DEFENCE DIPLOMACY & NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Views from the Global South

EDITORS

Ian Liebenberg
Dirk Kruijt
Shrikant Paranjpe

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India's Security Strategy Beyond deliberate ambiguity?

Shrikant Paranjpe

Framework

A national security policy that seeks to protect a nation's interests presents an interplay between two sets of issues: the technical and political issues, and capability and intent issues. The technical dimension covers material sources of national power that span geopolitical, economic, technological and other aspects, including the domestic and international linkages that each of these issues would have. The political issues work at three levels: the domestic political environment, its linkage with the international scenario, and the overall international situation. The political component is based on the principle of the 'primacy of the political'. This principle suggests that: (a) political order has primacy over all other societal associations in the sense that ordered patterns of relationships between social forms depend upon the political order, and its function is therefore to preserve social order; and (b) the performance of this political function presupposes that the good which the political order aims at cannot be identified with any specific interest, but rather with the good of the whole.

The non-material sources of national power are factored into the political dimension of the state. While the technical dimensions of security would determine the capability of a state, it is the political dimension that determines intent. Policy is thus an interplay between capability and intent, a product of matching the two with a goal that seeks to address the national interests of the state. The movement from policy to strategy is from a predominantly political to an executive domain. Policy is primarily a political statement, while strategy seeks its implementation in real terms, with the most efficient use of available means to accomplish the chosen ends. Such a strategy may or may not be spelt out in detail; it is the overall policy that would provide the road map for understanding the strategy of that state. On the other hand, doctrine is the nuts and bolts of strategy, targeting specific sectors (like nuclear, space, internal security, etc.) to provide a road map for the execution of strategy.

National interest is defined within the context of the core values of a nation, as identified by the Constitution: as being a product of history (civilisation); the value systems of the polity and economy; and the society and culture. The aspects which determine the core values are the geography, geopolitics, and the political, economic and socio-cultural context.

The origins of the concept of national security can be found in the historical formulations of national interest. As Walter Lippmann put it, 'a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate national interests to avoid a war, and is able, if challenged to maintain them by war' (Baylis, Smith & Owens, 2008:229). Arnold Wolfers argues that 'security, in an objective sense measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked' (Baylis, Smith & Owens, 2008:229), and this was the dominant theme of national security through most of the Cold War years. The term 'security' was deemed to belong to the armed forces, which were entrusted with protecting the national interests of a state. National interest was also closely linked to security, defined as defence of a nation's borders. As an organising concept in international relations, national security provides us with several advantages. It helps us to focus on common elements and uniformities in the external policies of all nations, and is in a sense the base on which foreign policies of nations are structured. Secondly, it helps us to focus on the underlying unity of internal and external activities of the state. It recognises that external behaviour of states is an integral part of the total behaviour of the state, and that internal and external security are essentially interlinked.

India

The Estimates Committee of the Indian Parliament, in its 19th Report on the Ministry of Defence, raised some crucial questions about India's defence policy. In its statement to the Committee, the Ministry of Defence explained that India's defence policy has essentially been to defend the territory, sovereignty, and freedom of the country, while the Estimates Committee considered this an oversimplification. It felt that India should have a national security doctrine which not only takes a long-term view of the country's security requirements but also looks into problems of internal security (Estimates Committee, 1992). Although the Indian National Security Council (NSC) was established in 1999, the Indian government has not yet presented an official document that spells out a National Security Strategy for India. Amongst the various reasons given for such a failure is a possible lack of political consensus on national security issues. It has been argued that there are differing perceptions of the threats India faces from its neighbours; ideological differences; different world views held by political parties regarding the current global situation; and equally complex and conflicting arguments about various internal security challenges.

However, the stand taken by the political establishment regarding articulation of a national security strategy has, in a sense, been consistent. In a reply to the Standing Committee on Defence (1995-96) in the Tenth Lok Sabha, the Defence Secretary argued that (Kanwal, 2017:2-3):

... there is a policy; the only thing is that it is not written down as a separate document and published as such ... As a matter of policy we have not published such a document and the Government has not been in favour of publishing a separate document ... Non-publication of the document does not mean in any way non-existence of policy.

Replying to the debate on the Demands for Grants of the Ministry of Defence on 10 May 1995, Prime Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao, who was also the Defence Minister, stated (Kanwal, 2017:2-3):

We do not have a document called India's National Defence Policy. But we have got several guidelines which are followed, strictly followed and observed ... This policy is not merely rigid in the sense that it has been written down, but these are the guidelines, these are the objectives, these are the matters which are always kept in view while conducting our defence policy.

Similarly, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), in its Annual Report for 1998-99, stated:

India's external relations were guided by well-established principles. These have formed the basis of our foreign policy for decades. They enjoy a broad national consensus, thus providing a strong foundation of stability and continuity. We view foreign policy as an integral part of the larger effort of building the nation's capabilities: through economic development, strengthening social well-being and the quality of life and of protecting India's sovereignty, territorial integrity and security, not only in its defence and economic aspects, but in the widest strategic sense of the term.

In April 2018, the government formed a new integrated institutional mechanism called the Defence Planning Committee (DPC), under the chairmanship of the National Security Advisor. This committee would consist of the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, the three Service Chiefs, Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary and Secretary (Expenditure) Finance Ministry. There would be subcommittees on Policy and Strategy, Plans and Capability Development, Defence Diplomacy, and Defence manufacturing Ecosystem. The integration of defence, foreign policy and finance would ensure an integrated approach to dealing with issues of national security. The DPC is expected to prepare a draft national security strategy, along with undertaking a strategic defence review (Behera, 2018).

A national security strategy for India would be based on India's core values, its principles, a clear assessment of its interests, and a determination to tackle the challenges that the country could face. An understanding of world affairs, internal security, and territorial integrity have always been over-riding priorities in India's strategic perspectives and these, along with its approach to peace and development, constitute the 'governing image' of India's policies. However, Indian security thinking has long been criticised for being abstract, rather than concrete.

Consequently, there is no spelling out of a national security strategy in terms of specific threats and possible ways to address them. It has been argued that a national security strategy normally provides a statement of objectives, an appreciation of the global, regional and domestic security environment, an assessment of the country's capabilities, and the approach to be taken at various levels to address these issues. It is true that there has been a distinct reluctance by India to present a clear-cut strategic doctrine and articulate the same in terms of policy. However, as was argued by the then Prime Minister, India has several guidelines which are followed and observed.

These goals and objectives have been clearly spelt out in the Indian Constitution.¹ Various statements made by the government at different times, as well as the annual reports of the concerned ministries, provide an appreciation of the security environment, an assessment of capabilities, and the approaches to be taken to address any issues. This article argues that the distinct reluctance on the part of India to present a clear-cut strategic doctrine and articulate the same in terms of policy stems from a belief in the utility of a deliberate ambiguity, and not from a lack of strategic culture, as George Tanham would have us believe (1992).

It is in this context that this article seeks to present an understanding of India's security strategy as it has evolved over the years, the challenges and issues faced, and the methods applied to address them.

Goals

To understand Indian security strategy, it is necessary to examine the sources that contributed to the evolution of India's strategic culture. India started its focus on history in the age of Indian nationalism in the 19th century. It was the first systematic effort to identify the concept of 'India' and seek historical references to present the country as an entity. One can flag three periods of history in which India was an entity with relatively defined territories within the geopolitical frontiers of modern-day South Asia. The first was the period of Ashoka (273-232 BCE), the second was the Mughal Empire during the reign of Akbar (1556-1605 CE) and the third the Maratha Peshwa empire (1798 CE). This South Asia lies between Afghanistan in the west and Myanmar in the east, south of the

Himalayas, covering the Indo-Gangetic plains in the north and the Deccan plateau of Central India with a peninsular coastline.

The Peace dimension of Hinduism was presented in the tenets of *Kshma* (forbearance) and *Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam* (the world is but one family), while Indian nationalists accept both Ashoka and Akbar as symbols of tolerance and as 'Indian'. Alongside this comes another Hindu tenet: *Sarva Dharma Samabhava* (peaceful coexistence amongst all religions).² The ancient Indian cultural legacy has been used as a base for a peace discourse in India.

The vision that the freedom struggle and post-independence India sought to project through the Nehru years (1947-1964) rested on ideological precepts such as anti-imperialism, liberal internationalism, and Gandhism (Power, 1969:22). At a theoretical level, the Indian stand was closer to the liberal institutionalists who accepted the key assumptions of realism, like the utility of military power, but at the same time insisted upon the utility of institutions as a framework for cooperation (Baylis, 1997:200-202). The anti-imperialist stance was a direct product of the colonial experience and the need to formulate an independent world view, while liberal internationalism drew from those who were at the core of the freedom struggle. In the Cold War years, neutralism represented India's desire to build a peaceful and prosperous society that was based on justice and equality and fostered all-round development. During the colonial period, it manifested itself in the desire to keep away from extra-regional hegemonic aspirations.

The fundamental question which India asks herself is not how to maintain security in a state of anarchy in international relations. Rather, the question is: how is peace maintained in a society of nation-states? The Indian approach, therefore, takes a global/international perspective of security, instead of a national perspective focusing on the problem of survival of the nation-state. It revolves around two fundamental principles/dimensions: one, the recognition that in any conflict situation, the roots of conflict need to be tackled; and two, conflict needs to be resolved without recourse to violence (Appadorai, 1969:111-117). The first is a long-term perspective and includes the social, political, and economic aspects of any conflict. It presumes that conflicts are the product of tensions arising from social, political, and economic issues that ultimately escalate into military and armed conflict. The latter is a more short-term view that looks at the pacific settlement of disputes.

The trend of revisionism emanates from a strong cultural tradition that called for a better world order and the innate ability of the Indian civilisation to bring about this change in society. The belief that the current world order is hegemonic and needs to change to provide welfare for the masses lead India to take a revisionist position in world affairs. This position has manifested itself in a variety of ways in terms of political policy in independent India.

A study of India's security strategy would have to focus on the following areas:

1. Military-security and strategic compulsions, looking at conventional and new security threats to India emanating from a changing strategic environment;
2. Politico-diplomatic issues;
3. Changes in science and technology the use of nuclear, space, and electronics technologies;
4. The economics of defence; and
5. Internal security, as the balance between external and internal security concerns is key to a national security policy.

The Cold War years

During the early years of Independence, India's security strategy followed two main trends: the first represented India's urge to retain newly won independence while upholding its peace policy; the second reflected the application of these principles in the context of building regional solidarity and the spread of regionalism. However, regionalism never became a fundamental concern of Asian states. Rather, interstate conflicts caused by unsettled boundaries, the existence of large groups of minorities, clashes between elites, and the onset of the Cold War in Asia with the Korean War (1950-1953) were some of the more serious obstacles.

From the Bandung Conference (1955) onwards, there was a slow shift towards a development of a neutralist policy that addressed the global concerns of the Cold War conflict, and the fundamental tenets of peace and independence were to become the foundations of the new non-aligned policy. The security dimensions of the non-aligned approach drew on these basic tenets and ensured that countries focused on the fundamentals of national interest, as defined by the notions of peace and independence, thereby structuring security strategies to achieve these goals. Such a perspective of non-alignment viewed the Cold War as the context within which definitions of interest had to be articulated (Subrahmanyam, 1988:250), ensuring the continued validity of non-alignment as a security strategy in the days of the Cold War and the period of détente. However, the post-Soviet scenario has raised new questions about this approach that need to be discussed further.

Until the India-China border war in 1962, there was very little debate on a national security strategy in India. This was mainly because of an apparent lack of expertise, and the success of Nehru's non-aligned policy. However, unlike during the Nehru phase, the post-Nehru debates appeared to focus more on power approaches to security policy. These debates were to remain within the broad parameters of international relations, except when they discussed defence matters in a technical sense or reflected on the experiences of the 1962

and 1965 wars (Rana & Subrahmanyam, 1988; Kavic, 1960; Khera; 1968; Thomas, 1978; Rao, 1970; Smith, 1994). It must be noted, however, that the focus of most of the debates remained issue-based or sectoral in nature, and rarely covered overall security policy. Rana describes the discussion on security policy in India as mainly 'debating literature' (1988:31). However, it is necessary to note some diverse perspectives on defence policy. Unlike Thomas (1978), who identifies political factors as determinants of policy, Kavic (1960) tends to include the armed forces as a strong influence on policymaking.

One can identify five distinct phases in the development of Indian strategic thinking on its security policies (see also Table 13.1). The first is the period from independence until the 1962 conflict with China, when the dominant trend was 'defence through diplomacy'. The second began with a re-armament programme and the recognition that defence through military preparedness would be necessary for national security. This phase saw the eventual crystallisation of a South Asian-centric perception of India's power status, as well as a shift towards problems of internal security. The third phase began with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and it was in this period that the overt ideological rationale of revisionism started to give way, leading to a more realist frame of reference with a willingness to strike up a security dialogue with the United States (US). The fourth phase was a continuation of the post-1991 framework that saw further application of the 'realist' posture that had come to dominate India's understanding of its national interest. This manifested in the decision to begin developing nuclear weapons capability in 1998, and the signing of the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (2008). The fifth phase also saw efforts at diversifying and expanding India's security footprint.

Indian security strategy during the Nehru years rested on his model of development, and the policy of defence through development. In essence, this approach accepted the logic of defence through diplomacy, and developed a security framework that had its roots in politico-diplomatic activities and the process of modernisation through industrial development. Thus, the key to security was seen as a long-term strategy of self-reliance through development. However, it was the 1962 war that brought about a change in these perceptions, with a direct linkage being sought between defence capability and politics. The post-1962 Reports of the Ministry of Defence reflected this change, acknowledging the need for a long-term view of defence planning to tackle tensions across the border, although the Indian commitment to peace and non-aggression was affirmed, along with the objective of building a social order by democratic means in which social, economic, and political justice would permeate all institutions of national life (Ministry of Defence, 1964:2).

The late 1960s brought about several changes. The first was that Pakistan sought to reassert itself, both by moving closer to China, and through conflict with India, first in the Rann of Kutch and later in Kashmir in 1965. The late 1960s also saw several initiatives taken by the

US and the Soviet Union that were of significance to India. Richard Nixon's 'Guam doctrine' and Henry Kissinger's 'Four Power Balance doctrine' spelt out the American position vis-à-vis India, while the Soviet Union developed the Brezhnev Plan for Collective Security in Asia, the Kosygin Plan for Economic Co-operation, and a series of treaty initiatives, one of which culminated in the Indo-Soviet treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation of 1971. While the 'Four Power Balance Doctrine' included the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan as the four powers that would be responsible for order in Asia, implicitly excluding India; the Brezhnev Plan sought to exclude China from the proposed security cooperation thus creating an impression that it sought to encircle China.

This period also saw the beginning of Soviet arms aid to India. Traditionally, India had depended on the West, particularly the United Kingdom (UK), for armaments, but this changed with the signing of the MiG deal with the Soviet Union in 1962 (Chari, 1979). The deal included provision for production, although MiGs were only delivered after the Chinese war was over. This was followed by the purchase of Petya class frigates and submarines in the mid-1960s (Thakur & Thayer, 1993), and Su-7B fighters, DT-76 and T-54 main battle tanks, and other equipment in later years (Smith, 1994). Over the years, Indian dependence on the Soviet Union grew, and it became the most important defence supplier to India.

The post-Bangladesh era (from 1971) saw a growing level of credibility about India's position in South Asia, with some serious efforts being made to develop Indian military capability, as both consolidation and modernisation of the armed forces were undertaken. India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, demonstrating its ability to produce a nuclear weapon. This was also the phase that saw India seeking to assert itself as a regional power in South Asia. The 'Indira Doctrine', as it has been called, represented a tough and uncompromising approach towards other South Asian countries (Cohen, 2001:137).

The 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was a significant year for India, and it saw a renewed US military interest in South Asia, with arms pouring into Pakistan in support of the Afghanistan Mujahedeen. The 1980s also saw a significant shift in patterns of conflict, as conventional border-type wars ceased to be major threats, and the focus shifted more to problems of internal security. Low-intensity conflicts, militancy, and insurgency emerged as key concerns of the decade, and these called for new approaches and strategies, resulting in the growth of paramilitary forces and changes in strategic doctrines. Nuclear and space science received increasing focus, and enhanced nuclear capability and the development of missile systems were the other marked features of this period.

The 1980s saw a more active security strategy being pursued by India, as it started to intervene in the Sri Lankan crisis to provide support to the Tamil minority population in the North and North Eastern regions of the country. This support eventually led to

the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka accord, which provided for the entry of Indian peacekeeping forces into the conflict zone. Along with this, India undertook a military operation in the Maldives to defeat a coup attempt in 1988, which was the first such operation that India was involved in outside of the South Asian region.

India also undertook a massive military exercise along the IndoPakistan border, 'Operation Brass-tacks', that led to a rise in bilateral tensions, as well as 'Operation Checkerboard' in the North East, to tackle covert Chinese intervention in Indian territory (Cohen, 2001:146). However, it was during the Kargil Crisis of 1999 that India was able to match its diplomacy with military strategy to ensure that Pakistan withdrew from the territory it had occupied across the Line of Control in the Kargil sector of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan's covert support to Jihadi activities across the border was exposed, and the US put pressure on Pakistan to withdraw back across the Indian border (Riedel, 2002).

In stark contrast to the importance that the Indian army has been given in the planning for defence, Indian maritime forces were given a low priority until the 1970s. Pleas for an active maritime policy, as articulated by K.M. Pannikar (1945), went unheard in a land-bound defence perspective, as India's security strategy has long been dominated by considerations of the defence of land frontiers. This is partly a product of the long history of aggression and migration along land routes, either from the North West or from the North and North Eastern regions of India. It is also a product of the equally long history of a 'secure' Indian Ocean, due to the British presence and the relatively small coastal navy of Indian rulers. Consequently, much of the work on Indian security strategy has focused on its land forces.

The unique geopolitical position of India in terms of its peninsular presence, along with its growing military capability, present an opportunity for the country to emerge as a key player in maintaining order in the Indian Ocean region. The Indian navy's first Maritime Vision was expressed in the Naval Plans Paper of 1948. Indian navy was to consist of cruisers and destroyers, structured around small aircraft carriers, with the objective of protecting India's sea lanes of communication (Ministry of Defence, 2007). Although the first conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir in 1947-48 did not see any naval activity, the rationale was one of 'territorial defence', a view that continued to dominate Indian strategic perspectives for over two decades. During the 1965 conflict, the role of the navy was restricted to the protection of trade. It was only in the 1971 conflict that the navy played a significant role, where the primary tactical success came from the use of missile attacks in the Arabian Sea.

The detonation of the Chinese nuclear device in 1964 set the Indian nuclear agenda in motion, and Indian nuclear policy in the early years revolved around two principles: the promotion of research and development for harnessing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and the attainment of self-sufficiency in the nuclear programme. Prime Minister

Shastri admitted to parliament that he was willing to consider the use of nuclear blasts for peaceful purposes (Lok Sabha, 1964), and is reported to have authorised the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to go ahead with designing a nuclear device and preparation of the non-nuclear component so that the lead-time required to build an explosive could be reduced from 18 to six months (Wholstetter, 1977:109). However, these decisions were followed by a protracted debate on the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The early years of Indira Gandhi as prime minister saw much political uncertainty in India, but it was the rejection of the NPT that confirmed the end of the uncertainty of the 1960s. By the early 1970s, the Indian nuclear agenda began to take a definitive direction.

At the Fourth Atoms for Peace Conference in September 1971, the Chairman of the Indian AEC announced that India had been working in the field of nuclear explosive engineering for peaceful purposes on a top-priority basis (Chandrashekar Rao, 1974:210). In her replies to Parliament in November 1972 and again in November 1973, Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi made it clear that the AEC was constantly reviewing the progress of underground nuclear explosion technology from both the theoretical and experimental angle. However, she denied that there was any schedule fixed for a nuclear explosion (Lok Sabha, 1972; Rajya Sabha, 1973).

It was after the nuclear implosion in 1974 that India finally developed a coherent nuclear doctrine to suit the changed circumstances. The test demonstrated that India was capable of producing a nuclear explosion, but what remained in question was its intent. At the policy level, the earlier Shastri position of peaceful use of nuclear energy with a focus on research in Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) was now further expanded, although the new approach was based on the same geopolitical constructs of national security that had governed the earlier line. However, the test did not alter India's nuclear disarmament and peace policy. In her statement to the Indian parliament, Gandhi went to great lengths to stress that the test was part of the research and development work that the AEC had been carrying out in line with the national objective of harnessing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (Lok Sabha, 1974). At the diplomatic level, the effort to create a deterrent capability threatened to translate into weapons intent, which helped India to retain the diplomatic advantage of being a non-nuclear power and continue its disarmament and peace agenda, and this deliberately ambiguous nuclear posture was to remain the basis of Indian nuclear policy for a long time.

On 11 and 13 May 1998, 24 years after having detonated its first nuclear device at Pokharan in 1974, India conducted a series of nuclear tests. Prime Minister Vajpayee announced that the tests were conducted with a fission device, a low-yield device and a thermonuclear device, adding that the measured yields were in line with the expected values (*The Times of India*, 1998). Expanding on the statement, the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister stated that the tests had established India's capability for a weaponised nuclear programme.

The dichotomy between defence and development has been a recurrent theme in debates on India's security strategy and is interrelated with the debate on arms production. One important impact of the 1962 war was the attention it generated on planning for defence. The following tasks were identified: (i) expansion and modernisation of the army; (ii) modernisation of the air force; (iii) creation of an adequate production base; (iv) improvement and expansion of the means of communication and transport; and (v) replacement of old ships so as to make the navy a balanced force (Ministry of Defence, 1964:2-3). The Defence Plan prepared in 1964 identified as its main objective the need to build up adequate defences to safeguard the country's territorial integrity (Ministry of Defence, 1968:4).

Internal security threats have become significant since the 1980s, resulting in a rise in paramilitary and related expenditures, and this was reflected in the budget allocation made for paramilitary and police in the Home Ministry budget. The Internal Security Division of the Ministry of Home Affairs deals with matters relating to internal security and law, order, including anti-national and subversive activities of various groups/extremist organisations, terrorist financing, policy and operational issues on terrorism, security clearances, monitoring of ISI activities, etc. The Annual Report 2015-16 of the Ministry includes the following as areas of concern in the context of internal security: terrorism in the hinterland of the country, cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, insurgency in the North Eastern States, and left wing extremism in certain areas (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2017:4).

Post-Soviet era

The global order began to change with the Gorbachev initiatives of Perestroika and Glasnost, and his 'New Thinking' in foreign policy was followed by the East European transformation of 1989, the Kuwait crisis and the first Iraq war, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It was in the aftermath of the Soviet Union collapse that economics and technology started to displace the military as the key determinants of power, and terrorism started to take a new form as it moved away from a state-centric phenomenon to one based on abstract religious ideology. Transnational issues, like human rights and environmentalism, started to gain ascendancy, while social networking grew as a new tool of communication.

The post-Cold War era saw four transformative events in India's strategic perspective that had far-reaching implications:

1. The economic watershed in 1991 when India launched an economic liberalisation and reform process because of its economically parlous situation;
2. The enunciation of the 'Look East' policy in 1993, followed by the 'Act East' policy in 2014, which indicated a shift from a West-Asian focus to one on the Indo-Pacific region;

3. The foreign and security policy watershed when India conducted a series of tests at Pokhran in 1998 and declared itself a nuclear weapon power; and
4. The transformation in India's world view when Indo-US relations moved from estrangement to engagement and, in the post-9/11 context, towards a mutually beneficial strategic partnership. The Indo-US nuclear deal for cooperation in civilian nuclear technology in 2005 symbolised this shift.

The Indian economic reform programme led to a sustained average annual growth of 8%, meaning that India was able to ride through the recession that hit the Western world in the early part of the 1990s decade. India emerged as an attractive 'strategic partner' to countries in the European Union (EU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the US. From a country dependent on the Aid India Consortium and food aid from the US, India today gives financial and technical assistance to a large number of developing countries, and its food self-sufficiency has made it a major interlocutor on issues of food security. Economic diplomacy has now emerged as an important tool in the Indian armoury vis-à-vis both the developed and the developing world, while a stable and growing economy at home enabled India to play an active role in global negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO), BRICS and G-20 meetings.

India's Look East Policy evolved during the early 1990s, primarily in the areas of economics and trade, and was targeted towards Southeast and East Asia (Ministry of External Affairs, 2007:ii, v). The Indian economic reform process generated a new-found confidence that encouraged the growth of India's economic engagement with East Asia, and India became a Sectoral Dialogue Partner (1992) and then a Full Dialogue Partner of ASEAN (1995). In 1996, India joined the ASEAN Regional Forum.

Parallel to its ASEAN linkages, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) was created in 1997 to include countries in South and Southeast Asia. The aim was to create an enabling environment for rapid economic development, accelerate social progress in the subregion, and promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest. In 2014, India went a step further to shift from a Look East to an Act East policy, and India's relationship with ASEAN was the foundation of this. The policy, which was originally conceived as an economic initiative, has gained political, strategic and cultural dimensions, including establishment of institutional mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation (Ministry of External Affairs, 2017).

The NPT regime, with its multifarious components such as the Nuclear Suppliers group, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), amongst others, had sought to place the P-5 (the five nuclear powers – China, Russia, the US,

the UK, and France) in a monopolistic managerial framework. This caused tension with other countries, which was compounded by the restraints placed on dual use technologies. The first symbolic defiance of this restraint came in the form of the 1974 nuclear test at Pokhran. The 1974 test had a limited agenda, an act of revisionist defiance highlighting the technological competence of a Third World country. However, the May 1998 nuclear tests represented this defiance at a time when the nuclear regime had become more stringent. It is against the backdrop of this nuclear non-proliferation and technology-denial regime that one must assess the India-US Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement signed in 2008.

India has argued that it is a responsible nuclear weapon state, conscious of its obligations to the international community on the control of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). India also reiterated its commitment to global nuclear disarmament and argued that it has always been critical of clandestine activities with respect to WMDs, seeking to be a partner and not a target for the global nuclear disarmament (Saran, 2005). The passing of this deal through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), as well as acceptance by the US Congress, symbolise the success of India in breaking through the denial regime and gaining legitimacy for its stand as a nuclear-capable power. Today, India has become a member of the Wassenaar Agreement and the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime and is seeking to join the NSG. These efforts would help to strengthen India's position as a member of the international community and enhance its credibility as a supplier of military products (Grevatt, 2018).

The Draft outline of the Indian Nuclear Doctrine, released on 17 August 1999, argued for autonomy in decision-making about security for India (National Security Advisory Board, 1999). The key features of the nuclear doctrine, as announced by the Cabinet Committee on Security, are (Basrur, 2006):

- i. Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent;
- ii. A policy of 'No First Use', where nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere;
- iii. Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage;
- iv. Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority;
- v. Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states;
- vi. In the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons;

- vii. A continuance of strict controls on export of nuclear and missile related materials and technologies, participation in the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations, and continued observance of the moratorium on nuclear tests;
- viii. Continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament.

The elaborate nuclear decision-making apparatus formalised by the government revolved around the National Security Council, as well as a nuclear command and control system and the National Command Authority. The Strategic Forces Command was established to control, deploy and use nuclear weapons, to structure strategic nuclear forces, and to plan for nuclear operations and nuclear contingencies. The Strategic Policy group in the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) was set up to liaise with the government and the military and contribute to overall policy and plans. The Strategic Forces Command drew up a strategic targeting list, identified appropriate sites for storing nuclear cores and weapons systems and the emplacement of vectors, and worked on nuclear weapon use plans to respond to certain scenarios.

Bharat Karnad concludes that India's nuclear policy has given up the baggage of self-abnegation and denial, in that the Indian nuclear deterrent is finding its strategic bearings, while Strategic Forces Command finds its feet and the conventional military establishment outlines a role for nuclear weapons as a shield against limited conventional wars (2008:97-106). The changes in the Indian position could lead one to question whether India has moved away from its 'revisionist' position to one more aligned with the status quo.

The Defence Production Policy announced by the Ministry of Defence in January 2011 reiterated the vision of self-sufficiency (Ministry of Defence, 2011). Initially, the defence manufacturing sector was reserved for the public sector only but in 2011, the Central Government opened it to participation by the private sector, too. The government also planned to involve academia, research and development institutions, and technical and scientific organisations to achieve self-sufficiency. The government announced increases in defence exports and industry licences, promoted defence partnerships, introduced a defence innovation fund for the promotion of indigenous technologies, and introduced a technology-funding scheme for the private sector (Grevatt, 2017a, b, c).

However, it has been pointed out that financial constraints, bureaucratic delays and internal organisational shortcomings have delayed the modernisation of the armed forces in India, and these problems extend to limitations of the Defence Research and Development Organization and the Ordnance Factories to deliver the necessary services (Bedi, 2018). A Committee of Experts (CoE) was constituted by the Ministry of Defence to recommend measures to enhance combat capability and rebalance the defence expenditure of the armed forces. The committee submitted its report in December 2016, and the government

informed parliament that the report was taken up by the Ministry of Defence to frame key action points and establish a roadmap for implementation (Ministry of Defence, 2018a).

In the Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap 2018, Defence Ministry seeks to guide the private sector industry in planning or initiating technology development, partnerships and production arrangements, with an emphasis on 'Made in India' (Ministry of Defence, 2018b).

The Indian navy's Maritime Strategy today speaks of the need to project power as a means of supporting foreign policy objectives (Ministry of Defence, 2007). The areas of primary interest that have been identified as needing attention include: (a) The Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, which largely encompass India's Exclusive Economic Zone, Island Territories, and their littoral reaches; (b) The choke points leading to and from the Indian Ocean, i.e. the Strait of Malacca, Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, and the Cape of Good Hope; (c) the island countries; (d) the Persian Gulf as a source of oil supply; and (e) principal international sea lanes that cross the Indian Ocean Region. The secondary areas of interest include: (a) The Southern Indian Ocean Region; (b) The Red Sea; (c) The South China Sea; and (d) The East Pacific Region. The likely scenarios in a use of military force by the Indian Navy have been outlined in the Indian Maritime Doctrine as follows (Ministry of Defence, 2007):

1. Conflict with a state in our immediate neighbourhood, or clash of interest with an extra-regional power;
2. Operations in the extended and or strategic neighbourhood in response to a request for assistance from a friendly nation;
3. Anti-terrorist operations conducted multilaterally or unilaterally;
4. Actions to fulfil international bilateral strategic partnership obligations;
5. Ensure good order at sea, which includes Low Intensity Maritime Operations (LIMO) to combat asymmetric warfare, poaching, piracy, and trafficking in arms/drugs;
6. Ensuring safety and security of International Sea Lanes through the Indian Ocean;
7. Actions to assist the Indian Diaspora and Indian interests abroad; and
8. Peacekeeping operations under the aegis of the United Nations, independently or as part of a multinational force.

South Asia is central to Indian strategic thinking. The 1970s saw a distinct stress on India's role as a regional power in the South Asian region, and the implicit aspect of a hegemonic position was sought to be softened by subsequent governments. The Janata Party government suggested 'mutually-beneficial bilateralism', while the Gujral doctrine talked of non-reciprocity with small powers, non-intervention, and peaceful bilateral negotiations for resolution of disputes (Gujral, 1997).

India has long maintained that it plays a key role in any consideration on the issue of peace, stability, order and security in the South Asian regional state system, which has recently seen a re-emergence of traditional sources of conflict along with non-traditional threats. Some of the traditional issues that South Asia is confronted with include the spill-over of the Afghan conflict, imperfect borders with China and Pakistan that have seen border skirmishes and tensions, growing competition in the Indian Ocean area, and a re-assertive China with its initiation of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor and the One Belt One Road proposal.

Along with this, the changing nature of terrorism is now visible in its impact on South Asia. Earlier forms of terrorism were state-centric in that the agenda of the terrorist was located in a particular people in a particular geopolitical region, but the terrorism that is taking shape in the post-9/11 era is not located in any state-centric formulation. It is a clash of ideas, often religious, which the terrorists fight through the use of force or violence if necessary. The tensions with Pakistan have the added dimension of terrorism from non-state actors.

In October 2000, President Putin visited India and the countries signed the Declaration of Strategic Partnership (2000), which declared that relations would be 'based on mutual understanding and long-term confidence in each other, this envisages the elevation of their multifaceted ties to an even higher and qualitatively new level'. The strategic partnership entailed cooperation in the following areas: Political, Trade and Economic, Defence, Science and Technology, and Culture. The provision in the first agreement of regular summit-level meetings between the two countries has helped to continue the mutual dialogue. Military-technical cooperation between the two countries includes joint research, development, and the production of advanced defence technologies and systems, such as the development of the BrahMos Missile System, and the production of SU-30 aircraft and T-90 tanks in India. The two countries also hold annual training exercises between their armed forces (Embassy of India in Moscow, 2018).

The post-Cold War years have altered the security considerations between India and the US. There had already been a serious effort to evolve a strategic dialogue with the US, with the first attempt to structure approaches to defence cooperation between the two countries was made in the 1990s by reciprocal exchange of information and personnel under what became known as the Kicklighter Proposals (Kumar, 1997:783). In 1995, the two countries signed the Agreed Minute on Defence Cooperation, covering service-to-service and civilian-to-civilian cooperation, as well as cooperation in defence production and research (Sboto, 2008). However, the Indian nuclear tests of 1998 broke the early momentum of the bilateral relationship and were followed by a prolonged dialogue between the Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh and the American Under Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, seeking to re-establish the broken links between the two countries.

From an Indian perspective, it was an attempt to get the US to understand the Indian decision to strive for nuclear weapons capability, but it was only after September 2001 that Indo-US security ties gained real momentum, as both countries came to acknowledge a desire for greater bilateral interaction on security issues. The Defence Policy Group was revived, and the new key word was 'inter-operability' (Embassy of the United States of America, 2005). It signified the mutual desire of the countries to work more closely in the area of military cooperation, and highlighted the possibility of sharing strategic doctrines and operations in the future to tackle new challenges.

Bilateral interactions continued to gather momentum through the early 2000s. In January 2004, the two countries agreed to expand their cooperation in three specific areas: civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programmes, and high-technology trade, as well as expand their dialogue on missile defence. These areas of cooperation were designed to progress through a series of reciprocal steps that built on each other and were the first phase of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership between the US and India (NSSP) (Embassy of India, 2008). In July 2005, the US State Department announced the successful completion of the NSSP, providing for expanded bilateral commercial satellite cooperation and removal or revision of some US export licenses for certain dual-use technologies (Embassy of India, 2008).

This Joint Statement, along with the June 2005 US India Defence Framework Agreement, constituted a step forward on all four issues of the NSSP. It was also the first step towards a far more ambitious agreement on Civilian Nuclear Cooperation that came to be signed in July 2005 eventually put into place in 2008. In 2009, President Obama reaffirmed the global strategic partnership between India and the US (Embassy of India, 2010), while Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the Indian External Affairs Minister established a 'Strategic Dialogue' during Clinton's visit to India in July 2009 (Embassy of India, 2010). The countries also signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement under which the militaries of India and the US share each other's military assets and facilities for repair, maintenance and supplies (Annual Defence Report, 2016).

Over the past few years, the present government of Narendra Modi has sought to expand security cooperation with other countries, including through reaffirming its close relations with the US and Russia, and efforts to build a dialogue with China. Other such efforts include the inter-governmental agreement with France for Dassault Rafale fighters, defence collaboration with Japan with terms of purchase and production in India, co-development of defence products with Israel, and participation in aerospace operational and naval exercises with Australia. Indian efforts at expanding its security footprint began with the establishment of the Fakhor Air Base in Tajikistan, and it now plans to build its first naval base in the Indian Ocean region as a joint project with the Seychelles government on Assumption Island (*The Hindu*, 2016).

Along with this, in 2018 Prime Minister Modi took several concrete security steps in Southeast Asia. These included an agreement with Indonesia to develop a port in the city of Sabang that would overlook the western entrance to the Strait of Malacca; a pact with Singapore on logistical support for naval ships, submarines and military aircraft during visits; a visit to Malaysia; and a promise to ASEAN to promote a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region (*The New Indian Express*, 2018).

TABLE 13.1 Survey of security perceptions and strategies

Year	Security perceptions	Security strategies and the context of power
1947-1962	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conventional threat from neighbours. Focus is on Pakistan. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Defence through diplomacy. Strategy evolved as an alternative to the bipolar military options of the Cold War. Regionalism is key outlook (Asian and Afro-Asian). The context of power is primarily military. Revisionist agenda.
1962-1972	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conventional threat manifests itself. Focus is on Pakistan and China. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Limits of diplomacy exposed in 1962. Development of military capability is accepted as the means of achieving national security. Bilateralism in the context of South Asia emerges as the key focus. The context of power is primarily military and economic. Revisionist agenda continues.
1972-1991	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conventional threat continues. Internal security problems start to manifest in the latter period in the context of low-intensity conflict and insurgency (Kashmir). 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Military capability continues to be the focus. Defence through a politico-military strategy. Dual use technology emerges as important factor. India evolves a South Asia-centric approach. Considers itself a regional power. The context of power is mainly economic and technological capabilities. Revisionist agenda continues.
1991-1998	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Threats now more global. Issues like economic and trade, technology start to be raised. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> The economic liberalisation (1991) and nuclear tests (1998) are watersheds. Economic and political stability, technological growth in face of sanctions makes India demand space in the decision-making circles of the world. Defence through an Economic technological – military strategy. Global world view, not South Asia centric. Look East policy. Technology is seen as main source of power. Moving away from revisionism?
1998 to date	Focus on threats in areas of technology and trade; growing concern about assertive China	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Indian nuclear test of 1998. Indo-US Nuclear Deal. Act East Policy. Use of public diplomacy. Stress on defence modernisation along with indigenous production. Moving away from revisionism?

SOURCE: Prepared by the author

Security strategy

Rodney Jones labels Indian strategic culture as 'omniscient patrician', arguing that philosophical and mythological factors form the foundation of this culture (Jones, 2006). He identifies the origins of Indian-ness that give mythological and metaphysical significance to the subcontinent as a territorial expression, and argues that the Indian thought process is ahistorical and generally resists being event-driven or trapped in deadlines, such that India is perceived as an ageless civilisation having a natural claim to greatness. Writings on India's foreign and security policy have traditionally sought to locate history and culture as a key component to an unwritten ethos, such as the *Mahabharata* and the *Bhagwat Gita*, which present a picture of the necessity of the use of force and at the same time the need for peace. The primary duty of the government was to enforce social order, and its coercive authority was recognised as it alone made life, property, morality or virtue possible (Prasad, 1968; Appadorai, 1992). If the fundamental task of any strategy is the efficient use of the available means to accomplish policy goals, then any debate on India's security strategy would have to balance its available soft- and hard-power resources. It is these aspects that enable one to understand the Indian reluctance to spell out a concrete strategic doctrine, retaining a deliberate ambiguity about national security strategy.

The first aspect relates to the geopolitical context that impinges on India's strategic mindset. The second is the contrast between the identity of India as it has been presented through the ages, versus the historical realities. The second flows from the first in that it focuses on the conceptual debate about the legitimacy of the use of force in international relations. In the context of nuclear weapons capability, this has a direct bearing on the position on minimal nuclear deterrence in a nuclear doctrine that also asserts the need for global nuclear disarmament. The debate regarding India being a revisionist power as opposed to one supporting the status quo is also a part of this debate on security strategy.

The geopolitics of South Asia resulted in the military orientation of ancient Indian civilisations being more defensive and non-expansionist in nature. India battled several incursions from the North West frontier areas, yet the strategic perspectives of Indian rulers in the subcontinent remained defensive. One important reason was the natural geopolitical isolation of the subcontinent. The Indian subcontinent lies along the southern fringe of the Eurasian landmass and is virtually cut off from the rest of the world by the Himalayas, which constitute a formidable northern boundary against the Tibetan plateau. Towards the western end lie the Karakoram and the Hindukush ranges that, along with the Sulaiman and the Kirthar ranges, eventually meet the sea. The traditional passes to enter the subcontinent were through the Hindukush along the Kabul valley into the northern part of the Indus valley, or from central Afghanistan into western Punjab. In the east, the southern Himalayas eventually branch off to become Naga Hills and the Manipur plateau, and various hill lines follow south demarcating the border with Myanmar. There have

been very few invasions from the east. It is noteworthy that none of the Indian empires, including those of Ashoka, the Mughals or the Marathas (Peshwa), whether indigenous or created by outsiders, expanded beyond these geopolitical boundaries.

Indian identity in terms of its strategic perceptions were spelt out in the initial years of independence, focusing around the concepts of independence and peace. The former had an external dimension of 'staying away from politics of groups aligned against one another' (Nehru, 1971:2) and an internal dimension of self-reliance. The source of the peace tradition was the assimilative cultural tradition and came to be articulated as an approach seeking conflict resolution. This is a product of India's history and culture spanning over several centuries, and it is this image that clashes with the question of whether the use of force is legitimate.

The debates in India about its strategic policy are state-centric, maintaining a belief that the post-Soviet era has not altered the hierarchal structure of the world order. These debates therefore tend to be located around the following issues: The first debate has a politico-military frame of reference. Given the tradition of peace that was central to India's world view, the newly independent country had to address the issue of military power in its strategic perspectives. Referring to the influence of Gandhi on what Nehru called a Cold War mentality, Nehru spelt out his views on the utility of force in terms of state policy (Singh, 1994). He understood the need of a country to maintain its military strength to avoid or conduct a war if necessary. However, there is always a need for keeping the option for compromise open, not necessarily on fundamentals but on areas where dialogue is possible. It was therefore necessary to make a distinction between appeasement and weakness. Nehru did not expect a person to be a pacifist, arguing that each one must maintain his strength, but also asked, 'why shout it out? Why talk about it? Why threaten the other at all the time' (Mende, 1958:126).

India has since moved away from the Nehruvian position of underplaying the use of force. The first time that India gave any indication that it was willing to seek options other than those within the peace approach was in 1971, when prime minister Indira Gandhi talked of 'other solutions to this problem' in response to Pakistan's actions in East Pakistan and the resultant influx of almost 10 million refugees into India (Kak, 2012:91). Today, there is a willingness to accept the utility of force as an option, even if done with restraint. India had also conducted a putative strike against Pakistan, shelling Pakistani installations across the Line of Control in Kashmir after the terrorist strike on the Jammu and Kashmir State Legislature in 2001 (Ladwig, 2010:1168).

In 2015, India conducted surgical strikes against terrorist camps along the Indo-Myanmar border, and in 2016, against terrorist launch pads in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (Indiatimes, 2015; MEA & MoD, 2016). The Defence Minister stated that the armed forces

in Kashmir had been given full authority to conduct operations against Pakistan's attempts to abet cross-border terrorism, as well as dealing with militancy in the Valley. He added that in war-like zones, military solutions were to be provided by military officers, not through the comments of politicians (In the case of China, the Doklam crisis that erupted in 2017, where the Chinese attempted to reshape the boundary and the security matrix with India at the India-China-Bhutan trijunction, was resolved to Indian satisfaction. India was able to achieve three tasks: hold the Chinese road-building efforts and prepare for a military retaliation by China; maintain Bhutan's interests and territorial integrity; and brave the inevitable Chinese pressure (Bagchi, 2017).

Revisionism has been a dominant theme in the Indian approach to international issues. The debate on revisionism has for a long time centred on the hegemonic status quo dominance that was the feature of the hierarchal world order. However, during the 70s, there was a subtle shift in the revisionist posture. India's own emergence as a hegemonic power in South Asia led it to take a different perspective towards South Asia on the one hand, and towards the world at large. The Indian position in the region came to be viewed in terms of its role in the regional state system of South Asia as a hegemonic power, and hence a power that had to take on the responsibility of maintaining peace and order in the region.

The traditional anti-status quo posture that India had espoused through the Cold War years has undergone a change, and the challenges that were posed to the nuclear club through the 1974 test had become obsolete by 1998. While India may continue to argue in favour of its role in global decision-making circles through a demonstration of its technological capability via the nuclear and space route, thus seeking a 'revisionist' position, the crossing of the nuclear threshold has blunted India's demands. This is especially so because of the ambiguity in the Indian position about the nuclear status of Pakistan and Iran, as India refuses to grant the same revisionist logic to either of these countries. Similarly, the rhetoric of the New International Economic Order of the 70s now has to confront Indian economic diplomacy at the WTO, BRICS and the G-20 forums, where India is emerging as one of the key actors. Thus, the dilemma is whether revisionism, as one of the key ingredients of an Indian world view, is more rhetoric than a critical component of policy.

India appears to have quietly abandoned the classical form of non-alignment that put it in the bracket of the Afro-Asian developing world. Today, while India may still identify itself as a Third World developing country, it considers itself a prominent actor seeking to lead the region in the global economic and other forums, and the limitations of revisionism are being recognised. The old ideological rhetoric of non-alignment has come to be replaced with a far more realist world view that seeks to remove the ideological blinkers. The exploration into the possibility of a strategic partnership with the US, France, Japan and Australia is a product of this new-found realism in foreign policy.

India's new security strategy, with a geopolitical focus on India's strategic concerns, can be spelt out as follows.

Basic principles

At the domestic level, there is an emphasis on the Indian success at establishing a pluralist representative system of governance based on the framework of unity in diversity. Meanwhile, At the international level, the focus is on India's principled commitment to peace policy and independent understanding of world affairs. India asserts its commitment to national security, and hence the legitimacy of the use of force and need for nuclear weapons capability, and at the same time reiterates its commitment to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and pursuit of global nuclear disarmament. In this context, there is an emphasis on developing a peaceful uses programme in the nuclear area, and the use of advance technology for peaceful (developmental) purposes. This is especially applicable to technologies relating to nuclear, space, and electronics, which are dual use technologies.

Regional level

The utility of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan remains unclear. In the short term, one would have to make a distinction between security considerations, which include border conflicts and internal security, and nuclear strategies. Conceivably, one can argue for a 'no first use' agreement and to not attack one another's nuclear installations. India can also argue that the critical Indian security concerns stem from China, not Pakistan. Here, Indian nuclear preparedness gains a different meaning, as the country can use its nuclear capability to strike up a new level of dialogue with China on politico-security issues. The Indian army ended their 71-day August to September 2017 stand-off over a Chinese road-building project in Doklam, and it is likely that this was possible because the PLA simply lacked the military ability to push the Indians out. Chinese resolve to 'take all measures to uphold its territorial integrity' is likely to be a product of this stalemate, but Doklam also provided a clear template for other countries to use in the face of incessant small-scale land grabbing (Joshi, 2017).

Global level

India faces a hard choice at the global level. International interaction has moved away from traditional methodologies of formal or informal negotiation to tacit bargaining (Agrawal, 1996:46), in which one state attempts to influence the policy decisions of the other through 'countervailing actions', rather than negotiation. These actions consist of threats, postures, deliberate delays, and building allies both within and outside of the countries. Tacit bargaining is likely to work on economic and technology transfer issues in the context of India, as the issue of modern technologies is a central security concern today. Here, the bargain may hinge on the degree to which the nuclear weapon powers

accept India's emergent status. Advanced technologies of the day may continue to be under denial regimes or be so costly as to make them unaffordable, while other technologies may either be of no real use or be created indigenously. It is here that Indian reluctance to present a clear-cut statement of its strategic doctrine has its utility, as it would give India the space to negotiate and take care of its national interests.

Notes

- 1 Directive Principles of India's Constitution, Art. 51 of the Indian Constitution, calls for the promotion of international peace and security, maintaining just and honourable relations between nations, fostering respect for international law and treaty obligations, etc.
- 2 Ashoka's conversion to Buddhism and his preference for cooperative practices in relations with other states is the core of India's Panchsheel philosophy. Ashoka's Empire lasted from 273 to 232 BCE. Two concepts of Akbar (Mughal Empire [Akbar] 1556-1605) need to be mentioned: Deen-e-Ilahi (Divine Faith) and Suleh Kul (Peace to All). The former was an attempt to create a new religious world view that attempted a synthesis of the then contemporary religions; the latter became a policy that sought to integrate the Hindu society in governance.

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