Testimonies are vital in court proceedings, often being the key evidence, especially in the absence of objective evidence like DNA (Davis & O’Donohue, 2004; Kassin, 2008; Howe & Knott, 2015). Understanding how various factors, like the emotional state of witnesses and social feedback, affect memory accuracy is critical. Misleading feedback has been shown to significantly distort event recollections, resulting in testimonial inaccuracies (Douglass et al., 2010; Ekeocha & Brennan, 2008; Greenspan & Loftus, 2020; Jin et al., 2022; Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Steblay et al., 2014; Vo et al., 2022; Wright et al., 2000). Furthermore, the mood of a witness has been found to substantially influence cognitive processes, including memory, thereby impacting the reliability of testimonies (Bell et al., 2019; Chai & Wu, 2022; Clausi et al., 2017; Fartoukh et al., 2014; Karjalainen, 2006). With this understanding of the intimate link between mood, memory, and the accuracy of testimonies, the current experiment aimed to examine the impact of positive and negative moods on testimony accuracy following false social feedback.
Testimonial Accuracy in Legal Contexts
Memory, serving as the foundation of legal testimonies, is reconstructive and prone to distortions (Howe & Knott, 2015). This malleability can lead to false memories, often with grave legal consequences, especially in sensitive cases like abuse allegations (Loftus, 2005; Otgaar et al., 2013a; Ren & Coutanche, 2021; Schacter, 1999). Influenced by misleading information, memory reconstruction can result in recalling incorrect details or misremembering events entirely (Erickson et al., 2016; Gurney et al., 2013, 2014, 2016; Battista et al., 2021a, b; Chrobak & Zaragoza, 2013; Greene et al., 2022; Zaragoza et al., 2001). Such inaccuracies in memory can lead to wrongful legal outcomes, undermining the integrity of the justice system (Le et al., 2022; Leo, 2005).
Building on this understanding of memory’s fallibility, the influence of social feedback has been recognized as pivotal in shaping memory recall and reporting, especially in eyewitness testimonies (Bradfield et al., 2002; Dixon & Memon, 2005; Douglass et al., 2010; Greenspan & Loftus, 2020; Jin et al., 2022; Quinlivan et al., 2011; Smalarz & Wells, 2014; Steblay et al., 2014; Vo et al., 2022). The misinformation effect (Loftus, 2005) highlights how exposure to misleading post-event information, such as false social feedback, may lead to the integration of false information into one’s recollection of the original event. For instance, in Zaragoza et al.’s (2001) study, participants first watched a video and then were introduced to fabricate details about events not depicted in the video. Additionally, they experienced confirmatory feedback, receiving positive reinforcement for these invented responses. This study found that participants often integrated these false details into their memory. Confirmatory feedback, on the other hand, increased participants’ confidence in their inaccurate recollections, leading them to believe more strongly in their erroneous identifications of details in the video.
Failing to report information or memory omissions can frequently occur during memory retrieval processes (Armstrong et al., 2000; Healy & Nairne, 1985) and can influence the trustworthiness of testimonies (Douglass et al., 2010; Loftus, 2005; Quinlivan et al., 2011; Smalarz & Wells, 2014; Steblay et al., 2014; Vo et al., 2022). Recent empirical research has not only focused on the impact of feedback on omission errors but also examined its effect on the belief in occurrence of events (e.g., Azad et al., 2022). Belief in the occurrence of events, in the context of autobiographical memory, has been posited as a primary driver for behavioral change (Scoboria et al., 2004, 2015). When memory is distorted by false feedback, it can shift foundational beliefs about an event, altering behavior and affecting one’s ability to accurately recall and testify. Therefore, understanding the complex relationship between beliefs and misleading feedback is essential for evaluating the accuracy of testimonies.
The Power of Autobiographical Belief
Autobiographical memory is comprised of two primary elements: Belief about the occurrence of an event and the recollection of the event’s specific details (Scoboria et al., 2014). Belief pertains to the truth values associated with an event’s occurrence (Scoboria et al., 2014). In contrast, recollection involves the retrieval of specific details, emotions, and sensory experiences linked to the event (Scoboria et al., 2014). Research suggests that belief about the occurrence of an event exerts a more significant influence on behavior change than recollection (Scoboria et al., 2004; Scoboria et al., 2015; but see Burnell et al., 2022).
Social feedback has been demonstrated as a potent method to reduce belief in the occurrence of experiences, such as being informed by someone that the recalled event never occurred (Li et al., 2020, 2023a, b; Otgaar et al., 2013b, 2017; Scoboria et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2017, 2019). For example, Otgaar et al. (2016) conducted a study in which participants were asked to perform, imagine, or hear about actions, such as breaking a toothpick. Then participants repeatedly imagined these actions. For the actions they identified as “performed”, a random selection was subsequently challenged by social feedback, implying that these actions were not originally performed. Belief or recollection was relinquished in 38.7% of adult participants and 51.1% in children. Similarly, Li et al. (2020) used an imagination inflation procedure involving both familiar (e.g., drinking from a bottle) and bizarre actions (e.g., licking a cup). They found that 73.8% (n = 79) of participants gave up their belief for the remembered actions following false social feedback.
Prior research predominantly explored how individuals integrate incorrect information into their memories due to false feedback (Horry & Palmer, 2012). However, there has been limited exploration into the specific effects of how such feedback alters beliefs about events and how this subsequently influences the precision of the information reported. This study aims to bridge this gap by delving into how false feedback not only affects belief adjustments but also examines its broader impact on the accuracy of memory reporting and the prevalence of omission errors, offering new insights into the nuanced ways false feedback can influence memory beyond mere incorporation of incorrect information.
The Impact of Mood on (Eyewitness) Testimony
Mood, as another key factor influencing eyewitness testimony, is defined as a transient and subjective feeling that individuals experience in response to various stimuli or events (Gray et al., 2001), which can have an impact on the quality and reliability of eyewitness accounts (Brück et al., 2011; Lazarus, 1982; Linnenbrink & Pintrich, 2004; Plass & Kalyuga, 2019; Piqueras-Fiszman & Jaeger, 2016; Rusting, 1998; Sinclair, 1988; Tyng et al., 2017). Theories like the affect-as-information theory (Schwarz & Clore, 1983) and the Affect-Infusion Model (Forgas, 1995) describe several mechanisms of how mood can influence cognitive processes. These theories propose that mood can bias information processing and retrieval, thereby influencing an individual’s judgment and decision-making (Bohner et al., 1992; Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Forgas, 2017; Isbell et al., 2013; Koch & Forgas, 2012; Mackie & Worth, 2020).
Positive moods (e.g., pleasure, joy, and excitement), for example, are associated with heuristic processing, making individuals more susceptible to external influences and misinformation due to a general focus on information (Bless & Fiedler, 2012; Forgas & George, 2001). Conversely, negative moods (e.g., sadness, anger, anxiety) prompt a more systematic processing strategy, where individuals pay more attention to detail and exhibit enhanced memory accuracy and detail-oriented recall (Bless et al., 1996; Gasper, 2004; Schwarz, 2000; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Thus, mood states affect how information is processed, leading to variations in testimony accuracy, as evidenced by various studies (Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Brosch et al., 2013; Storbeck & Clore, 2005; LeBlanc et al., 2015; Mériau et al., 2006; Schwarz, 2000; Triberti et al., 2017).
When extrapolating these findings to eyewitness testimony, it becomes evident that mood can significantly influence its quality (Christianson, 1992; Christianson & Hübinette, 1993; Hayes et al., 2012; Rusting, 1998; Tyng et al., 2017). Researchers have argued that moods can affect cognitive processes such as encoding, storage, and retrieval of event-related information (Hayes et al., 2012; Rusting, 1998; Tyng et al., 2017), which in turn impacts how witnesses attend to details and remember events (Christianson, 1992; Christianson & Hübinette, 1993). Witnesses in negative moods are likely to provide more precise and accurate descriptions, enhancing testimony reliability, while those in positive moods might offer more generalized accounts, potentially affecting testimony accuracy (Christianson, 1992; Christianson & Hübinette, 1993; Goodman et al., 2014; Forgas, 1995; Bless & Fiedler, 2012).
Understanding the impact of mood on individuals’ responses to false social feedback is essential, especially regarding memory recall and belief formation. Research indicates that an individual’s response to false social feedback is significantly influenced by their current mood state (Forgas, 1995). For example, individuals in positive moods are more susceptible to false feedback, likely leading to greater belief change and omitting key details by integrating misleading information (Bless & Fiedler, 2012; Forgas, 1995). In contrast, persons in negative moods, like sadness or anxiety, show resistance to false feedback due to their detail-oriented processing, leading to more accurate memories and less likelihood of overlooking important information (Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2016).
The Current Study
Drawing from the extensive literature on memory accuracy in legal contexts (Bradfield et al., 2002; Dixon & Memon, 2005; Douglass et al., 2010; Greenspan & Loftus, 2020; Jin et al., 2022; Quinlivan et al., 2011; Smalarz & Wells, 2014; Steblay et al., 2014; Vo et al., 2022), this study aimed to address the gap in psychological research regarding the combined impact of mood and false social feedback on belief reduction as well as testimonial accuracy. While previous studies have highlighted the significant effects of mood and social feedback on memory accuracy and eyewitness testimony (Christianson 1992; Deffenbacher et al., 2004; Fisher & Schreiber, 2017; Forgas et al., 2005; Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Schacter, 1999; Yuille & Daylen, 2014), a comprehensive understanding of how these factors interact to influence belief reduction and the accuracy of recalled information, especially in reporting or omitting details from memory, remains underexplored.
To address our research objectives, we designed an experiment segmented into three sessions. Participants were randomly assigned to either a positive music, negative music, or no music (control) group, with mood states induced via background music for the first two groups. The first session involved watching neutral mini videos and undertaking a recognition task, focusing on recalling details of the specific events displayed in the videos. This was followed by a second session during which false feedback was given that aimed at challenging participants’ beliefs about specific memories of the videos. A subsequent memory test was conducted to determine if each description was remembered, believed to have occurred, or identified as not being part of the video content. One week later, their recollection of the video content was re-evaluated through a free recall task and a repeated memory test.
Guided by prior research, our hypotheses were as follows. Research indicates that individuals experience significant belief reduction when confronted with contradictory social feedback (Li et al., 2020, 2023a, b; Otgaar et al., 2017; Otgaar et al., 2013b; Scoboria et al., 2004; 2015; 2018). Additionally, belief has been identified as a major driver of behavior (Scoboria et al., 2004; Scoboria et al., 2015). Therefore, we hypothesized that exposure to false feedback would lead to a notable reduction in belief. This reduction, we anticipated, would influence the accuracy of testimonies and result in an increase of omission errors. Additionally, in line with the Affect-Infusion Model (Forgas, 1995), we hypothesized that mood states would influence cognitive processing strategies. Specifically, we expected that participants in positive moods to be more vulnerable to false feedback compared to those in negative moods, leading to more significant belief reduction, increased detail omission, and reduced testimony accuracy. Conversely, we hypothesized that participants in negative moods, owing to their more detailed focus, would demonstrate greater resistance to false feedback than participants in positive or neutral moods. This resistance was expected to result in a smaller reduction in belief and, potentially, an increase in the precision and reliability of their recollections.