Tenure-Track Contract Helps Self-Selection

Economics Bulletin, Volume 35, Issue 4, pages 2482-2486

6 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2015 Last revised: 7 Dec 2016

See all articles by Sergey V. Popov

Sergey V. Popov

Cardiff University - Cardiff Business School; National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow)

Date Written: September 2, 2015

Abstract

Tenure-track contract is criticized for curbing the incentives for spending effort after obtaining the tenured status. Yet, the most productive faculty seems to work on a tenure contract, and schools who aim to employ the best faculty seem to prefer to offer tenure-track contracts to their new hires. I argue that tenure-track contracts are by construction more attractive to more able freshly minted PhDs, and therefore the observed sorting is rationalizable.

Keywords: tenure, academia, job market, self-selection

JEL Classification: I23

Suggested Citation

Popov, Sergey V., Tenure-Track Contract Helps Self-Selection (September 2, 2015). Economics Bulletin, Volume 35, Issue 4, pages 2482-2486, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2580900 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2580900

Sergey V. Popov (Contact Author)

Cardiff University - Cardiff Business School ( email )

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National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow) ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/sergeyvpopov/

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