious issue between the two countries. Further, Zhang Zuolin's successor, his eldest son Zhang Xueliang, would not acknowledge Japan's right to begin constructing the Jihui or Zhangda railways. At this time, Shidehara was residing in Rikugien. One day he received some

disturbing information. It was details on the 'Seiyūkai cabinet's latest hardline policy'. To strengthen Japan's hand in securing both land leasing and railway construction rights in Manchuria, the Tanaka cabinet were 'ready to carry out the mobilization of several divisions'.³³ Fearing the worst, Shidehara relayed this information to the lord keeper of the privy seal, Makino Nobuaki.

Shidehara felt it necessary to use his position as a member of the House of Peers in order to speak at the plenary session on 2 February 1929. Upon the podium, Shidehara addressed Tanaka, asking him to clarify just what was meant by a 'so-called hardline policy, and by an aggressive policy'. According to Shidehara, from the time of the Tōhō Kaigi (Eastern Summit) held in Tokyo in the summer of 1927, the Tanaka cabinet had inflamed the 'indignation of the [Chinese] people against our nation', triggering an anti-Japanese movement. Shidehara also argued that when Tanaka had previously spoken of rendering Manchuria 'into a peaceful land', he should have stopped at the protection of Japan's interests.³⁴ Shidehara was also critical of how the Tanaka cabinet had advised Zhang Xueliang to delay reaching an understanding with the Nationalist government.

Further, Shidehara asserted that the deployment of troops to Shandong was also a policy failure, given that they did not prevent a considerable loss of life among local Japanese residents. In his view, the Japanese government should have negotiated with the National Revolution Army and evacuated Japanese residents before deciding to send troops. He pointed out that not a single Japanese life was lost in the Nanjing Incident of 1927, when he himself had been foreign minister, despite the fact that no troops were deployed. Finally, Shidehara criticised the Tanaka cabinet's announcement that the Chinese policies of the previous cabinet had reached a dead end. Rather, the situation was exactly the opposite. In fiery language he handed down his damning verdict:

The foundation of friendly Sino-Japanese relations, the achievement of diligent effort during our time in charge of the ministry, has during the current cabinet been, for the most part, tragically destroyed.³⁵

In response, Tanaka spoke evasively of the need for diplomacy to be tough and aggressive. He also claimed that use of military force was a last resort and that he was doing his utmost to avoid it. According to Tanaka,

if troops had not been deployed to Shandong, the situation would have certainly grown much worse. Of course, this line of reasoning would never have convinced Shidehara.³⁶

Therefore, on 5 February 1929, Shidehara stood to ask questions at the House of Peers. Again, he pressed the issue, asking whether troops would be dispatched to Manchuria for the sake of maintaining stability. He also repeated his doubts as to the wisdom of the advice given to Zhang Xueliang, and the deployment of troops to Shandong. He also expressed his regret that Japan was now behind the other powers when it came to reaching a tariff agreement with China.

In the end, however, the Tanaka cabinet would not last out the year. The cause of its undoing was their handling of the assassination by bomb of Zhang Zuolin. Tanaka had asserted that the perpetrators would face harsh punishment. However, pressure from the army ensured that the chief conspirator, Kōmoto Daisaku, only faced suspension from office. This led to the Shōwa emperor reprimanding Tanaka, and the subsequent resignation of the entire cabinet in July 1929.

Years later, when questioned at the Tokyo Trial by international prosecutors, Shidehara would say emphatically: 'One cause of the collapse of the Tanaka cabinet was clearly the dispatch of troops to Jinan, along with other failures of its China diplomacy'.³⁷ From Shidehara's perspective, he had worked hard to establish both the tradition of Japanese diplomacy and international trust in Japan. Yet the policies of the Tanaka cabinet had disrupted these efforts. How would he manage to overcome these setbacks during his second term as foreign minister, commencing in the Hamaguchi cabinet?

Endnotes

1 Shidehara, *Gaikō 50 Nen*, 277–80.

2 Itō Takashi and Hirose Yoshihiro, eds, *Makino Nobuaki Nikki* [The diary of Makino Nobuaki] (Tokyo: Chuōkōronsha, 1990), 278; Oka and Hayashi, *Taishō Democracy-ki no Seiji*, 607; 'Kizokuin Giin Kakuha-betsu nikansuru Chosa' [Survey of respective factions among the House of Peers members], date unknown, in 'Kondō Hideaki Kankei Bunsho' [Documents relating to Kondō Hideaki], no. 70, Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, National Diet Library; 'Kizokuin Giin Kakuha-betsu: Ji Meiji 34 Nen 12 Gatsu, Shi Shōwa 7 Nen 3 Gatsu' [Respective factions in the House of Peers, from December of Meiji 34 to March of Shōwa 7], in 'Kondō Hideaki Kankei Bunsho', no. 96; House of Representatives and House of Councilors, eds, *Gikai Seido 70 Nen-shi: Seitōkai-ha Hen* [A 70-year history of the Diet system: Volume on party-based factions] (Tokyo: Ministry of Finance Printing Bureau, 1961), 60; House of Representatives and House of Councilors, eds, *Gikai Seido 70 Nen-shi: Kizokuin, Sangiin Giin Meikan* [A 70-year history of the Diet system: House of Peers, House of Councillors, Diet members directory] (Tokyo: Ministry of Finance Printing Bureau, 1961), 124.

3 Shidehara, *Gaikō 50 Nen*, 145–49. For details on Chinese policies of the Tanaka cabinet, see Satō Motoei, *Shōwa Shoki Tāi-Chūgoku Seisaku no Kenkyū: Tanaka Naikaku no Tāi-Man-Mo Seisaku* [A study of policy regarding China of the early Shōwa era: The Tanaka cabinet's policies regarding Manchuria and Mongolia] (Tokyo: Harashobō, 1992); Hattori, *Higashi Asia Kokusai Kankyō no Hendō to Nihon Gaikō, 1918–1931*, 191–251; Kobayashi Michihiko, 'Tanaka Seiyūkai to Santō Shuppei: 1927–1928 (1) (2)', *Kita Kyūshū Shiritsu Daigaku Hōsei Ronshū* 32, no. 2–3 (December 2004): 1–33; 33, no. 1 (June 2005): 1–52; Shao Jianguo, *Beifa zhanzheng shiqi de Zhong Ri guan xi yan jiu* [A study of Sino-Japanese relations during the Northern Expedition War] (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 2006).

4 Shidehara to Adachi, in 'Adachi Mineichirō Kankei Bunsho' [Documents relating to Adachi Mineichirō], 7 June 1927, Correspondence Department, no. 302, Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, National Diet Library.

5 Ibid.

6 *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, 14 February 1928.

7 *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, evening edition, 16 February 1928.

8 Shidehara Kijūrō, 'Shina Mondai Gaikan' [Overview of the Chinese problem], *Gaikō Jihō*, no. 560 (April 1928): 9.

9 Ibid., 10.

10 Ibid., 10.

11 Ibid., 11.

12 Ibid., 12.

13 Ibid., 15.

14 Ibid., 17, 18.

15 Ibid., 18.

16 Honda Kumatarō, 'Tai-Shi Gaikō no Hasan' [The bankruptcy of diplomacy towards China], *Gaikō Jihō*, no. 538 (May 1927): 19–38.

17 Ikei Masaru, Hatano Masaru and Kurosawa Fumitaka, eds, *Hamaguchi Osachi Nikki, Zuikanroku* [Hamaguchi Osachi diary, record of reflections] (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1991), 19, 41, 44, 45, 46, 54, 56, 61, 65, 67, 74, 83, 109, 124, 134, 143, 158, 166. Murai Ryōta has also provided me with valuable insights on this topic.

The presentation given in Osaka is also contained in Shidehara Kijūrō, 'Tai-shi Gaikō nitsuite' [On the matter of diplomacy towards China], *Minsei* 2, no. 11 (November 1928): 4–17. See also 'Hamaguchi Shidehara Ryo-shi no Tanaka Gaikō Hihan' [Critiques of Tanaka diplomacy as advanced by Mr Hamaguchi and Mr Shidehara], date unknown, in 'Shidehara Heiwa Bunko', Reel 18.

18 Hamaguchi Osachi, 'Yukizumareru Kyokumen no Tenkai to Wāgatō no Shuchō' [The development of the current impasse and the position of my party], *Minsei* 2, no. 10 (October 1928): 6–17; 'Hamaguchi Sōsai no Ketsui Kataku' [The strong determination of President Hamaguchi], *Minsei* 2, no. 10 (October 1928): 86–93. Murai Ryōta has also provided me with valuable insights on this topic.

19 Shidehara Kijūrō, 'Yashi-teki Tanaka Gaikō' [The charlatanry of Tanaka diplomacy], *Minsei* 2, no. 10 (October 1928): 18–20; Shidehara Kijūrō, 'Gen-Naikaku no Gaikō Hōshin' [The diplomatic policy of the present cabinet], *Kensei* 7, no. 8 (August 1924): 5–9; Shidehara Kijūrō, 'Teikoku Gaikō no Kichō' [The basic theme of Japanese diplomacy], *Kensei* 8, no. 2 (February 1925): 11–12; Shidehara Kijūrō, 'Jishu-teki Gaikō no Kiso Kakuritsu' [Establishing the foundations of autonomous diplomacy], *Kensei Kōron* 6, no. 2 (February 1926): 13–20; Shidehara Kijūrō, 'Waga Kuni Genka no Kokusai Kankei' [Our nation's contemporary international relations], *Kensei Kōron* 7, no. 2 (February 1927): 21–27.

For further details on Diet speeches given during Shidehara's second appointment as foreign minister, see Shidehara Kijūrō, 'Kokusai Heiwa nikansuru Sekai no Taisei' [The global situation on international peace], *Minsei* 3, no. 12 (December 1929): 9–13; Shidehara Kijūrō, 'Genjitsu Nihon no Kokusai Kankei' [Japan's international relationships at the present moment], *Minsei* 4, no. 2

(February 1930): 27–35; Shidehara Kijūrō, ‘Genzai Nihon no Kokusai Kankei’ [Japan’s current international relationships], *Minsei* 4, no. 5 (May 1930): 16–19; Shidehara Kijūrō, ‘Shiryoku wo Tsukushite Keirin no Jitsugen ni Manshin’ [Pushing forward to the utmost of our ability to realise governance], *Minsei* 5, no. 2 (February 1931): 4–6; Shidehara Kijūrō, ‘Wagakuni Saikin no Kokusai Kankei’ [Our nation’s recent international relationships], *Minsei* 5, no. 2 (February 1931): 15–18.

20 Shidehara Kijūrō (lecture), ‘Gaikō Kanken’ [My views on diplomacy], 9 October 1928, in ‘Shidehara Heiwa Bunko’, Reel 17. For discussion on the full text, see Hattori Ryūji, ‘Shidehara Kijūrō kōen, “Gaikō Kanken”’ [Shidehara Kijūrō (lecture), ‘My Views on Diplomacy’], *Sōgō Seisaku Kenkyū*, no. 13 (March 2006): 99–112.

Further, the majority of ‘Gaikō Kanken’ is included in Shidehara Kijūrō, ‘Gaikō no Honshitsu to Waga Tai-Shi Gaikō’ [The essence of diplomacy and my diplomacy towards China], (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6), *Minsei* 3, nos 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 (February–July 1929): 102–07, 100–03, 96–101, 88–93, 102–07, 96–101.

21 Shidehara, ‘Gaikō Kanken’.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Miyake Kijirō, ‘Yoshida-san wo Shinobite Omou Kotodomo’ [Reminiscences of Mr Yoshida] (2), *Kasumigaseki-kai Kaihō*, no. 285 (November 1969): 12–13; Tsutsui Kiyoshi, ‘Mori Tsutomu no Seikaku’ [The personality of Mori Tsutomu], *Kasumigaseki-kai Kaihō*, no. 289 (March 1970): 7–10; Yamaura Kanichi, ed., *Mori Tsutomu* (Tokyo: Harashobō, 1982), 552–53; Yoshida to Makino Nobuaki, 7 June 1932, in *Yoshida Shigeru Shokan* [The letters of Yoshida Shigeru], ed. Yoshida Shigeru Memorial Project Foundation (Tokyo: Chuōkōronsha, 1994), 630–33. See also Shibata Shinichi, *Shōwa-ki no Kōshitsu to Seiji Gaikō* [The imperial household in the Shōwa era and political diplomacy] (Tokyo: Harashobō, 1995), 11–14.

33 Shidehara to Makino, 17 February 1929, in ‘Makino Nobuaki Kankei Bunsho’, Correspondence Department, vol. 28, no. 476–2. See also Itō and Hirose, *Makino Nobuaki Nikki*, 338–39, 341.

34 *Kanpō*, extra edition, 3 February 1929.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 *Kanpō*, extra edition, 6 February 1929; a question to Minister of State Shidehara and its reply, 31 May 1947, in ‘Shidehara Heiwa Bunko’, Reel 7.

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