TERRITORIAL PLANNING AND LA PLATA BASIN BORDERS

Antonio Paulo Cargnin
Aldomar Arnaldo Rückert
Bruno de Oliveira Lemos
(Eds.)

Letra**1**

© 2018

Editors

Antonio Paulo Cargnin
Aldomar Arnaldo Rückert
Bruno de Oliveira Lemos

Editorial Board

Carla Giane Soares da Cunha
Fernando Dreissig de Moraes
Irma Carina Macolmes

Language Review

Marlise Margô Henrich

Layout

Diego Meneghetti
Ronaldo Machado

Cover Design

Laurie Fofonka Cunha

Institutional support

Programa de Pós-Graduação em Geografia (POSGEA)
Instituto de Geociências (IGEO)
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), Brazil

Secretaria de Planejamento, Governança e Gestão (SPGG)
Governo do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil

Letra1

www.editoraleta1.com.br
leta1@editoraleta1.com
(+5551) 3372 9222
Rua Lopo Gonçalves, 554
Cidade Baixa 90050-350
Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil
CNPJ 12.062.268/0001-37

Dados Internacionais de Publicação

Biblioteca Regina de Carvalho Pereira CRB8/91772

T327 Territorial planning and La Plata Basin borders /
Antonio Paulo Cargnin, Aldomar Arnaldo Rückert, Bruno
de Oliveira Lemos (Eds.) . – Porto Alegre : Editora Letra1,
2018. 232p.

ISBN 978-85-63800-35-0

DOI 10.21826/9788563800350

1. Brasil - Fronteiras. 2. La Plata - Fronteira. 3. Território. I.
Cargnin, Antonio Paulo. II. Rückert, Aldomar Arnaldo. III.
Lemos, Bruno de Oliveira. III. Título.

CDD 320.12

VIII THE IMPERFECT SYNTHESIS BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND DEFENSE IN BORDER MANAGEMENT IN LA PLATA BASIN

Flávia Carolina de Resende Fagundes

ABSTRACT

The guarantee of security necessarily passes through the development dimension, just as this is also a fundamental condition for the continuation of economic activities. Although this interdependence is evident, when we look at policies towards Brazilian borders, we note the mismatch between development and security bias, since the latter has dominated the agenda, overlapping the other dimensions. Thus, in this article we will analyze the links between security and development, as well as the actions in these spheres in the borderland, focusing on the context of La Plata Basin, more specifically the Iguaçu cross-border region.

KEYWORDS Defense, Security, Development, Borderland.

INTRODUCTION

The guarantee of security necessarily passes through the development dimension, as this also depends on a secure atmosphere for the continuation of daily activities. Although this relationship of interdependence is well known, in the management of the Brazilian border there is a mismatch between these dimensions.

In recent years, the border has been increasingly prominent on the political agenda. This is mainly due to issues related to public security, with a logic oriented towards the problems that afflict large urban centers, such as Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, often without considering the particularities of the borderland.

Consequently, this movement towards the securitization of Brazilian borders has in some extent to overlap a more positive agenda related to borders, with themes such as public policies of development and regional integration.

Considering this, we will analyze these processes in the Tri-Border between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, since this is an important area of the integration in La Plata Basin, as well as a border region differentiated by its regional economic role and security dynamics highlighted in the national regional and international context.

Thus, in this article, we discuss the relationship between the dimension of development and security in the prevention of the so-called new threats, a subject not yet much discussed in Brazil in a systematic way. In addition, we seek to assess whether there are links between the main initiatives in the area of security and development in the borderland.

THE RELATION BETWEEN SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

The discussion of the relationship between security and development is not new, but this agenda became more strongly discussed after the 2000s, focused mainly on the post-conflict environment, but this dynamic also plays an important role in public security contexts and guarantee of sovereignty.

The profound process of transformation of the concept of security drove this debate. A state-centered concept of security has given space to a new conceptualization, moving from a state-centered view to a more individual-related approach (Klingeibel, 2006). As we can see in Barry Buzan's (1983) definition of security as "the necessary condition to allow the survival and coexistence of the individual who is satisfied in each culture in accordance with the mechanisms established by it to establish and protect it".

Nevertheless, the concept of development also moved away from the macro level to focus on the micro, the individual. Currently, development encompasses several dimensions, ranging from human rights to environmental sustainability, as well as from economic growth to governance (Tschirgi, 2006).

In this way, it made explicit that a peaceful environment is a necessary condition for development, in other words, these dimensions are intrinsically interdependent. According to the *Ministério da Integração Nacional*– Ministry of National Integration (2009), the growth of tension and social exclusion is an obstacle to the sustainable economic development of the nation, since it promotes violence, which can, and in many cases destroys the formation of social and physical capital as well as the flow of internal and external investments.

Hence, the perverse side of globalization tends to affect most heavily the poorest because of its low capacity to enter into the highly competitive dynamics of global markets. Thus, low or negative growth in marginalized regions, high levels of unemployment (especially among young people), disorderly urbanization, poverty, ease movement of drugs, arms, and finance across borders, poor governance and effectiveness of the law are problems that feed each other, providing fertile ground for violence (Tschirgi, 2006).

In this regard, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his report *In Larger Freedom* quoted by Tschirgi (2006) notes that “not only development, security, and human rights are imperative, they reinforce each other.”

Therefore, as we can see from the arguments demonstrated above, the dimensions of development and security are interdependent in ensuring the well-being of populations, which creates the need for synergies in the formulation and implementation of both policies.

However, if national development policies are poorly integrated, articulations with security policies appear to be even more problematic. National security institutions tend to focus more on traditional frameworks than on a broader understanding of human security and prevention strategies (Tschirgi, 2006). Notwithstanding, the concepts of security and development are fluid and elusive, which also hinders coordination between these two spheres since it raises questions such as where to cooperate? To what end?

Thus, there is still concern that the security agenda will overlap the development dimension in the formulation of joint strategies, leading to the subordination of actions aimed at development to security.

However, Klingebiel (2006) argues that it is vital to identify situations and spheres, where the closest coordination and even in some cases joint planning, action, and monitoring are more appropriate and effective.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY POLICIES FOR THE BRAZILIAN BORDERLAND

The borderland is the 150 km¹ zone within the national territory from the international borderline, it corresponds to approximately 27% of the territory, extending through 11 states and 588 municipalities along 16,886 km, being 7,363 km in dry line and 9,523 km in rivers, lakes, and canals, bordering 10 countries, it has a population of about 10 million inhabitants. It is one of the largest borderlands in the world.

Comparing with international examples, the Mexico-United States of America border extends for 3.141 km, one of the most controlled borders in the world, and still a very problematic one. In this sense, the Brazilian borderline is almost 6 times longer than the one of U.S.A-Mexico, along with very different regional realities, what it is very challenging for any administration. The map on the next page exemplifies the magnitude of the Brazilian borderland.

It is worth noting that this region has peculiar characteristics in comparison to the rest of the country. Such differentiation is due in part to the way in which the territorial occupation of Brazil occurred, focused mainly on the coast and with the concentration of economic activities in this space.

The border region, until the stabilization of the Brazilian borders, was seen as a zone of containment and guarantee of the integrity of the territory, thus having a low economic insertion in the rest of the country. However, with the consolidation of borders, this area continued to be seen through a security bias and was characterized by marginal economic insertion (with the exception of a few matters), difficulty in accessing public goods and services, lack of social cohesion, lack of compliance with citizenship and problems peculiar to border regions.

In this context, the populations of these regions often have closer contacts with the other South American countries than with their own country, especially in the twin cities, with their own models of organization amidst the difficulties generated by the complex existing legal framework (TCU, 2014).

¹ The current regulation of the borderland was formulated in 1979, during the government of João Baptista Figueiredo, the last administration of the military regime, by Law 6,634.

Figure 1. Map of the Brazilian Borderland

Source: SPGG/DEPLAN-RS

Therefore, the borderland is a paradoxical space. If on the one hand it is characterized by being the limit, where the state jurisdiction ends, a peripheral zone, on the other hand it is a reaffirmation space of the State, a synonymous of its affirmation and of its absence (Dorfman, Cardin, 2014).

These peculiarities led this space to impose singular challenges to the State, demanding specific policies. In this sense, we will analyze the initiatives of Brasília to strengthen the cohesion and security of the borderland.

PROMOTION PROGRAM OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BORDERLAND

The issue of planning for development was abandoned with the ideology of neoliberalism in vogue in South America in the 1990s. However, by the end of the decade, this issue returned to the political agenda, materializing in public policies in the early years 2000.

Considering that, the development agenda and the search for mitigation of regional inequalities are fundamental in a country as diverse and vast as Brazil. The country has great regional asymmetries that still present challenges to the society in reducing inequalities (Ministério da Integração Nacional, 2009).

In the year 2003, discussions on territorial planning and regional development policies began at the federal level. In this context, two proposals were developed: the National Policy for Territorial Planning (PNOT *acronym in Portuguese*) and the National Policy for Regional Development (PNDR *acronym in Portuguese*). Of these proposals, only the National Policy for Regional Development advances, while PNOT² had no continuity, although its workshops have generated a significant knowledge about territorial planning.

In 2007, through Decree No. 6,047, the National Policy for Regional Development was instituted, under the coordination of the Ministry of National Integration, with the objective of reducing regional inequalities and activating the potential development of the regions in the country.

In order to better approach the specificity of some areas, the Regional Planning Secretariat implemented three subsidiary programs to the policy: the Program for the Promotion of Sustainability of Sub-Regional Spaces, the Program for the Integrated and Sustainable Development of the Semi-Arid and the Promotion Program for the Development of the Borderland (Ministério da Integração Nacional, 2009).

In this sense, the Promotion Program for the Development of the Borderland has tried to mitigate the deficient economic insertion of this region, aiming to:

² A Territorial Planning Policy presupposes a wide scope, involving several dimensions for territorial planning, which makes its achievement extremely difficult.

Promote the development of the Borderland through its physical, social and productive structure, with emphasis on the activation of local potentialities and articulation with other South American countries. With this purpose, it seeks to implement initiatives that respect the diversity of the region and follow the guidelines of the National Policy for Regional Development – PNDR (Ministério da Integração Nacional, 2009).

Thus, the program aimed to strengthen the processes of change from the stimulus to the formation of networks of local actors, strengthening new dynamic axes of the economy. In addition, it sought to articulate the public policies of the three spheres of government, as well as to draw the attention of congressional representatives to channel resources from amendments to the General Budget of the Union as a financial reinforcement to the elaboration and implementation of regional development actions in the borderland (Ministério da Integração Nacional, 2009).

One of the main challenges that have constrained the advance of the program was the prioritization of the border security agenda, largely due to how the border is understood, seen as concentrating and propitious regions for the practice of various crimes, notably drug trafficking, prostitution, violence and various human rights abuses. Nevertheless, it is not understood as a region with the singularity of catalyzing subregional development processes and regional integration (MI, 2009), as well as an important laboratory of regional integration.

One of the aspects of the Promotion Program for the Development of the Borderland was the institutional strengthening in the border area. In this sense, it proposes the articulation with the actions of the Interministerial Working Group, which strengthens the Borderland, based on the integrated action in line with the necessary infrastructure for the development of the region. Moreover, support to sub-regional development forums; encouraging the articulation of Development Forums with Committees and Border Commissions; and local and integrated organization, including the participation of neighboring countries – creation or strengthening of border committees (Ministério da Integração Nacional, 2009).

As we can observe, the Promotion Program has proposed very broad actions at the borderland. However, the program did not have an adequate allocation of resources, what lead to insufficient results. The Pluriannual Plan for 2012-2015

grouped various federal programs and actions into 65 strategic policies, thus the program was diluted within the South American Integration Policy (Neves, 2016). Nevertheless, the creation of the Permanent Commission for the Development of the Borderland represents the end of the Promotion Program for the Development of the Borderland as a program.

Henceforth, even though the results of the Promotion Program for the Development of the Borderland are modest, and the PNDR seems to be undergoing a weakening, it is important to keep in mind the need for actions aimed at improving the living conditions of these populations and not only actions to repress transnational crime.

STRATEGIC BORDER PLAN AND THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PUBLIC SECURITY FOR BORDERS

In general terms, both the zones and the borderland are directly linked to the functional profile of the borders (Silva, 2013), and this has undergone transformations throughout the 2000s. In this sense, in Brazil in the last decades, we have observed that the borders have gained increasing prominence in the Brazilian political agenda. This process generated new forms of political management of border spaces, by the federal government (in articulation with the state governments) that combine elements of affirmation of sovereignty and of territorial defense with specific concerns regarding public security – such as drug and arms trafficking, contraband, etc. (Alvarez;Salla, 2013).

On this subject, such initiatives are also responses to the political tensions that lead to the debate about the abandonment of the border, the need to defend borders, closer control of transnational crimes and illegal economic flows (such as smuggling and drug trafficking) and population. In this sense, in addition to the demands for a greater presence of the Armed Forces in the borderland, reaffirming its role of defending the sovereignty of the State, control over the flows of people and goods has become one of the most important targets of the tensions in the political debate on borders in Brazil (Alvarez; Salla, 2013).

Within this logic, when we study the documents of the National Defense Policy of 1996, 2005 and their revision, we perceive that the border appeared with greater focus from one version to the other, highlighting mainly the need to vivify the border. Concerning this, there has also been an increase in the attributions of the Armed Forces in this space, being these endowed with police power in the borderland.

Because of this process, in 2011 the Strategic Border Plan was launched, with the general objective of preventing, controlling and repressing cross-border crimes and crimes committed in the Brazilian borderland. The decree established cross-border crimes as trafficking drugs, arms and people, smuggling, eviction and illegal export of vehicles, environmental and homicides (Brasil, 2011).

In the scope, Operation Ágata was launched, being the most important operation, currently on the border, under the coordination of the Ministry of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces. The execution is done by the Navy, the Army and the Brazilian Air Force (Força Aérea Brasileira, 2013). In addition to the Armed Forces, about 30 federal, state and municipal agencies participate in the operation, among ministries, regulatory agencies, and oversight and security agencies.

Also within the plan, there were smaller operations, such as the Operation Sentinel, coordinated by the Federal Police and formed by the Federal Highway Police, the National Security Force and the Rio Grande do Sul Military Brigade (Polícia Federal, 2012). This is a continuous operation differently from the Operation Ágata, which happens sporadically. In addition, there are other operations deployed by the various federal and state security agencies.

The strategic design of the Strategic Border Plan envisaged that Operation Ágata would be a momentary pressure on cross-border crimes, reducing the supply of illicit drugs and disrupting smuggling supply networks, at which point the Ministry of Justice, with a judicious use of intelligence, will employ its police departments in the context of Operation Sentinel.

Operation Ágata has among its objectives: to promote the integration of efforts between the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Defense in the borderland, including the participation of other federal, state, municipal and non-governmental bodies; ensure the legitimacy of the actions undertaken by Brazil in the national and international spheres. Moreover, strengthen state presence in the border region and promote integration with neighboring countries to strengthen prevention, control, enforcement and repression of cross-border crime.

In the spectrum of public security, in 2012, the National Strategy for Public Security at the Border was proposed in conjunction with the Strategic Border Plan. This plan seeks to create mechanisms to increase the effectivity of the coordinate actions of public agencies in the borderland, with the aim of reducing crime and illicit trafficking, being coordinated by the Ministry of Justice, through the National Secretariat of Public Security.

Therefore, we can see that these plans aimed to affirm the presence of the State in this region, the greater effectiveness of repression of transnational crimes, and the improvement of the work of the security and defense agencies, without concern for the development dimension. Thus, we can infer that these are in some way limited to the issue of repression, based on a reactive approach, lacking a broader view of human security and prevention.

THE ARTICULATION BETWEEN THE SPHERES OF DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THE BORDER

As was shown above, the borderland is a differentiated space on which diverse public policies at different levels of government are involved. In view of this, the Court of Auditors of the Union – TCU (2014) draws attention to the fact that in this region there are several organs in its management, with their own directives and multiple attributions in several lines of action, which must be carried out in a joint and cohesive manner, with adequate infrastructure, appropriate controls, and complementary purposes, in order that their actions be productive, without gaps or counterproductive efforts, and to enable common objectives to be achieved.

Among this myriad of agencies operating in the border area, in this study we call attention to the work of the Ministry of National Integration and the Ministry of Defense. In this regard, when we observe the performance of these, we find that they act together, especially with respect to the borderland. However, this interaction is often formal, existing only in regulations.

In this sense, the two ministries are members of the Permanent Commission for the Development of the Borderland (a committee that has in a way supplanted the Promotion Program for the Development of the Borderland) established by the Decree of September 8, 2010, within the Regional Development Secretariat of the Ministry of National Integration. The commission has the purpose of proposing measures and coordinating actions that aim at the development of initiatives necessary for the action of the federal government in the borderland (Neves, 2016). Therefore, we may infer that the Commission is an advance in the institutional strengthening agenda posted by the Promotion Program. The Commission is composed of several institutions:

It is composed of eighteen ministries linked to the regional development and international integration actions, as well as the Institutional Relations Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic and the Office of Institutional Security of the Presidency of the Republic, which bring together the necessary competencies for the materialization of plans and objectives for federal policies aimed at the borderland (TCU, 2014).

The Permanent Commission for the Development of the Borderland seeks to provide solutions to the problems generated, above all by the fragmentation and disarticulation of the public policies applied in the region. However, its effectiveness has been low. According to the report on the borderland of the Court of Auditors of the Union (2014) up to the date of the report, there had been very few meetings since the creation of the Commission. The actions of this are reserved for discussions and the field of ideas, with considerable disinterest and even a certain lack of knowledge on the part of several interviewees by the Court of Auditors of the Union³, especially those who work in the area of security. Nevertheless, this fact reinforces the conception that the actions voted for the development and integration of the borderland occupy a secondary position in the priorities of the government in relation to security actions.

This became evident from the funding of resources for the borderland, with a considerable share concentrated in the security area in detriment of actions aimed at the development and integration of the region, which restricts the number of actors involved in the network of policies that are effectively interested in these regions (TCU, 2016).

Considering that, the security and defense dimension has gained prominence in the management of the border, it is important to mention that there is a difference in the understanding of this in the National Defense Policy and in the National Policy for Regional Development. While the Defense Policy defends a plan of vivification and development in the borderland, using the strategy of presence, the

³ The Court of Auditors of the Union interviewed the coordinators of the Permanent Development Committee and the Integration of the Borderland – Ministry of National Integration and the Strategic Border Plan – Ministry of Defense, Justice and Finance, as well as the Department of Federal Highway Police, National Secretariat of Public Security, Federal Revenue Service of Brazil. In addition, also of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, represented by the Assistant Secretary-General of South America, Central America and the Caribbean, by the Assistant Secretary Brazilian Communities Abroad, by the General Secretariat of Policy I, by the General Coordination of Defense Affairs, by the General Coordination of Budget and Finance and by the Internal Control Secretariat.

National Policy for Regional Development identifies that the border deserves to be highlighted by its strategic importance in the greater objective of South American economic integration (Coutinho, 2015).

Thus, we can infer that the National Defense Policy, as well as the Border Strategic Plan and the National Strategy for Public Security in the Borderland, although its documents include the issue of integration, has a logic of national introspection, while the development policy is more integrative with neighboring countries.

Coutinho (2015) draws attention to the fact that in the National Defense Policy the word *development* appears dozens of times, as in the National Defense Strategy, almost a hundred repetitions, and in the White Paper on National Defense, there are more than 200 citations. On the other hand, in the National Policy for Regional Development, the word *defense* does not appear even once, nor in the Border Strategic Plan, whereas the issue of development is mentioned, which leads us to conclude that this alignment is not a legal, although a necessary requirement.

Such differences in mentality could be mitigated through meetings of the National Defense Policy, National Defense Strategy and National Defense White Paper working group since the Ministry of National Integration participates in this process (Coutinho, 2015).

Another dimension that is very evident in all the documents for the border is cooperation and integration with neighboring countries, which would complete the famous tripod of the three *Ds*, Defense, Development and Diplomacy. In this sense, the deepening of cooperation would have a positive impact on the implementation of the policies defined for that territory, insofar as it facilitates the implementation of integrated actions indispensable for initiatives to promote socioeconomic development and security in the region.

However, the latest trends in security, defense, and development policies for the border show that the disarticulation between these dimensions is growing, since the agenda has been almost totally absorbed by security and defense issues, as we can observe in the process of formulating the Integrated Border Protection Program.

In an attempt to respond to the criticisms of the Court of Auditors of the Union, some of which presented in this paper, the federal government, in 2016, created a working group composed of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Justice and

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the focus on cross-border flows, such as drugs, trade and arms.

The result of these works was the formulation of the Integrated Border Protection Program, established in November 2016, replacing the Strategic Border Plan, with the objective of promoting the integrated and coordinated action of public intelligence agencies, the Federal Revenue Department, the Treasury and the Armed Forces in the border regions, also involving municipal authorities and neighboring countries. It additionally provides for the reformulation of Operation Ágata.

Furthermore, the program creates an Executive Committee composed of representatives of the Institutional Security Office, the Brazilian Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, the Federal Revenue Department, the Federal Police, the Federal Highway Police, the Ministry of Justice, Public Security and Citizenship, and the General Secretariat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It is important to note that both during the formulation and in the implementation process of the Integrated Border Protection Program; the Ministry of National Integration was not called to participate, making clear the current government's vision regarding the management of the border, based much more on a negative agenda than on development and regional integration.

THE DYNAMICS IN LA PLATA BASIN: THE CASE OF THE TRIPLE BORDER

As we have seen above, there are huge differences in the understanding and disarticulation among public agencies in border management. This situation can be clearly seen in the cross-border region of La Plata Basin, since this may be considered as one of the most dynamic areas of the Brazilian border, being the logistic and geo-economic core of the Southern Common Market, especially in the cross-border region of Foz do Iguaçu, due to its regional economic importance as well as security problems. Therefore, this region imposes the challenge of how to guarantee the circulation and to protect itself from illicit activities.

The Triple Border is formed by the twin cities of Ciudad del Este (PRY), Foz do Iguaçu (BRA) and Puerto Iguaçu (ARG), which polarize an area that encompasses

municipalities located in the Department of Alto Paraná in Paraguay; the Department of Iguazú in Argentina; and the Microregion of Foz de Iguaçu, Brazil, forming the cross-border region of Iguaçu. This regionalization was suggested by Pereira Carneiro (2016) and follows the standards of the European Union's cross-border regions, which are created from pre-existing political-administrative divisions (municipalities, states, provinces, etc.).

Unlike most of the borderland, the Triple Border is characterized by an area of strong economic dynamism, due to the tourist flow and the presence of two free zones – Puerto Iguazú and Ciudad del Este – the region polarizes the logistical nucleus which integrates the Argentine Northwest, the East of Paraguay and the West of Paraná State. Ciudad del Este is the third largest free trade zone in the world, thus being an important revenue for Paraguay. In addition, this area has a good infrastructure with airports, port and road networks.

However, due to the large volume of trade flowing through the region, there is a need to increase the local infrastructure that is why it is contemplated in the portfolio of the South American Council of Infrastructure and Planning, which incorporated the Initiative for Integration in Infrastructure of South America. The projects for the region are: the construction of the Cascavel-Foz do Iguaçu and Cascavel-Guairá-Maracaju Railway; a Railway Bridge with a cargo yard between Foz do Iguaçu and Ciudad del Este; the concession for the improvement of Highways No. 2 and 7 (Assunción-Ciudad del Este); the construction of the Iguaçu hydroelectric power station; and the transmission line 500 KW (Itaipu-Assunción). In addition, there are complementary projects, the construction of the road ring in Foz do Iguaçu and the construction of the intermodal terminal on BR-277 (IIRSA, 2009).

In addition, the region has also become an important locus for the integration of Latin American peoples, with the foundation of the Federal University of Latin American Integration (UNILA acronym in Portuguese). The university has 57% foreign students, as well as foreign teachers, with classes in Portuguese and Spanish, providing an environment for building a Latin American identity, but primarily a South American one.

Thus, we observe that various regional integration projects affect the region. In addition to these, the Promotion Program for the Development of the Borderland also covers the city of Foz do Iguaçu. Regarding this, there are discussions in

the Thematic Chambers for the creation of an international border hospital; the construction of a second bridge integrating Foz do Iguaçu and Ciudad del Este, with the purpose of transporting loads. Moreover; the implementation of the Economic and Social Development Council of Foz do Iguaçu; and the integration of the airports at the Triple Border in normative and operational aspects (MI, 2017).

Thus, this is a highly integrated borderland from not only the economic as well as the social point of view. However, this integration also brings externalities; the region has become an important point in the activities of transnational criminal networks that use the local infrastructure to carry out all kinds of trafficking and smuggling, usually using small aircraft for the transportation of narcotics. The money generated by these illegal flows is “laundered” by the criminal networks in the commerce of Ciudad del Este.

Salvador Raza (2014) shows that this is a highly regulated border, with illicit transit and smuggling points, relatively effective in populated areas. The efficiency of illegal flows is due in large part to the high levels of corruption in these places, which is more serious on the Paraguayan side, a situation that has improved in recent years according to the Brazilian authorities. Another factor in this equation is that the illegal economy in Paraguay represents a large part of the country's economic activity.

In addition, the Triple Border is one of the main corridors for the international traffic of drugs and supply of the Brazilian market. After the entrance, mainly by the border with Paraguay (important producer of marijuana), this is internalized into Brazil. In addition, more recently, this space has become part of the international cocaine trafficking route. Smuggling is also intense in this area, facilitated by the porosity of borders.

In this way, the porosity of the border is seen in a negative way, generating the image of the border as a crime place, not as a space for integration. Nevertheless, in view of the growth of the political debate around the border as one of the sources of violence in large urban centers, it became the main agenda in the management of the border. In Foz do Iguaçu there was an increase in the operations carried out by all the security organs and the Internal Revenue Department, as well as operations in conjunction with the Armed Forces.

In this sense, although there are several infrastructure integration projects in the region, the implementation of these projects is low, and as discussed, the budget

allocations for Promotion Program for the Development of the Borderland have declined significantly in recent years, while investments in security have shown an increase.

Another important aspect is the disarticulation between such initiatives as demonstrated above. While development and integration policies have a more universalist logic, of cooperation with neighboring countries, security and defense policies are based on deterrence, in other words, in the denial of access to Brazilian territory.

However, in an economic and social integrated region, such as that of Foz do Iguaçu, a security framework based on the closure of the border and national introspection is inadequate, especially since transnational crime networks act in a deterritorialized way. In this way, combating such crimes demands approaches based on cooperation with neighboring countries, as well as strategies that seek regional development, since social vulnerability on the other side of the border has impacts on both sides.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Border management is indeed complex and it is a thorny terrain since it is surrounded by several divergent interests and presupposes the articulation between a vast myriad of actors at different levels of government. However, the need to create synergies is an imperative to ensure the well-being of border populations as well as to protect the country from negative flows, which often find an environment conducive to its activities in the border area.

However, the achievement of an environment conducive to interinstitutional cooperation is hampered by the way the border has been managed in Brazil. Without its own law, besides being disciplined exclusively by executive decree, government actions directed to the border are bound to the established priorities in each government, not constituting a state policy that integrates all entities and has an intergovernmental character (TCU, 2016).

In this sense, the articulation between organs of different spheres, with diverse mentalities, as exemplified above becomes even more complicated. In addition, it is important to mention that even cooperation between defense and security institutions is problematic in many ways.

Moreover, the cooperation between the Ministry of National Integration agencies and the security sector was practically infeasible by the overlapping of the security dimension in the agenda and little emphasis on its coordination with development and integration activities. This process resulted in the incipience of formalization of plans and objectives by the Permanent Commission for the Development and Integration of the Borderland, not harmonizing the sequence of appropriate intervention to deal with problems already diagnosed through studies carried out by the Ministry of National Integration (TCU, 2014).

This discrepancy can also be observed by the allocation of resources, even though the border is an important space for integration and interconnection with the productive chains of neighboring countries, as could be observed in La Plata Basin. A number of resources applied by the federal government for development and integration, besides low materiality, has complex identification, if not infeasible, in the way it is configured in the Pluriannual Plan, as shown by the dilution of the Promotion Program for the Development of the Borderland in other headings.

However, although the previous model presented serious shortcomings, there was a certain articulation between the development and security dimension in the Committee for the Development of the Borderland, since it became the space for discussion of border issues. However, the new model established by the Integrated Border Protection Program seems to have moved further away from these spheres. Because the Ministry of National Integration did not participate in its formulation, nor does it participate in the Executive Committee of the program, which should become the main forum for articulating actions for the border, supplanting the Committee for the Development

Nevertheless, this shows a narrow understanding about the border. Because, as we could see in the case of La Plata Basin, more specifically in the transnational border region of Iguazú, a repressive bias shows poor effectiveness in a highly integrated border, since this criminal networks function in a deterritorialized way. In this sense, policies that aim development that would bring more opportunities to the population, as well cooperation with neighboring countries could have results that are more beneficial. In addition, due to the extension of the Brazilian border, one approach could not be implemented in the whole borderland, since the realities are very distinguished.

Finally, we could observe that although development and security are interdependent, policies for Brazilian borders have neglected the issue of development, a process that seems to have deepened in the new security plan, and these are oriented almost entirely to the security bias, which evidences a myopic view of border management, since there is no security without development.

REFERENCES

- Alvarez, M. C. and F. Salla** (2013). Estado-nação, Fronteiras no Brasil: Redesenhando os Espaços Fronteiriços no Brasil Contemporâneo. *Civitas* 13(1), p. 9-26.
- Brasil**. (2011). Decreto n. 7496. Institui o Plano Estratégico de Fronteira. Brasília, DF.
- Buzan, B.** (1983). *People, State and Fear*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books.
- Cargnin, A. P.** (2014). Política Nacional de Desenvolvimento Regional e Repercussões no Rio Grande do Sul. *Mercator* 13, p. 19-35.
- Coutinho, W. T. Z.** (2015). A Política NaRegionalcional de Defesa e a Política Nacional de Desenvolvimento. Monografia de Conclusão de Curso – Escola Superior de Guerra.
- Dorfman, A. and E. G. Cardin** (2014). Estratégias espaciais do ativismo em condição fronteiriça no Cone Sul. *Cuadernos de Geografia*, Bogotá, v. 23, p. 31-44.
- Força Aérea Brasileira (FAB)**. (2013). *Operação Ágata: Plano Estratégico de Fronteira*. Brasília. Disponível em: <<http://www.defesa.gov.br/operacao-agata/index.html>>. Acessado em 20 de maio de 2015.
- Iniciativa para a Integração da Infraestrutura Sul-Americana (IIRSA)**. (2009) Cartela de Projetos IIRSA.
- Klingebiel, S.** (2006). *New Interfaces between Security and Development*: changing concepts and approaches. German Development Institute.
- Ministério da Integração Nacional (MI)**. (2017). Faixa de Fronteira: Programa de Promoção do Desenvolvimento da Faixa de Fronteira. Brasília, 2009.
- Ministério da Integração Nacional (MI)**. (2017a). Consolidação dos Planos de Desenvolvimento e Integração das Faixas de Fronteira. Brasília.
- Neves, A. J. das et al.** (2016). *Mapeamento das Políticas Públicas Federais na Faixa de Fronteira: interfaces com o Plano Estratégico de Fronteira e a Estratégia Nacional de Segurança Pública*. Brasília: Ministério da Justiça e Cidadania. Secretaria Nacional de Segurança Pública.
- Pêgo, B. et al.** (2017). *Fronteiras do Brasil*: diagnóstico e agenda de pesquisa para política pública, volume 2. Brasília: IPEA: MI.
- Polícia Federal**. (2012). *PF apresenta balanço de um ano da Operação Sentinela*. Brasília. Disponível em: <<http://www.pf.gov.br/agencia/2012/junho/pf-apresenta-balanco-de-um-ano-da-operacao-sentinela>>. Acessado em 01 de janeiro de 2016.
- Silva, G. de V.** (2013). *Usos Contemporâneos da Fronteira Franco-Brasileira*: Entre os Ditames Globais e a Articulação Local. Macapá: Unifap.
- Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU)**. (2014). *Auditoria Operacional. Avaliação de Governança de Políticas Públicas. Fortalecimento da Faixa de Fronteira*. Análise Sistemática das Oportunidades de Melhoria Constatadas. Recomendação aos Órgãos Responsáveis. Brasília.
- Tschirgi, N.** (2006). Security and Development policies: untangling the relationship. In: KLINGEBIEL, Stephan. *New Interfaces between Security and Development*: changing concepts and approaches. German Development Institute.