Chapter 1

Statues of Liberty?

Attitudes towards apartheid and colonial statues in
South Africa

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The concept of public memory is used to explain the many and varied ways in which communities deal with the past. However, public memory refers not only to what we *remember* about the past, but what we *forget*, and how we chose to *frame* these recollections.¹ The idea of memory as including ‘what we forget’ is very relevant to South Africa, where historical and collective amnesia, as well as a resolute desire to live in the present and focus on today’s challenges,² is sometimes an obstacle to rectifying past injustices. It is not uncommon to find that there is a worrying number of South Africans who would like to forget the past and move on. Consider some of the results of The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation’s (IJR) South African Reconciliation Barometer which indicated that two thirds of South Africans across all race groups agreed with the statement, ‘Forget Apartheid and move on’. This view is held almost equally by Black (63%) and White (69%) South Africans. Furthermore, White South Africans are less likely than other South Africans to acknowledge the relation between the apartheid legacy and post-apartheid poverty levels.³

1 Matthew Houdek & Kendall R. Phillips, “Public Memory.”

2 The work of Primo Levi, the Italian writer and Holocaust survivor, in relation to memory and trauma is particularly relevant here. He argued in *The Drowned and the Saved* (1986, 187) that memories become distant and historical over time and across generations, and that young people increasingly “are besieged by today’s problems, different, urgent: unemployment, the depletion of resources, the demographic explosion, frenetically innovative technologies to which they must adjust”. This desire to focus on the present rather than the past is a salient aspect of ‘forgetting’ and resonates with South African debates about memory.

3 Kim Wale, *Confronting Exclusion: Time for Radical Reconciliation South Africa Reconciliation Barometer Survey*: 2013, 37.

Houdek and Phillips argue that public memory is socially constructed, with symbols and structures constituting powerful ways of analysing memory (2017, 2). Furthermore, as argued by Halbwachs and Nora,⁴ the symbols and events through which these recollections are expressed can also function to consolidate a sense of nationhood. The social activism of a movement like #RhodesMustFall can be situated at the intersection between public memory and nationhood. This is because it critiques the way in which the past has been memorialised in the rainbow nation project and the manner in which symbols of the “ruins” of empire and segregationist and apartheid histories remain in the present as “documents to damage”,⁵ while simultaneously questioning the legitimacy and transformative competence of social and political institutions. It also raises questions around who should participate (victims, perpetrators, their descendants, or everyone) in the construction of public memory. On this question, Araujo (2010), in the case of the slave trade in the South Atlantic, describes public memory as plural because of the involvement of the descendants of both perpetrators and victims.⁶ This applies to the post-apartheid state as well.

The #RhodesMustFall campaign resulted in the removal of a statue of Cecil John Rhodes from the University of Cape Town (UCT) campus in April 2015. This action cast attention on broader issues of racial transformation imperatives such as redress, restitution, social cohesion and active citizenship and invites us to ask how the general South African population viewed the movement’s central goal.⁷ Questions such as these are important since public opinion is

4 Maurice Halbwachs, *On collective memory*; Pierre Nora, *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past*.

5 Ann Laura Stoler, *Imperial Debris: On Ruins and Ruination*.

6 Ana Lucia Araujo, *Public Memory of Slavery: Victims and Perpetrators in the South Atlantic*.

7 Redress, restitution, social cohesion and active citizenship have all featured as key concepts and issues in daily public discussion as well as academic and policy discourse on racial transformation in South Africa. See National Planning Commission (2012), Sharlene Swartz (2016), as well as Kate Lefko-Everett, Rajen Govender and Donald Foster (2017) for examples. While there remains substantive contestation about the definitions,

essential to policy debate in any functioning democracy. Wilson (2013) argues that public opinion has been an “orderly force”, contributing to democratic political life for thousands of years.⁸ The convergence between public opinion and public policy is often considered to be a crucial characteristic of successful democratic governance.⁹ How widely the goals of the #RhodesMustFall campaign were shared by the general adult population in South Africa is, therefore, an important question. Answering this question will help us understand the different ways people think about redress and restitution in the country.

The character and nature of the 2015 #RhodesMustFall movement provoked questions about who should be making decisions about racial redress and restitution policies in South Africa. The movement’s leaders wanted the student body to exert greater decision-making power in the case of the Rhodes statue. The movement provoked questions relating to who the final arbiter should ultimately be when deciding the fate of apartheid and colonial statues. Should such decisions fall to the general public (through say a referendum)¹⁰ or to those who suffered most from the policies of the previous regime? Or should the matter be left to the traditional powerholders, academic boards and government departments? This question invites wider inquiries about the way decisions about the pace and extent of racial transformation policy are currently made. In a polarised society like South Africa, public preferences concerning *who* should have the final say in making such decisions is perhaps just as important as the

scope and practical implications of such concepts, they are nonetheless frequently invoked in engagements on transformation in the country.

8 Francis Graham Wilson, *A Theory of Public Opinion*.

9 Stuart N. Soroka and Christopher Wlezien, *Degrees of Democracy: Politics, Public Opinion, and Policy*.

10 It should be noted that the referendum, as a device of direct democracy, has increasingly become the subject of appreciable debate. This has been compounded by recent, contentious experiences, such as the Brexit vote in the UK (2016). Critics argue that referenda may enhance societal divisions, produce incoherent and ineffectual policy agendas, and are often based on weak levels of voter turnout, while supporters maintain that participation, strengthen democratic institutions and promote voter education and issue awareness (Morel 2001, 2011).

actions that stem from those decisions and will be interrogated as part of this chapter.

The 2015, the #RhodesMustFall campaign's platform garnered a considerable level of attention and debate in the international and domestic press. Political leaders, academics, media pundits and others have weighed in with their thoughts, but little is known about the views of the general public. In this chapter, using nationally representative public opinion poll data, we will look at how far the adult public accepted #RhodesMustFall's principal goals. The chapter will first examine attitudes towards the removal of South Africa's pre- transition statues (such as Cecil John Rhodes, King George and Jan van Riebeeck) from public spaces. Subsequently, it will show what the general population thinks about collective decision-making on this important restitution issue. The emphasis of our analysis will be on how attitudes differ between important socio-demographic groups with a focus on age cohorts. These findings will then be discussed, and their implications debated.

Literature review

Ndletyana and Webb (2017) clearly state in a recent work that the depth and magnitude of the furore around statues and memorials should have been anticipated.¹¹ According to these authors the initial approach circa 1994 to promote unity, social cohesion and a sense of nationhood through memorialisation was not based on intellectual rigour and lacked a well thought out approach. Policy approaches were essentially just an extension of the old regime's approach to memorials and did not try and address past attachments or identities whilst dealing with the formation of new group identities or attachments.

11 Mcebisi Ndletyana and Denver A. Webb, "Social divisions carved in stone or cenotaphs to a new identity? Policy for memorials, monuments and statues in a democratic South Africa", 97-110.

In a comprehensive examination of adult South African attitudes towards redress and redistribution policies, Gibson (2004) found that group attachments predicted individuals' policy preferences in South Africa.¹² This is because attitude formation is explained by the influence of culture on identity boundaries and values.¹³ It could therefore be expected that group identities would influence attitudes towards colonial and apartheid-era statuary.

The most obvious of these group identities are race¹⁴ and political affiliation. The former is particularly important in a divided country like South Africa where the collective memories of the nation's different population groups differ so dramatically. However, political affiliation is also significant as the country's major political parties – the African National Congress (ANC), the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) – all have different positions on racial transformation and restitution in the country.¹⁵ Consequently, there is a need to examine public attitudes in South Africa across these significant fault lines of group identity.

It is clear that statues, monuments and memorials are not value-free or neutral objects but important tools that have symbolic power and memory within a society. The recent protests around the statues have clearly highlighted the need for dialogue on this issue and this chapter is an attempt to get the broader public involved in discussions and decisions around the issue of statues.

12 James L. Gibson, *Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?*

13 Susan T. Fiske, and Shelley E. Taylor, *Social Cognition: From Brains to Culture*. *Social Cognition*; R. Michael Alvarez and John Brehm, *Hard Choices, Easy Answers: Values, Information, and American Public Opinion*; David Sears, Carl P. Hensler and Leslie K. Speer, "Whites' Opposition to 'Busing': Self-Interest or Symbolic Politics?"

14 While the authors acknowledge that there is no such thing as 'race' in biological or physical terms, at the same time, it must be recognised that race continues to play a salient factor in many aspects of South African society. It continues to inform discussions of historical injustices, as well as policies intended to promote restitution and redress. Through the long history of processes of classification, segregation, oppression, and persecution, the social construction of 'race' has come to assume meaning and purpose, and have a bearing on everyday life, and, by extension, may plausibly have a bearing on public opinion.

15 These three parties account for more than 80% of party support in the country, though the range of policy approaches to racial transformation and restitution is likely to be even more expansive if one takes into account a broader sweep of registered political parties.

Data

Data from the 2015 round of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) was used for this study. SASAS is an annual, nationally representative opinion survey with a realised sample of 3,115 people aged 16 years and older living in private homes. This sample excludes those living in places such as university residences, hospitals and old age homes. SASAS fieldwork was conducted between October and December 2015, roughly six months after the Rhodes statue was removed from the UCT campus. The questionnaire was translated into the major languages spoken in South Africa. Participation in the survey was voluntary and was conducted through face-to-face interviews. Respondents were assured of anonymity and signed consent forms detailing the confidentiality of their responses.

One of the main limitations of a survey is the difficulty of knowing whether respondents have provided truthful and accurate answers to the interviewer. Extensive literature on “response bias” has been published to identify the optimal conditions under which survey participants give ‘truthful’ responses. In the case of this study, asking questions about colonial and apartheid-era statuary may invoke memories of apartheid “pain” in the respondents. Questions of this type may also prime respondents to the norms that govern racial interactions in South Africa. Under such circumstances, the opinions ventured to the interviewer may vary with the race match between the respondent and the person administering the survey. This assumption is in accordance with research on race-of-interviewer effects in other divided societies (like the United States).¹⁶ In order to resolve this problem, SASAS deploys its fieldworkers to ensure (as far as possible) that a respondent is interviewed by an interviewer of a similar race group.

16 Shirley Hatchett and Howard Schuman, “White Respondents and Race-of-Interviewer Effects”, 523-28; Nora Cate Schaeffer, “Evaluating Race-of-Interviewer Effects In a National Survey”, 400-419.

SASAS included several standard questions to gauge a respondent's socio-demographic characteristics. These included age, race group, geographic status, formal educational attainment and political affiliation. In terms of the last, the survey obtained affiliation by asking the respondent which party they felt closest to. This is a more revealing technique to measure political partisanship than a simple question about voting behaviour as many people do not vote. To account for an individual's socio-economic status, we used the Living Standard Measure (LSM). This indicator is comprised of more than 30 questions on household assets and access to services and was designed by the South African Advertising Research Foundation. This measure partitions the population into ten groups – ranging from the wealthiest (10) to the poorest (1) – based on their access to assets and services.

Results

The results section is divided into three parts. First we will consider the public preferences for 'if' and 'how' apartheid and colonial statues should be removed. Then we examine the general population's attitudes towards 'who' should make such an important decision. We will look specifically at how attitudes towards these questions vary between key socio-demographic groups in South Africa. Finally, we look at whether attitudes towards apartheid and colonial statues are related to individual preferences for other types of racial transformation.

What should be done with apartheid and colonial statues?

Respondents were asked: 'In your opinion, what should be done with statues of South Africa's apartheid and colonial leaders, such as Cecil John Rhodes, King George, Jan van Riebeeck?' Responses to this question are presented in Figure 1.1 and demonstrated that close to half of the adult public (46%) believes that the statues should be removed. Of this group of 'removers', the main preference was for the

statues to be housed in a museum (27%) and just over a tenth (12%) felt they should be destroyed. A small portion (7%) of the general adult population favoured a different option – replacing the commemorative statues of the apartheid era with those of struggle heroes. Roughly a third (34%) of the adult public indicated that the memorialisations should be left alone while the balance (16%) expressed indifference or uncertainty. Between the ‘remove’ and ‘leave alone’ camps was a third option, which suggested that ‘statues of struggle heroes should be put up next to them’. By selecting this option, respondents could choose a strategy that ‘spoke back’ to the remembrance of apartheid and colonial monarchs and politicians with new artwork. Given the inclusivity of this option, it was surprising that it found only nominal support (4%) amongst adult South Africans.

Figure 1.2 depicts how responses to the question on removing of symbolic representations of colonial and apartheid figures differ across age cohorts. The percentage favouring the removal ranged between 43% and 50% across the different cohorts. Given the apparent similarity in responses, it is appropriate to employ bivariate tests to assess how well the observed distribution fits with our expectations that our two variables (i.e. age cohort and attitudes towards statue removal) are independent. The results show clearly that the two variables are unrelated.¹⁷ The #RhodesMustFall campaign appeared to have many of the hallmarks of a general youth revolt, similar in character to the famous 1968 university student strikes in the Global North.¹⁸ We anticipated, therefore, to observe a sizeable age effect.

17 To discern the probability of a correlation between these two variables, we used a Pearson's Chi-square test and the results are as follows, Pearson $\chi^2(36) = 39.359$; $Pr = 0.322$. Of course, this type of test is only an assessment of the probability of independence of a distribution. We then used the more complex one-way analysis-of-variance model to further test whether attitudes towards statues and age are correlated. Here we treated age as a continuous variable. The results ($F(6,3080) = 1.55$, $p = 0.157$) confirm our earlier test and clearly show that age does not seem to be associated with preferences for the removal of statues of South Africa's apartheid and colonial leaders at a statistically significant level.

18 For more on the character and dynamics of the 1968 protests, see Ali 1978, 2009; Kurlansky 2004.

However, we found little evidence of intergenerational variation amongst the general population.

Figure 1.1 Views on what should be done with statues of apartheid and colonial leaders

Figure 1.2 Age group differences underlying preferred action on apartheid and colonial statues

Looking beyond age cohort, Table 1.1 examines attitudes across four key socio-demographic characteristics in South African society: (i) educational attainment, (ii) spatial classification, (iii) political

affiliation, and (iv) population group. When reviewing the results of the table, it is important to remember how the characteristics of these groups intersect. Unsurprisingly, we noted distinct attitudinal variations between the country's four major population groups. The first choice of the Black African majority was removal (52%) while members of the country's different racial minorities were, on average, less willing to select this option. Relative to other population groups in South Africa, the Black African majority was also more in favour of the 'destroy' (14%) route. Compared to other racial minorities, White South Africans were the least likely to consider removal in general and considerably less willing to select destroy. A majority (61%) of White South Africans joined the 'leave alone' camp compared to about two-fifths of Coloured and half of Indian adults.

Given the country's post-transition history of party partisanship, political identity should exert an influence over individuals' policy preferences in this study. As can be observed in Table 1.1, ANC supporters strongly believed in removal (53%), with the placement in museums the most preferred choice. EFF supporters voiced an even stronger preference for removal (63%). Between ANC and EFF partisans, the main difference was between the 'museum' and the 'destroy' options. EFF supporters exhibited higher than average popularity for the destroy option (22%) when compared to other subgroups in the table. 'Leave alone' was the dominant response among DA supporters (51%), with less than a third (29%) favouring removal. Amongst those who were non-partisan – about 15% of the total adult population – primary support was again reported for the 'leave alone' (29%) and 'don't care' (24%) options. We used multivariate analysis to disentangle these results from our population group findings described above. We found that an individual's political affiliation did influence their preferences even when accounting for population group.¹⁹

19 To better comprehend the correlation between political affiliation and preferences for the removal of statues, we used a logistic regression. Here, we were interested in those who favoured destroying the statues. We created a dichotomous variable that was coded 1 for

Table 1.1 Support for the removal of Apartheid and Colonial Statues by Selected Subgroup, 2015

	Remove and destroy	Remove and place in museum	Replace with statues of struggle heroes	Statues of struggle heroes should be put up next to them	They should be left alone	(Do not care)	(Do not know)
Population group							
Black African	14.0	29.6	8.2	3.7	29.0	12.0	3.6
Coloured	3.8	21.3	2.6	3.4	43.6	21.7	3.6
Indian/Asian	6.7	15.5	4.9	6.0	49.2	9.6	8.1
White	2.0	19.0	2.0	4.4	61.1	6.2	5.4
Political Affiliation							
ANC	15.5	30.8	8.1	3.1	27.2	11.8	3.4
DA	3.3	22.3	3.4	4.6	49.8	14.1	2.4
EFF	22.4	41.2	2.5	3.0	21.0	5.8	4.0
Other Parties	7.7	26.0	8.0	6.8	35.2	13.1	3.2
No Party	5.0	19.9	4.6	5.3	45.2	15.3	4.8
Undeclared	9.1	22.6	10.2	3.4	37.6	11.0	6.1
Educational Attainment							
Post-Matric	8.8	23.6	6.1	3.0	44.7	9.1	4.6
Matric	12.2	28.5	6.7	3.8	33.1	12.0	3.7
Incomplete Secondary	11.1	30.1	5.9	3.2	34.5	11.9	3.3
Senior Primary	13.7	22.4	8.0	6.2	28.2	18.2	3.3
Junior Primary and Below	16.5	18.5	16.0	4.1	26.1	11.6	7.1
Geographic Location							
Urban formal	11.2	28.1	6.2	3.6	34.2	12.0	4.8
Urban informal	11.2	42.1	10.0	2.0	21.6	13.0	0.2
Rural trad. auth. Areas	12.3	22.3	8.7	5.0	37.9	11.4	2.5
Rural farms	18.8	17.4	2.8	2.6	29.1	24.4	5.0

Note: Row percentages.

‘selected remove and destroy’ and 0 ‘did not select remove and destroy’. We found that, even accounting for population group, the relative log odds of preferring that the statues be destroyed will decrease by 0.854 (SE= 0.368) if an individual supported the DA instead of the ANC. The relative log odds of preferring that destroy option will decrease by 1.033 (SE= 0.324) if an individual had no political party association (versus supporting the ANC).

A preference for removal was highest in the country's informal urban settlements where more than three-fifths of adults indicated an inclination to remove pre-transition leaders' statues. Looking at this general desire for removal more closely, we can observe that adult informal urban dwellers were more likely than those in living elsewhere to select the 'museum' option. Approximately two-fifths (42%) of the informal urban dwellers favoured this approach, about twice the portion of those living in other types of geographic spaces. The spatial proximity of many informal urban areas to more economically affluent areas, may be informing attitudes. Research has shown that residing in economically unequal spatial environments can have an impact on how an individual sees the core facets of a society's ethos.²⁰ In this case, it may be that informal urban dwellers' juxtaposition to economic inequality has had a specific effect on their desire for racial transformation.

We can observe an inverse association between formal educational attainment and removal of statues. Those with junior primary education or below were more inclined to support the 'removal' (51%) than other attainment groups in Table 1.1. Those with a post-matric education were the only group where the 'leave alone' (45%) option was more supported than the 'remove' possibility (39%). The observed relationship here may be informed by the overrepresentation of the racial minorities amongst the higher educational groups. We validated this thesis by using a multivariate testing and showed that formal educational attainment was not found to have a statistically significant association with preferences for the disposal of apartheid and colonial statues.²¹

20 Benjamin J. Newman, Christopher D. Johnston, and Patrick L. Lown, "False Consciousness or Class Awareness? Local Income Inequality, Personal Economic Position, and Belief in American Meritocracy", 326-40.

21 We used a standard multinomial (polytomous) logistic regression to test the predictive power of educational attainment on attitudes towards statues. We produced a model that included formal educational attainment and population group as independent variables and preferences for the removal of statues as the dependent variable. Using the 'leave alone' option as the base outcome, we found that years of formal educational attainment was not correlated with preferences when controlling for population group. This finding holds regardless whether we treated formal educational attainment as a continuous variable (i.e. years of completed formal education) or a categorical variable

This suggests that an individual's position on the country's socio-economic ladder did not predict attitudes towards this issue.

Who should decide about what should be done?

In this section we move from the individual's preferences for action to *who* should make decisions about historical redress. In SASAS 2015, respondents were asked 'who should decide what happens to these statues of South Africa's apartheid and colonial leaders?' The most common selected option was 'the government should decide' (34%) while around a fifth (22%) favours a referendum on the matter to allow citizens to decide (Figure 1.3). There was surprisingly low support (10%) for the strategy of letting 'those most hurt by the past' decide, while one might similarly have expected a greater share to opt for the 'academics and historians' option (15%). Around a tenth (11%) said they would choose 'none of the above', but these consist largely of those expressing indifference in the preceding question.

Figure 1.3: Public Views on who should decide what happens to the statues

(as it is treated in Table 1.1). If we substituted our LSM indicator with formal educational attainment, our other measure of socio-economic status was also found to be statistically insignificant.

Figure 1.4: Age group differences underlying preferred group who decides on what happens to the apartheid and colonial statues

An individual's preferences for *who* should decide had a robust correlation with *how* they wanted South African society to resolve the problem. Adults who thought that the statues should be removed were more likely to indicate a preference for allowing 'those most hurt by the past' to determine the statues' future than those who preferred the status quo.²² This is particularly true of those who preferred that the statues be destroyed. In addition, we note that those who thought that the statues should be placed in a museum, were more inclined to trust the government to resolve the matter than those who favoured some other options. Remarkably, supporters of 'leave alone' were much more willing to trust the intelligentsia to determine the statues removal than those who backed removal.

²² We noted that those who favoured removing the statues tended to prefer certain decision-making options. This suggests a correlation between these two attitudinal variables. The results of a Pearson's Chi-square test ($\chi^2(30) = 1644.827$; $Pr = 0.000$) conforms to our expectations. In order to investigate this observation further we used a multinomial logistic regression to determine if this relationship held even when controlling for socio-demographic variables like population group, age, formal years of education, geographic location and political affiliation. The outcome of this regression confirmed that the statistically significant relationship between these variables persisted even accounting for these socio-demographic variables.

Preferences for which group should decide differ significantly by age cohort (Figure 1.4). It was interesting to note that twice as many 16-19 year olds (33%) support the option of a referendum as the basis for deciding, compared to those of pensionable age (16%).²³ To further explore attitudinal subgroup differences on this question, Table 1.2 presents data on how attitudes vary across three important socio-demographic groups in South African society. Black African adults were more likely than any of the nation's racial minorities to identify government as the arbiter of such decisions. In contrast, less than a fifth of white, coloured or Indian adults selected government. Of all population groups, coloured adults were the least willing, on average, to consider the government option. Compared to other population groups, white South Africans tended not to favour a referendum on the question of statues. Unlike what was observed for other population groups in South Africa, even young white adults were disinclined to selected referendum as a desirable route. Instead, young white adults tended to agree with their elders and opted for academics and historians.

Substantive differences on who should decide were noted amongst supporters of the country's major political parties. We note that 44% of ANC supporters were inclined to say that the government must decide – no other partisan subgroup displayed a similar level of faith in government. A correlation between age and decision-making attitudes play help explain why EFF supporters and the political unaffiliated have a strong preference for deciding by means of a referendum or vote. Both EFF supporters and the unaffiliated tend to be, on average, much younger than the supporters of other political affiliation subgroups.

23 A one-way analysis of variance indicated that mean age differs significantly amongst the different decision-making options ($F(5,3082) = 7.46, p = 0.000$). We then used a Scheffe multiple-comparison test to determine which groups differed from each other. The results show that the age difference between options 'government' and 'referendum or vote' is 3.65, and this difference is statistically significant at the $p < 0.001$ level. Statistically significant differences were also noted between 'referendum' and 'none of the above' as well as between 'referendum' and 'do not know'. These observed differences remained statistically significant even if we used another multiple-comparison test like Sidak or Bonferroni.

Interestingly, EFF supporters were more likely to select government as an arbiter than supporters of the DA. It is noteworthy to observe that a large majority of the political non-aligned or undeclared indicated a preference for option other than government.

Table 1.2 How should it be decided what is done with the statues of South Africa's apartheid and colonial leaders, by selected subgroups

	Referendum or Vote	Those most hurt by the past	Government	Academics and historians	None of the above	(Do not know)
Population group						
Black African	22.7	11.2	39.3	12.8	7.4	6.6
Coloured	22.9	5.9	16.4	15.1	19.3	20.4
Indian/Asian	21.0	5.5	19.2	16.1	25.5	12.6
White	12.6	6.3	17.0	30.4	24.1	9.6
Political Affiliation						
ANC	20.7	10.5	44.0	11.6	7.3	5.9
DA	15.1	9.5	21.4	19.6	21.5	12.9
EFF	31.8	15.5	33.9	1.7	12.6	4.4
Other Parties	18.3	7.5	36.2	16.7	13.9	7.4
No Party	28.1	6.5	18.2	24.5	11.0	11.8
Undeclared	21.4	11.5	28.4	16.4	11.4	11.0
Living Standard Measurement (LSM)						
LSM 1-3	9.6	3.2	50.5	17.2	9.1	10.3
LSM 4-5	19.4	10.9	44.1	11.4	7.7	6.4
LSM 6-7	23.8	11.0	33.2	14.5	7.6	9.9
LSM 8-9	23.8	12.8	26.8	13.8	14.8	8.0
LSM 10	16.4	3.4	16.6	29.3	27.0	7.2

Note: Row percentages.

We detected substantive class-based differences in Table 1.2. Half of the poor (LSM 1-3) chose the state option, compared with 44% in the lower middle (LMS 4-5) and 33% of those in the upper middle (LSM 6-7). Compared to their less affluent counterparts, those in

the upper LSM categorisations were the least likely to select the 'government'. Support for a referendum was higher among those with a medium living standard and lowest amongst the poor. Members of the top LSM group were found to be more likely to choose academics than all other LSM groups. A similar pattern was observed if we used formal educational attainment as a measure of socio-economic status. It could be argued that this apparent relationship is artificial – a product of existing racial inequalities in socio-economic class composition. Using multivariate analysis, however, we find that these effects hold even when controlling for population group and political partisanship.²⁴ This outcome points to the salience of socio-economic position as a driver of attitudes towards redress in South Africa.

Support for existing policies of racial transformation

People often have limited information about a subject and this presents a problem when they must make a decision on an unfamiliar matter. Using sophisticated experiments, researchers have shown that people make sense of the world using heuristics.²⁵ Instead of engaging in exhaustive gathering and processing of information, individuals use cognitive mental shortcuts to categorise the limited information accessible to them and simplify attitude formation.²⁶ Cognitive heuristics are especially employed when individuals are asked to frame attitudes towards a complex policy issue (such as the disposal of colonial and apartheid statues). Heuristics can include general assumptions

24 In order to further explore the predictive affected played by LSM in selecting a preferred group to decide the problem, we used a multinomial logistic regression analysis. As our dependent variable we have preferences for decision-makers and we have population group and LSM as independent variables. Using government as the base outcome, we find that the relative log odds of selecting the 'referendum' ($r=0.259$; $SE=0.054$), 'those hurt by the past' ($r=0.184$; $SE=0.067$), and 'academics and historians' ($r=0.115$; $SE=0.057$) options will increase if an individual gained one LSM rank. These observed correlations were statistically significant at the $p<0.05$ level or higher.

25 Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody, and Phillip E. Tetlock, *Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

26 Fiske & Taylor, *Social Cognition*.

about human nature or political predispositions or even elite clues. By using these shortcuts, individuals can form attitudes that are ‘rational’ in the sense that these attitudes are internally consistent.²⁷ This is a very limited conception of rationality, though, as it ignores any deeper rationality requirements for the content of attitudes.

We posit that people use their general predispositions about racial transformation policy as *heuristics* to shape attitudes towards the removal of apartheid and colonial statuary. The remainder of this section will seek to validate this thesis. In order to gauge understandings of transformation, we turned to data on specific redress policies. In SASAS 2015, respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed with three statements about specific forms of racial transformation. Responses to these questions are presented in Figure 1.5 for the country’s Black African majority and racial minorities. It is evident that the Black African population is predominantly in favour of these policies of racial transformation while racial minority members are more hesitant in their support. Although we note dissimilarities in how each of the country’s different racial minorities viewed these policies in 2015, these disparities are not as stark as may have been anticipated. While disagreement was also more prevalent amongst White South Africans, high levels of disagreement were observed for adult members of the Coloured and Indian groups (see Roberts 2014 for a more comprehensive examination of redress attitudes of this type).²⁸

27 James H. Kuklinski, and Paul J. Quirk, “Reconsidering the Rational Public: Cognition, Heuristics, and Mass Opinion.” In *Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and the Bounds of Rationality*, edited by Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins and Samuel L. Popkin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 153–82.

28 Benjamin J. Roberts, “Your Place or Mine? Beliefs about Inequality and Redress Preferences in South Africa.” *Social Indicators Research* 118, no. 3 (2014): 1167–90, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-013-0458-9>.

Figure 1.5: Public Attitudes towards Different Forms of Racial Redress across Selected Groups

In order to understand whether individual attitudes towards racial transformation affected preferences for the disposal of statues we created a Racial Transformation Index. This indicator was constructed by combining responses to the three questions depicted in Figure 1.5 and converting them into a 0-10 index.²⁹ ‘Don’t know’ responses to these statements were treated as missing. The higher the score on the Racial Transformation Index, the greater the reported support for racial redress. Mean results on this index are depicted across the statutory disposal preferences in Table 1.3 and we can clearly see evidence of a substantive correlation. Individuals who favour the ‘remove and destroy’ ($M=8.02$; $SE=0.13$) or ‘replace with heroes’ ($M=7.64$; $SE=0.14$) options tended to have a high index score.³⁰ Conversely, low support

29 To determine the internal consistency of the Racial Transformation Index, we used Cronbach’s alpha to examine the index’s reliability. The result ($\alpha=0.78$) suggested that the three items have shared covariance and probably measure the same underlying concept. The national mean on the index was 6.73 ($SE=0.062$), indicating a more moderate position on this measure than may be expected given the country’s history. Examining the skewness (-0.945) and kurtosis (3.117) confirm that the index has a symmetric distribution with well-behaved tails.

30 When investigating the mean Racial Transformation Index score on the ‘remove and destroy’ option we noted that the statistical distribution has a higher kurtosis (6.36) than the curvature you would expect to find in a normal distribution. In other words, the index mean values are clustered at the end of the distribution indicating a uniformity of opinion within the ‘removed and destroyed’ camp. This leptokurtic distribution result can be contrasted with how the index distribution looks in the ‘leave alone’ camp (2.10)

for redress was associated with the 'leave alone' ($M=5.75$; $SE=0.12$) option. This demonstrates that attitudes towards pre-transition statuary cannot be understood independently of attitudes towards existing policies of racial redress.

Table 1.3: Mean Racial Transformation Index Score across Attitudes towards the removal of Apartheid and Colonial Statues

	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		skewness	kurtosis
Individual Preferences for Colonial and Apartheid Statues						
Removed and destroyed	8.02	0.13	7.78	8.27	-1.44	6.36
Replaced with struggle hero statues	7.64	0.14	7.36	7.92	-1.09	4.63
Removed and placed in a museum	7.30	0.10	7.10	7.50	-1.38	5.23
Struggle hero statues placed next to them	7.04	0.20	6.65	7.43	-1.08	4.38
(Do not know)	6.48	0.38	5.73	7.23	-0.64	2.37
I don't really care what happens to them	6.45	0.19	6.08	6.82	-0.62	2.26
They should be left alone	5.75	0.12	5.52	5.99	-0.44	2.10
Individual Preferences for Collective Decision-Making						
Those most hurt by South Africa's past	7.52	0.13	7.27	7.78	-1.03	4.69
Government	7.51	0.09	7.34	7.69	-1.39	5.65
Referendum or vote	6.89	0.12	6.65	7.12	-0.98	3.36
(Do not know)	5.77	0.26	5.25	6.29	-0.30	1.81
Academics and historians	5.74	0.20	5.35	6.13	-0.48	1.98
None of the above	5.30	0.22	4.86	5.74	-0.02	1.91

– here the distribution is more mesokurtic. People who are in this camp were found to be much less uniform in their support for racial transformation.

An individual's attitudes towards racial transformation policies seemed to be associated with their preferences for 'who' should make decisions on redressing post-apartheid memorialisation strategies. Those who were uncertain ($M=5.77$; $SE=0.26$), favoured leaving the decision to academia ($M=5.74$; $SE=0.20$) or selected 'none of the above' ($M=5.30$; $SE=0.22$) exhibited relatively low Racial Transformation Index mean scores. To better understand this apparent correlation we can use multivariate techniques to determine the predictive strength of the index relative to the following predictive variables: population group, socio-economic status and partisanship. In all cases, the predictive effect of the index was observed even controlling for these other variables.³¹ It is clear therefore, that the general public's preferences for who should decide on how apartheid and colonial-era statues should be preserved (if at all) cannot be isolated from their general attitudes towards the country's broader programme of racial redress and restitution.

Discussion

Overall, we found that the public's views on colonial and apartheid-era statuary were polarised. Many demanded removal which seems to signal a desire for a new type of commemorative public culture – one that excludes statues of colonial and apartheid era masters. Others preferred the status quo, displaying a defence of the current monumentalising efforts of the post-apartheid state – where new heroes stand alongside villains of the past. Even greater polarisation was observed when respondents were asked about who should decide the fate of these statues. Some backed government while others favoured

31 To test whether the relationship between the Racial Transformation Index and the individual preferences for who decides, we used a multinomial logistic regression. Preferences for decision-makers were the dependent variable while the index, age, population group, socio-economic status and political affiliation were the independent variables. Using 'historians and academics' as the base outcome, the relative log odds of selecting people most hurt by South Africa's past ($r=0.129$; $SE=0.044$), government ($r=0.259$; $SE=0.054$) and referendum ($r=0.212$; $SE=0.043$) increased if the Racial Transformation Index score grows by one unit. These associations were statistically significant at the $p<0.05$ level or higher.

a referendum and there was no majority position. Our analysis has also shown that how the public sees the statuary reflects a larger division about how South African society should be transformed. Perhaps this is not surprising. Pre-transition monuments (like the statue of Cecil John Rhodes on the UCT campus) represent a range of different symbolic continuities with the colonial and apartheid era. They are, in other words, symbols of a truncated decolonisation process.

After the end of apartheid, the new democratic regime combined the preservation of colonial and apartheid monuments with the commission of new memorials next to or nearby the preserved monuments. This created spaces characterised by a multiplicity of different representations of the nation's various cultural and historical elements. This post-apartheid attempt to create polyvocal spaces encouraged the diversification of the symbolic landscape.³² Holmes and Loehwing call this strategy 'multiplicative commemoration'.³³ This strategy, however, finds little support amongst the general population. We found that only a small portion of the South African adult public backed multiplicative commemoration with most preferring either preservation or removal. This outcome should lead us to question the standing, and therefore suitability, of the country's current multiplicative strategy. Indeed, our results seem to support an existing critique of South Africa's strategy of heritage preservation within the literature on memorialisation.³⁴

The 2015 #RhodesMustFall campaign was a youth movement that seemed to speak to a common set of values amongst the wider (and so called) 'Born Free' generation. Consequently, we may have expected clear intergenerational differences to have emerged in our study.

32 Ali Khangela Hlongwane, "Commemoration, Memory and Monuments in the Contested Language of Black Liberation: The South African Experience." *Journal of Pan African Studies* 2, no. 4 (2008): 135-70.

33 Carolyn E. Holmes, and Melanie Loehwing, "Icons of the Old Regime: Challenging South African Public Memory Strategies in #RhodesMustFall", 1215.

34 Karel Anthonie Bakker and Liana Müller, "Intangible Heritage and Community Identity in Post-Apartheid South Africa". 48-54; Elizabeth Rankin, "Creating/curating Cultural Capital: Monuments and Museums for Post-Apartheid South Africa", 72-98.

But we could not find proof for a strong age effect underlying statuary preferences. Despite the fact that today's young adults grew up under a different political system from their older counterparts, the new post-apartheid generation seemed to favour broadly similar options to redress the problem of colonial and apartheid statues. This outcome seems to correspond with public opinion research by Mattes (2012)³⁵ which found that South African youth was no more greatly predisposed towards principles such as equality and redress than older generations.³⁶ However, we did note that the youth were more likely to support the most democratic of the decision-making options when asked about who should decide the statues' fate. This outcome could serve as a possible contradiction of Mattes's central thesis that the country's post-apartheid generation is as "lukewarm" on democracy as their parents and grandparents.

There is little evidence that the observed polarisation over pre-transition monuments is the product of class-based differences. Population group differences characterise the survey results with black African adults more likely to support removal than members of the country's various racial minorities. It is possible to explain attitudinal differences amongst black African and white adults by referring to how individuals employ memories about their groups' collective pasts to form attitudes about present-day events. However, the lack of attitudinal variation between the white, coloured and Indian adults is unanticipated given the country's history. One admittedly contentious hypothesis is that this might be related to the popularity of the DA amongst the country's racial minorities.³⁷ Political support for the DA tended to correlate with backing for the status quo. This finding may be related to the brand of non-racialism currently employed and promoted by that party

35 Robert Mattes, "The 'Born Frees': The Prospects for Generational Change in Post-Apartheid South Africa", 133-53.

36 Gibson, *Overcoming Apartheid*.

37 For a fuller discussion on the role of race and class in relation to voting patterns in South African elections, see Habib and Naidu (1999, 2006).

(see Anciano, 2016 for a fuller discussion).³⁸ More work is needed to validate this thesis and better understand minority group differences on the question of colonial and apartheid statues.

One of the most interesting findings of this chapter concerns how academics and historians are viewed by the general adult population. In our analysis those displaying greater levels of opposition to transformation policies tended to display more support for academics and historians having ultimate decision-making power over colonial and apartheid-era statuary. The basis for this preference will clearly require further follow-up investigation.

Conclusion

The 2015 #RhodesMustFall campaign brought renewed attention on issues of race, redress, restitution, social cohesion, and active citizenship in South Africa. However, the general public remains divided on one of the campaign's central calls – that of changing society's approach to memorialisations of the old regime. This division signifies the difficulties and contestations likely to be encountered in pushing forward change on this issue. One of the possible contributions to confronting and minimising such divisions would be to advocate for greater public dialogue as a means of promoting a fuller, multi-perspective understanding on historic memorialisation that is rooted within a broader agenda of redress and restitution. An imperative of such dialogues, as argued in Swartz's *Another Country: Everyday Social Restitution* (2016), would be to bring diverse groups of people together for conversations that recognise and acknowledge past injustice and the effects it continues to have on the present. Such intergroup dialogues also require meaningful location of oneself within these past histories and their legacies, and a consideration of

38 Fiona Anciano, "A Dying Ideal: Non-Racialism and Political Parties in Post-Apartheid South Africa", 195-214.

the obligations one acquires by virtue of their location.³⁹ While it by no means represents a social panacea to a complex debate, dialogues of this kind could prove transformative in creating a broader consensus on how we as a society deal with pre-transition memorials.

In the course of this chapter, we have analysed the attitudes of South Africa's sampled population towards an issue of particular importance. The findings presented from this analysis are the first evidence concerning the predispositions of the public towards the symbolic representations of colonial and apartheid figures following the end of #RhodesMustFall campaign. The study was based on a limited number of questions and, as such, the researchers were restricted in their scope and exploration. There is a need for further quantitative analyses and to continue to monitor change in attitudes over time. Moreover, there are certain questions that even a more in-depth quantitative survey would be unable to answer. Careful, nuanced and in-depth qualitative explorations that seek to further understand the 'stubborn kernel' of opposition to transformation (Dixon et al., 2007) that continues to exist in the country, especially amongst minority groups, is urgently required.

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39 Sharlene Swartz, *Another Country: Everyday Social Restitution*.

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