Legal Interference with Private Preferences

46 Pages Posted: 11 Oct 2019

See all articles by Cass R. Sunstein

Cass R. Sunstein

Harvard Law School; Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Date Written: 1986

Abstract

There are distortions in a system based on private preferences, analogous to the problems of "market failure" that frequently call for government action. Because of such distortions, significant dangers lie in any approach that would treat private preferences, as expressed in markets, as exogenous variables. Even outside of the traditional category of harm to others, the legal system does and should attempt to shape private choices. Whether the ultimate goal is liberty or welfare, there will often be important gains from government action that decides on ends rather than simply implements them.

Suggested Citation

Sunstein, Cass R., Legal Interference with Private Preferences (1986). University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 4, 1986, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3462594 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3462594

Cass R. Sunstein (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

1575 Massachusetts Ave
Areeda Hall 225
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-2291 (Phone)

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
98
Abstract Views
913
Rank
486,005
PlumX Metrics