Challenges of post-war policy reforms in Lebanon ’ s water sector – lessons learned

Lebanon has not been able to properly develop and benefit from its water sources. A confessional system of governance has hindered development of the sector. Laws and regulations have been developed erratically with many superseding others without the superseded laws being erased from the registry. This created a chaotic regulatory and legal environment with overlapping jurisdictions and no clear accountability mechanisms. The period before the onset of the civil war in 1975 witnessed significant progress of both infrastructure and laws and regulations related to the management of the water sector. The civil war destroyed the water sector infrastructure and emptied all regulatory control of the resources. The period of reconstruction between 1990 and 1999 witnessed the promulgation of ambitious reconstruction plans for the water sector with funding reliant on borrowing from local and external debtors. Post 1999, government reforms started creeping into the system but were often donor driven and still suffered from the same mistakes of laws overlain on top of existing laws without erasing the older material. Critically, the management of the sector is not inclusive and the beneficiaries of water services are often not heard and ignored.

INTRODUCTION that is unaccounted for due to system losses is about 40%; mostly due to the lack of maintenance of the water supply networks and illegal connections (MEW ; Gharios & Farajalla ). Throughout the country, water resources are limited in terms of both quantity and quality as a result of mismanagement and an ageing infrastructure resulting from inadequate investment (Oxfam ). The country endured 15 years of civil war and its water sector in terms of institutions, administration and infrastructure was left barely operational. It was not until the war ended in 1990 that fresh investment began in the sector as part of the post-war reconstruction efforts. Since then, Lebanon has invested more than $4 billion in the water sector. Its water and sanitation infrastructure, badly damaged by the civil war, was partially rehabilitated with substantial external financial assistance, most of which came as loans (Gharios & Farajalla ). Lebanon is currently ranked among the world's most indebted countries due to inefficient and unproductive spending on post-war reconstruction coupled with an inability to rein in waste and prevent corruption (Oxfam ).
Currently, several countries in the Middle East are experiencing armed conflict and will eventually undergo reconstruction that would target their water sectors. What are the challenges that can be learned from reconstruction and particularly the post-war policy reforms in Lebanon's water sector? This paper will highlight the potential for lessons-learned to enable the translation from the case of Lebanon to other countries in the region. This paper presents a policy reform review that is focused on post-conflict governmental actions in Lebanon.
The paper offers an analysis of the pluralistic legal framework governing water resources in Lebanon and explores the country's potential in the management of water through the regional water establishments (RWEs).

ORGANIZATION OF THE WATER ADMINISTRATION
The current water management framework in Lebanon is the result of administrative reforms that were set in place in 2000. The chief government authority responsible for water and sanitation in Lebanon is the Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW) through the four RWEs along with the Litani River Authority. Their responsibilities are interrelated and it is difficult to discern a clear authoritative system linking promulgated decrees to the corresponding and appropriate agencies (Comair ).

The ministry of energy and water
The Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW) is the main and highest authority for water management in Lebanon. It prepares and sets in place general water policies and is responsible for executing projects. MEW also has an oversight role of the regional water establishments (RWEs).
When it was first established in 1966 via Law 20, its mandate covered matters related to water, energy, mines and domestic wastewater (CAMP ). Currently, the MEW is made up of three General Directorates (Article 2 of Law 20/66 and Law 247/2000): the General Directorate of Hydraulic and Electric Resources (GDHER), which is responsible for research, studies and the implementation of large-scale projects; the General Directorate for Exploitations (GDEXP), which has oversight responsibility with respect to RWEs, for overseeing public provision, for administration and financial affairs and for mines and quarries; and the General Directorate of Petroleum Resources (GDPR) (Comair ).

Regional water establishments
As shown in Figure      habits that used to govern water in the past. The water legal framework of Lebanon emerges as a paralleled system that exists concurrently: the formal system that represents the governmental institutions, regional water establishments, and the governing laws and regulations; and the informal system that represents the traditional management and individualistic arrangements. Figure 2 illustrates the chronology of key water laws.

ANALYSIS OF WATER LAWS IN LEBANON
The situation before 1999 Customs and practices were constituted by various rules relating more to common sense than anything else and were recognized over time and given approval by legis-    Despite the large number of stakeholders involved, no mechanism for sharing information between different administrations has been set up for Lebanon's water resources. As a result, information is obtained in a rudimentary and bureaucratic manner due to the lack of cooperation between the different administrations. Moreover, there is no database of national water statistics shared among administrations. This is mostly due to political protectiveness; lack of information sharing enforcement, especially from the private sector, and corruption in that data is often viewed as a source of money for its holder. • Accountability and transparency are the basic elements for any successful development and implementation of water sector plans and strategies. Mechanisms that ensure accountability must be coded into law and free, unobstructed access to information must be instituted to ensure transparency. This is especially true in the procurement and operations phases of any project.
• Develop laws, regulations, etc. and their various upgrades in a holistic manner taking all existing laws into account to ensure that there are no ambiguities and/or confusing overlaps in jurisdictions.
• Inclusive management and policy development that gives consumers a voice would ensure that laws and regulations as well as proposed plans have local support and buy-in, thus their chances of success will be greatly increased.
• Development planning and infrastructure construction and implementation have to accommodate and be cognizant of one another, and cost recovery has to be built into all plans.
• International donor agencies should embrace existing legislations rather than pushing for specifically tailored additional texts that increase burdens on struggling post-conflict governments.
• International donor agencies should not force agendas on beneficiaries that could create dysfunctional development projects. Concomitantly, beneficiaries must have their own sector development plans ready to properly align donor support and coordinate activities in order to avoid duplication and redundancies.

ETHICAL APPROVAL
Not Applicable.

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE
Not Applicable.

CONSENT TO PUBLISH
Not Applicable.

COMPETING INTERESTS
Not Applicable.

AVAILABILITY OF DATA AND MATERIALS
Not Applicable.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
All relevant data are included in the paper or its Supplementary Information.