Democracy, Elite-Bias and Financial Development in Latin America

2015, World Politics, 67, no. 4: 726-759.

48 Pages Posted: 31 Dec 2013 Last revised: 22 Nov 2016

See all articles by Victor A. Menaldo

Victor A. Menaldo

University of Washington - Department of Political Science; UW Political Economy Forum

Daniel Yoo

University of Washington

Date Written: December 30, 2013

Abstract

Does democracy induce financial development? There are good theoretical reasons to believe this to be the case. However, the evidence adduced to support this claim has, to this point, been mixed. In this paper, we try to make sense of this fact by unpacking democracy. We posit that only democracies that appeal to the median voter, because they have adopted their own constitution after transition, rather than inherited one from an authoritarian predecessor, should experience financial development. Focusing attention on Latin America, where there have been several reversals and improvements in financial outcomes, and where many countries have cycled between regime types, we empirically test this theory. We find very robust support for it across different specifications. While “popular” democracies tend to reform their financial systems, have greater participation in the banking system, increase the supply of credit, reduce its price, and grow their stock markets, “elite-biased” democracies do not.

Keywords: Democracy, Financial Development, Factor Endowments, Latin America

Suggested Citation

Menaldo, Victor A. and Yoo, Daniel, Democracy, Elite-Bias and Financial Development in Latin America (December 30, 2013). 2015, World Politics, 67, no. 4: 726-759. , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2373287 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2373287

Victor A. Menaldo (Contact Author)

University of Washington - Department of Political Science ( email )

101 Gowen Hall
Box 353530
Seattle, WA 98195
United States

UW Political Economy Forum ( email )

Seattle, WA 98195
United States

Daniel Yoo

University of Washington ( email )

Seattle, WA 98195
United States

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