The Trajectory of the Discourse of Jihad in Indonesia

The term jihad is central in the development of Islamic identity and the political USAge. The term has created many competing identities within Muslim communities especially in Indonesia, a country with the biggest Muslim population in the world. This article provides a historical analysis of the representation of the term jihad in the writing of Muslim scholars and organizations in Indonesia from the early arrival of Islam to the contemporary debate in the context of democratic transition after the collapse of Soeharto's authoritarian regime. This article employs discourse analytical tools to look at various interpretations of the concept of jihad in the global context and particularly in the Indonesian context, and how these global and local interpretations are interconnected. The article argues that the doctrine of jihad in the history of Islam has developed into a contested doctrine over a long period of time. The article suggests that there is a long history of substantial minorities promoting militaristic jihad in Indonesia against ‘enemies' of Islam which are defined variously from colonial state to the Indonesian government. The promotion of militaristic jihad was undermined by the consensus of mainstream moderate and peaceful Islam developed in the middle to late years of the New Order regime. However, the promotion of militaristic jihad reappeared after the fall of the New Order authoritarian regime and was further reinforced by transnational influences.


INTRODUCTION
This article looks at various interpretations of jihad, globally and in Indonesia, in the historical context from the early arrival of Islam in Indonesia until the first decade of the 21 st century. The discussion is focused on the question of how the global discourse of jihad has developed historically and the implications of this development in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The polarized discourse of jihad is chosen in this research because the term is central in the development of Islamic identity over many centuries. The WHUP LV FRPPRQO\ WUDQVODWHG DV µWR VWULYH ¶ RU µWR VWUXJJOH ¶ EXW WKHQ LQWHUSUHWHG GLIIHUHQWO\ by Muslim scholars. According to Cook (2005: 1-µWKH WHUP ¶V FRPSOH[LW\ LV QRW surprising given the centrality of the concept of jihad for Islam and the length of time² fourteen centuries² that Muslims have had WR ZRUN ZLWK LW ¶ )XUWKHUPRUH WKH SROLWLFDO usage of the term has created many competing identities within Islamic communities especially in Indonesia, a country with the biggest Muslim population in the world. On one hand, the term jihad has been used by violent extremist groups to justify their actions, on the other hand, many so-called moderate Muslim groups have actively promoted the concept of contextual and non-violent jihad to counter the extremist discourse. Therefore, the study of the construction of Indonesian Islamic identity through the discourse of jihad is an important step to understand the position of Muslim groups in Indonesia in countering radicalization. This study complements previous studies which mainly focused on a specific time frame. Ahmad (2006) discusses the concept of Prang Sabi in Aceh, Anwar (2011) explores the idea of jihad in the book Babad Diponegoro and Solahudin (2011) investigates the idea of jihad during the transformation from Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah.
The article specifically discusses how this trajectory has influenced the Indonesian interpretations of the doctrine of jihad. I start the article by outlining interpretations RI WKH 4XU ¶DQLF PHDQLQJ RI jihad, then reviewing several works on the politicization of jihad in the global context, followed by investigating the historical trajectory of the discourse of jihad in Indonesia. The article argues that (a) the meaning of jihad in the history of Islam is highly contested depending on the surrounding social and political context and (b) the contemporary Indonesian discourse of jihad is not autonomous, but rather that it is best understood in the global contest over the meaning of jihad.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This study draws on the basic assumption from the constructivist approach of identity formation that identity is constructed and contested. The construction and contestation of identities operates through the process of making meaning DURXQG µD FXOWXUDO DWWULEXWH RU D UHODWHG VHW RI cultural attributes, that is given priority over other sources RI PHDQLQJ ¶ &DVWHOOV 6). From a constructivist point of view, the media plays a significant role in the construction and the contestation of identities. As Woodward (1997: 14) argues µWKH PHGLD FDQ EH VHHQ DV SURYLGLQJ XV ZLWK the information which tells us what it feels like to occupy a particular subject-SRVLWLRQ ¶ 7KH WHUP µPHGLD ¶ KHUH UHIHUV WR DQ\ instrument that is capable of communicating information, facts, opinion and ideas which can reach a wider audience than interpersonal communication. It includes a wide variety of platforms such as, but not limited to, newspapers, magazines, books, television, radio, videocassettes, DVDs, video games, cinema and the internet (Errington and Miragliotta, 2007). More practically, these media have been extensively used intentionally or unintentionally in the articulation and the reproduction of competing identities producing domination, conflict, competition, resistance and opposition (van Dijk, 1998).

RESEARCH METHOD
This article employs discourse analysis as the research method. The socio-cognitive approach of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) developed by Teun van Dijk (2001) is utilized in this research. This approach focuses on the role of socio-cognitive structures in mediating texts and society, and the complexities of the relationship between discourse structures and social structures. Several elements of discourse are analyzed including semantic macrostructures and schematic structures of the text (topics, propositional structures), local meaning (choice of vocabulary, specific arguments), context and event models (the context and facts represented in the text) and the relationship between the text and its broader social context. Various articles and books on jihad from prominent international and Indonesian authors are explored and analyzed in this research. The article combines both primary data and secondary data to provide a chronological account on how the doctrine of jihad is interpreted by Muslim groups in Indonesia in many different social and political contexts.

The Meaning of Jihad LQ WKH 4XU ¶DQ
Jihad is an important part of Islamic teaching. The word jihad is derived from the Arabic word jahada which literally means to struggle, to strive or to put effort into achieving an objective and it does not have any direct relationship to war or violence (M.H. Hassan, 2006). According to Al-Qaradhawi (2011: 29), the word jihad (noun) and its derivative forms are mentioned 34 WLPHV LQ WKH 4XU ¶DQ DQG WKH ZRUGV Dre derived from the singular verb jahada. According to Lane (1863: 473)

Mohammed Habib Shakir
Those who believed and fled (their homes), and strove hardly LQ $OODK ¶V ZD\ ZLWK their property and their souls, are much higher in rank before Allah; and those are they who are the achievers (of their objects).
Source: http://www.alquran-english.com/9-attaubah/ There is no connection found, in the aforementioned verse, between the word jahadu as the verb form of the noun jihad (translated in the texts above as strive, striven or strove hardly) and war or violent action. Further, the verse mentioned above indicates two different types of jihad; namely jihad through the use of wealth and jihad through the use of life force. The description of jihad in more general meaning as the use RI RQH ¶V XWPRVW SRZHU LQ DQ\ endeavor is also supported by the history or the revelation of WKH 4XU ¶Dn. 1 According to Al-Qaradhawi VRPH RI WKH YHUVHV LQ WKH 4XU ¶DQ which mention jihad were revealed during the peaceful period in Mecca several years before the prophet Muhammad migrated to Medina and started to wage the war against non-believers (Al-Qaradhawi, 2011). This historical analysis supports the opinion that jihad meant struggle before it became associated with war or violence (Romli and Sjadzili, 2004).
In the Islamic scholarship, the doctrine of jihad can be implemented in many forms of actions. Ar-Raghib Al-Ashfahani (died 1108/1109), an early twelfth century classic Islamic scholar, classified three different forms of jihad, namely the struggle to fight against enemies, the struggle to fight against the devil and the struggle to fight against inappropriate desire. Another Islamic scholar, Ibnul Qayyim (1292-1350), classified the application of jihad into thirteen stages which includes different types of struggle such as the struggle against lust and devils, the struggle against destruction, wrongdoing and hypocrisy, the struggle in Islamic preaching and also physical struggle with weapons (Al-Qaradhawi, 2011). In addition, Moniruzzaman argues that: ³The main objective of Islam is to eradicate anti-social elements that are harmful to human society. Such elements could be of various natures such as political oppression or injustice, economic exploitation, moral decadence, social crimes, administrative discrimination and corruption, environmental degradation and threats, and military brutality and oppression. Islam uses the concept of jihad as a value-EDVHG ³XOWLPDWH HIIRUW´ WKH OLWHUDO meaning of jihad) to eliminate these harmful elements in order to make human society safer and more peaceful. Jihad provides moral sanction to fight against anything unjust and threatening for human society. This is the fundamental philosophical objective of the concept of jihad. However, during the early period of Islamic expansion (622-750 CE), the term gained extensive legitimacy in military use, which remains prevalent until today´ (Moniruzzaman, 2008: 2).
These various historical and etymological interpretations of jihad indicate that its contemporary use referring to religious violence and war reflects a partial reinterpretation of the meaning of jihad.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION Various Interpretations of Jihad in the Global Context
In the history of Islam, the interpretation of the Arabic word jihad has been politicized by many states and Muslim communities for a variety of reasons. Esposito supports the opinion that the interpretation of jihad is highly politicized, he argues: ³The doctrine of jihad is not the product of a single authoritative

LQGLYLGXDO
RU RUJDQL]DWLRQ ¶V interpretation. It is rather the product of diverse individuals and authorities interpreting and applying the principles of sacred texts in the specific historical and political contexts. (Esposito, 2002: 64) $OWKRXJK WKH 4XU ¶DQLF RULJLQV RI WKH term jihad are not specifically related to war, classical Islamic legal texts developed by Muslim jurists in the post-prophetic period (especially in the seventh and eight centuries) played an important role in the association of the term jihad with war (Saeed, 2002). Saeed further argues that the µFODVVLFDO GRFWULQH RI jihad thus became closely associated with the Islamic doctrine RI ZDU DQG SHDFH ¶ ZKLFK LV µODUJHO\ HTXLYDOent to the modern doctrine of defense of the KRPHODQG ¶ 6DHHG ,Q DGGLWLRQ jihad was also used for many reasons including the justification of early Arab conquests of non-Muslim lands and also the MXVWLILFDWLRQ RI 0XVOLPV ¶ VWUXJJOH DJDLQVW colonialism and communism in many parts of the world (R. Hassan, 2006).
More systematically, R. Hassan (2008) classifies the articulation of the term jihad as an armed struggle into several stages from the formative stage of jihad to the jihad in the contemporary Muslim world. He argues that in the formative stage (7 th century), the doctrine of jihad was constructed as an LQGLYLGXDO ¶V GXW\ WR HVWDEOLVK DQ ,VODPLF identity, while in the empire stage (8 th -16 th centuries), it was employed to motivate and to mobilize Muslim communities to establish Islamic hegemony. During the colonization of Muslim countries (18 th -20 th centuries), the doctrine of jihad was mainly used as an ideology of resistance against the colonialists. Furthermore, in the post-colonial and during the cold war and decolonization period (mid to late 20 th century), this doctrine was used to mobilize many different actions including the struggle for Islamic states in many parts of the world and the fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The uses of jihad since the post-cold war period (1990 to the present) in the context of military and political struggles have become even more diverse, and it includes describing the struggle for Islamic states, offensive jihad against the west/US and current martyrdom operations in several predominantly Muslim countries (R. Hassan, 2008). The continuous use of the doctrine of jihad to justify armed struggle in the post-cold war period is mainly promoted by the contemporary global and transnational salafi jihadi group, an armed movement which started in Afghanistan during the fight against the Soviet Union and has since developed in many parts of the world.
During the colonial period, many Muslim scholars started to restrict the use of jihad as a militaristic struggle. According to them, jihad as an armed struggle could only be undertaken to liberate Muslims from religious oppression (Peters, 1979). Peters further argues that this restricted interpretation in the colonial period was first introduced in India in the 1870s by the leaders who wanted to contain the conflict between Indian Muslims and the British colonialists. A prominent representative of Indian Muslims during this period, Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898, promoted this interpretation: ³By restricting the scope of jihadobligation to wars for religious reasons, i.e. armed struggle in order to defend Moslems (sic) against religious oppression, and excluding from it wars for temporal reasons like e.g. (sic) wars for territorial conquest or armed resistance against civil oppression´ (Peters, 1979: 160).
An Indian Muslim scholar, Maulana Wahiduddin Khan, (born 1925) argues that WKH µDUPHG VWUXJJOH ¶ SHUVSHFWLYH RI jihad was historically used to defend the freedom of belief and worship. Khan (as cited in Omar, 2008) specifically argues that in the situation when Muslims are free to practice WKHLU UHOLJLRQ WKHUH LV QR 4XU ¶DQLF justification for the use of violence or waging a war to defend this freedom. More recently, this pacifist interpretation of jihad is also found in a textbook of the Al-Azhar University Cairo published in 1984, written by a later sheikh Jadul Haq Ali Jadulhaq . He wrote: ³In earlier ages the sword was necessary for securing the path of the GD ¶ZD [propagation]. In our age, however, the sword has lost its importance, although the resort to it is still important for the case of defense against those who wish to do evil to Islam and its people. However, for the dissemination of the GD ¶ZD, there are now a variety oI ZD\V«7KRVH ZKR IRFXV on arms in our times are preoccupied with weak instruments´ (Jadulhaq as cited in Tibi, 2007: 57).
Many other Muslims believe that jihad as an internal struggle is more important than armed struggle. This perspective is mainly promoted by the ascetic movement in Islam which started in the first half of the ninth century (Cook, 2005). The promoters of this perspective usually refer to a popular hadith (prophetic tradition) which distinguishes the greater jihad (spiritual struggle) and the smaller jihad (physical struggle). However, the justification for the distinction between the greater and the smaller jihad is weak because the quoted hadith is not included in one of the authoritative compilations of the prophetic traditions (Peters, 1979).
There has been no empirical research conducted into the number of Muslims, or the particular Islamic schools that hold each different perspective of the concept of jihad. Several studies, however, have done comparative research on this issue. Sofjan (2006) conducted a survey about the attitude towards armed jihad in Indonesia and Iran in the early 2000s. The research shows that 46.7% of the Muslim respondents in Indonesia stated their willingness to participate in armed jihad and 61.2% of the Muslim respondents in Iran said yes when they were asked about the willingness to participate in armed jihad. Although the willingness to participate in armed jihad does not necessarily lead to actual participation, these numbers show a relatively high support for the implementation of armed jihad in response to the current world political order (Sofjan, 2006).
Another survey conducted by R. Hassan (2008) showed a range of different attitudes of Muslims in predominantly Muslim countries towards the place of war in conflict resolution. In this survey more than 6300 Muslim respondents were asked the question: is war justified when other ways of settling international disputes fail? The agreement rates in response to this question in the Middle East and South Asian countries were higher (ranging from 58% in Iran, 63% in Egypt, to 66% in Turkey and Pakistan) than the rates for the respondents in South East Asian Muslim countries and Kazakhstan (ranging from 11% in Kazakhstan, 33% in Indonesia, to 37% in Malaysia) (R. Hassan, 2008). Both surveys indicate Muslims in different parts of the world express different attitudes towards armed jihad and war in the contemporary world order. Based on his study on the historical trajectory of the doctrine of jihad, Hassan concludes that ³The nature of the jihad doctrine and its expression has been profoundly shaped by historical and material conditions prevailing in Muslim societies´ (R. Hassan, 2008: 126).

Jihad in Indonesia
Historically, Islam in Indonesia has been widely regarded as a variant of moderate and tolerant Islam (See for instance Pringle, 2010;Feillard and Madinier, 2011). The arrival of Islam in Indonesia was generally described as a peaceful process through many generations of trade and the dissemination of Islamic mysticism by foreign Sufi leaders. However, the spread of Islam across the archipelago was not entirely a peaceful process, especially after the establishment of Islamic states in several parts of Indonesia. The wars between states in the early history of Indonesia were often influenced by religious causes apart from dynastic, strategic or economic ones (Ricklefs, 2008).

Armed jihad in the nineteenth century Indonesia
In the early history of Indonesia, the interpretation of jihad as a defensive armed struggle was promoted by resistance movements against the colonial occupation. Many Muslim fighters, who had participated in the war against the colonial occupation, including the leaders of Islamic kingdoms in Aceh, Java, Sulawesi and Moluccas, used the doctrine of jihad to mobilize people to fight against the colonialists. For instance, in the early 1820s the leaders of the Padri movement in WHVW 6XPDWUD GHFODUHG µMLKDG ¶ to mobilize their followers in the fight against the Dutch and the perceived corrupt local rulers (Ileto, 1994). Ileto (1994) argues that: ³The Padri war illustrates how a religious impulse from the outsidereform Islam-was able to radicalize existing tarekat (sufi order or brotherhood) and pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), thus transforming groups of teachers and pupils into LQVXUJHQW DUPLHV WKDW IRXJKW WKH µFRUUXSW ¶ Islam of the villages as well as the expanding colonial VWDWH´ ,OOHWR 210-211).
During the Java war against the Dutch in 1825-1830, Diponegoro, a Javanese Muslim hero and an iconic figure of Indonesian nationhood, used the term sabil as an abbreviation of the term jihad fi sabilillah (struggling in the way of God) to motivate his followers to fight against the Dutch (Anwar, 2011). In a research on Babad Diponegoro, a book written by Diponegoro, Anwar (2011) argues: ³'L GDODP %DEDG 'iponegoro, jihad dimaknai dengan perang melawan orang kafir yang telah melakukan penyerangan, pengusiran dan perampasan terhadap umat Islam. Jihad juga diartikan berperang melawan orang-orang Islam yang membantu orang kafir dalam memusuhi dan melakukan agresi terhadap umat Islam yang dianggap sebagai orang-orang yang telah keluar GDUL DJDPD PXUWDG ´ $QZDU ³[In Babad Diponegoro jihad is interpreted as war against non-believers who have attacked, displaced and robbed Muslims. Jihad is also interpreted as war against the apostates or Muslims who have helped the non-believers in the aggression against Muslims]. -1912). This doctrine was written in a literary work titled Hikayat Perang Sabil/Prang Sabi (Epic of the Holy War) which has been used to motivate the Acehnese fighters in the war against the Dutch (Ahmad, 2006). These historical studies suggest that in the early colonial occupation of Indonesia, the doctrine of jihad was used by Muslim leaders as a justification to motivate and to mobilize their followers in the fight against the colonial rulers and their supporters.

A Turn towards a Peaceful Jihad
During the era of established Dutch colonial rule, Islamic movements in Indonesia generally adopted accommodating attitudes towards the colonial authorities. This attitude was particularly shown by the traditionalist Nahdhatul Ulama (established in 1926) and the reformist counterparts such as Muhammadiyah (established in 1912), Al-Irsyad (established in 1913), and Persatuan Islam (established in 1923) (van Bruinessen, 2008). These organizations have focused on the dissemination of Islamic teaching through the establishment of various educational institutions and charitable activities. The Dutch agricultural policy during this period also played a significant role in the growth of Islamic culture, especially in East Java. The sugar cultivation areas developed by the Dutch colonial government gave rise to many pesantren (traditional Islamic boarding schools) which eventually became the institutional basis of traditionalist Islam (Pringle, 2010). The teaching of Islam in various Islamic educational institutions in this period was primarily focused on the understanding and the implementation of Islamic law and traditions in day-to-day life; as opposed to the political orientation of emerging contemporary Islamist groups in Indonesia. Arguably, as a consequence of this pacifist and accommodating attitude towards the Dutch, the discourse of armed jihad was not commonly found and employed in this period.
The emphasis on the pacifist interpretation of jihad can be found in the publication of an Indonesian Islamic party before Indonesian independence, Indonesian Sarekat Islam Party (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia--PSII). In a pamphlet signed by Kartosuwiryo in 1936, the author explained that ³WKH µpositive ¶ struggle is the jihad of the tongue and the heart (the jihad al-akbar led by imam), and not that of sword²the jihad al-asghar, defined instHDG DV QHJDWLYH DQG GHVWUXFWLYH´ (Formichi, 2012: 63). The thinking of Kartosuwiryo was dramatically changed in 1947, triggered by Indonesian politics after the Independence in 1945, when he called the ummat to undertake armed jihad against the colonialists and subsequently established the Darul Islam or the Indonesian Islamic State in 1949(Formichi, 2012. In other words, depending on political circumstances the doctrine of jihad might change. The adoption of the pacifist interpretation of the doctrine of jihad during twentieth century Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia shows a pragmatic approach of Muslim groups in Indonesia in response to colonial occupation and echoes the attitude of Muslims in India during the British colonial rule in the nineteenth century as discussed earlier in this article.

National armed jihad after Indonesian independence (1945-2000)
In the early years after Indonesian independence, mainstream Indonesian Muslims justified the fight against foreign troops as a defensive armed jihad to defend independence. In October 1945, hundreds of respected Muslim scholars from Nahdlatul Ulama declared the so-called Resolusi Jihad (Jihad Resolution) to motivate their followers to defend Indonesian independence (Solahudin, 2011 (Solahudin, 2011). During this struggle, the term perang sabil which had been used during the Java war (1825-1830) and the Aceh war  were adapted to the context of the renewed fight against the colonial power. For instance, in a study of the role of Kartosuwiryo, the founder of the Darul Islam (Indonesian Islamic State--NII), in the development of political Islam in Indonesia, Chiara Formichi quoted a statement of Kartosuwiryo that the term perang sabil can EH LQWHUSUHWHG DV µD ZDU IRU WKH defense of the sovereignty of the state, and the purity of religion, a war to fight any attempt to FRORQL]DWLRQ IURP DQ\ QDWLRQ LQ DQ\ ZD\ ¶ (Kartosuwiryo as cited in Formichi, 2012: 104).
In Indonesian history, local armed jihad was not only directed at the colonialists but also against the perceived un-Islamic government established after Indonesian independence. In August 1949, Kartosuwiryo proclaimed the Darul Islam, the first rebellion after Indonesian became independent. Before establishing the Darul Islam movement, Kartosuwiryo was a prominent member of the anti-colonial Sarekat Islam party (Formichi, 2012). Kartosuwiryo cited his disappointment with the early form of the Indonesian secular government and the result of the so-called Roem-van Royen Agreement between Indonesian government and the Dutch as justifications for starting the rebellion by proclaiming an Indonesian Islamic state (Darul Islam) (van Dijk, 1981). 3 The Darul Islam rebellion started in West Java and then spread to parts of Central Java, South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi and Aceh. Van Dijk argues that the Darul Islam movement ZDV µWKH UHVXOW RI D FRPELQDWLRQ RI FRQIOLFWV of interests and outlooks within the Armed Forces, resistance to an increasingly pervasive central authority, gradual changes in the agrarian structure, and Islamic views DQG LGHDOV ¶ YDQ 'LMN 9). The Islamic views of Kartosuwiryo were particularly influential in the establishment of Darul Islam in East Java. While van Dijk mainly frames the Darul Islam as a rebellion using Islam as the justification, Formichi argues that in the establishment of the Darul Islam, ,VODP ZDV QRW µMXVW D PHDQV IRU UDOO\LQJ popular support or as a rhetorical exercise for gaining legitimacy, but rather as the LGHRORJLFDO IRXQGDWLRQ RI .DUWRVXZLU\R ¶s DFWLYLWLHV ¶ )RUPLFKL 6). In addition to the basic constitution, the Darul Islam established a criminal law which contained the justification for an armed jihad against DQ\RQH ZKR GLVREH\HG WKH ,VODPLF VWDWH ¶V JRYHUQPHQW .DUWRVXZLU\R ¶V UHEHOOLRQ ZDV ended after his arrest and the defeat of his troops in 1962. He was sentenced to death and executed by the Indonesian military on one of the islands in the Thousand Islands (Pulau Seribu) off the coast of Jakarta in 6HSWHPEHU .DUWRVXZLU\R ¶V LGHD RI armed jihad or perang sabil through the establishment of Darul Islam was sustained by a small number of his followers in Tasikmalaya, West Java, but Darul Islam had never again became a serious threat to the Indonesian government (Solahudin, 2011 (Ricklefs, 2008). The former members of Darul Islam, who had surrendered and pledged loyalty to the Indonesian government, were mobilised by the Indonesian Intelligence Agency to support the fight against the members of Indonesian Communist Party (Solahudin, 2011).
Nahdhatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, the two biggest Muslim organisations in Indonesia, supported this fight by declaring a fatwa that the fight against communists was a legitimate jihad. Nahdlatul Ulama declared the jihad fatwa in its publication Duta Masyarakat and Muhammadiyah published the fatwa in its weekly magazine Suara Muhammadiyah, number 9 November 1965 (see Boland: 1982;Hefner, 2000 1982: 147). Therefore, during the resistance to communism, the doctrine of jihad was politicised by the Indonesian government and mainstream Muslim organisations to justify the eradication of communism and the killing of Indonesian Communist Party members.
After Kartosuwiryo was sentenced to death in 1962, his idea was sustained by his IROORZHUV LQ ¶V FODQGHVWLQH DUPHG MLKDG ¶V organizations commonly known as the Komando Jihad (the command of jihad) in Java and Sumatra and transformed into the Aceh Independent Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka-GAM) in Aceh. The Komando Jihad organisation was responsible for several armed robberies and several bombing actions mainly targeting Christian facilities in Sumatra (Solahudin, 2011). Many prominent members of the Komando Jihad were arrested and taken into custody in 1977. Several other prominent members continued to operate the Darul Islam as a clandestine organisation and recruited new followers. In the early 1980s the Darul Islam members strengthened their opposition to Soeharto and planned a revolution against the New Order government inspired by the revolution in Iran. The New Order government was seen by the remaining followers of Darul Islam as increasingly developing anti-Islamic policies especially by the declaration of Pancasila as the sole organizing principle (asas tunggal) for the states, political parties and mass organizations. The Islamic revolutionary plan which included the plan to assassinate Soeharto and bombing plans targeting Borobudur temple in Central Java and a temple in Bali, ended in failure (Solahudin, 2011). In the case of GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/Independence of Aceh movement), Islam was seen as an HOHPHQW RI $FHK ¶V QDWLRQDO LGHQWLW\ Therefore, the doctrine of jihad was used mainly to motivate individual fighters and not a central ideology of the organization. According to Aspinall (2009) The existence of Laskar Jihad generated special attention from many SHRSOH ZRUOGZLGH EHFDXVH RI WKH PRYHPHQW ¶V use of the internet to disseminate the information about the conflict from ).$:- ¶V SHUVSHFWLYH ).$:-PDLQWDLQHG D website www.Laskarjihad.or.id which provided daily updates from the conflict site (Brauchler, 2004).
As these examples show, the doctrine of jihad has been used by various Muslim groups in Indonesia from the early years of Indonesian independence to the early 2000s to justify fights against different types of perceived enemies. These perceived enemies include colonial troops, un-Islamic Indonesian government, the followers of the Indonesian Communist Party and also the perceived Christian rebellion in the Moluccas. These struggles were generally situated in the context of national struggles, where the grievances to be addressed were specifically Indonesian issues. This changed under the influence of the transnational Salafi Jihadi movement in the early 2000s.

The Influence of SaODIL -LKDGL ¶V Transnational Jihad
From the beginning of this century, a more transnational outlook has been imported in to Indonesia. The Salafi Jihadi movement gained momentum in Afghanistan from the early 1980s. This ideology is developed as a combination of the ideology of Ikhwanul Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) introduced by Sayyid Qutb in (J\SW DQG $EXO $ ¶OD $O-Maududi in Pakistan, and the Salafi ideology that drew upon the ideas presented by Ibn Taimiyya and Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab (As-Suri, 2009). The development and the expansion of Salafi Jihadism were supported by the arrival of mujahid (holy fighters) from many parts of the world such as in Pakistan and Afghanistan to fight against the invasion of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The ideology of Salafi Jihadism was brought to Indonesia by some prominent members of Darul Islam who went to Afghanistan during their exile in Malaysia, such as Abdullah 6XQJNDU $EX %DNDU %D ¶V\LU DQG $EX 5XVGDQ After returning from Malaysia they rebelled from Darul Islam and established a new organisation known as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) (Solahudin, 2011). Salafi Jihadi groups are regarded as a rebel group or Kharijite 5 by the dominant Salafi movement in Indonesia, because the mainstream Salafi movement focuses on moral and ritual issues rather than political issues. The mainstream Salafi movement also disagrees with MLKDGLV ¶ tendency to delegitimize the governments which are regarded as un-Islamic, including the Indonesian government (International Crisis Group, 2004 Ghufron stated explicitly in one of his books that the only MDPD ¶DK (Islamic group) which has been guaranteed freedom from hell is Al-MDPD ¶DK $O-jihadiyah As-salafiyah (the Salafi Jihadi group). The publication of these books and other books with similar themes indicates a trend toward radical jihad becoming increasingly acceptable as part of public discourse and in quantitative terms more prominent in Indonesian Islamic publications in the period of 1999-2009 (Zada, 2011).
The ideological position of these books is further supported by the establishment of many websites which are dedicated to promote the perspective of jihad as fundamentally an armed struggle. Many of these websites are anonymous but some have clear ownership and authorship such as Arrahmah (arrahmah.com) and Voice of Al-Islam (voa-islam.com). Both of these websites identify themselves as Islamic online news services and have created a special section on jihad and promote jihad as primarily an armed struggle.
Indonesian Salafi Jihadi groups replicate the ideas of transnational Salafi Jihadis. According to Solahudin (2011), there are several characteristics of 6DODIL -LKDGL ¶V doctrine that are different from the mainstream Salafi movement. First, Salafi Jihadis hold the opinion that there is no other legitimate meaning of jihad except war or physical struggle. The followers of this movement reject the interpretation that the greater jihad is a struggle against oneself. According to Abu Muhammad Jibriel, a prominent Salafi Jihadi leader, the hadith which distinguishes the greater and the lesser jihad is a false hadith and therefore could not be used as a reference. He further asserts that the greater jihad is not the struggle against desire but fighting against non-believers who have fought Muslims (Jibriel, 2009). Second, Salafi Jihadis regard jihad in the form of armed struggle as a IDUGKX µDLQ (an individual obligation) for all Muslims today and terrorizing enemies is allowed in jihad. A specific example can be found in the book written by Imam Samudra, one of the masterminds of the first Bali Bombing, as the justification for his participation in the first Bali bombing in 2002. He wrote confidently in his book that the obligation to participate in armed jihad has become an individual responsibility for Muslims all over the world and his action was a manifestation of jihad fi sabilillah (struggle in the way of God) (Samudra, as cited in MH Hassan, 2006). Another mastermind of the Bali bombing, Ali Ghufron, contends that armed jihad has become obligatory because many Muslim countries are occupied by non-believers; many Muslim authorities have became apostates because they have rejected the implementation of Islamic law; the Islamic caliphate has disappeared; and the jails in many places are full of Muslim fighters (Ghufron, 2009). This distinct perspective on jihad is strongly influenced by the thinking of Abdullah Azzam the mentor of the leader of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden. In his book Signs of ar-Rahman in the jihad of Afghan, he argues: ³If the citizens of the Islamic state are unable to repel the enemy, or due to some reasons do not engage in the Jihaad (sic), the duty then devolves on all those Muslims who are closest to the Muslims under attack. The Jihaad (sic) becomes Fardh-e-Ain (an individual obligation) upon them´ (Azzam, n.d.: 60).
In addition, Salafi Jihadis also believe that political sovereignty is in the hand of God, therefore there is no accepted social and political regulation except Islamic law (Solahudin, 2011).
With regard to the position of jihad in Islamic piety, Salafi Jihadi consider armed jihad as the best form of Islamic pieties. The prioritizeation of armed jihad above other forms of Islamic pieties is a common feature of global Salafi Jihadism. This interpretation is particularly influenced by the thinking of a classic Islamic scholar Imam Ibn Nuhas, an Islamic scholar who died during the war against the Roman army in the year 814 Hijri in Egypt. In a book entitled Mashari alashwaq ila masari al-ushaq ¶ Zhich was used as part of the syllabus of study for the members of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during the 1940s, Nuhas strongly argues in that book that armed struggle jihad µLV WKH JUHDWHVW GHHG RI DOO ¶ DQG µmujahid (the fighter) is the greatest of all peoSOH ¶ 1XKDV n.d: 29). Several prominent Salafi Jihadi in Indonesia echo this opinion. For instance, Ali Ghufron, in one of his books, states that jihad is the most preferred deed by the prophet Muhammad, his companions and WKRVH ZKR IROORZ WKH SURSKHW ¶V Fompanions (Ghufron, 2009). Abu Muhammad Jibriel, a prominent leader of Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia-MMI), also holds a similar opinion, he contends ³«MLKDG PHUXSDNDQ DPDODQ PXOLD dan paling tinggi derajatnya berbanding dengan amalan-amalan lain, bahkan jihad fie sabilillah merupakan satusatunya amal shalih yang menjadi benteng dan penyelamat seluruh ajaran Islam, dan kedudukannya tidak bisa GLJDQWLNDQ GHQJDQ DPDODQ \DQJ ODLQ ´ (Jibriel, 2009: 7) [«jihad is a noble deed and it has positioned in the highest degree compared to other deeds. Jihad is the only piety which has become the defense and the salvation of all Islamic teachings and its position could not be replaced by other deeds].
Despite their similar interpretation of jihad, there are also rivalries among Salafi Jihadi groups in Indonesia. After the collapse of Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Bakar %D ¶DV\LU DQG KLV IROORZHUV IRXQGHG WKH Indonesian Mujahidin Council in 2000.

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$EX %DNDU %D ¶DV\ir resigned from MMI because of a dispute over the RUJDQL]DWLRQ ¶V leadership structure and established a new organization named Jamah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) (International Crisis Group, 2010). Abu %DNDU %D ¶DV\LU GHFODUHG -$7 DV D QRQviolence organization, but not long after its establishment, several members of JAT were arrested and accused for their involvement in terrorist actions and an illegal military training in Aceh 2010 (International Crisis Group, 2012). Another split occurred after the declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq DQG 6\ULD LQ $EX %DNDU %D ¶DV\LU decided to pledge loyalty to the Islamic State, but many prominent members of JAT opposed this decision and established a new organization named Jamaah Ansharusy Syariah (JAS) in August 2014 (Arrahmah, 11 August 2014).
It is difficult to identify the precise vehicles by which the ideology of Salafi Jihadism first spread in Indonesia. The activities of Salafi Jihadi groups are mostly conducted underground. In the early 2010, a training camp which was established by an alliance of major Jihadi groups in Indonesia was found in Aceh and approximately 200 members were arrested by Indonesian authorities. In addition to this training camp, other smaller activities were noticeable in Medan (North Sumatra), Poso (Central Sulawesi), Solo (Central Java), Bima (West Nusa Tenggara), and parts of East Kalimantan (International Crisis Group, 2012).

Contextual jihad in the Contemporary Indonesia
Despite the use of jihad to justify militaristic struggle, there is still a moderate majority who considered jihad to be a SHDFHIXO VWUXJJOH 9DQ %UXLQHVVHQ ¶V UHVHDUFK shows that only a very small number of pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) in Indonesia have a connection with Islamic political oriented organizations such as the transnational Islamic Brotherhood or the local Darul Islam movement (van Bruinessen, 2008). In his research on pesantren in Indonesia, Lukens-Bull (2005) suggests that the mainstream pesantren in Indonesia tend to develop a distinct identity RI µ,VODPLF PRGHUQLW\ ¶ E\ emphasizing the WHDFKLQJ RI µSHDFHIXO MLKDG ¶ within their education system (Lukens-Bull, 2005: 129). The interpretation of jihad as necessarily an armed struggle against non-believers is rejected by the mainstream Muslim organizations in the twenty-first century Indonesian context especially the statesponsored Indonesian Ulema Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia-MUI) and the two biggest non-government organizations Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama. They argue that jihad can take place through non-violent struggle for the development of Islamic communities. In a fatwa in 2004, the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), the official Muslim clerical body in Indonesia, contends that jihad can be interpreted in two different forms; namely jihad as a struggle to fight and defend Islam from the aggression of the enemies and jihad as any serious and sustainable endeavor to protect and uphold the religion of Allah (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2004 This jihad can be categorized as the small jihad. Secondly, spiritual jihad, namely the war against desire such as purifying the heart from the doubt of the God, arrogance, jealousy, despotism, vanity and so on. This jihad can be categorized as the great jihad. Thirdly, the biggest jihad (the biggest struggle or the ultimate jihad), is the combination of physical and spiritual struggle such as teaching, building Islamic schools and prayer facilities and so on].´ 1DKGODWXO 8ODPD ¶V opinion is also strengthened by the statement of several individual prominent leaders of Nahdhatul Ulama such as Said Agil Siradj, the general chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama and Salahudin Wahid (the younger brother of the former general chairman of Nahdhatul Ulama and former Indonesian president from 1999 to 2001, Abdurrahman Wahid). In a meeting with Indonesian Muslim farmers, Siradj stated that Muslims should perform the correct jihad by improving economic conditions, improving the quality of life and GHIHQGLQJ WKH QDWLRQ ¶V VHFXULW\ $FFRUGing to him, this contextual interpretation will help Muslims in Indonesia to gain a prosperous life (NU Online, 2010). In addition, Salahudin Wahid argues that the biggest jihad in the context of the Indonesian nation state is to fight against corruption and injustice (NU Online, 2013).
According to the mainstream moderate groups, the term perjuangan (struggle) is regarded as the most appropriate translation of the term jihad in Indonesian language. The term perjuangan in Indonesian language can be used more broadly and includes any kind of physical, intellectual or spiritual struggle. The struggle can be understood as war or battle if the term qital (fight) or harb (war) is specifically used in WKH 4XU ¶DQ RU hadith (prophetic traditions). The use of the term perjuangan can cover a broader meaning according to the social condition and the capabilities of Muslims in a particular time. The adaptation of the meaning of jihad with the social condition is a process of contextualization and not a process of constriction of the doctrine of jihad (Romli and Sjadzili, 2004 has also supported the interpretation of jihad in a more general meaning. In the online version of the newspaper (www.republika.co.id), Republika has also published news items and opinions articulating the broad meaning of jihad.

Conclusion
Jihad has been a contested doctrine across the Muslim world and through most periods of history. Arguably, the term jihad--ZKLFK LQ 4XU ¶an has a general meaning related to any exertion of strength--has been used by Muslim leaders to justify wars and interpreted by classical Muslim jurists as a doctrine of war and peace. On the other hand, the non-violent interpretation of jihad has also been promoted by moderate Muslim scholars to justify less antagonistic attitude towards colonial rulers during the colonial period and maintaining a peaceful relationship with un-Islamic authorities and non-Muslims in general. This pacifist interpretation has also been promoted by contemporary moderate Muslims to denounce the use of jihad as the justification for many recent terrorist actions.
A similar pattern to the global trajectory of the interpretation of jihad can also be found in Indonesia. Islam arrived in Indonesia through a peaceful process, therefore the doctrine of armed jihad was largely absent in the early Islamization of Indonesia. However, since the establishment of Islamic states/kingdoms in several parts of Indonesia, the doctrine of armed jihad started to be used to justify the wars between the states and the fight against colonialists. Since the nineteenth century, mainstream Islamic movements in Indonesia have started to build an accommodating relationship with the colonial rulers. This moderate approach emphasized the pacifist interpretation of jihad and this interpretation has become a dominant attitude of the majority of Muslims in Indonesia.
The militaristic jihad tradition is generally a minority tradition in Indonesia. However, the idea has secured substantial following in particular periods of Indonesian history. In the early years of Indonesian independence, the doctrine of militaristic jihad was used by Islamic organizations to motivate Indonesian Muslims in the fight to defend independence and this justification was repeated in the fight against Indonesian communists in 1965Indonesian communists in --1966 5. How to present picture, graph, photo, and diagram a. Picture, graph, figure, photo and diagram should be placed at the center b. Number and title should be typed above the picture, graph, figure, photo and diagram. c. Number and the word of the picture, graph, figure, photo and diagram should be typed in bold, 12pt Font Georgia and at the center, while title of them should be typed in normal (not bold). d. Number of the picture, graph, figure, photo and diagram should use an Arabic word (1, 2, 3 and so forth). e. Source of the picture, graph, figure, photo and diagram should be typed below the table, align text to the left, 10pt font Georgia. f. Picture, graph, figure, photo, and diagram should not be in colorful type (should be in white and black, or gray).
Example: Figure 1 Indonesian employment in agriculture compared to others sectors (% of the total employment) Source: World Development Indicator, 2005 6. Research findings This part consists of the research findings, including description of the collected data, analysis of the data, and interpretation of the data using the relevant theory

Referencing system
Analisa uses the British Standard Harvard Style for referencing system.

a. Citations (In-text)
Analisa uses in note system (intext citation) referring to the British Standard Harvard Style referencing system; format (last name of the author/s, year of publication: page number).
-&LWLQJ VRPHRQH HOVH ¶V LGHDV Example: Culture is not only associated with the description of certain label of the people or community, certain behavior and definite characteristics of the people but also it includes norm and tradition (Afruch and Black, 2001: 7) Afruch and Black (2001) explains that culture is not only associated with the description of certain label of the people or community, certain behaviour and definite characteristics of the people but also it includes norm and tradition.
-Citations; quotation from a book, or journal article Quotations are the actual words of an author and should be in speech marks. You should include a page number. Example:

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DUJXHV WKDW ³,VODPLVP is not about violence but as the order RI WKH ZRUOG ´ ,W KDV EHHQ VXJJHVWHG WKDW ³,VODPLVP is not about violence but as the order RI WKH ZRUOG´ 7LEL -Citations -Paraphrasing a book or journal article Paraphrasing is when we use someone else ideas/works and write them in our own words. This can be done two ways, either is correct. Example: Batley (2013) argues that some of the detainees in the bombing cases were members of JI.
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-Citing a source within a source (secondary citation) Citing the source within a source, it should be mentioned both sources in the text. But, in the reference list, you should only mention the source you actually read. Example: Tibi (2012, cited in Benneth, 2014 argues that Islamism is not about violence but as the order of the world. It has been suggested that Islamism is not about violence but as the order of the world (Tibi, 2012as cited in Benneth, 2014).
-Citing several authors who have made similar points in different texts In text citations with more than one source, use a semi colon to separate the authors. Example: Understanding the cultural differences is an important element for mediation process (John, 2006: 248-289;Kevin and George, 2006: 153-154;Kriesberg, 2001: 375;Alaeda, 2001: 7).
-Citations -Government bodies or organizations If you reference an organization or government body such as WHO, the Departments for Education or Health, the first time you mention the organization give their name in full with the abbreviation in brackets, from then on you can abbreviate the name. Example : The World Health Organization (WHO VXJJHVWV WKDW«